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Preface 
This work has come about through the contribution of many individuals and many events. 
I came to Christchurch, a few days before the 4 September 2010 earthquake, with a general idea 
of what my research would be. That changed on 4th September 2010 at 4:35am when greater 
Christchurch had the first in a series of earthquakes of MW 7.1. From a research perspective, the 
earthquakes brought about an invaluable research environment. However, for greater 
Christchurch, it was a sad moment. 
In Christchurch I have seen the power that nature holds and that nature can wield. As I write 
this, it feels good to know that whatever the setbacks, Christchurch is on the way to recovering. 
Cantabrians, whatever the circumstances they have lived through and because of that experience, 
are determined to define for themselves who they are and who they should be.
iv Preface 
 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
There are so many others who have contributed in so many ways to the completion of this 
thesis. Thank you. 
To my supervisors: Dr. Erica Seville, Associate Professor John Vargo and Professor David 
Elms. This thesis has involved the combination of many facets and each of you has provided a 
significant and unique contribution which I am greatly indebted for. As well as your guidance in 
the technical aspects of this research, you also have had a positive impact in my personal 
development for which I am further grateful to you all. 
Thank you to the other of the 3 PhDs, what a journey. 
Thanks to Drs. Tom Wilson, Barry Newell, Margaret Rossiter and Derek Roger for their 
invaluable comments on some of my thoughts. 
To all my friends scattered across the globe; thank you for putting up with my ramblings and for 
keeping me sane.  
Many thanks to all the people who allowed me to interview them while they were in the midst of 
sorting through the chaos after the earthquakes. Thanks also to all the organisations and 
interviewees without whom it would not have been possible to come to these conclusions. 
Without their cooperation and help this research would not have been. 
To my family for putting up with my being in places that made you lose sleep at night: naonga. 
To mum who made me believe that I could scale any heights and whose advice is even more 
useful today, I know you would have been so proud of me. 
vi Acknowledgements 
 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
vii 
 
Abstract 
The Canterbury region of New Zealand experienced four earthquakes greater than MW 6.0 
between September 2010 and December 2011. This study employs system dynamics as well as 
hazard, recovery and organisational literature and brings together data collected via surveys, case 
studies and interviews with organisations affected by the earthquakes. This is to show how 
systemic interactions and interdependencies within and between industry and geographic sectors 
affect their recovery post-disaster. The industry sectors in the study are: construction for its role in 
the rebuild, information and communication technology which is a regional high-growth industry, 
trucking for logistics, critical infrastructure, fast moving consumer goods (e.g. supermarkets) and hospitality 
to track recovery through non-discretionary and discretionary spend respectively. Also in the 
study are three urban centres including the region’s largest Central Business District, which has 
been inaccessible since the earthquake of 22 February 2011 to the time of writing in February 
2013. 
This work also highlights how earthquake effects propagated between sectors and how sectors 
collaborated to mitigate difficulties such as product demand instability. Other interacting factors 
are identified that influence the recovery trajectories of the different industry sectors. These are 
resource availability, insurance payments, aid from central government, and timely and quality 
recovery information. 
This work demonstrates that in recovering from disaster it is crucial for organisations to identify 
what interacting factors could affect their operations. Also of importance are efforts to reduce 
the organisation’s vulnerability and increase their resilience to future crises and in day-to-day 
operations. 
Lastly, the multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the recovery and resilience of 
organisations and industry sectors after disaster, leads to a better understanding of effects as well 
as more effective recovery policy.  
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Abbreviations 
BRT (BRT-53) – Benchmark Resilience Tool (complete version) 
BRT-13 - Benchmark Resilience Tool (short version) 
CAS – Complex Adaptive Systems 
CBD – Central Business District 
CCC – Christchurch City Council 
CCDU – Central City Development Unit 
CERA – Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
CDEM – Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
CLD – Causal Loop Diagram 
CREDS – Canterbury Regional Economic Development Strategy 
ECan – Environment Canterbury 
EQC – Earthquake Commission 
FMCG – Fast Moving Consumer Goods 
ICT – Information and Communication Technology 
MCDEM – Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
MMI – Modified Mercalli Intensity (depicting severity of shaking in an earthquake) 
MW – Moment Magnitude (measuring the amount of energy released by an earthquake) 
REAG – Resilience Expert Advisory Group 
RRC – Recovery Rate Coefficient 
SD – System Dynamics 
TISN – Trusted Information Sharing Network 
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Definitions used in this thesis 
Business-as-usual – organisational and sectoral conditions pre-earthquakes 
Contextual interviews – interviews with industry and business leaders, recovery agency 
representatives to establish the background and context in which organisational and sectoral 
recovery was taking place after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 – 2011 
Effective - the intended and actual outcomes are the same 
Failure - when a system component does not fulfil its intended purpose in a certain timeframe 
(Leveson, 1986, p. 128) 
Industry sector (sector) - a group of  organisations that operate in the same segment of  the 
economy or share a similar business type are characterised as making up an industry sector 
Organisation - collections of people joining together in some formal association in order to 
achieve group or individual objectives (Dawson, 1992, p. xviii). Organisations in this study 
include for-profits, not-for-profits and government departments. Organisation and business will 
be used interchangeably in this thesis 
Organisational crisis - threat to the organization's reputation and viability (Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993, p. 49) 
Organisational crisis management - the efforts by an organisation and external parties to 
prevent crises or to manage effectively crises that arise 
Organisational or sectoral recovery - when an organisation or sector can function and sustain 
itself  (continually) in its new post-disaster environment 
Organisational resilience - the ability to survive crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty 
Seville et al (2008, p. 18) 
Risk - the effect of  uncertainty on objectives - positive and/or negative (AS/NZS ISO 
31000:2009, p. 1) 
x Abbreviations 
 
Societal crisis - a serious disruption of  the functioning of  a community or a society involving 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the 
ability of  the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 2009a, 
p. n. pag) 
Supply web – a supply chain implies a linear relationship between a focal organisation, 
suppliers, customers and infrastructure used to manufacture/produce and deliver goods and 
services. From a system dynamics point of view, the interactions between these system actors is 
non-linear, hence the idea of the supply web. 
System - an assemblage or combination of  things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole 
(R. A. Johnson, Kast, & Rosenzweig, 1964, p. 367) 
System delays and environmental time delays - a system delay is caused by a lag in the effect 
of  one system element on another. In the time horizon for this thesis, the system delays are not 
yet evident. Environmental time delays are those in the system’s environment that have an effect 
on the system. 
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1 Introduction 
This study, using a system dynamics point of view, aims to close a gap in the disaster literature 
by investigating the recovery of industry and geographic sectors after the Canterbury series of 
earthquakes. A system is defined as an assemblage or combination of  things or parts forming a complex or 
unitary whole (R. A. Johnson et al., 1964). This means that industry sectors are systems within larger 
systems. Additionally, every system is defined for a purpose and is influenced by and influences 
its environment. The system dynamics approach makes use of qualitative and quantitative 
information in the generation of frameworks or models for the analysis of  complex situations 
involving multiple agents. In this thesis, the use of system dynamics is advantageous because of 
the myriad interactions between the sectors and their environments and employs a holistic rather 
than reductionist approach.  
In the last few years, not only has the trend of disasters increased, but the costs of these disasters 
have also been substantial. Natural disasters occur because of the interaction between humans 
and the environment (Dynes, 1974; Godschalk, 2003). New Zealand serves as an example of this 
interaction as a large majority of the population and the organisations based in the country are 
exposed to numerous natural hazards. On 4 September 2010, Canterbury in New Zealand 
experienced a MW 7.1 earthquake. This was followed by three earthquakes greater than MW 6.0. 
One of these was the 22 February 2011 earthquake which was more destructive in the 
widespread damage it caused, including the loss of 185 lives. Eighteen months after the 22 
February 2011 earthquake, large parts of the Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, 
New Zealand’s second largest city, remained cordoned off1. Organisations and industry sectors 
in the region are therefore faced with a complex, ever changing recovery scenario. 
1.1 Canterbury and Christchurch 
Christchurch is officially the oldest city in New Zealand. It is located on the east coast of New 
Zealand’s South Island in the region of Canterbury. The essence of Christchurch is that it is the 
hub of the South Island of New Zealand (Korsching & Allen, 2004). At the time of the 4 
                                                     
1 Progress for the gradual reduction of the cordon can be found at http://cera.govt.nz/maps/cordon-reduction, accessed 15 June 
2012. 
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September 2010 earthquake, greater Christchurch’s 2  population was approximately 400,000 
people. 
The Canterbury region is a significant part of the New Zealand economy (Canterbury Economic 
Development Co. Ltd., 2009). Half of all South Island businesses, accounting for 53 per cent of 
South Island employees, are located in Canterbury (Statistics New Zealand, 2011a). The 
geography of New Zealand’s two main islands makes it prudent for many organisations to have 
a main base on each island. One of the major reasons for this is the cost of transporting goods 
between the two islands. Consequently, Christchurch’s geographic position and its port facilities 
(air and sea) make it attractive to organisations. Its setting close to natural attractions such as 
mountains and the sea also makes it ideal for settlement. 
1.2 Brief history of seismic risk and activity in New Zealand  
New Zealand is located on the Pacific Ring of Fire; this is an extensive belt of volcanic and 
earthquake activity. This causes approximately 2500 earthquakes a year in and around New 
Zealand, most of which are too small to be felt. 
“New Zealand is on the boundary between two [tectonic] plates; the Australian Plate and the Pacific 
Plate. These plates are constantly grinding into each other, which causes stresses to build up in the brittle, 
upper layers of the plates. When the brittle rock finally breaks, it generates an earthquake” (Geonet, 
2010). 
Aside from ground motion, earthquakes can also cause the generation of tsunamis as well as 
liquefaction3. Since the European settlement of New Zealand, the largest earthquake on record 
was of MW 8.2 on 23 January 1855 near the Wairarapa plains of the North Island. However, on 1 
                                                     
2 Greater Christchurch has been defined by ‘drawing a line around Christchurch City that takes in the communities within the 
'commuter belt' (approximately half an hour drive from the Central City) in Selwyn and Waimakariri Districts. Greater 
Christchurch therefore includes the urban area of Christchurch City and Lyttelton harbour, the area of Selwyn District north of 
the Selwyn River and east of Kirwee (including the towns of Prebbleton, Lincoln, Rolleston and West Melton), and Waimakariri 
District south of the Ashley River and east of Swannanoa (including the towns of Rangiora, Waikuku, Woodend/Pegasus and 
Kaiapoi)’ (The Greater Christchurch Urban Development Strategy, 2012) 
3 Liquefaction is defined as the transformation of a granular material from a solid to a liquefied state as a consequence of 
increased pore-water pressure and reduced effective stress (Laplante, 2007). The loss of effective confining stress within the soil 
results in an associated loss of strength and stiffness that contributes to deformations of the soil deposit (Goldratt & Cox, 1989). 
Cubrinovski et al (2002)note that it can occur during earthquakes. 
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September 1888, an earthquake with an estimated MW 7.0–7.3 struck the Amuri district of North 
Canterbury, approximately 100 kilometres north-west of Christchurch. This earthquake caused 
damage to buildings over a wide area, including in Christchurch. Another destructive earthquake, 
MW 7.8, struck on New Zealand’s North Island near Hawke's Bay on 3 February 1931 and 
affected the towns of Napier and Hastings. The Hawke’s Bay earthquake was New Zealand’s 
deadliest with the loss of at least 256 lives (Khatri & D'Netto, 1995). It should be noted that 
New Zealand has experienced many large earthquakes, only some are mentioned here. 
1.3 The Canterbury series of earthquakes 
Historically Christchurch was thought to have a moderate seismic risk and the faults that caused 
the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes were previously unknown (Beavan, 
Fielding, Motagh, Samsonov, & Donnelly, 2011). However, that the 2010 – 2011 earthquakes 
occurred and caused such damage and disruption shows that organisations should have plans 
that encompass an extensive range of hazards. 
1.3.1 4 September 2010 earthquake 
The 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake was a MW 7.1 which struck the South Island of New 
Zealand at 4:35 am on 4 September 2010 local time. The earthquake caused widespread damage 
and several power outages. Mass fatalities were avoided partly due to the earthquake occurring 
during the night when most people were asleep. The earthquake's epicentre was 40 kilometres 
west of Christchurch, near the town of Darfield. The initial shaking lasted approximately 
40 seconds, and was felt widely across the South Island. Initial claims after the earthquake, for 
damage to residential land, buildings and contents, were estimated to be between NZD 2.75 and 
3.5 billion (Earthquake Commission, 2011). 
1.3.2 22 February 2011 earthquake 
The 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, nearly six months after the MW 7.1 earthquake 
of 4 September 2010, severely damaged Christchurch and caused the deaths of 185 people. The 
MW 6.3 earthquake
 struck the Canterbury region at 12:51 pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The 
earthquake was centred approximately 5 kilometres west of the town of Lyttelton and 10 
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kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch. The February earthquake had some of the 
largest vertical peak ground acceleration (PGA) values ever recorded  (Bradley, 2012). 
The damage caused by the 22 February earthquake was especially pronounced in the 
Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) and the city’s eastern suburbs. Some of the 
damage was exacerbated by buildings and infrastructure already being weakened by the 4 
September 2010 earthquake and aftershocks. The total cost to insurers of rebuilding was 
estimated at NZD 20–30 billion, making it by far New Zealand's costliest natural disaster, and 
one of the costliest worldwide in 2011 (Swiss Re, 2011). A representative from the Canterbury 
Employers’ Chamber of Commerce (CECC) pointed out that these estimated figures will likely 
rise as the scale of the earthquakes and effects become clearer (P. Townsend, personal 
communication, October 19 2011). 
1.3.3 13 June 2011 earthquakes 
On 13 June 2011 two more earthquakes, measuring MW 5.6 and MW 6.3, occurred in the greater 
Christchurch area. The earthquakes were centred approximately 10 kilometres from 
Christchurch. They produced severe shaking in and around the city of Christchurch, destroying 
buildings and causing additional damage to some of the structures affected by previous 
earthquakes. Rebuilding costs in Christchurch increased by NZD 6 billion owing to the 
additional damage from the 13 June earthquakes (Earthquake Commission, 2011). As at October 
2012, the earthquakes in Canterbury are ongoing. 
1.4 The disaster management cycle 
The disaster management cycle comprises four main phases: reduction, readiness, response and 
recovery (O'Brien, O'Keefe, Gadema, & Swords, 2010). According to the United Nations Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR, (2009b), there are two main phases after disaster: (1) 
response and (2) recovery. Response is immediate, involves rescue and also the restoration of 
essential services. Recovery is the phase in which the immediate needs of the affected 
community have been met and is the stage where the affected community seeks to return to 
what is normal. Consequently, recovery involves compressing decades of development into a few years while 
reducing future risks (Levers & Bhatia, 2011, p. 5). However, as Smith and Wenger (2007) also 
write, it is difficult to pinpoint when response ends and recovery begins as some activities 
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overlap in the two phases. The New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) (2000) defines three aspects in the timeline for recovery after disaster: 
short-term (1-2 years), medium-term (2-4 years) and long-term (5 or more years). For the 
purposes of this thesis, the primary periods of scrutiny have been defined as: 
 response; and 
 short-term recovery. 
There are two principal reasons for this. The first is that data were collected within the two year 
post-disaster window defined by MCDEM as short-term recovery. The second reason is that 
with each aftershock in Canterbury the response clock was reset and transition to recovery was 
made difficult.  
1.5 Sectoral and organisational disaster resilience and recovery 
In the disaster literature, there have been some studies done on the resilience and recovery of 
individual organisations4 post-disaster. Other studies had documented the effects of disaster at 
the aggregated level of regions or nations. In addition, the effects of disaster are usually reported 
as damage or loss to the built environment. However, assessment of losses should also 
encompass those brought about by indirect means such as business interruption or loss of 
custom. Words such as rebuild, restore and repair have all been used in the discussion on recovery 
from disaster. However, the use of these words serves to simplify this often difficult, complex 
and drawn out task. Also, these words may disguise the realisation that after disaster, there may 
be irrevocable change (tangible and intangible) and that there is no return to what was. 
Industry and geographic sectors5 are the building blocks of any economy and are themselves 
made up of organisations. Furthermore, most national and regional economic plans are reported 
at the sectoral level and investment decisions are arrived at after analysis of sectoral trends. 
However, few disaster studies have focused specifically on the recovery of multiple industry and 
                                                     
4 Organisations in this study include for-profits, not-for-profits and government departments. Organisation and business will be 
used interchangeably in this thesis. 
5 In this thesis, a group of organisations that operate in the same segment of the economy or share a similar business type are 
characterised as making up an industry sector. Sector and industry sector will be used interchangeably. 
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geographic sectors post-disaster: how they are affected and how they recover. The consequences 
of a disaster event to organisations are often complex, the causes difficult to unravel and effects 
can be long-lasting. As a result of the myriad interacting components, the effects of disaster are 
different for different industry sectors. 
In relation to the Canterbury earthquakes, some of the questions that will be addressed in this 
thesis include: how are sectors affected by disaster?; how do sectors interact with each other in 
disaster?; what elements determine the degree of impact?; how long before organisations and 
sectors return to pre-disaster levels of performance?; and what are some measures that mitigated 
the effects of the earthquakes?  
1.6 The Resilient Organisations research programme 
The Resilient Organisations research programme aims to improve the resilience of New Zealand 
organisations to major hazard events. According to Resilient Organisations (2011), some of its 
strategic objectives include: 
 To better understand the nature of resilience within individual organisations and across 
sectors, and to communicate solutions for improving resilience 
 To develop tools and techniques that are easy to use for organisations to actively engage 
with the concept of resilience and to identify ways that they can improve their resilience 
 To build up a suite of case study examples of different resilience strategies that 
demonstrates how they can be employed at organisational, sectoral and community 
levels. 
 To continue undertaking longitudinal studies of the organisational aspects of post-
disaster reconstruction and recovery to develop a significant body of knowledge in this 
area. 
 To continue to develop the business case for greater resilience by undertaking 
longitudinal studies exploring the linkages between resilience for crises with 
organisational performance.  
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The contributions resulting from this PhD will be to all of the strategic objectives listed and in 
particular: will investigate how and what disaster resilience strategies can be used at the 
organisation and the sector level; will chart recovery and reconstruction efforts after disaster and 
will enhance the already existing Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) (Resilient Organisations, 
2010a). 
1.7 Thesis arrangement 
The emphasis in this work is on the system dynamics of organisational and sectoral recovery 
after the earthquakes in Canterbury. This thesis has 11 chapters that can be loosely broken down 
into three segments. The first segment (chapters 1 – 3) lays the foundation for this work, 
analyses the existing literature on organisations, crisis management and disasters and details the 
methods used for data capture and analysis. Segment 2 (chapters 4 - 6) presents the results from 
the data collection. These qualitative and quantitative results are then used in segment three 
(chapters 7 - 11) of the thesis where some statistical and system dynamics analysis is employed to 
investigate the key elements that affected the recovery of organisations and sectors in 
Canterbury after the 2010 - 2011 earthquakes. The contents of each chapter are detailed below. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter puts forward the reasons for the necessity of this body of work. It also outlines the 
context of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 – Literature review 
This section contains an exploration of the relevant literature that forms part of the discussion 
on organisational and sectoral recovery and resilience after disaster. This includes the literature 
on organisational crisis management and recovery, disaster recovery, system dynamics and 
disaster resilience. 
Chapter 3 – Research methods and design 
In chapter 3, the structure of the study is outlined. The plan for data collection and analysis is 
also presented. The justification for the methods employed in this study, how they are used 
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together and the sampling technique are explained. As well, the sample used in the study is 
introduced. 
Chapter 4 – Contextual interviews 
This chapter contains information from contextual interviews with industry representatives, 
business leaders and experts from recovery agencies. It contextualises and gives more detail of 
the sectors in the study as well as forming part of the background for the work that is presented 
in the later analysis chapters. 
Chapter 5 – Surveys 
Here results from the surveys deployed in the course of the research are outlined along with an 
interpretation for each set of results. The survey results are presented in two parts; the first part 
has the impact data and the second part has organisational resilience data. A comparison of the 
results from all three surveys is also done in this chapter. 
Chapter 6 – Case studies 
Chapter 6 has material from case study organisations that are a subset of the larger sample 
group. The case studies allow for a first-hand account from earthquake affected organisations 
and provide in-depth knowledge that adds to and complements the survey results in Chapter 5 
and the contextual interviews in chapter 4.  
Chapter 7 – Significant contributors to organisational and sectoral short-term recovery 
In this chapter are discussed the major contributors to the recovery of organisations and sectors 
after the Canterbury earthquakes; considering the timeframe of data collection specifically the 
short-term recovery of organisations and sectors. The qualitative data from chapters 4 and 6 as 
well as the quantitative data from chapter 5 are first brought together in this chapter and used to 
determine the main contributors and signifiers to organisational and sectoral short-term disaster 
recovery. Statistical analysis methods are used in chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 – System dynamics of organisational and sectoral resilience 
In this section, information from chapters 4 to 7 is used in a system dynamics framework to 
show the interactions between sectors and other system agents. The system dynamics structure 
is used to explain the interlinked nature of recovery for the sectors and organisations in this 
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study and how this influences their recovery. Investigation of the system leads to the description 
of particular system behaviours and characteristics that have a bearing on organisational and 
sectoral recovery. 
Chapter 9 – Points of leverage 
Chapter 9 is an amalgamation of analysis of the system in chapter 8 and the data from chapters 4 
to 7 to demonstrate the aids, hindrances and possible points of intervention in the system in 
order to effect recovery. This is an examination of the primary aids, hindrances and points of 
intervention to organisational and sectoral recovery in the context of the 2010 - 2011 Canterbury 
earthquakes. 
Chapter 10 – Organisational disaster resilience 
This chapter explains the need for both business-as-usual organisational resilience and 
organisational disaster resilience. The findings in this chapter are arrived at by analysis of the 
results from the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) presented in chapter 5 (surveys) as well as 
the contextual interview (chapter 4) and case study (chapter 6) data. This is supported by the 
findings from the analysis chapters 7 – 9. Chapter 10 also has information on the self-report 
organisational disaster resilience indicators from organisations in the study, how the Benchmark 
Resilience Tool (BRT-53) can be improved and how organisations and by extension sectors can 
be more disaster resilient. 
Chapter 11 – Summary and conclusions 
This is the research summary and a brief discussion on the possible avenues of continuing the 
research in future. 
1.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter establishes the context of the thesis by giving an overview of the gap in the disaster 
recovery literature in analysis of industry sector recovery. This chapter also contains the rationale 
for the use of the system dynamics approach in investigating sectoral recovery after disaster. The 
myriad industry sectors and agents in the system necessitate the use of methods of analysis for 
complex situations. 
10 Introduction 
 
As well, the chapter has information on the arrangement of the thesis with a brief description of 
the contents of each chapter. 
The next chapter contains information on the state of the art in the organisational and sectoral 
disaster recovery field. 
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2 A review of the literature 
The study of  recovery after disaster is both inter- and multi-disciplinary. The topic brings 
together the subjects of  risk, crisis, disaster, business, management, leadership, sociology, 
psychology, systems theory, complexity theory and engineering. This review provides an 
analytical, systematic review of  the existing literature by breaking down and discussing the 
building blocks that make up part of  the discussion on organisational recovery and that pertain 
to this thesis. 
The review starts with an overview of  what makes a disaster. This is followed by a section on 
the use of  systems theory, complex adaptive systems (CASs) and how organisations fit in with 
these concepts. The next section has a definition of  organisational recovery and organisational 
disaster resilience, which is followed by an analysis of  organisations and risk as well as how crises 
develop and are managed in organisations. The discussion on crisis management includes 
organisational adaptability, innovation, learning and some possible barriers to preparation for 
crises. 
The review then has a section on information currently available to do with organisational 
disaster recovery and the growing scholarship on the need for organisations to be disaster 
resilient. There is also a discussion on the general concept of  organisational resilience. In the last 
part of  the review, the context for this research is explained, along with the main aims and 
objectives. 
It should be noted that the unit of  analysis for this thesis is the industry or geographic sector. 
However, the data were collected through the sampling of  the organisations within these sectors. 
As such, there is reference to both organisations and sectors because of  this relationship. 
2.1 Crisis, disaster and catastrophe 
Disasters that can affect organisations can be of  any description; natural (e.g. tsunami, 
earthquake, floods) or man-made (data loss, arson, oil spill). In the history of  humanity disasters 
are not rare occurrences, neither is recovery from disaster. However, an important question that 
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should be posed when looking at risk, hazards, disasters and recovery is when does a situation become 
a crisis or a disaster? In answering the question, one view to take is that the definition depends on 
the point of  view of  the affected party (Dyson, 1983). Pearson and Mitroff  define organisational 
crisis (or disaster) as an event that poses a 
threat to the organization's reputation and viability (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993, p. 49). 
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, UNISDR, defines [societal] 
disaster as 
a serious disruption of  the functioning of  a community or a society involving widespread human, 
material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of  the affected 
community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 2009a, p. n. pag). 
This thesis is investigating sectoral recovery and resilience after the earthquakes in Canterbury. 
Consequently, both concepts of  organisational and societal crisis are important. Furthermore, 
from the above definitions of  crisis, it is clear that extreme events in and of  themselves do not 
constitute a disaster; this comes about when a hazard event has destructive and damaging 
outcomes for organisations or for people. For instance, Bolin and Stanford (1998) in their 
analysis of  an earthquake at Northridge in 1994 contend that disasters result when extreme 
events and human habitation come together. Others, such as Hewitt (1997) and Blaikie et al 
(1994) agree. Therefore, organisations and industry sectors, existing within larger systems, are 
affected by the interaction with other system agents and events such as earthquakes. 
2.1.1 Different degrees of reach and consequences 
The reported magnitude of  hurricanes or earthquakes for instance does not in itself  really 
communicate the scale of  possible devastation. The aftereffects, to organisations, industry 
sectors and people, also vary according to the scale of  the disaster event. Different kinds of  
disasters (for example caused by hurricanes, floods, earthquakes or tornadoes), bring different 
sets of  problems and might require varied responses. Hurricanes for instance have some lead 
time before they make landfall. This is in contrast to earthquakes which give little, if  any 
warning. 
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Quarantelli (2006) puts forward the argument that there are different levels of  crisis and that it is 
important to differentiate them as this helps when it comes to the level or degree of  response. 
Depending on the scale and societal impact of  an accident or crisis, there can be an emergency, a 
disaster or a catastrophe. 
2.2 Systems theory, systems thinking and systems practise 
This thesis, in investigating how organisations can recover after disaster as well as how they can 
become more resilient to disaster, will be written from a systems perspective, i.e. by employing 
systems thinking. A reason for using systems thinking (sometimes called the systems approach) is to 
reflect more productively on how a system functions within a larger context (Gharajedaghi, 
1999) and use that knowledge to improve the working of  the system (Richmond, 1994). Systems 
theory and systems thinking are derived from General Systems Theory (GST) which was 
proposed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the 1930s (von Bertalanffy, 1972). Systems theory has 
made possible the growth of  new ways of  working on complicated problems that involve 
different disciplines and it gives a broader view of  the workings of  complex systems. 
Churchman (1979) writes that the true application of  the systems approach calls for the working 
together of  multiple disciplines. 
A system is an assemblage or combination of  things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole (R. A. 
Johnson et al., 1964, p. 367) and is how organisations and society are organised or structured 
(Ackoff, 1981; Haviland, Walrath, & El Prins, 2007). Organised indicates that these parts interact 
with each other by way of  special relationships and that the system displays an overall behaviour 
unique to itself. The system is coherently organised in a way that achieves something; it has a 
function or a purpose (D. H. Meadows & Wright, 2008). The bi-directional information 
exchanges between the actors in a system leads to a process called emergence, where the system 
becomes a whole exhibiting properties not exhibited by its constituent parts acting alone. 
A system is encircled by its environment and the (sometimes imperceptible but vital) separation 
between the two is the boundary. Any elements not in the system are in its environment 
(Sterman, 2000). It can be concluded that the system is defined based on its purpose and on the 
extent of  analysis. The definition of  what is included in a system is therefore subjective. 
However, because of  each system having a purpose, it is important to add that a system’s 
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environment is not and cannot be all elements not included in the system. The system’s 
environment is specifically those elements that affect the system and are affected by it. This is 
vital in analysis of  a system and is the view taken in this thesis. The system and its environment 
have a symbiotic relationship; they exchange input and output, both tangible and intangible. An 
example of  a system is a community within the larger environment of  a town. The purpose of  
the community is to serve the needs of  its residents. The community is formed of  many 
interconnected parts and the community’s actions can influence the town and vice-versa. 
Ackoff  (1990) states that systemic thinking is holistic not reductionist and is synthetic not 
analytic. Reductionist and analytic thinking attempts to deduce the attributes of  a whole by 
looking at that of  its individual parts, i.e. not scrutinising the interconnectedness of  the parts. 
Holistic and synthetic thinking deduces the attributes of  components based on the whole that 
encapsulates them (Ackoff, 2004). This can be taken to mean that holistic thinking takes in the 
interactions between system agents and the emergent behaviour of  the system. Embedded in the 
umbrella concept of  systems thinking are different but compatible formal systems approaches. 
Some of  the more well-known ones are shown in Figure 2-1. 
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Figure 2-1: Different but compatible formal systems approaches 
In this work, the approach used is that of  system dynamics; which can be used to show how 
concerns that at first glance appear localised can have causes as well as outcomes that have a 
much broader impact. System dynamics is also used where there are multiple interdependent and 
interrelated components and helps to show that the solutions to complex problems are not 
simple and direct. System dynamics is built on three main concepts: the system, the structure of  
the system and the behaviour of  the system. The structure of  the system arises from the system 
components and the nature of  the interactions among them. Consequently, behaviour of  the 
system emerges from the structure of  the system. Bateson (1972) emphasises that a fundamental 
point is recognition of  the pattern of  interactions between the elements in a system that gives 
rise to particular emergent behaviour. This perspective is useful for analysis of  a complex 
disaster scenario such as that in Canterbury. 
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Systems 
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Systems 
Thinking 
 
Viable Systems Model 
(VSM) developed by 
Stafford Beer (Beer, 1989) 
System Dynamics 
(SD) by Jay Forrester 
(Sterman, 2000) 
Strategic Options Development 
and Analysis (SODA) developed 
by Colin Eden (Eden & 
Ackermann, 2001) 
 
Critical Systems Heuristics 
(CSH) developed by 
Werner Ulrich (Flood & 
Romm, 1996) 
 
Soft Systems 
Methodology (SSM) 
developed by Peter 
Checkland (1994) 
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As observed, apart from being useful for looking at complex situations, system dynamics is 
useful for when they are dynamic. System dynamicists think in terms of  two main classes of  
complexity. The first is combinatorial or detail complexity which is mainly in reference to the 
number of  components there are in a system. The second is dynamic complexity which is a 
result of  the exchanges between the components in the system over time and is possible even in 
what would be thought of  as simple systems (Senge, 2006; Sterman, 2000). The types of  
complex problems examined through the lens of  system dynamics are referred to as messes by 
Ackoff  (1981). He further adds that the management of  messes calls for planning and not 
[traditional] problem-solving which often looks for a linear cause and effect. Others such as 
Reynolds and Holwell agree with this perspective and add that messes for the most part have 
more serious ramifications, involve more people and may appear in different guises (Reynolds & 
Holwell, 2010, pp. 4 - 5). 
However, systems theory and systems thinking should not be viewed as the mere simplification 
of  complex problems. Manson (2001) asserts the same and argues that there is a possibility that 
interactions between actors can be erroneously viewed as having a one-to-one cause and effect 
relationship when this is not so as systems are non-linear. From Manson’s description, this can 
be taken to mean that input and output do not always have a one-to-one relationship. For 
instance, a small amount of  input could lead to a large amount of  output and vice-versa. Dooley 
(1997) also takes this position. Sterman (2000) further describes the supply chain beergame which 
shows that a decision made at one point in the supply chain could lead to magnified effects in 
other nodes along the chain. The work of  Johannessen (1998, p. 359) summarises the primary 
components to systems thinking: 
 the sub-systems and the system must be viewed in context, i.e. the part/whole 
relationship; 
 the system in the environment, not the system separated by a border is emphasised; 
 the type of  connection between elements as this shows changes in the system; and 
 the reorganisation of  the connection between elements as this provides guidance for 
processes of  creation as well as innovation in the system. 
The above points expressed alternatively can be thought of  in terms of  the five checks for a 
healthy system: balance, cohesion, clarity, completeness and consistency (Elms, 1998). 
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System dynamics can also be utilised to show the ways in which a system such as an organisation 
can protect itself  and even benefit from internal and external disturbances which disrupt the 
workings of  the system (Coyle, 1977). When the system can survive and thrive despite these 
disturbances, then the performance of  the system is enhanced and can be said to be resilient.  
2.2.1 Complex Adaptive Systems (CASs) 
Holland (1992) notes that among systems of  various types, there are those that when faced with 
disturbances in their environment have the capability to change and rearrange their component 
parts. He assigns to such systems the designation Complex Adaptive Systems (CASs). Apart 
from the ability to adapt, Holland states that CASs are also able, through the collective behaviour 
of  their parts, to differentiate themselves from other systems. For example, an organisation, with 
its many interactions and ability to adapt is different from a static system such as a building. 
CASs can also anticipate changes in their surroundings. Lansing (2003) further notes that even 
what are considered the simplest systems can exhibit complexity, where complexity is seen as 
individual actors linked in a system and together exhibiting complex behaviour. 
As pointed out earlier, organisations belong to larger, more complex systems such as industry 
sectors, communities and nations. Furthermore, in the literature organisations are considered 
social systems. Bunge (1985) writes that the study of  social systems should comprise the study 
of  four branches: biological, cultural, economic and political. However, it appears that physical 
systems are missing from Bunge’s list. Interactions between physical systems and those defined 
by Bunge are vital in investigating recovery after earthquakes. 
Additionally, Malotaux (2008, p. 1) writes that the study of  systems should include 
understanding both the interface and the behaviour of  humans so that people can work well within the 
system. Kelly (1995, p. 164) states clearly why organisations should be analysed as CASs: 
The challenge is simply stated: Extend the company’s internal network outward to include all those with 
whom the company interacts in the marketplace. Spin a grand web to include employees, suppliers, 
regulators, and customers; they all become part of  your company’s collective being.  
In CASs, the extent to which one part has an effect on another is known as the degree of  
coupling (Perrow, 1999). The extent of  coupling can range from tight to loose. Another property 
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of  a CAS relevant to this work is that it has memory; the system stores information from past 
events and can use that knowledge to inform its strategy in the present (Pentland & Reuter, 
1994; Senge, 2006). 
Authors such as Comfort (1999) and Shrivastava (1994) have shown that systems thinking is 
widely and successfully used in disaster research; while Senge and Sterman (1992) and Mitleton-
Kelly (2003) show that it can be used to explain how organisations function. These two aspects 
will be used in this thesis to determine the key elements of  organisational and sectoral recovery 
after disaster. 
System feedback, hierarchy, self-organisation and resilience 
The interactions between the actors or elements in a system are called feedback (Sterman, 2000). 
There are two types of  feedback: positive (reinforcing) and negative (balancing). Positive 
feedback is where an action produces a result which leads to more of  the same action whose 
outcome is growth or decline. Negative feedback is aimed at moving the system, through some 
action, to a current or desired state (the goal or the objective) (Sterman, 2000). As a result of  
positive and negative feedback, systems thinking includes a cyclical rather than linear pattern of  
cause and effect. Systems can also experience oscillation which is caused by negative feedback 
with time delays within the system. Also, one of  the key features of  positive feedback is that 
small distortions in the system can be amplified as they move through the system. Positive 
feedback is self-reinforcing and will continue until it reaches its limits or is counteracted by a 
negative feedback loop. For example amplification can be seen in a supply web when there is a 
variation in orders along the supply chain which can then lead to excess inventory in one part of  
the supply chain. Forrester called this the beer game (Sterman, 1989) (see section 2.5.2 for 
details). 
Meadows and Wright (2008) and Sterman (2000) point out that there are three fundamental 
system characteristics that enable systems to function well: hierarchy, self-organisation and 
resilience. For this thesis, function well will be taken to mean that the system achieves its purpose. 
What can also be implied from these characteristics is that for hierarchy, self-organisation or 
resilience to occur, there must be an exchange of  information or feedback among the system 
actors. 
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Organisations are systems within the larger system of  an industry sector within a still larger 
system of  an economy, a region or a nation. The nesting of  systems within systems is known as 
the hierarchy of  systems (Daellenbach, 1994) and makes the management of  the system easier. 
Hierarchies (or subsystems) develop so that not all the system’s information is contained in one 
subsystem; which might lead to an information overload. This is not to say that the right and 
relevant information should not be passed on to different subsystems. Importantly, the aim(s) of  
the subsystems should not be at cross-purposes to that of  the overall system. However, there is 
the ideal system versus the real system. Therefore, it is possible that a subsystem is at odds with 
the larger system’s purpose. This can lead to system sub-optimisation. In the system dynamics 
literature, it has been shown how in the functioning of  a city, optimisation in one part without 
consideration of  other parts can be detrimental (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999). 
However, another advantage of  system hierarchy is that failure in one part of  the system may 
not affect other parts. This is provided the failure is not so great as to cause system collapse and 
does not adversely affect other parts. This is the basis for Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model of  
accidents (Reason, Hollnagel, & Paries, 2006). 
System self-organisation is important because after a perturbation, the system can assume a 
temporary or permanent modified structure that enables the system to keep functioning. Self-
organisation is also important for the continued existence of  a system in a changing 
environment. Some of  the organisational crisis literature points to the ability of  a system, such 
as an organisation, to self-organise as a means of  survival (Mitroff, Alpaslan, & Green, 2004; 
Senge, 1998). 
Resilience, an emergent property of  the system, is another term that is subjective (see section 2.7 
for more detail). As has been demonstrated, resilience is not easy to measure (Manyena, 2006). 
Resilience contributes to the stability of a system through the feedback loops present in the 
system. There are various feedback loops in any system and these are dominant at different 
times. The existence of negative feedback loops leads to system balance or equilibrium. The 
resilience of  a system is to ensure not just continued functioning of  the system but also survival. 
This is achieved through the use of  system feedback and the other system characteristics of  
hierarchy and self-organisation (see chapter 8.4). 
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System delays and environmental time delays 
A system delay is caused by a lag in the effect of  one element on another. In the time horizon 
for this thesis, the system delays are not yet evident. However, as is shown in chapters 6, 7 and 8, 
there are time delays in the system’s environment and they affect the system. In Canterbury, some 
of  these environmental time delays were to do with insurance settlement, availability of  
machinery, availability of  skilled labour and decisions on building demolition. All these 
environmental time delays affected organisations and sectors. 
2.2.2 System dynamics frameworks and modelling 
The system dynamics approach makes use of  system models for the analysis of  situations and 
includes the use of  quantitative and qualitative procedures. Modelling can be described as the 
construction of  abstract models and includes the development of  mental models, influence 
diagrams, causal-loop diagrams, stock-and-flow maps as well as stock-and-flow models (Adjunct 
Associate Professor Barry Newell, personal correspondence, 2012). Consequently, if  the 
modelling (qualitative or quantitative) has to do with investigating the behaviour of  a system 
over time, then this constitutes system dynamics modelling (Furlong & Scheberle, 1998; Hammer, 
Champy, Daniels, James, & Hughes, 1994; Handmer & Dovers, 1996; Markides & Williamson, 
1994). Richardson and Pugh (1981, pp. 312-313) state that the use of  a model as well as its 
effectiveness are dependent on the degree to which the model communicates, helps to generate 
insights, enhances understanding, and in general reaches and influences its audience. 
Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) (see Figure 2-2) are mainly qualitative and help to show how 
interrelated variables (or nodes) affect one another. The relationships between these variables are 
represented by arrows and can have positive or negative polarity. For quantitative analysis of  a 
system, stock and flow diagrams can be used. A stock is anything that accumulates or depletes 
over time while a flow is the rate of  change of  a stock. Figure 2-3 has a depiction of  a simplified 
stock and flow diagram. Inflow adds to the stock while outflow depletes the stock. The arrows 
from Stock to inflow and outflow show that there is an exchange of  information between the stock 
and the flows which can contribute to the rate of  the flows. Notably, a stock is only ever 
changed through its flows. The clouds on the ends of  the flow arrows depict the environment 
of  the system. 
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Figure 2-2: Illustration of a system dynamics causal loop diagram of organisational or sectoral recovery 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Illustration of a simplified system dynamics stock and flow diagram with inflow, outflow and 
information links 
In system dynamics modelling, the time horizon in the model is crucial to analysis. The model 
must reach far enough into the past to show how a problem may have started as well as the 
symptoms and it should also go far enough into the future that it can show the delayed, indirect, 
unforeseen effects. This is very relevant to the discussion of  recovery after crisis or disaster later 
in this work that posits that the pre-existing crisis or disaster conditions in an organisation may 
contribute to its recovery post-disaster. This is also relevant to the timing of  data collection after 
a disaster, as will be seen in chapter 7. 
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The validation of  system dynamics models is an important yet contentious subject. Even though 
system dynamics modelling uses both quantitative and qualitative information, some authors 
(Nordhaus, 1973; Zellner, 1980) have criticised the technique as relying too much on qualitative 
aspects. However, other authors such as Barlas (2006), Sterman (1984), Coyle (1977) and 
Forrester (1994) write that it is possible to validate system dynamics models. An alternative 
perspective on modelling in general is captured in the words of  Box and Draper (1987, p. 74): 
essentially, all models are wrong, but some models are useful. In this thesis, the validity of  the model has 
to do with how well it depicts the system being analysed, considering the system’s purpose, as 
well as how useful the model is in analysing the system. Of  utmost importance and with 
reference to any type of  modelling; the usefulness of  the model is dependent in the first place 
on the quality of  the input information.  
2.3 Organisational crisis management 
Some authors (Tierney, 2007b; Turner, 1976) have noted that there are immense benefits to 
analysing the recovery of  organisations after disaster from the point of  view of  the larger body 
of  organisational research. This is to do with how organisations manage risk, cope in turbulent 
environments and in general handle run-of-the-mill crises. In this thesis, the study of  
organisational crisis management has been extended to how organisations deal with and recover 
from disaster. After all, a large proportion of  the literature on crisis management is built on the 
evaluation of  industrial or organisational disasters. Crisis management is defined as the efforts 
by an organisation and external parties to prevent crises or to manage effectively crises that arise 
(Pearson & Clair, 1998). The primary difference between a disaster situation and the day-to-day 
operations of  an organisation is that the disaster environment compresses in time what would 
have occurred over a longer, more expansive timeframe (Olshansky, Johnson, & Topping, 2006). 
In disaster, decisions often have to be made under time pressure and tremendous uncertainty. 
For instance, when infrastructure is damaged after a disaster event, decisions have to be made 
quickly on the restoration, repair or replacement of  this infrastructure and associated services. 
This is done in a shorter amount of  time than a city would take to plan for and build 
infrastructure. 
In this thesis, some of  the concepts from the organisational (crisis) literature will be drawn on to 
investigate how organisations can recover from disaster. Some of  these concepts include risk, 
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organisational decision making in crisis (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993), organisational processes 
(Clarke, 1991), organisational change (Dervitsiotis, 2003), leadership, organisational culture 
(Perrow, 1999; Senge, 2006), crisis management (Turner, 1976) and organisational resilience 
(Hamel & Välikangas, 2003; McManus, 2008; Stephenson, 2010). All of  these works have looked 
at the organisation as composed of  elements as well as the organisation in its environment. This 
is compatible with the systems approach adopted for this thesis. 
2.3.1 Organisations and risk 
The life-cycle and operation of  any organisation involve risk. The Joint Australia New Zealand 
International Standard (AS/NZS), based on the International Standard Organisations ISO 
31000:2009 document, defines risk as the effect of  uncertainty on objectives - positive and/or negative 
(AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009, p. 1). From the literature on crisis and disaster management, 
Comfort (2005, p. 338) says risk represents the possible occurrence of  a harmful event that has some known 
likelihood of  happening over time.  
A group of  experts (Jolly, 2003) in the field of  corporate risk write that effective risk 
management can be used as a tool for corporate survival. In the guide, the authors argue that for 
reasons such as population shift and technological advances, the risks faced by organisations are 
ever changing and that the management of  risk should be a part of  an organisation’s everyday 
operation. The authors point out that the main areas of  corporate risk can be broken down into 
financial (e.g. affecting capital), strategic (e.g. affecting the wider business environment) and 
operational (e.g. affecting organisational processes). The authors advise organisations to identify 
risks that may affect them, specifically how the organisation would be affected and lastly to 
prioritise these risks according to severity for the organisation. 
Risk is therefore unavoidable. As well, other authors state that the organisation does, however, 
have the power to choose between risks and how to effectively identify, analyse and manage 
those risks (Couto, 1989; Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; Wildavsky, 1988). As with recovery and 
resilience, the definition of  risk is subjective. For different organisations, different risks pose 
different threats. Thinking of  ways in which the organisation would react given a certain risk also 
plays a part in how that risk is perceived and planned for. The analysis of  risk should also 
include consideration of  context: of  the system as well as the scale. For instance, for risk 
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reduction, Comfort (2005; 2001) calls for the involvement of  multiple actors such as 
government agencies, for-profit organisations, not-for-profits organisations and the community 
as they all form a part of  a system. 
2.3.2 The inevitability of crises? 
In this thesis, failure is defined as when a system component does not fulfil its intended purpose 
in a certain timeframe (Leveson, 1986, p. 128). This can be the organisation or in one part of  the 
organisation. There has been a need in both industry and academia to define failure; how and 
why accidents and crises develop; how they can be prevented, mitigated and managed; as well as 
what consequences could result.  
There are a few noted schools of  thought which at first seem incompatible but do have some 
similarities; these are High Reliability Theory (HRT) (La Porte & Consolini, 1991) and Normal 
Accident Theory (NAT) (Perrow, 1984). LaPorte and Consolini (1991), Roberts (1990) and 
Weick (1987), proponents of  HRT,  state that the design and working of  the organisation itself  
contributes greatly to safety and to preventing accidents, in part by being proficient in reacting 
quickly to failure. On the other hand, the underlying premise of  NAT is that regardless what 
measures organisations take, accidents will happen and chances increase with the level of  system 
complexity (Perrow, 1994). There is general consensus that in complex systems, accidents 
happen when various factors coincide (Cook, 1998; Reason, 2000; Turner, 1976). For example, 
when failsafe mechanisms like emergency buttons, personnel training and procedures are in use at 
any one time, one of  these failing might not lead to a catastrophe, but their combined failures 
and interactions could. This means that failure is dependent on the state of  the system and on 
factors present and interacting at any given time. Leveson (2010) confims this notion. 
Much has been said and written by the advocates of  the two differing outlooks of  NAT and 
HRT on organisational safety, the inevitability of  accidents in organisations, how organisations 
can deal with cascading failure as well as how such analyses can be used to give insight into how 
organisations might be vulnerable to disaster. However, a point of  view adopted in this thesis is 
expressed in the work of  Leveson et al (2009) who write that although NAT and HRT have 
been discussed at length, they can still benefit from being integrated with the systems approach 
to problem analysis for organisations. NAT and HRT have limitations such as confined or 
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restricted definitions and the unclear difference between reliability and safety and would 
therefore be enhanced by the inclusion of  systems thinking in the two theories. 
Apart from NAT and HRT, there is what Mitroff  terms abnormal accidents (Mitroff, 2004, p. 43) 
of  the deliberate, intentional kind. In this category, one of  the biggest events in recent living 
memory, and whose effects are still being felt, is the flying of  planes into New York’s twin 
towers in September 2001. 
Additionally, Heinrich (1950) put forward his Domino Theory in which he asserts that 
metaphorically, an accident is like a line of  dominoes falling over: the culmination of  a chain of  
sequential events. When one of  the dominoes falls, it knocks down the next one and so on (the 
domino effect).  
Heinrich’s (1950) five symbolic dominoes which may cause accidents: 
 social environment and ancestry; 
 fault of  person; 
 unsafe act, mechanical or physical hazard (unsafe condition); 
 accident; and 
 injury (Heinrich et al., 1950). 
However, removing a key factor such as an unsafe condition or an unsafe act prevents the start 
or the perpetuation of  this chain reaction. Unsafe acts are those which are caused by persons 
not paying enough attention, and unsafe conditions might be a result of  inadequately designed 
or improperly maintained equipment and work areas. Alternatively, the system could have built-
in buffers to dampen the reaction. 
What can be added to Heinrich’s Domino Theory and relevant to this thesis is that either 
method should be designed with the entire system in mind. Another point of  interest is that 
Heinrich points specifically to fault of  person. Organisations are social systems; therefore it is of  
little value to design processes as if  they were solely for use by machines without taking into 
account the human element. Reason (1998) has written on this. In other work, Malotaux (2008, 
p. 1) contends that in practice we see however that many systems fail because engineers ignored, forgot to 
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include, or incorrectly assumed how people interface and behave. Therefore, regarding accidents and failure 
prevention which can lead to crisis, it can be argued that systems fail, not people (Cook, 1998; 
Reason, 2000; Turner, 1976). In other words, failure is a property of  the entire system and not 
of  the individual components. Accordingly, Pugsley (1973) , from the discipline of  structural 
engineering, developed an indicator model that can be used by organisations in the assessment 
of  risk and the potential occurrence of  crisis or disaster. The indicators are: 
 new or unusual materials; 
 new or unusual methods of construction; 
 new or unusual types of structure; 
 experience and organisation of design and construction team; 
 research and development background; 
 industrial climate; 
 financial climate; and 
 political climate. 
Both the Heinrich and Pugsley models can be extended and used in dealing with organisational 
crisis. First, they can both be taken as very general in how they define their indicators. Heinrich’s 
model does not include specific environmental factors such as finance or politics that could 
trigger some of  his dominoes. Pugsley’s model, on the other hand, includes some environmental 
factors but he does not explicitly discuss the interaction of  the indicators. This is where the use 
of  system dynamics is essential in looking at the different elements in the system and how they 
are related to each other and could affect recovery. Using both Heinrich’s and Pugsley’s models, 
organisations could adapt them to different situations and add missing elements relevant to the 
organisation’s situation. Lastly, both models are qualitative which would make it difficult to 
observe any changes as well as the degree of  those changes, in the system. Therefore, metrics are 
required to measure the indicators. 
From the theories discussed in the above paragraphs, it is clear that trying to detail all the 
possible failure permutations is impossible; the world is filled with unknowns and a disaster in 
some form is bound to happen at some time. That such complex systems are built in the first 
place, leads to what Charles Perrow (1986, p. n. pag) calls the habit of  courting disaster. 
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Consequently, as complex systems have more parts to them and differing degrees of  interaction 
between those parts, component interaction accidents where the system designers did not plan 
for all the possible interactions are more common (Leveson, 2010). In the New Zealand context, 
Isaac (1997) shows how pre-existing organisational conditions in the Department of  
Conservation and local conditions in the creation of  a viewing platform led to disaster. Pre-
existing organisational conditions included understaffing leading to overworked staff  while local 
conditions were a poorly designed and constructed structure. 
For organisations, it is therefore prudent to take the all-hazards approach which requires the 
development of  organisational plans and responses capable of  dealing with a wide range of  
disruptive activities as opposed to a few targeted ones. This idea of  the all hazards approach has 
been documented in the disaster and emergency management literature (Berkes, 2007; 
Godschalk & Brower, 1985; New Zealand Ministry of  Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, 2012b; Reason, 2000; S. D. Smith, 2004). There is also a need for organisations to 
become more resilient in the face of  numerous crises (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003).  
Lastly, it has been shown in the organisational crisis literature that failure to identify risks or the 
mismanagement of  risk and crises could have negative consequences for the organisation. For 
instance, Pretty and Knight (2002) show how an organisation’s misidentification of  risks and 
mismanagement of  crises can result in the loss of  value of  the organisation’s stock price. 
2.3.3 The build-up and progression of crises in organisations 
Various models for how organisational crises develop have been suggested. One model, 
proposed by Turner, refers to the failure of  foresight (Turner, 1976, p. 378) and is shown in Table 
2-1. This is where facts to pre-warn of  a crisis were available but there was failure to act on this 
information to prevent or mitigate the crisis. One of  the most crucial of  the stages in Table 2-1 
is the second stage, which from a systems viewpoint outlines an emergent property of  the 
system: from the pre-conditions as separate parts to the emergent state of  disaster (or accident). 
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Table 2-1: The sequence of events associated with a failure of foresight 
The sequence of  events associated with a failure of  foresight 
Stage 1 
Notionally normal starting point: 
(a) Initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards 
(b) Associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of  practice, 
mores, and folkways 
Stage 2 
Incubation period: The accumulation of  an unnoticed set of  events which are at odds with the 
accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance 
Stage 3 Precipitating event: Forces itself  to the attention and transforms general perceptions of  stage 2 
Stage 4 Onset: The immediate consequences of  the collapse of  cultural precautions become apparent 
Stage 5 
Rescue and salvage – first stage adjustment: The immediate post-collapse situation is recognised in 
ad hoc adjustments which permit the work of  rescue and salvage to be started 
Stage 6 
Full cultural readjustment: An inquiry or assessment is carried out, and beliefs and precautionary 
norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of  the world 
Adapted from (Turner, 1976, p. 381) 
Another model detailing how crises develop and are handled was proposed by Smith. This 
model has three main phases: crisis of  management, operational crisis situation and crisis of  legitimation 
(D. Smith, 1990, p. 271). In phase one, there is failure to use the information presented by a 
situation that is imminent and demonstrates the role of  management in the unfolding of  
organisational crises. Phase 2, the operational crisis situation (sometimes called the response 
phase), is where the crisis is manifest and the organisation moves into crisis mode to try to 
address the crisis. Recovery is part of  the final crisis of  legitimation phase of  Smith’s model. 
This is also the phase in which organisations try to deal with and adapt to the changed 
environment, and also where they look for whom or what might be to blame for the crisis. 
It appears that in Smith’s model, resilience is measured by the kind of  information available, how 
it is used, as well as the organisational learning and culture. Furthermore, the models by Turner6 
and Smith use different vocabulary but are very similar. Phase one in Smith’s model corresponds 
to the first two stages in Turner’s model. Smith’s response phase is similar to Turner’s stages 3 
and 4, while Smith’s phase three aligns with Turner’s last two stages. From the two models 
discussed, it can also be concluded that other than planning, how a crisis is handled can itself  
lead to an escalation of  the crisis. How organisations react to an external event such as an 
earthquake is an example of  this. Both Turner’s and Smith’s models appear to take the 
organisation in isolation. However, from the system perspective, there are environmental factors 
that may influence the development and progression of  a crisis. Also from the system’s 
                                                     
6 This work has since been added to by Pidgeon. 
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perspective, the time horizon prior to the crisis and during the crisis should be considered. This 
has not been included in the models. 
As well, the models put forward by Turner and Smith are to do with man-made disasters while 
this thesis deals with organisations affected by a disaster caused by earthquakes. However, some 
of  the lessons from how organisations handle man-made disasters can be used to investigate 
how they deal with natural disasters. To start, organisations consist of  people, who would be the 
ones dealing with a disaster regardless of  the cause. Also, as organisations are part of  larger 
systems, they are likely to be affected through their assets, staff, processes, customers or supply 
chain for example, by a regional disaster. Lastly, it is possible that a natural disaster could 
exacerbate existing or potential problems in an organisation. This is equivalent to the second, 
incubation, stage in Turner’s model. 
In addition, dealing with crises requires some prior, effective planning (Quarantelli, 1988). The 
assumption is often made that if  disaster preparation has taken place then the management of  
crisis will be an automatic success. Instead of  waiting for an event to occur to gain experience, 
organisations could instead use simulated exercises where all the major actors are present as a 
way of  checking for gaps, testing the system and fine-tuning it. For instance, Clarke (2001) 
cautions organisations against thinking that written plans alone are sufficient. As well, apart from 
the documents written by organisations for their own use, there are numerous standards that 
detail how an organisation should behave in a certain situation. Again, the compliance with such 
standards does not always translate into how well the organisation will do in a crisis.  
Lastly, MacManus (2008) writes that in planning to manage crises, organisations should 
understand what hazards they face and how they might be affected by them. Depending on 
scope and extent, hazards with the potential to affect an organisation can be categorised as: 
 regional (such as the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes to organisations based in 
the region); 
 societal (such as the SARS outbreak in 2003 affecting organisational staffing and 
manpower); 
 localised (organisation specific such as the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010); or 
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 distal (consequences as a result of actions on the supply chain for instance) (McManus, 
2008). 
 
In this thesis the primary focus is on disasters of a regional nature and to a small extent those 
that are distal. 
2.4 Adaptation and learning 
It has been argued that for a social system, such as an organisation, to recover from disaster a 
certain level or amount of  adaptation and learning are necessary. Furthermore, in order for there 
to be adaptation and innovation, there needs to be learning (Hall, 1962). Consequently, learning 
and adaptation in a system are a result of  the information exchanges within the system: of  
feedback. 
2.4.1 Organisational adaptability 
Pasmore (1994) argues that for organisations, two things are certain: the speed of  meaningful 
change will increase and complexity will grow. Therefore, it can be concluded that organisations 
need to respond with more thought, better utilisation of  resources and better organisational 
preparation. From a systems perspective, organisations should adapt and also evolve. This will 
enable organisations to handle successive change without resorting to firefighting where each crisis 
is handled singly with no planning for the future or experience from the last crisis. Managing 
one-off  crises on a continually ad hoc basis is insufficient, inefficient and time-wasting (Pasmore, 
1994; Senge & Sterman, 1992). Organisations should also be able to adapt to changing 
environmental factors and achieve their goals not only during business-as-usual but also through 
tumultuous times (Boisot & Child, 1999; Dervitsiotis, 2004; Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). Fink et 
al (1971) and Mitroff  (2005) allude to the fact that crises can be a positive learning experience 
provided they do not cause the organisation permanent collapse. In fact, organisational resilience 
itself  becomes a competitive advantage. 
Also, for a lot of  complex systems, Edmunds et al. argue that problem formulation poses a difficult 
challenge and a highly flexible process is required to cope with the necessarily evolving configuration (Edmunds, 
Feldman, Hicks, & Mullineux, 2010, p. 1). For organisations, problem formulation can be taken as 
the direction of  organisational evolution and is made even more challenging in a crisis or 
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disaster situation. Edmunds et al further state that; the objectives and constraints are not independent, so 
they have to be dealt with concurrently; additionally, they may evolve as the design process continues and 
understanding of  the system develops, meaning that some objectives must be added, strengthened, weakened or 
removed completely (Edmunds et al., 2010, p. 2). However, the organisation gains from going 
through this process by better understanding their operating environment and thereby ensuring 
that they can learn and adapt. 
2.4.2 Learning 
From the literature, organisations need to innovate, be diverse, adapt and keep learning in order 
to carry on being successful as well as handle crises effectively (Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999; 
Hamel & Välikangas, 2003; Lengnick-Hall & Beck, 2005; Pascale & Athos, 1981; Peters & 
Waterman, 1982; Senge, 2006; Stacey, 1995). Using the analogy of  the organisation as a complex 
adaptive system (CAS); a CAS is resilient to disruptions from the environment that would cause 
the breakdown of  less adaptive systems, and it does not need perfect conditions in which to 
exist (Holland, 1992; Levin, 1998). It can alter its own state to make up for variations in the 
environment, thereby increasing its ability to survive and even thrive. Furthermore, because it 
has memory, a complex adaptive system can learn to make the best of  its situation and 
circumvent or deflect many hazards that may exist in its environment (Pascale & Athos, 1981; 
Senge, 2006). As a result of  CASs being dynamic and non-linear, there are a number of  factors 
which could combine to give a different outcome every time and at no two points in time are the 
states of  the system identical (Dooley, 1997; Holland, 1992). Using the conditional probabilities 
view of  the Markov process7, a system’s ability to withstand crisis or disaster in one state is a 
measure of  the likelihood (probability) of  its transition to a different state (Belegundu & 
Chandrupatla, 1999). The ability to withstand should not be taken to mean that the system does 
not change as that may mean that the system is not adaptable. The inability to adapt could itself  
lead to failure. 
Pascale and Athos (1981) as well as Senge (2006) describe how finding an organisation’s best fit, 
given the environment, and deciding what direction to take are a part of  organisational learning. 
This is because factors like customers, competitor behaviour and other events over which 
                                                     
7  The Markov Process is sometimes used in the optimisation of systems in systems engineering 
32 A review of the literature 
 
organisations do not have complete control, all have the ability to affect an organisation. 
However, using information from the environment, organisations can adapt and create an 
environment in which the organisation can continuously learn and operate. For example, 
Thomke et al (1998) found that two-thirds of  equipment innovations in the semi-conductor 
industry were developed by the end-user feeding information back to organisations. 
The environmental feedback affecting the organisation’s strategy formulation also necessitates 
that organisations plan ahead while at the same time being ready for change. However, 
organisations find that they have to make decisions with only the information at hand, what 
Herbert Simon (1991, p. 132) refers to as bounded rationality. According to Dovers and Handmer 
(1992, p. 270), for organisations recognition that additional knowledge will not by itself  provide all, or even 
the main, answers, means that in effect we have to learn how to manage in ignorance. 
Additionally, limited and intangible resources such as money, time, competence and market share 
act as constraints on the decisions an organisation can make, which in turn has a bearing on 
organisational strategy. Resources can be even scarcer in a disaster environment; a situation 
which can be amplified when multiple actors are competing for the same resources. As a result 
of  operating under changing multiple constraints especially in crisis times, occasionally, any CAS 
moves towards a critical state (Bak, Tang, & Wiesenfeld, 1988, p. 364) where the system is at the 
edge of  transition between two states. It is in this critical state, what Dervitsiotis (2003, p. 252) 
calls the edge of  chaos, that conditions are ideal (for the system’s purpose) and organisations have 
the best opportunity to make dramatic change. Even as an organisation has to deal with finding 
its best fit under multiple constraints, the major developmental changes, the critical states, occur 
intermittently (Sneppen, Bak, Flyvbjerg, & Jensen, 1995). 
Lastly, organisations need to remember that long periods of  success [can] breed complacency (Hopkins, 
2007, p. 7). In certain instances, organisations should forget what made their enterprise 
successful previously as this might lead to failure of  a new venture (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003). 
The process of  innovation and creation should be treated as an opportunity to learn as failure in 
itself  is not a bad thing; it is what is learnt in the process that is important (Cannon & 
Edmondson, 2005; Senge, Scharmer, & Flowers, 2005). 
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Individual learning 
One aspect of  better crisis management is the ability of  the organisation to learn. In thinking of  
organisations as systems, one of  the most important components of  that system is the people 
who make up the organisation (Kaplan & Norton, 2004b). A discussion on organisational 
learning would be incomplete without mention of  individual learning. It can be deduced that 
when an individual learns, the organisation also learns. Kim (1996) writes that even though there 
does not exist a universal definition of  organisational learning, the important thing is how 
individual learning is transferred to or incorporated in the organisation. Organisational crisis 
learning can be divided into 3 stages, all of  which involve the human aspect: 
 pre- (prior personal experience, history); 
 intra- (lessons learnt during a crisis); and 
 post-crisis learning (feedback, debrief, commissions of  enquiry) (Newlove, Stern, & 
Svedin, 2003; Stern, 1997). 
Fundamentally, individuals should learn what is relevant for the purpose of  the organisation and 
they should learn well. In a crisis situation, this is even more important, especially given the 
heightened uncertainty of  the environment. It is argued that people are more motivated to bring 
about positive change when they feel they have a stake in the life of  the organisation (Collins, 
2001). 
2.4.3 Possible impediments to preparation for crises 
In the disaster literature, Mileti and Sorensen (1987) posit that the degree of  damage wrought by 
disasters like earthquakes can be lessened if  appropriate preparatory measures are taken prior to 
the disaster. For instance, Spittal et al (2005, 2008) in their findings from work on preparedness 
for earthquakes, report that optimistic bias may affect the preparation for hazard events. 
Optimistic bias (originally unrealistic optimism by Weinstein (1980)) is the inclination people 
have that negative actions are less likely to happen to them. This mindset could lead to 
inadequate planning and preparation for hazard events leading to catastrophic losses. 
Additionally, Senge (2006) states that organisations maintain long-term memory and 
organisational culture through the processes and procedures they establish and practice in their 
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day-to-day operations. These ingrained organisational routines may have a bearing on how 
organisations manage disasters. For instance, when faced with a disaster event organisations 
might carry on with normal routines in trying to deal with the crisis when a response 
commensurate with the situation is called for (T. C. Powell, 1991). This is supported by Staw et 
al (1981, p. 507) who write that for some organisations, dealing with an extraordinary crisis 
situation such as that brought on by an earthquake may lead to a maladaptive reaction that 
threatens the organisation’s survival, even when the same organisation is perfectly capable of  
handling other problems with which they are more familiar. 
Even while organisations employ the all-hazards view in crisis preparation and mitigation, no 
two crises are identical and each crisis should be thought of  as a learning experience (D Smith & 
Sipika, 1993). This is related to organisations learning continuously. Leveson (2010) suggests that 
organisations should take up new, more sophisticated, systemic methods for the analysis of  
failure as systems have become more complex. Depending on the scale of  analysis, methods of  
problem solving which are built around cause and effect having a linear relationship, which is not 
the case with complex systems, (Leveson, 2010) should be avoided. Additionally, there are some 
hazards that are truly unique but should still be considered in planning. As the 2010 and 2011 
Canterbury earthquakes and Hurricane Katrina in 2004 show, although it is known that a major 
event might happen, the effects caused by the event are difficult to predict in their entirety. Taleb 
(2007) writes about such events and calls them Black Swans; where humans are blind to and in 
denial of  the fact that extreme events they have not thought of  could occur. To cope with Black 
Swan events, Taleb advises that people and organisations should be built robustly to protect 
them against the negative type of  Black Swan event while allowing them to take advantage of  
the positive type. Another impediment might involve the thinking that after surviving one 
disaster, organisations may think that they can survive the next one (Mitroff  et al., 2004). 
While there are some impediments to preparing for crisis and that it is not possible to be 
prepared for every scenario, some amount of  preparation can ensure that the organisation has a 
starting point after a disaster occurs. For instance, in how to contact staff. 
2.4.4 Inter-organisational and inter-sectoral dependencies 
The environment of  an organisation is made up of  many entities. Nystrom and Starbuck (1981) 
advise that distinguishing organisations from their environments is not an easy task and may 
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distort the reality of  the interactions among them. Evan (1965) typified a focal organisation and 
all actors that interact with it as an organisation set. In the organisation set, these interactions 
vary in their formality and frequency and can be co-operative, neutral or conflicting. For 
instance, an organisation may have frequent contact with its customers, co-operative interactions 
with suppliers and conflict with any elements that might disturb the organisation achieving its 
goals. Evan adds that some of  these interactions are specific in extent and can be because of  
factors such as the organisation’s location or industry sector. 
Dawson (1992) explains that the interactions an organisation has can be put into three broad 
categories; interactions to do with the supply of  inputs, interactions to do with distribution of  
output goods and services, and regulatory interactions of  the organisation’s operations and 
transactions.  
Furthermore, in this thesis, a group of  organisations that operate in the same segment of  the 
economy or share a similar business type are characterised as making up a sector. Sector and 
industry sector will be used interchangeably in this thesis. As there are interactions and 
dependencies between organisations in the same or different sectors, it follows that there are 
interactions and dependencies between sectors also. 
2.5 Recovery 
Before investigating factors that contribute to recovery, there is a need to define the concept. 
Just as with the concepts of  crisis, disaster or risk, recovery also has myriad definitions, 
dependent on the context of  recovery under examination and to a lesser extent on academic 
discipline. The definition of  recovery is important because the description of  what recovery 
looks like and incorporates is an extension of  the definition of  the purpose of  a system. From 
the disaster literature some of  the definitions of  recovery are shown in Table 2-2. 
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Table 2-2: Definitions of recovery from different research areas and disciplines 
Definitions of recovery from different research areas and disciplines 
Author (s) Academic research/discipline Definition of  recovery 
Leveson Computer Science Backward recovery techniques involve returning the system 
to a prior state. Forward recovery involves repair of  the 
faulty state (Leveson, 1986, p. 152) 
Tierney Sociology Longer-term efforts to reconstruct and restore the disaster-
stricken area, e.g., through repairing or replacing homes, 
businesses, public works, and other structures (Tierney, 
1993b, p. 1) 
Alesch et al Urban and regional planning In systems terms, recovery means a return to [a state of] 
dynamic homeostasis approximating conditions and 
relationships that existed before the event (Alesch & Holly, 
2002, p. 2) 
Altay and Green Operations research Recovery involves the actions taken in the long term after 
the immediate impact of  the disaster has passed to stabilize 
the community and to restore some semblance of  normalcy 
(Folke et al., 2004, p. 480) 
Smith and 
Wenger 
Sociology and social research The process of  restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the 
physical, social, economic, and natural environment through 
pre-event planning and post-event actions (G. P. Smith & 
Wenger, 2007, p. 237) 
UNISDR Humanitarian/disaster reduction The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of  
facilities, livelihoods and living conditions of  disaster-
affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster 
risk factors (UNISDR, 2009b)  
 
It is clear from Table 2-2 that recovery is complex and encompasses many aspects. It has been 
argued that disasters are social phenomenon and should be considered in this wider social 
context; they should not be thought of  merely as physical phenomenon (Dynes, 1974). The 
definitions in Table 2-2 have included some of  the social aspects of  disaster. From Table 2-1, 
the authors have used the words restoration, reconstruction, rebuilding, repair and replacement in 
describing some of  the activities that could be involved in recovery. The conceptualisation of  all 
these ideas as being part of  recovery shows that the definition of  what recovery is or what it 
involves depends on the lens of  analysis. For instance, the definitions in Table 2-2 all point to 
there being a disruption to what is perceived as normal and that there is a desire to correct, or 
stabilise, this situation. Additionally, Smith and Wenger (2007) illustrate that recovery from 
disaster cannot and should not be separated from disaster preparedness and mitigation. 
For the recovery of  organisations and industry sectors in this thesis, their recovery should 
consider that they are systems nested within larger systems and that they are influenced by and 
influence the environment. 
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2.5.1 Sectoral and organisational recovery 
It is the opinion of  the author that recovery encompasses all of  the ideas in Table 2-2 and is not 
about returning to how things were before a disaster eventuated. This is impossible as even in 
non-disaster circumstances, everything changes with time. Alesch at al., (2009) in looking at 
community recovery after different disasters attest to this. For the purposes of  this thesis, 
recovery of  an organisation8 or sector is defined as 
when an organisation or sector can function and sustain itself  (continually) in its new post-disaster environment.  
Recovery is also about setting the conditions where organisations can thrive, so not only 
rebuilding and recovering for the short-term but also about orienting the wider economic, social 
and political conditions of  an area in order for organisations to prosper in the medium- to long-
term. Additionally, organisations and sectors are affected in different ways by disaster; these 
effects (or impacts) can be direct or indirect and can be positive or negative. 
2.5.2 Organisational recovery after disaster 
With every disaster, it is evident that the losses that result are not instantaneous. Instead, they 
accrue over time. This is partly to do with systemic characteristics of  non-linear cause and effect 
as well as delays (see chapter 8.4.2 for more detail on system delays and environmental time 
delays). Even more, the effects of  disaster should be placed in context; organisations, industry 
sectors, people and places are not affected the same by disaster and the process of  recovery can 
be long, complex and arduous. 
With the increasing numbers and costs of  disaster, there has been a lot of  interest in recovery 
from various parties such as governments, local authorities, insurers and the disaster research 
community at large. However, after a review of  the disaster literature, recovery (especially for 
response and short-term recovery) after disaster does not seem to have been rigorously 
examined and outlined. Quarantelli (1999) and Rubin (2009) propose that this is likely because 
the process of  recovery is lengthy and complex and involves physical, social, political and 
                                                     
8 Dawson (1992, p. xviii) defines organisations as collections of people joining together in some formal association in order to achieve 
group or individual objectives. 
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economic aspects. The involvement of  these different aspects pointed out by Quarantelli and 
Rubin means that recovery is a systemic process and where systems analysis should be used.  
Alesch (2002) also advocates planning for recovery from a systems point of  view. Further 
examination of  the disaster literature shows that the process of  recovery is without a clearly 
determinable point of  completion. While this point is valid, it can be argued, that depending on 
the definition of  recovery, i.e. aligned with the purpose of  the system, it may be possible to 
recognise recovery at some point from a disaster event.  
In the disaster and recovery literature, there are numerous studies that have analysed different 
aspects of  recovery for organisations but this has been done in the context of  the recovery of  
larger areas or economies. Losses from recovery have traditionally also been looked at from the 
household or regional level. However these aggregated loss reports (e.g. Kunreuther and Fiore 
(1966), Alexander (1981), Okuyama (2003)) do not tell the story of  how different industry 
sectors and organisations are affected differently by a disaster event. The task is made even more 
formidable because of  the deficiency of  relevant information, data and methods in the disaster 
literature for evaluating recovery after disaster. The development of  a framework for system 
influences on recovery will be one contribution of  this thesis. Additionally, the effects of  
disaster are usually reported in terms of  physical damage to the built environment, injury or loss 
of  life. However, there are additional social and economic consequences that extend temporally 
and spatially. For example, physical damage to buildings and infrastructure can lead to disruption 
of  operations and routines in organisations and communities. This disruption, often intangible 
or indirect, is frequently difficult to measure and can have regional, national and international 
repercussions. 
Influences on organisational recovery 
From the available literature, there are numerous determinants put forward as having an 
influence on organisational recovery after a hazard event turns into a disaster. These include the 
level of  physical damage, damage to the organisation’s non-structural elements such as 
machinery (Godschalk, 2003; Webb, Tierney, & Dahlhamer, 2002) and also the location of  the 
organisation’s premises (Alesch, Holly, Mittler, & Nagy, 2001). Runyan (2006) further illustrates 
the role that an organisation’s physical location plays in determining the types and magnitude of  
effects experienced by the organisation. The location of  the organisation, e.g. in a central 
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business district or a rural area, as well as the pre-disaster trends and plans that have shaped the 
area’s development are all part of  this physical context. For example, Chang and Nojima (2001) 
showed that urban areas that experienced decentralisation before a disaster often see an 
acceleration of  this trend in the recovery period. Decentralisation can lead to organisations 
having local customers. Organisations that have a local custom, especially those in retail that rely 
on foot-traffic, tend to recover more slowly (Alesch & Holly, 1998; Chang & Falit-Baiamonte, 
2002; Kroll, Landis, Shen, & Stryker, 1991). Alesch and Holly (1996) in their study of  businesses 
disrupted by the 1994 Northridge earthquake, found that businesses located in highly damaged 
areas, especially if  they depended heavily on a local customer-base, suffered proportionately 
more than others. 
Alesch and Holly (1998), Kroll et al (Kroll, 1991), as well as Tierney and Dahlhamer (1997) have 
all noted that the size of  the business or its financial state before a disaster can act to influence 
its recovery. Other reasons that could contribute to the recovery of  organisations after disaster 
include the need for the organisation’s goods and services after a disaster event, the access to 
needed resources as well as the leadership style in the organisation (Alesch et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, organisations affected by disaster face disruptions that flow on to the community 
and other organisations that depend on them (Tierney & Nigg, 1995; Webb et al., 2002). 
The literature also contains accounts of  recovery based on empirical observation of  community 
attempts at recovery after disaster, for example Alesch et al., (2009), Webb at al., (2002) as well as 
Galbraith and Stiles  (2006). Other authors have looked at recovery from the perspective of  the 
need for adequate shelter and how this affects recovery (Bolin & Stanford, 1991; Comerio, 1997; 
Quarantelli, 1982a; Wu & Lindell, 2004). Some studies have specifically focused on the 
mitigation of  critical infrastructure loss or disruption as a way of  mitigating the wider effects of  
disaster (Chang, Svekla, & Shinozuka, 2002; Gordon, Richardson, & Davis, 1998; Rose, 
Benavides, Chang, Szczesniak, & Lim, 1997). 
However, there are not many studies in the organisational recovery literature that have been 
intentionally conducted to investigate how industry sectors recover from disaster. Some 
exceptions are Ritchie (2003) and Shrivastava (1988): Ritchie focused on the tourism industry 
while Shrivastava investigated the accident at Bhopal. Other authors such as Anderson (1969) 
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and Tierney (1993a, 1997) have also touched on facets of  sectoral recovery. In an 18 month long 
study of  23 organisations involved in the emergency community response after the 1964 
earthquake in Anchorage, Alaska, Anderson (1969) reports that 73% of  the organisations  
studied changed structurally and/or functionally because of  the earthquake. For some of  the 
organisations in Anderson’s study, the disaster led to the emergence of  new patterns of  change 
while in other organisations it hastened pre-existing trends. Anderson further found that 
organisations experienced this change when the earthquake significantly altered their 
environments, for example, by creating new demands, and when it brought about or intensified 
already present internal problems such as organisational tensions. In later work, Tierney (1993a, 
1997) conducted studies of  organisational recovery after the 1993 Midwest floods and 1994 
earthquake at Northridge by sampling organisations using business type and business size. For 
the organisations affected by the floods, results show that a disruption to critical infrastructure 
services affected the organisations more than the actual flooding. Businesses affected by the 
Northridge earthquake showed that some of  the losses suffered by businesses were caused by 
disruption to the businesses and were not just from physical damage. 
From other analyses of  disaster recovery in general, there have been indications that 
organisation type or industry sector do have a bearing on post-disaster effects on organisations.  
For example, in examining the effects in the aftermath of  the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in 
the San Francisco Bay Area of  California, Kroll et al. (1991) found that single location retail and 
service organisations in the cities of  Santa Cruz and Oakland, experienced greater losses and 
had more difficulty recovering when compared to other types of  organisations. Despite these 
findings, Dahlhamer and Tierney (1998) found that industry sector was not a statistically 
significant predictor of  short-term business recovery in Santa Cruz after the Loma Prieta 
earthquake or in South Dade after Hurricane Andrew. In a follow-up study with the same 
businesses conducted by Webb et al. (2002), economic sector was found to be a strong predictor 
of  long-term recovery in South Dade but not in Santa Cruz.  
Some of  the theories outlined above, on the determinants of  recovery, will be tested in chapter 7 
of  this thesis. Additionally, results from various studies serve to show that there are several 
factors that interact to influence the recovery of  organisations and industry sectors after disaster. 
Recovery for an organisation begins before the disaster manifests by the existence of  
organisational planning and environmental conditions for the prevention and detection of  
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potential disaster. Crises will happen and even the best laid plans will eventually be put to the 
test. Turner (1976), Smith and Sipika (1993) and others demonstrate how crisis planning alone is 
insufficient, organisations should also plan how to respond to and manage crises as well as the 
aftermath.  This is in part because the impacts of  the disaster are influenced by some of  the 
decisions that are arrived at and actions taken before and after disaster. For example, an 
organisation with no disaster insurance might have to dip into its much needed own cash 
reserves to finance recovery, while the loss of  a key customer or supplier because of  crisis can 
also affect organisational recovery. This goes back to the system and its environment influencing 
each other. It should be kept in mind that systems thinking is an aid in analysis of  the many 
interacting components involved in organisational and sectoral recovery. 
Supply Web9 aspects of disaster recovery 
Organisations work with and rely on each other to exchange inputs (e.g. raw materials, 
information) that are then transformed into goods and services for commerce (Lambert & 
Cooper, 2000). For the provision of  goods and services, organisations require input material 
sourced from various suppliers who together form a supply chain (Lambert & Cooper, 2000), or 
web. In essence, and taking the systems perspective, all the structures and processes that are used 
by an organisation10 to deliver goods and services to its customers are part of  its supply web. 
Harland (1996) states the same. Figure 2-4 illustrates the primary elements in an organisation’s 
supply web and shows the flow of  material from suppliers to end customers through processes 
of  conversion and distribution. Of  importance in Figure 2-4 is the information that flows in the 
supply web. The flows in the web are governed by the organisation’s control systems and 
processes and corporate culture. 
                                                     
9 A supply chain implies a linear relationship between a focal organisation, suppliers, customers and infrastructure used to 
manufacture/produce and deliver goods and services. From a system dynamics point of view, the interactions between these 
system actors is non-linear, hence the idea of the supply web 
10 The organisation at the centre of a supply web will herein be referred to as the focal organisation 
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Figure 2-4 - Elements of a supply web (adapted from (Sheffi & Rice, 2005)) 
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is important as it deals with operations management, 
materials and production which may be affected by disaster. As one way of  increasing and 
maintaining the competitive advantage of  the organisation, the management of  its supply web is 
now seen as vital. Porter (1998) reiterates this when he shows the significance and benefits of  
utilising an organisation’s internal and external connections. From a systems perspective, a 
supply web has essential parts that include but are not limited to suppliers, production facilities, 
distribution services as well as customers, all connected by way of  the forward flow of  materials and 
the feedback flow of  information (Stevens, 1989). Such crucial links have a bearing on the recovery of  
an organisation post-disaster. 
Over time, many organisations have spent vast amounts of  resources in trying to predict and 
control their supply web (Choi, Dooley, & Rungtusanatham, 2001). In addition, supply web 
managers now need to harmonise the need for organisational demands such as low-cost and 
efficiency with the knowledge that the supply web might fail (Christopher & Peck, 2004; 
Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). For instance, in the 1950s, Taiichi Ohno of  Toyota developed what 
came to be known as lean manufacturing (LM) (Sato & Hoshino, 1984) based on increasing 
efficiency and decreasing waste as a way of  managing the supply web. LM is driven by forecast 
rather than demand which leads to tight coupling between supply and demand and which makes 
the organisation vulnerable to supply web disruptions (Christopher, 2000; Christopher & 
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Rutherford, 2004). This means that organisations have to find the balance between an efficient 
supply web and a resilient supply web.  
Several authors (Asbjornslett, 1999; Bak et al., 1988; Pathak, Day, Nair, Sawaya, & Kristal, 2007) 
are of  the view that organisations should understand not only how a disaster event might affect 
their assets; they also need to prepare and plan for what effects this might have on their supply 
web and other organisational structures and processes. As supply webs are made up of  
organisations from various industries, it can be argued that they should be treated as complex 
adaptive systems that are tightly-coupled. From the systems point of  view, the failure of  one 
organisation might lead to adverse consequences to its supply web as the system is 
interdependent (Christopher & Peck, 2004). For example, a deviation from the usual 
consumption, as is possible after disaster, can lead to changes in supply starting at one node 
which could then be amplified along the supply web. This is systemic non-linear feedback. In the 
beer game11 designed by Jay Forrester (Sterman, 1989) it was illustrated that this is partly the 
effect of  the individual reactions to the change of  information as it travelled along the supply 
web and the inability of  the members of  the chain to recognise that the different parts of  the 
supply chain are interconnected. This further shows that the reduction of  a whole to its 
component parts presents a distorted picture of  how the individual parts work together. 
There has been recognition that the recovery of  organisations after disaster can be affected by 
and is closely linked to upstream and downstream supply web partners (Christopher & Peck, 
2004; Finch, 2004). For instance, an organisation’s inability to meet a critical customer’s supply 
needs for an extended period might compel the customer to turn to other suppliers for the 
foreseeable future which would affect the recovery of  an organisation at the time when it is 
crucial for them to be trading. This was seen after the 2011 Japanese earthquake; one of  the 
indirect effects was the disruption to the global motor vehicle supply web. This was due to the 
inability of  organisations in the disaster affected area to supply parts or to assemble motor 
vehicles (Canis, 2011). This is related to points made in chapter 2.2.2 on the time horizon in a 
system being important and on system hierarchy and self-organisation. The different but 
                                                     
11 The beer game was invented by Jay Forrester and is a role-play supply chain simulation that lets students experience typical 
supply chain problems. It can be played at http://www.beergame.org/the-game, accessed 19 July 2012. 
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interlinked (sub)-parts of  the system have differing timescales. On the one hand customers need 
goods and services in a certain timeframe which does not match the post-disaster delivery times 
of  affected organisations. However, customers can organise themselves by turning to other 
suppliers for goods and services.  
In today’s exceedingly interconnected world, organisations are even more vulnerable to 
disruptions of  the supply web. Organisations now need to learn how to prevent or mitigate this 
particular kind of  risk. Starr et al (2003) advocate this when they state that organisations now 
face a more complex interdependent type of  risk. Notwithstanding any measures an 
organisation may take, just as with any other type of  risk, it is all but impossible to eliminate all 
risk from the supply web. The supply web is part of  the organisation’s environment enabling the 
delivery of  goods and services and may be affected in a regional disaster. Therefore, it is vital 
that supply web aspects be considered in looking at organisational or sectoral recovery. 
2.6 Framework for recovery after disaster 
The path recovery takes can be long and there are different influences on this as one moves 
away from the initial point of  the disaster event. It is these influences on recovery that are of  
great import to organisations as well as policy- and decision-makers. This temporal trajectory of  
recovery can be used to understand that what happens many months after disaster in the main 
recovery phase is as important as what took place in the response and early recovery phase. 
One of  the most well-known models for recovery, based on practical experience, is the cyclical 
process of  recovery after [natural] disaster proposed by Haas, Kates and Bowden (1977) and 
shown in Figure 2-5. The process involves four separate stages: the emergency phase, the 
restoration phase, the replacement reconstruction phase and the developmental reconstruction 
phase. The emergency phase begins immediately after the disaster event and can last for several 
weeks or months depending on the severity of  the damage caused by the disaster event. It 
involves search and rescue operations, debris clearing, and basic utility and infrastructure 
restoration. The restoration of  utilities can include temporary bridges, temporary water and 
sewage lines, and generator power to critical facilities and systems. The restoration phase 
includes all permanent repairs to facilities and infrastructure. The replacement construction 
phase is described as where construction of  housing and workplaces takes place while the 
development reconstruction phase involves putting up correspondent infrastructure such as 
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churches. Kates and Pijawka (1977) determined that each successive stage takes 10 times as long 
as the preceding one.  
 
Figure 2-5 - Four phases of recovery (adapted from (Haas et al., 1977)) 
Kates and Pijawka’s model, implies linearity in recovery, which is not the case as different 
activities may occur at the same time for instance. Additionally, the model by Haas et al. was a 
good starting point, nevertheless, other successive analyses such as those by Berke et al., (1993) 
and Bolin (1994) as well as observation of  activities after the earthquakes in Canterbury point to 
recovery not being as orderly or even as certain as Haas et al wrote. The stages are not as clearly 
defined and often overlap. Additionally, others have tried to add to this generalised framework 
with narratives of  the process of  recovery after specific disasters such as earthquakes, floods and 
Hurricanes (Chang & Miles, 2004; Hummel, Ahlers, Science, & Affairs, 2007; Olshansky et al., 
2006; Ota, Maki, & Hayashi, 2009). In the latter literature after the Haas et al. model, there has 
been a shift in focus to highlight that disaster does not affect different sectors of  society the 
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same:  there are variations in the rates and paths of  recovery including for industry sectors and 
individual organisations. This has made more prominent some of  the factors that have been 
reported in the literature as affecting the recovery of  different organisations. 
In the Canterbury context, apart from recovery not being a linear process, the time horizons in 
the model by Haas et al do not fit. To start, Canterbury experienced multiple large aftershocks at 
different times from the initial earthquake on 4 September 2010 event. Another difference that is 
not accounted for in the Canterbury sequence of  earthquakes is that different parts of  the 
greater Christchurch area were affected to varying degrees. Haas et al do not detail what recovery 
looks like for such a scenario. In general, it would appear that the Haas et al model focuses on 
the built environment. However, the social, economic, political and other aspects of  disaster 
need to be included also. Some of  these aspects are covered in Pugsley’s (1973) model on the 
proneness of  structures to failure. 
As yet, there has not been a comprehensive account of  recovery after disaster from the 
perspective of  the organisation or industry sector and the systemic interdependencies that affect 
this recovery. Hence the need for a more consolidated and integrated approach to the subject of  
disaster recovery for organisations. One of  the aims of  this thesis, and using the system 
dynamics approach, is to advance the knowledge of  the elements that influence the recovery of  
organisations and sectors. 
2.7 Organisational resilience 
In 2005, at the United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction, the concept of  
resilience was adopted via the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015. This relates to and calls 
for the focal points to be on the prioritisation of  risk identification and reduction; the 
enhancement of  early warning systems; the building of  a culture of  safety and resilience, and the 
strengthening of  disaster preparedness and response capabilities (UNISDR, 2005). 
In order to avoid repeated crises or disasters that leave organisations unable to cope, the idea of  
organisational resilience has been put forward as a means for organisations to maintain their 
ability in the face of  crisis (Hamel & Välikangas, 2003; Seville et al., 2008; Tierney, 2003). One 
argument in this thesis is that this general concept of  organisational resilience should be 
extended into that of  organisational disaster resilience. Several authors (Brewer, Weinstein, Cuite, 
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& Herrington, 2004; Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, & Abel, 2001; Couto, 1989; Tierney, 2008) 
have, in recent, years written on organisational disaster resilience. It has been proposed as an 
attribute essential for organisations in disaster and variously encompasses crisis prevention, crisis 
or emergency management, organisational learning, leadership and strategy among others. For 
this thesis, the definition of  resilience by Seville et al., (2008, p. 18) will be used: 
the ability to survive crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty. 
Figure 2-6 illustrates that organisational disaster resilience is not separate from the resilience of  
other actors such as the individual, the family and the community (see section 6.6 for more 
detail). Additionally, depending on the scale of  a crisis or disaster (see Quarantelli (2006) and 
McManus (2008)). McManus (2008) further describes the types of  crisis as: 
 distal - affecting the organisation through its supply web); 
 localised - organisation specific incidents that cause disruption; 
 societal – nationwide but where the organisation’s physical infrastructure is undamaged 
but staff  are unable to work; and 
 regional – significant physical damage and disruption of  lifelines in a large area.  
From these descriptions of  crisis types, this thesis puts forward that there are also two, 
interrelated, levels of  organisational resilience dependent on the scale of  a crisis. The two 
interrelated levels of  organisational resilience: business-as-usual (BAU) organisational resilience 
and organisational disaster resilience. Figure 2-6 shows that BAU organisational resilience is 
associated with crises or disasters of  a distal nature to the organisation, while organisational 
disaster resilience is associated with crises on a regional scale. For organisational disaster 
resilience, the affected organisation may be affected to a greater extent as a result of  the region 
they are in being affected. This means that not only are the organisation’s assets affected but also 
those of  their staff, the community the organisation exists in as well as other organisations in the 
region. As a result of  the scale of  a regional crisis or disaster and the number of  people or 
organisations affected, an organisation may find itself  in need of  resources it may not usually 
need, e.g. earthmoving equipment after an earthquake. Additionally, an organisation may be 
competing for these scarce and much needed resources with other affected organisations or 
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communities in the region as they all try to recover. In chapter 10, the dissimilarities between 
BAU organisational resilience and organisational disaster resilience are expanded on and it is 
shown how business-as-usual resilience can be used as a foundation to advance organisational 
disaster resilience. 
 
Figure 2-6: The different interconnected facets of resilience as used in this thesis 
While the origin of  resilience as a concept is still being debated, it can be said that the idea of  
resilience was widely disseminated from the field of  ecology via Resilience and Stability of  
Ecosystems (Holling, 1973). The origin of  the word resilience is Latin. From the Oxford English 
Dictionary: 
Latin origins < L resili (ēns), prp. of  resilīre: the power or ability to return to the original form, 
position, etc., after being bent, compressed, or stretched (OED, 2010). 
It appears that the OED definition assumes that a system will always bounce back. This is not 
the case as all systems have a breaking point, resilience is finite. From the academic perspective, 
resilience has been given many different meanings depending on the researcher or the area of  
research. Table 2-3 shows some of  the definitions of  resilience from the different disciplines.  
All hazards and 
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Individual resilience 
Family resilience 
Organisational 
resilience 
Distal crisis or disaster 
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Table 2-3: Definitions of resilience from different disciplines and research areas 
Definitions of  resilience from different disciplines and research areas 
Author(s) Academic/research 
discipline 
Definition 
Holling Ecology 
a measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to 
absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same 
relationships between populations or state variables (Holling, 
1973) 
Horne & Orr 
Organisational and human 
resource development 
resilience is a fundamental quality of individuals, groups and 
organisations, and systems as a whole to respond productively 
to significant change that disrupts the expected pattern of 
events without engaging in an extended period of regressive 
behaviour (Horne & Orr, 1998) 
Perrings 
Environmental and resource 
economics 
resilience is a measure of the ability of a system to withstand 
stresses and shocks – its ability to persist in an uncertain world 
(Perrings, 1998) 
Comfort 
Public and international 
affairs (public policy analysis) 
the capacity to adapt existing resources and skills to new 
systems and operating conditions (Comfort et al., 1999a) 
Petak Public administration 
the system’s ability to make a smooth transition to a new stable 
state in response to the disturbance (Petak, 2002) 
Bruneau et al 
Earthquake engineering 
(community disaster 
resilience) 
the ability of social units (e.g., organizations, communities) to 
mitigate hazards, contain the effects of disasters when they 
occur, and carry out recovery activities in ways that minimize 
social disruption and mitigate the effects of future earthquakes 
(Bruneau et al., 2003) 
Tierney Sociology 
a property of physical and social systems that enables them to 
reduce the probability of disaster-induced loss of functionality, 
respond appropriately when damage and disruption occur, and 
recover in a timely manner (Tierney, 2003) 
Christopher and 
Peck 
Logistics 
the ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a 
new more desirable state after being disturbed (Christopher & 
Peck, 2004) 
Rose Economics 
the ability or capacity of a system to absorb or cushion against 
damage or loss…(more general definition) that incorporates 
dynamic considerations, including stability, is the ability of a 
system to recover from a severe shock (Rose, 2004) 
Walker et al Ecology 
the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize 
while undergoing change so as to still retain essentially the same 
function, structure, identity, and feedbacks (Walker, Holling, 
Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004) 
Hollnagel et al Engineering 
the ability of systems to anticipate and adapt to the potential for 
surprise and failure (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) 
 
Seville et al 
Business and engineering 
an organisation’s ability to survive, and potentially even thrive, 
in times of crisis (Seville et al., 2008) 
UNISDR Disaster reduction 
the ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the 
effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including 
through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic 
structures and functions (UNISDR, 2009a) 
From the numerous definitions listed in Table 2-3, a central theme emerges. The various 
disciplines use the terms resist, absorb and anticipate; thereby emphasising a pro-active as opposed 
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to re-active stance in terms of  resilience. These definitions also indicate that most disciplines 
regard resilience as an end result of  other contributing factors rather than as a process. At the 
same time, the major line of  thinking in terms of  resilience is the concept of  bouncing back 
(Paton, 2007). However, it can be said that resilience especially after disaster is about more than 
just bouncing back, it also requires adaptability and transformability as the post-disaster context 
is markedly changed. As stated earlier, the definition of  organisational resilience used in this 
thesis is that of  Seville et al (2008, p. 18): the ability to survive crisis and thrive in a world of  uncertainty. 
The reason for using this definition of  organisational resilience is because it is not restricted to 
one type of  crisis, instead it is all encompassing. As well, it talks of  the uncertainty of  an 
organisation’s environment and the organisation’s possibility to thrive, i.e., to adapt post-disaster. 
2.8 Organisational disaster resilience 
In this thesis, the perspective on organisational resilience is that of  organisational disaster resilience. 
This is a focus on how organisations can become less vulnerable and make themselves more 
resilient to disaster. Extreme events can cause damage to physical infrastructure, cause 
disruptions to organisation and impinge on people’s livelihoods. Disruptions can adversely affect 
the operations of  organisations and investments in resilience can give a business a competitive 
advantage over organisations not as well prepared for dynamic circumstances. 
A search in the disaster literature for organisational disaster resilience shows that this is a 
relatively young but growing field. In the disaster scholarship, there exists work on the disaster 
resilience of  communities by Chang and Shinozuka (2004), Paton (2007) and Mayunga (2007). In 
addition to this view, there is an emerging, but limited, body of  literature that links an 
organisation’s level of  resilience to its recovery post-disaster (Bruneau et al., 2003; Chang, Rose, 
Shinozuka, Svekla, & Tierney, 2000). It appears that this growing focus on organisational disaster 
resilience stems from the awareness that some organisations adapt better than others during 
times of  crisis and turbulence. There is recognition that resilience is a fundamental 
organisational attribute that facilitates adaptation, transformability, learning and functional 
stability post-disaster. Tierney and Bruneau (2003, p. 14) say of  disaster resilience that it 
reflects a concern for improving the capacity of physical and human systems to respond to and recover from 
extreme events. 
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From the Resilience Alliance (2012), resilience as pertaining to socio-ecological systems (of  
which organisations are a part) has three defining aspects:  
 the amount of  change the system can undergo and still retain the same controls on 
function and structure; 
 the degree to which the system is capable of  self- organisation (recovery); and 
 the ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaptation. 
For this thesis, the Resilience Alliance make an important point that a lot of  the work reviewed 
for this thesis does not: the amount of  change the system can undergo. This means that 
resilience is not infinite and every system can break depending on the conditions. Additionally, 
the adaptive capacity referred to is taken to be the ability of  the actors in a system to influence 
or direct their resilience. This is a trait of  systems that learn and store knowledge. Walker and 
Meyers (2004) write that the capacity for forward planning demonstrates the difference between 
resilience in ecosystems and social systems.  
2.8.1 The need for organisations to be disaster resilient  
For some organisations struggling to recover after disaster, the destruction and the task before 
them can seem insurmountable. Government departments, critical infrastructure providers, local 
authorities, emergency services, businesses, civil society and other community organisations can 
all be affected by disaster and should therefore all strive to be disaster resilient. In addition, when 
an organisation can demonstrate that it is disaster resilient, this leads to an elevated level of  trust 
in the organisation from other organisations or people that work with it. For example, in the 
case of  critical infrastructure providers, the Australian Resilience Expert Advisory Group (2011) 
write that a benefit of  this is the possibility for less regulation from the government for 
organisations seen as resilient. 
While organisations that are owned or run by the government may be under mandate not to fail, 
the same cannot be said of  private enterprise. However, these organisations, part of  larger 
systems, also carry responsibilities that mean that they should be able to continue to some 
extent, in a disaster situation (A. B. Carroll, 1991; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). These 
responsibilities extend to the organisation’s employees (and by extension the communities these 
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employees belong to), customers, supply chain partners and shareholders. Were an organisation 
to close or to take a long time recovering after disaster, this would have an effect on the 
livelihoods and operations of  many who depend on it. 
To extend this further, organisations are also a part of  the social and economic fabric of  the 
regions they contribute to and could affect a whole region’s social and economic wellbeing if  
they failed. For example, organisations whose goods and services are necessary for a region’s 
economic growth and by extension its recovery (Popp, 2006). In addition, organisations also 
contribute to the community and the region by way of  the rates and taxes they pay. Prolonged 
disruption or closure of  business may put a financial strain on the local or national government 
which in turn could have a bearing on development plans (Chang, 1983). Other organisations 
that need to be disaster resilient are those that are part of  civil society 12 . Aldrich (2008) 
examined the role of  civil society in recovery after the Kobe earthquake in Japan and concluded 
that the quick recovery of  some parts of  the area was because of  the work carried out by civil 
society. 
2.8.2 Organisational resilience – from theory to application 
For most organisations, the overall concept of  resilience, its characteristics and how to measure 
them remain intangible. Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) report that there is increased resilience when 
emphasis is placed on the positive attributes of  individuals and the organisation. According to 
Bruneau et al (2003), it is possible to quantify the effects of  resilience beforehand by calculating 
the losses incurred as a result of  resilient actions not carried out before a crisis. This 
quantification would be the next step in the previously discussed qualitative indicators proposed 
by Heinrich and Pugsley (see section 2.3.2). 
Other actions, or metrics, leading to resilience include how long it takes to resolve a crisis should 
it occur (Rose, 2004). Resilience can also be measured as savings made by actions such as 
sustainable production methods (Fiksel, 2006). Being able to measure resilience in such tangible 
ways would help to make resilience a point of  discussion in organisational boardrooms as it can 
be shown how resilient actions can add to the bottom line. From the system dynamics 
perspective, measures of  resilience could be how far from a pre-disaster state the system deviates 
                                                     
12 The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines civil society as ‘that aspect of society concerned with and operating for the 
collective good, independent of state control or commercial influence’. Accessed on 19 July 2012 from www.oed.com 
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or the time taken for the system to return to a pre-disaster state or better, for example revenue 
earnings for organisations. This makes use of  the system characteristic of  negative feedback 
which is goal seeking. There is more discussion in chapters 7 and 10 on revenue and time as 
measures of  disaster resilience. 
In some cases, organisations fail to realise that environmental changes outside the organisation, 
such as those brought on by disaster, necessitate changing the goal(s) of  the organisation (Evan 
& Black, 1967; D. Kelly & Amburgey, 1991). Other actions of  resilient organisations include 
redefining the organisation’s goals and aligning these goals with the organisation’s operations 
(Rummler & Brache, 1990). The equivalent of  this process in systems terms is systems re-
optimisation13. 
Additionally, dealing with a crisis effectively is part of  being resilient. Knight and Pretty (1996) 
showed that organisations that did not deal with crises effectively or adequately suffered a 10% 
decrease in the price of  their stock after the first week of  the crisis and a 15% decrease below 
pre-crisis prices in the first year following the crisis. Alternatively, organisations that effectively 
managed a crisis had just a 5% stock price dip in the wake of  the crisis and the stock price 
recovered quickly in the year after the crisis (Knight & Pretty, 1996). For a resilient organisation, 
the emphasis should not be on disaster preparedness but on general preparedness for all hazards 
and for day-today activities (Reason, 1998). 
Lastly, apart from being able to determine the organisation’s level of  resilience, organisations are 
also concerned with knowing when they should evolve from a certain level of  resilience to 
another, for instance after disaster when there are many changes and uncertainties.  The primary 
question is: should organisations strive to get back to the level of  disaster resilience they had 
prior to the disaster event? On the contrary, a resilient system need not be stable in the 
traditional sense. Lebel et al (2006) posit that a resilient system should be stable in being able to 
withstand turbulent conditions and still survive, adapting and changing if  necessary. 
                                                     
13 To optimise the system and redefine the goal, principles from systems engineering can be used (for more on this, see 
Laplante (2007), Sommerville (2000) and Bhamadipiti (2010)). 
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2.8.3 Measuring organisational resilience 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) make the link between organisational resilience and positive 
performance at the individual and organisational levels. They also argue that resilience should be 
viewed as always being developed, as an ability that develops over time from continually 
managing risks. From a systems viewpoint, it can be concluded that resilience is relative, is an 
emergent property of  the system and changes depending on specific circumstances, i.e. resilience 
displayed in one situation may not be sustained over time or transposed to other circumstances. 
It is implied in this developmental perspective that resilience depends on the presence of  
inherent or dormant resources that can be activated and put together using various permutations 
as the situation warrants. For example, Maguire and Hagan (2007) posit that the development of  
emergency plans must use some of  the inherent existing organisational social resilience as part 
of  their foundation. 
Before disaster strikes, the resilience of  an organisation can be strengthened. However, as has 
been shown, the idea of  resilience is broad and multifaceted. A cardinal point is how to 
recognise and determine the level of  resilience for an organisation. Therefore it is helpful to 
break it down into components that are understandable, easily usable, can be measured, are of  
relevance and explain the overall concept. Some work has been undertaken in this area. 
McManus (2008) and Stephenson (2010), starting with an appraisal of  the wider organisational 
literature and using case studies, surveys and focus groups, went on to identify 13 organisational 
characteristics that together form the umbrella concept of  organisational resilience. These 13 
indicators of  organisational resilience can be used by organisations to appraise their overall level 
of  resilience and based on the score for each indicator can also be used for identification of  any 
possible areas of  improvement. These indicators of  organisational resilience are sometimes 
referred to as the attributes or components of  organisational resilience. 
The Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) (Resilient Organisations, 2010b) is a multiple indicator 
measure of  resilience. Quantification of  indicators of  resilience allows for the measure of  
differentiation of  resilience at different points in time. For recovery after disaster, it is as yet 
unclear which, if  any, of  these indicators of  organisational resilience has a more substantive 
effect. In chapter 10, it will be shown how the BRT-53 can be enhanced for organisational 
disaster resilience. 
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The 13 indicators of organisational resilience 
As a result of  the work of  McManus (2008) who investigated the resilience of  New Zealand 
organisations, three pillars of  resilience were identified, along with the possibility to derive what 
was called the Relative Overall Resilience or ROR of  an organisation. The indicators are shown in 
Table 2-4. Each of  McManus’ three pillars of  resilience comprises five indicators of  resilience 
aim to capture the different aspects of  this complex idea. 
As discussed in previous paragraphs, resilience is subjective and contextual. McManus’ indicators 
of  organisational resilience assume a one-size-fits-all model for organisations, and do not 
consider that there may be different aspects of  resilience required for organisations in different 
circumstances. For instance, an organisation’s level of  resilience pre-disaster is likely not the 
same post-disaster. In a system, there are different feedback loops dominant at different times 
and contributing to its resilience. For instance, Pugsley (1991), in writing on how to predict 
proneness to failure included in his indicators environmental aspects such as finance and politics 
which are not explicitly shown in McManus’ model. Additionally, McManus’ indicators are also 
qualitative only. This is good start to measuring organisational resilience. For organisations, the 
addition of  a quantitative aspect to McManus’ model is beneficial. This is because a purely 
qualitative measure would make it difficult for them to know what their level of  resilience was or 
how much effort was needed to improve it. 
Table 2-4 - Pillars and indicators of organisational resilience 
Pillars and indicators of organisational resilience 
Pillars of  resilience Situational awareness 
Management of  keystone 
vulnerability 
Adaptive capacity 
Indicators of  Resilience SA1 Roles and 
responsibilities 
KV1 Planning strategies AC1 Silo mentality 
SA2 Understanding 
of  hazards and 
consequences 
KV2 Participation in 
exercises 
AC2 Communications and 
relationships 
SA3 Connectivity 
awareness 
KV3 Capability and 
capacity of  internal 
resources 
AC3 Strategic vision and 
outcome expectancy 
SA4 Insurance 
awareness 
KV4 Capability and 
capacity of  external 
resources 
AC4 Information and 
knowledge 
SA5 Recovery 
priorities 
KV5 Organisational 
connectivity 
AC5 Leadership, management 
and governance 
structures 
Adapted from Organisational Resilience in New Zealand (McManus, 2008) 
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The later work of  Stephenson (2010), based on that of  McManus (2008) and carried out with 
organisations based in Auckland, led to the benchmarking of  organisational resilience with the 
aim of  giving organisations a standard for resilience that they could use as a comparison. From 
the Auckland study, based on statistical analysis, Stephenson also developed a restructured, 
revised and more refined model of  organisational resilience that had 13 indicators of  resilience 
illustrated in Table 2-5. 
Table 2-5: Newer model of organisational resilience 
Organisational resilience factors and indicators contained in newer model 
Adaptive Capacity Planning 
Minimisation of  silo mentality Planning strategies 
Capability and capacity of  internal resources Participation in exercises 
Staff  engagement and involvement Proactive posture 
Information and knowledge Capability and capacity of  external resources 
Leadership, management and governance 
structures 
Recovery priorities 
Innovation and creativity  
Devolved and responsive decision making  
Internal and external situation monitoring and 
reporting 
 
(Stephenson, 2010, p. 176) 
The advantage of  Stephenson’s model is that it is quantitative. However, this latest model by 
Stephenson (2010) also assumes that the indicators would work for organisations of  different 
types. As organisations are different and have different entities they interact with, this may not 
be the case. For instance, minimisation of  silo mentality or leadership, management and 
governance structures may not be applicable to an organisation with no departmental barriers or 
with different leadership structures. As an example, Handler and Kram (2004) concluded that 
leadership and governance are not the same in family businesses as in other organisations. 
Stephenson included traditional financial measures (cash flow, return on investment-(ROI) and 
profits) used to measure a firm’s excellence or viability. This is useful for organisations as these 
are measures already in use or are easy for the organisation to understand. However, as was also 
noted by Chakravarthy (1986), these conventional measures, such as ROI and profits, have the 
limitation that they are usually taken in isolation, and while important, show an organisation’s 
history but not the direction in which it might go. Graham (2001) calls these lagging, or past, 
indicators which should be used in conjunction with leading (or future) indicators such as how 
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aware employees are of  services to be offered in future, as well as the potential value of  these 
services (monetary or otherwise) to the organisation (see chapter 10 of  this thesis). Examining 
the nature and type of  a firm’s decisions and shifts, via its strategy for example, could be used as  
an alternative measure (Evan, 1978). As well, intangibles like team spirit should not be devalued 
when measuring an organisation’s performance as these also give an indication of  the state of  
health of  an organisation (Senge, 2006). Stephenson’s (2010) work asks about staff  satisfaction 
at a broad organisational level. In addition to overall staff  satisfaction questions, the organisation 
could ask for specific reasons for the level(s) of  satisfaction of  their staff. In short, measures 
that are relevant to the organisation and the context should be used. 
Stephenson’s model of  organisational resilience provides organisations with metrics for 
measuring organisational resilience. Organisations can use changes in these metrics to monitor 
changes in organisational resilience over time. Stephenson’s model would benefit from having 
different versions to suit different organisations and different industry sectors as well as 
questions specifically to do with disaster resilience. One of  the aims of  this thesis is to highlight 
how Stephenson’s model could be advanced, especially for organisational disaster resilience. This 
is discussed in detail in chapter 10. 
Lastly, Stephenson’s quantitative model leads to an overall organisational resilience figure. The 
overall organisational resilience score is useful as a general marker for the organisation’s change 
in resilience. However, organisations concentrating on only this aggregated measure of  resilience 
may find that it does not aid in making improvements to specific aspects of  their resilience.  
Additionally, both McManus and Stephenson talk of  the resilience of  the organisation. 
However, organisations are part of  larger systems. Therefore, both the resilience of  the 
organisation and the resilience of  the system it is a part of  need to be measured. This can be 
defined dependent on the purpose or goal of  the system. 
Other indicators of organisational resilience in the literature 
There are other occurrences of  organisational resilience in the literature and they have all been 
used in the context of  organisations overcoming turbulent environments. As with the definitions 
of  resilience, the indicators or attributes of  organisational resilience are also assigned different 
labels by different researchers. However, the descriptions have a similar theme. 
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Lengnick-Hall and Beck (2005) characterise organisational resilience as having three 
components: cognitive, behavioural and contextual. Meanwhile, Walker et al (2004) write that 
factors important to the future direction of  an organisation are resilience, adaptability and 
transformability. Resilience is further broken down into four parts, latitude, resistance, 
precariousness, and panarchy. Adaptability is defined as the capacity of  actors in the system to 
influence resilience whereas transformability is the capacity to create a fundamentally new 
system when ecological, economic, or social structures make the existing system untenable. 
Rose (2004) talks of  organisations having inherent and adaptive types of  resilience. Tierney 
(2008) writes about the 4-R framework of  resilience that also applies to organisations and 
includes technical, organisation, social and economic aspects. Bell (2002) also cites five pillars of  
organisational resilience: leadership, culture, people, systems and settings. Horne and Orr (1998) 
have gone further than most authors and aligned organisational performance to their seven streams 
of  resilient behaviour: 
 community; 
 competence; 
 connections; 
 commitment; 
 communication; 
 coordination; and 
 consideration. 
These seven streams, if  present in organisations, have been identified as actions that contribute 
to the creation of  a resilient organisation. Horne and Orr state that the streams are intertwined. 
This is in line with the notion of  organisations as systems that is used in this thesis. According to 
Horne and Orr (1998), community is the employees’ understanding of  the purpose, vision, 
mission and values in the organisation while competence is the repertoire of  skills the employees 
possess to meet the demands of  changing environments. The connections stream deals with the 
extent of  an organisation’s social support in periods of  crisis, commitment is the ability of  all 
units in the organisation to work together effectively in times of  change. Communication 
focuses on sharing relevant information during these times of  change. Coordination is the act of  
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arranging the entire system in order to have effective results. The last stream, consideration, is 
about factoring in the human element in the everyday dealings of  the organisation. 
The measures of  organisational resilience from Lengnick-Hall and Beck, Rose, Tierney, Bell and 
Horne and Orr, while descriptive, do not detail how organisational resilience can be measured so 
that organisations can use these metrics for improvement. This is especially vital after a disaster. 
2.8.4 The case for investment in organisational disaster resilience  
If  any measure of  disaster resilience is to be useful to the organisation, it should be invested in 
prior to any disaster and improved upon as the organisation learns. For instance, Knight and 
Pretty (1996) and Rose (2004) demonstrate that organisations can minimise disaster losses as a 
result of  engaging in resilient pre-disaster actions. Resilience is necessary because organisations 
now have to deal with situations where new problems come up and the old methods of  
analysing problems have themselves become problems (Jacques, 1996). Additionally, 
organisations now have to compete with everyone for everything from everywhere (Sirkin, Hemerling, & 
Bhattacharya, 2008, p. 6). Being able to adjust to different situations such as those brought on by 
disaster, being creative and learning are some of  the traits and actions of  a resilient organisation. 
This means organisational disaster resilience is more than just returning to the situation as it was 
before a disaster. Adapting to suit changing circumstances is another characteristic of  a resilient 
organisation. According to Pascale and Athos (1981), one indication of  an organisation that has 
adapted effectively is that it can partner its strengths and its abilities with the opportunities 
presented by the environment, and then choose a strategy that aligns with these opportunities. 
Pascale and Athos’ advice, while very true, may not take into account the sustainability of  taking 
up these opportunities if  the long-term purpose of  the organisation is not considered.  
Moreover, the ways of  doing business grow more intricate and competing financial, social, and 
political interests increase. Leveson (2002) and Perrow (1986) acknowledge that as a result of  
such interconnectedness systemic risk cannot be avoided; rather, the innate risks in the way 
organisations operate should be recognised as much as possible. Furthermore, the system should 
be made resilient to external and internal factors (Thain & Goldthorpe, 1989) to ensure 
continued existence. It is tempting to try and design risks out of  a system; however, this is close 
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to impossible and may create more complications as the system might then not be fit for 
purpose.  
Worldwide, in just the last few years, numerous events have had a bearing on organisational 
recovery and resilience. These include events such as the boxing day Tsunami of  2004 in which 
many lives were lost and which had a negative impact on the tourism industry of  the majority of  
the countries affected (Birkland, Herabat, Little, & Wallace, 2005; Majumder, 2005). The 
importance of  disaster resilience is so that in times of  disaster an organisation has the ability to 
accept change gracefully (H. D. Foster, 1997, p. 6) and without near permanent collapse (Bolin & 
Stanford, 1998; H. D. Foster, 1997). Therefore, there is a need to investigate what actions can 
lead to organisational and sectoral disaster resilience. 
2.9 The frame of reference for this research 
Organisations in New Zealand are exposed to a wide range of  hazards, natural and otherwise. 
While the focus in this thesis is on organisations and sectors, there is recognition that especially 
in crises that are regional, the recovery of  the organisation, the sector, the community and the 
region are very closely linked. The frames of  reference used in this thesis are from the literature 
on organisations, crisis management and disaster recovery. These are brought together through 
the use of  the grounded theory and system dynamics approaches. 
This research therefore addresses the gap in the literature on the recovery of  individual 
organisations as well as industry sectors and also the interlinked nature of  organisational 
recovery after disaster by taking a systems (or holistic) view of  disaster recovery. There is also a 
gap in addressing what aspects are most important in organisations in the response and short-
term recovery phases of  disaster. Moreover, it has been noted that much of  the existing research 
and documented work on organisational crisis and disaster management has been focused on the 
internal working of  an organisation, not taking the organisation in the context of  its 
environment (Evan, 1965; Senge, 2006). Using the organisational, crisis management and 
disaster recovery literature points of  view, underpinned by systems thinking helps in 
understanding how organisations belong to the bigger picture that is Canterbury post 2010-2011 
earthquakes. Consequently, another component of  this thesis will be to start to answer the 
question of  what are some of  the determinants of  recovery, prosperity or failure of  an 
organisation and sector after a major hazard event. 
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Furthermore, in the disaster and organisational literature, there is a gap in knowledge of  how 
different industry sectors are affected by disaster as well as how they recover. As industry sectors 
and the interconnections between them play a crucial role in the economic and social well-being 
of  an area, the way(s) in which they recover from disaster is conspicuous in its absence from the 
disaster literature. This is even as there has been some research focused on how (mainly) for-
profit organisations fared after other disasters similar to the earthquake(s) in Canterbury, New 
Zealand. Examples include the earthquakes in San Francisco (Webb et al., 2002) and Northridge 
(Bolin & Stanford, 1998; Tierney, 1997) in the USA as well as Gisborne (F. Powell & Harding, 
2009) and the Ruapehu eruptions (Miller, Paton, & Johnston, 1999) both on New Zealand’s 
North Island. However, the damage and effects of  these disasters and the subsequent recovery 
have been scrutinised from a broad local or national level (Alesch et al., 2001) masking how 
industry sectors were particularly affected and how they fared afterwards. In contrast, it has been 
documented that small business might have difficulty recovering (Alesch & Holly, 1998; Runyan, 
2006) and that certain individual sectors such as construction and manufacturing might 
experience a boom in the immediate aftermath of  an earthquake (Tierney, 1993a; Tierney & 
Webb, 2001). However Tierney’s work does not extend to the development of  a recovery 
framework for organisations and industry sectors and the systemic linkages involved. Adding to 
this segment of  the disaster scholarship will be another contribution of  this thesis. From the 
disaster recovery and organisational bodies of  work, some of  the other theories that will be 
tested in this thesis are what determines recovery for organisations and sectors and is it a linear 
process? 
Additionally, in this PhD research, the recovery from, resilience to and short-term impacts of  
disaster on individual organisations, localities (central business districts) and multiple industry 
sectors (e.g. hospitality, trucking, retail) will be analysed. Included in the study is the investigation 
of  the transitory effects of  disaster on different sectors, for example as a result of  increased or 
decreased demand for goods and services at certain points after the earthquake. In this work, 
specific attention is also paid to the repercussions of  multiple organisations in a supply chain 
being disrupted by the same event as well as the effects when a critical node in a supply chain is 
shaken by disaster. Apart from investigating the key elements of  recovery for organisations and 
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industry sectors, another contribution of  this work will be through the addition made to the 
existing literature on organisational disaster resilience.  
In light of  the above, it is imperative that a new, systemic, way of  looking at organisational and 
sectoral recovery from disaster be taken up by organisations as well as organisational and disaster 
scholars. Keeping in mind the extent of  the Canterbury series of  earthquakes and the number 
of  organisations involved, the analysis in this work is that of  a regional disaster perspective. 
From the previously outlined retrospective on the organisational, crisis management, disaster 
recovery and systems thinking literature, research aims and questions were developed to aid in 
achieving the intended contributions of  this work. 
2.10 Research Aims 
The aims of  this research are to: 
 Investigate the major factors involved in the recovery of  organisations after a major (regional) hazard 
event. 
 Determine the system dynamics involved in the recovery of  organisations and sectors. 
 Review the work done by Stephenson and McManus, enhance the Organisational Resilience 
Measurement Tool and contribute to the overall aims of  ResOrgs. 
 Explore ways of  enhancing the (business) case for resilience. 
 
2.11 Research Questions 
From the aims stated above, the research questions are: 
 What factors - severity of  the effects (direct and indirect) of  a major hazard event, or the pre-or post-
event performance - have substantial effects on the recovery of  organisations and what are the relative 
magnitudes of  these effects? 
 What are the system behaviours that contribute to the recovery of  an individual organisation, a sector 
and between sectors? 
 Which of  the indicators of  organisational resilience are prominent in a regional disaster? 
 What is the link between resilience and organisational performance? 
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2.12 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, it has been shown that the literature on different aspects of  the recovery process 
and that on how organisations deal with crises continues to expand. This chapter reviewed the 
critical points of current knowledge in the literature on organisational crisis management, 
disaster recovery, disaster resilience and organisations as systems. In the chapter, it was further 
emphasised that disaster recovery needs to be looked at from the sectoral perspective and within 
a system dynamics framework. This knowledge is valuable not only for strategy and policy 
formulation after disaster but also for future decisions for organisations and sectors. 
However, there has so far not been a system dynamics model or framework that brings together 
the complementary disciplines reviewed, to outline the process of  recovery for organisations and 
industry sectors in a disaster environment as well as what that might involve. Specifically a 
framework that takes into consideration the systemic nature of  organisations and industry 
sectors, to track their recovery from almost immediately after a disaster event to the short-term. 
A framework that takes into account that recovery from disaster is a long, complex, inter-
organisational and systemic affair. In this thesis, the frames of  reference utilised are from the 
existing literature on organisations, crisis management and disaster recovery. Importantly, these 
will be underpinned by the grounded theory and systems thinking approaches and used to 
investigate and establish the key elements of  recovery for organisations and sectors after the 
2010 – 2011 earthquakes in Canterbury. The gaps to be addressed in this thesis include: 
 considering organisations and industry sectors as systems and belonging to larger 
systems, what are some of  the determinants of  recovery, prosperity or failure after the 
2010-2011 Canterbury series of  earthquakes?; 
 what are some of  the aspects that are important in organisations in the immediate 
response and short-term recovery phase of  disaster?; 
 what are some of  the key characteristics of  disaster resilience for organisations and 
industry sectors as well as the interlinked nature of  organisational and sectoral recovery?; 
and 
 what is contained in a systems dynamics post-disaster recovery framework for 
organisations and industry sectors? 
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The next chapter is on the rationale used for the design of the research. 
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3 Research methods and design 
Recovery from any major event is long term and can last anything from 5 years to decades after 
an event. In the overall recovery process, this research was conducted over the two year period 
spanning response and short-term recovery. The study was carried out starting from a few weeks 
after the 4 September, 2010 MW 7.1 Darfield earthquake and was designed to follow sampled 
organisations and industry sectors through their recovery process after the 2010 and 2011 series 
of earthquakes. The aim of the study was to chart the effects and consequences, in the 
immediate and short-term, of the earthquakes on these selected organisations and industry 
sectors in Canterbury. 
The study utilises a multi-method research strategy which draws on the strengths of different 
research methods. This way of conducting research is sometimes known as triangulation (Denzin, 
2009; Robson, 2002). Specifically methodological triangulation, a process of combining 
quantitative and qualitative approaches, was employed for analysis of surveys, contextual 
interviews and case studies. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches ensures 
a richer data set as the two methods can be used to collect data that is complementary. This is 
seen as advantageous for research (Campbell & Fiske, 1998; Jick, 1979). Furthermore, all of the 
data were analysed from a system dynamics perspective which aids in the analysis of situations 
with numerous interrelated elements. The system dynamics approach is used because the post-
disaster situation being analysed is complex and dynamic and stems from the interaction of 
physical, social, economic, political and environmental systems. In the case of organisations, 
their recovery involves all these facets as well as the possibility of an affected organisation having 
an effect on other organisations it interacts with or vice-versa. 
Given the sensitive and emotive nature of this research, measures were taken to ensure that it 
would be conducted in an ethically sensitive manner. This included seeking and receiving 
permission from the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (HEC). 
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3.1 Sample group14 
The main research site was the earthquake hit Canterbury region on the South Island of New 
Zealand; with a focus on the greater Christchurch area, Waimakariri district and Selwyn district. 
The sectors that make up the sample group were selected so as to reflect various elements of the 
Canterbury economy. For the purposes of this thesis, a group of organisations that operate in 
the same segment of the economy or share a similar business type are characterised as making 
up an industry sector. The selection of the sectors was done in collaboration with a research 
team comprised of organisational, resilience and recovery experts. The experts were consulted 
for their knowledge of the economies and business landscapes of Christchurch and Canterbury. 
The reason for selection at the sector level was to establish the effects of the recovery on a 
whole sector as well as individual organisations in a sector. Also, to make the research valid and 
applicable, one of the factors in picking the sample was that some of the organisations should 
belong to industry and geographic sectors that were an integral part of the economy of 
Christchurch. Additionally, the sectors selected had interactions with each other. This to better 
show the effects that sectors can have on each other’s recovery. From a system’s perspective, the 
primary aim of this thesis is to investigate the key elements of recovery and resilience for 
industry sectors. The sectors selected fulfilled this purpose. 
Therefore, included in the overall sampling frame were sectors noted in the Canterbury Regional 
Economic Development Strategy (CREDS) 2005 – 2015 part of whose vision includes making 
Canterbury a world leading regional economy founded on innovation, diversity and sustainability (Canterbury 
Economic Development Co. Ltd., 2009). Included in CREDS are the agricultural, information 
and communication technology (ICT), manufacturing and business services sectors; not all of 
these sectors were selected for the study. After some discussion a shortlist of other possible 
sectors seen as vital to the recovery of Canterbury after the earthquake was drawn up. This 
shortlist was further whittled down to the final list of sectors shown in Table 3-1. 
 
 
                                                     
14 A more detailed description of each sample group can be found in chapter 4. 
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Table 3-1: Final list of industry sectors selected for the study 
Final list of industry sectors selected for the study 
Sector or sub-sector Details of sector or sub-sector Brief explanation for inclusion in study 
Construction Building suppliers 
involved in the repair, remediation, restoration 
and reconstruction process of the built 
environment. Also may possibly experience an 
increase in demand during the recovery process 
Critical Infrastructure 
(Lifelines) 
Engineering and non-engineering 
provision of essential services to all other sectors 
in the study 
Fast Moving Consumer 
Goods (FMCG) 
Food producers, supermarkets, dairies, 
service stations with dairies 
vendors of consumables like milk, bread and 
other perishable goods part of customer non-
discretionary spending 
Hospitality Bars, cafés, restaurants 
track the discretionary spending habits of the 
general population and how this affects recovery 
Information and 
Communication Technology 
(ICT) 
Light manufacturing, software and 
professional service providers 
high-growth sector identified as a key 
component of Canterbury’s regional economic 
plan 
Transport Trucking 
part of the logistics chain for all the other 
industry sectors in the study 
Christchurch Central 
Business District (CBD) 
Mixed business types. The Christchurch 
Central Business District (CBD) is defined 
as the area bound by the four Avenues: 
Bealey Avenue, Fitzgerald Avenue, Deans 
Avenue and Moorehouse Avenue 
economic hub of Christchurch, heavily affected 
by the 22 February 2011 earthquake 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 
Mixed business types. The Kaiapoi Town 
Centre is located primarily along the main 
street (Williams Street) and adjacent streets 
bound by Cass Street and Ohoka Road 
heavily affected town centre following the 4 
September 2010 earthquake 
Lyttelton Town Centre 
Mixed business types. Lyttelton Town 
Centre is bounded by London Street, 
Dublin Street, Oxford Street and Norwich 
Quay 
heavily affected town centre following the 22 
February 2011 earthquake 
The study was targeted at investigating the recovery of organisations in an urban setting. 
Therefore, the agriculture sector was excluded (see (Z.R. Whitman et al., 2011)) for detail on 
effects to the agriculture sector).  With the resources available for the research, only a limited 
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number of sectors could be examined in detail. For instance, manufacturing and business 
services, even though they are high growth sectors, were excluded because of research resource 
limitations. These and other sectors could be investigated in future studies  
However, it was identified that some of the sectors selected, e.g. ICT, had organisations that 
were involved with aspects of manufacturing or business services. In addition, the 
manufacturing sector is closely linked to some of the sectors selected such as trucking and retail. 
Analysing the trucking and retail sectors should provide some insights into some of the factors 
that might affect the manufacturing industry. The manufacturing sector also shares some 
commonalities with ICT as they are both export oriented. 
Once the industry and geographic sector groups were selected, organisations were randomly 
sampled from within each sector (this was done by the researcher). The selected organisations 
share the main characteristic of being based in Canterbury and doing business in the region. As 
the organisations were from the entire Canterbury region, this means that the list includes 
organisations positively, negatively or not at all affected by the earthquakes. Part of the reason 
for this was to find out what different organisations had done differently before and after the 
earthquake and if this was a factor in how organisations were affected by and would recover 
from the event. Additionally, an individual sector had to be large enough that the conclusions 
formed would be applicable to the wider sector. 
After review of the literature (Knight & Pretty, 1996; Lansing, 2003) and inspection of resource 
availability (time and funding), 100 organisations per sector was deemed a suitable sample size 
for each industry sector. This number would account for those who did not want to participate, 
for the attrition rate that is a part of any extended study and also allow for generalisations to be 
made about the sector. Also, for each of the 9 sectors sampled, giving a total of 900 
organisations, 100 organisations per sector is also a manageable size given the available resources 
to conduct the study. 
3.2 Industry sectors 
3.2.1 Building suppliers 
The building suppliers sector was selected because after the physical damage caused by the 
earthquakes; they would be involved in the repair, remediation, restoration and reconstruction 
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process of the built environment. Also, they are a good barometer for the performance of the 
construction industry sector as they have interactions with almost all levels of the sector. The 
starting sample list for the building suppliers sectors was from the Yellow Pages15 2010/2011. 
From this, every third organisation was selected until 100 organisations were on the list. The 
sample group included wholesale and retail building suppliers. 
3.2.2 Critical infrastructure 
Critical infrastructure is regarded as one of the cornerstones of recovery post-disaster. These 
organisations were included because of the essential services they provide to all other sectors in 
the region. Their inclusion was to investigate how the loss or disruption of critical services 
affects other sectors and also to investigate how this particular sector was affected. The 
organisation list for critical infrastructure was obtained from the endorsing agency16 which has 
ties to the sector. The list was made up of 45 organisations and includes engineering and non-
engineering critical infrastructure providers. 
3.2.3 Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) 
The Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) sector includes secondary food producers, 
supermarkets and dairies17. Apart from the intra-sectoral linkages, this sector has linkages with 
the trucking sector and these organisations are sellers of everyday consumables like milk, bread 
and other perishable goods which are part of consumer non-discretionary spending. The Food 
and Grocery Council of New Zealand (FGC) advised that there were four major branches (not 
listed for reasons of confidentiality) to this sector in Canterbury. Twenty-five organisations from 
each branch were randomly selected. 
3.2.4 Hospitality (bars, cafes, restaurants) 
Hospitality is a sector that comes under people’s discretionary spending habits making it possible 
to track the discretionary spending habits of the general population and how this affects 
                                                     
15 The New Zealand Yellow Pages are a directory listing for businesses 
16 Not named here for confidentiality reasons 
17 A dairy is the New Zealand equivalent of a corner store or a convenience store 
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recovery.  It also has strong connections to the tourism sector which is a high-impact sector in 
the Canterbury region. Half (50) of the sample was from the Yellow Pages 2009/2010. The 
other half of the sample came from an internet list provided by the Central City Business 
Association (CCBA), along with their endorsement. 
3.2.5 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
Increasingly, organisations rely on some part of information and communication technology 
(ICT) to conduct their affairs. In addition, ICT is a high-growth sector identified as a key 
component of Canterbury’s regional economic plan. The concentration of ICT firms in 
Canterbury leads to it being known as the Silicon Plains of New Zealand (after Silicon Valley in 
the USA). The starting sample list was provided by the Canterbury Development Corporation 
(CDC) after they had consulted the organisations on the list. The list had organisation names 
only. It was left to the researcher to find out the organisations’ addresses and whom to address 
the survey to. A random sample of 100 was picked from the list provided using Microsoft 
Excel’s random generator function. 
3.2.6 Trucking 
Trucking represents the transport sector but was specifically selected because they are part of the 
logistics chain for all the other industry sectors in the study. The trucking sector also has linkages 
with some of the other sectors selected for this study making it possible to observe how these 
sectors affected each other in recovery as well as how sectors not included in this study might be 
affected because of such linkages. The names and addresses for the trucking sector organisation 
were provided by the Road Transport Association New Zealand Inc. (RTANZ), in consultation 
with their members. The Association’s endorsement was also obtained so as to help increase the 
response rate. A random sample of 100 organisations was picked from the list provided using 
Microsoft Excel’s random generator function. 
3.3 Geographic locales 
Also strategically selected were specific geographic sectors not related to business type. The 
geographically selected groups were included based on their role in the Canterbury economy as 
well as because of their location to exemplify the importance of environmental context on 
organisational recovery. Additionally, the geographic sectors, with the existence of a large 
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number of organisations concentrated in one physical area, represent a system which has 
interactions between organisations from different industry sectors. As well, the geographic 
locations are economically and culturally significant to the regions they are in. These geographic 
locations were also severely affected by the earthquakes. 
3.3.1 Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) 
The central business district (CBD) is the economic hub of Christchurch18, has some of the city’s 
major tourist attractions and represents an aggregation of organisations in one locality. For this 
study, the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) is defined as the area bound by the four 
Avenues: Bealey Avenue, Fitzgerald Avenue, Deans Avenue and Moorehouse Avenue. The 
organisations for the Christchurch CBD sample group were selected from a list of organisations 
within the Four Avenues. The final sample list was arrived at using stratified sampling by 
business type and by percentage of that business type on the starting list. This was in an effort to 
ensure proportional representation. 
3.3.2 Kaiapoi Town Centre 
Kaiapoi is a satellite town about 20kms north of Christchurch. Kaiapoi was one of the most 
heavily affected town centres following the 4 September 2010 earthquake. As well, it is also an 
aggregation of organisations in one locality. A sizeable proportion of the local population works 
in Christchurch city. The Kaiapoi Town Centre is the town’s central business district and is 
located primarily along the main street (Williams Street) and adjacent streets bound by Cass 
Street and Ohoka Road. A list of organisations was provided by the recovery office formed after 
the 4 September 2010 earthquake. The cluster sampling method, i.e. all organisations were 
included, was used for Kaiapoi as the sample population was less than 100.  
3.3.3 Lyttelton Town Centre 
Lyttelton has the main port for the South Island of New Zealand and is connected to 
Christchurch by the Lyttelton Road Tunnel which is used for the transportation of imports and 
exports. Lyttelton is also known for its vibrant arts and crafts scene. Lyttelton Town Centre is 
                                                     
18 Prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
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roughly bounded by London Street, Dublin Street, Oxford Street and Norwich Quay. For 
Lyttelton also, cluster sampling was used. The sample organisations for Lyttelton Town Centre 
were from a list provided by the town’s business association. 
3.4 Data collection 
3.4.1 Research instruments and methods 
In this thesis, the unit of analysis is the industry or geographic sector. However, the primary unit 
of inquiry, to enable data collection, is the organisation. This is similar to an investigation on 
community recovery collecting data from individual households 
Data were collected using multiple methods; surveys, contextual interviews and case studies. The 
information from the surveys was augmented by information from semi-structured interviews 
conducted for the establishment of context and background with industry sector and business 
leaders. Data were also collected from case studies with selected organisations within the study 
sample group. There are several reasons for this combination of methods for data collection. 
The survey, sent in hard or soft copy, is less expensive than a telephone call or a face-to-face 
visit and it might be more convenient for the respondent as they can complete it at a time of 
their choosing. However, there are advantages to telephone or face-to-face interviews. The 
researcher is able to establish rapport with the respondent; he/she can amend and adapt the 
research questions as the interview progresses and can clear any doubt and misunderstanding by 
repeating or rephrasing the questions. In addition, the face-to-face interview allows the 
interviewer to observe the body language or facial expressions of the respondent. These can 
work as non-verbal prompts, which is of advantage to the researcher. The interviews also 
provide the opportunity for the researcher to ask for more in-depth information that would be 
difficult to collect using a survey. 
The case study gives the chance to get more detailed information about specific organisations 
(Yin, 1989). Also, for small businesses, it has been shown that case studies done in conjunction 
with other research methods, yields a richer data set (Romano, 1989). This is in part due to each 
small business having a different management structure. The case studies were to supplement 
and add to the information already collected via surveys and contextual interviews. Part of the 
reason for this is that some qualitative, in-depth information is not as easy to obtain via survey 
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questionnaires as it is through interviews and even more, through case studies. Also, with the 
utilisation of case studies the researcher hears first hand from the organisations involved their 
description of occurrences before, during and after the event and specifically how the 
organisation dealt with the acute phase of the crisis as well as the aftermath. Additionally, it is 
important to understand the recovery of the individual organisations in order to understand the 
recovery of the industry sector. Table 3-2 shows the link between the research aims, research 
questions and the research methods and analysis that were used. More details of the methods 
analysis are in section 3.5. 
Table 3-2: Research aims, research questions and research methods matrix 
Research Aims Research Questions Research Methods 
and Strategies 
Analysis 
Investigate the major factors 
involved in the recovery of 
organisations after a major 
(regional) hazard event. 
What factors - severity of 
the effects (direct and 
indirect) of a major hazard 
event, or the pre-or post-
event performance - have 
substantial effects on the 
recovery of organisations 
and what are the relative 
magnitudes of these effects? 
Questions contained 
in surveys, contextual 
interviews, case 
studies. 
 
Grounded Theory, 
qualitative analysis, 
quantitative analysis, 
grand theory. 
Determine the system 
dynamics involved in the 
recovery of organisations and 
sectors. 
What are the system 
behaviours that contribute 
to the recovery of an 
individual organisation, a 
sector and between sectors? 
Model or framework 
of the system, 
contextual interviews, 
case studies. 
 
Principles of system 
dynamics. 
Review the work done by 
Stephenson and McManus, 
enhance the Organisational 
Resilience Measurement Tool 
and contribute to the overall 
aims of ResOrgs. 
Which of the indicators of 
organisational resilience are 
prominent in a regional 
disaster? 
Case studies, 
Organisational 
Resilience 
Measurement Tool 
contained in surveys. 
 
Grounded Theory, 
quantitative and 
qualitative analyses. 
Explore ways of enhancing 
the (business) case for 
resilience. 
What is the link between 
resilience and organisational 
performance? 
Questions contained 
in surveys, semi-
structured interviews, 
case studies. 
 
Quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. 
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3.4.2 Research timeline 
Richards and Morse (2007) note that data is not collected but rather is made through an interactive 
process occurring between researchers and participants. For this extended study participants 
were sampled at different times from the 4 September 2010 event through the various research 
methods mentioned. The research time line is shown in Figure 3-1. 
Survey 1 was deployed a few weeks after the 4 September 2010 earthquake to capture 
information in the critical period just after a disaster has occurred. This was followed by Survey 
2 which was deployed after the 22 February 2011 earthquake and was ongoing during the 13 
June 2011 aftershocks. Contextual interviews were started while the second survey was 
underway. The case studies were begun after Survey 2 had drawn to a close and the bulk of the 
contextual interviews had been done. Survey 3 was deployed as the case studies came to a close. 
Each part of the research was informed by the preceding part which enabled the adjusting of the 
overall research plan to best answer the research questions. The case study research was an 
opportunity to establish a grounded theory (see section 3.5) toward answering the cardinal 
research question: How do organisations recover after disaster? 
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Figure 3-1: Research timeline for this thesis
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3.4.3 Surveys 
Surveys come in a wide range of forms and can be distributed using a variety of media (written, 
oral or electronic). As with all modes of research, surveys also have strengths and weaknesses. 
Several authors (e.g. (Prud'homme, 2008), (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & 
Handfield, 2007), (Jaeger et al., 2007), (Cruz & Steinberg, 2005)) have written on the pros and 
cons of using surveys as a data collection tool. Some of the strengths of surveys include their 
relative affordability and reach; they can be administered from remote locations using physical 
mail, electronic mail or telephone. It is also possible to administer a survey to a large population 
and the results can then be used to describe the characteristics of the general population. The 
standardisation of the questions in a survey makes measurement more exact because the 
questions use uniform definitions for each participant. This also means that similar data can be 
collected from different groups and the results compared. 
Some of the weaknesses of surveys are that the standardisation of questions to make them 
applicable to a sample group means that some of the questions may end up being too general 
and not elicit the information sought. In addition, the initial survey study design cannot be 
changed over the course of the data collection period once the survey is deployed. Lastly, the 
researcher needs to ensure that a large enough number of respondents complete the survey 
especially for purposes of statistical validity and generalisation. 
Survey deployment 
After a review of the literature (Knight & Pretty, 1996; Richards & Morse, 2007), the research 
team concluded that 100 organisations per sector was a suitable sample size for an extended 
study of this nature. Firstly, this would account for the attrition, for instance through non-
response, that is a part of a study of this length. Second, the number of respondents per group 
was also designed to allow the researcher to make generalisations about a particular sector. 
To help with the initial deployment of the survey, research assistants (RAs) were hired. The RA 
positions were advertised through Student Job Search Canterbury which works in collaboration 
with the University of Canterbury. Each applicant was asked to send a CV and cover letter. One 
criterion for making the RA shortlist included that the applicant have a grade point average 
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(GPA) higher than 6.5 (as measured in New Zealand where the maximum is 9), or B+. 
Shortlisted applicants were invited to face-to-face interviews with a minimum of two 
interviewers from the research team present. Successful applicants were then invited to an 
information session on the aims of the research as well as to be told in more detail what the job 
entailed. The information session also included telephone etiquette to ensure uniformity among 
the RAs.  
The survey used for this research was designed so that it could be completed by the respondent 
and could also be administered using different media. The multi-media format was to give 
respondents the flexibility to complete the survey at a time of their choosing. It was recognised 
that in some cases, the respondents might have no time to complete the survey for instance 
during regular business hours as they effected recovery for their organisation. 
Organisations were contacted by telephone to establish who would be the right person to 
complete the survey on behalf of the organisation as well as how they would like to receive the 
survey. Respondents were then asked to give their preferred address; electronic or physical. The 
survey was then sent to the nominated person and a follow up call made a few days later to offer 
them the option of completing the survey over the telephone with a research assistant taking 
down the answers or a researcher meeting with them in person. 
The survey used a paper based questionnaire that was sent out to participants via physical mail 
or electronically (as an attached text document in e-mail). Respondents also had the option of 
completing the survey online via the University of Canterbury’s Qualtrics survey engine. All 
respondents who agreed to take part in the study were sent a survey cover letter detailing the 
nature of the research. The cover letters were tailored for the different sectors. In addition to a 
survey cover letter, organisations that opted to receive a physical copy of the survey were sent 
the survey booklet and a pre-addressed, pre-paid return envelope. Respondents that received the 
survey as an electronic document had the option of returning the survey in the same format or 
as a printed copy sent by physical mail. 
Each survey contained 2 main parts, the recovery part and the resilience part. For recovery, the first 
survey (Survey 1) was deployed to capture perishable data while it was still somewhat fresh in 
respondents’ minds. The survey included questions that asked about initial impacts and initial 
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perceptions of respondents soon after the 4 September 2010 event. Survey 2 was to gather more 
detailed information about ongoing effects and also included organisations from Lyttelton that 
were not part of the original sample group. This is because Lyttelton was relatively unaffected by 
the 4 September 2010 earthquake but severely affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
Survey 3 asked about continuing effects more than 18 months after the 4 September 2010 
earthquake as well as effects due to the ongoing aftershocks. 
For the questions on organisational resilience, Survey 1 contained a shortened (13 questions) 
trial version of the complete (53 questions) Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) developed 
from the work of Stephenson (2010) and McManus (2008). The reason for this was to test for 
the accuracy of predicting the resilience score using fewer questions from the tool in place of 
deploying a full version. Another reason was to keep the surveys to a reasonable length for 
participants. The results from this were compared to results of the BRT-53 deployed in Survey 
2. Survey 3 also contained a shortened version of the BRT-53. The questions contained in the 
BRT-53 are in appendix F. The development of the shortened version of the BRT-53 is detailed 
in Whitman et al. (2013).  
From the outset, it was acknowledged that the respondents would most likely suffer from survey 
fatigue as the number of researchers and organisations with an interest in the aftereffects of the 
earthquakes was large. Importantly, the nature of the subject was very emotive and somewhat 
invasive as this was to do with people’s lives and livelihoods. To help increase the survey 
response, industry associations and other local bodies like the Canterbury Development 
Corporation (CDC) 19  were asked for their support and endorsement (see Table 3-3). 
Endorsements were included in the cover letters. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
19 CDC is funded by the economic development arm of  the Christchurch City Council (CCC) 
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Table 3-3: Industry sector and endorsing organisation 
Sector or Sub-sector Industry Association or Endorsement 
Building Suppliers New Zealand Building Industry Federation (BIF) 
Critical Infrastructure Critical Lifelines and Infrastructure Group 
Retail (FMCG) Food and Grocery Council of New Zealand (FGC) 
Hospitality 20 
Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) 
Canterbury Development Cooperation (CDC) 
Trucking Road Transport Association NZ (RTANZ) 
Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) Christchurch City Council (CCC), Canterbury 
Employers’ Chamber of Commerce (CECC) 
Kaiapoi Town Centre Enterprise North Canterbury (ENC) 
Lyttelton Town Centre Lyttelton Harbour Business Association (LHBA) 
 
3.4.4 Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interview techniques were used for the contextual interview and case study 
phases. This is because it is not easy to capture in-depth answers to the why and how questions 
using only surveys. Additionally, although basic information such as demographic and social 
indicators were captured throughout the surveys, the questions more specific to organisational 
response and recovery changed over time the farther away from the event. Consequently, some 
of the contextual and case study questions were modified based on the answers to the survey 
questions. The interviews were conducted face-to-face with each interviewee. However, in two 
instances, the contextual interviews were done by e-mail due to the distance between the 
researcher and interviewee. Information from the interviews was also used to inform the 
qualitative part of the system dynamics models in this study. 
                                                     
20 The team was advised that there were many associations within the hospitality industry which did not all have the same 
organisations as members. Further, not all hospitality organisations belonged to any association. 
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Kvale (1996) writes that the research interview is a particular type of conversation between 
interviewer and interviewee. The semi-structured interview approach allowed the researcher to 
consider a pre-specified list of areas of discussion with each interviewee. The time assigned to 
each area of conversation was left to the discretion of the interviewer. The open format of the 
semi-structured interview ensured that unexpected facts, attitudes or opinions could easily be 
further examined. 
The semi-structured interviews were specifically tailored to the nature of the information sought, 
contextual or case study. However, each phase (contextual or case study) had a specific interview 
guide developed to ensure that the respondents were all asked the same basic questions. This 
was for the purposes of comparability later in the research and also to ensure that all topics of 
relevance were covered with each interviewee. 
Contextual interviews 
Each situation has background and context, so too the recovery of organisations after the 
Canterbury series of earthquakes. Contextual interviews were conducted with industry sector 
representatives, business leaders, experts on the Canterbury economy as well as those working 
with recovery agencies. The interviews were meant to enrich the information gathered via the 
quantitative portion of this research, to explore prevalent themes among the different industry 
sectors and to identify issues that transpired as recovery progressed. 
The researcher called each interviewee to ask if they would participate in the research. A follow 
up e-mail was then sent to the interviewee with a brief description of the research and their 
involvement in it. The interview details (time and place) discussed on the phone were confirmed 
by e-mail. 
The common question set designed for this phase of the study was modified dependent on the 
interviewee. Each interviewee signed an interview consent form which contained details of who 
was conducting the research and that everything they said was anonymous and confidential. At 
the end of each session, interviewees were asked if there was anyone else they thought the 
interviewer/researcher should speak with in relation to the research. All interviews were 
recorded and the researcher made extended field notes after each interview. Copies of the 
interview consent form and interview guide are in appendix A and appendix B. Further 
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treatment of contextual interview data will be described in section 3.5 on data processing and 
analysis. 
Case studies 
A re-analysis of the data from Surveys 1 and 2 as well as the contextual interviews provided the 
background context of this segment of the research. To start, all the organisations that had been 
contacted for Survey 2 were included in the long list as possible case study organisations. As the 
information from the case studies complement that from the survey and contextual interviews, it 
was decided that at least two organisations from each sector would be studied. Organisations 
were selected based on the criteria outlined below.  
The criteria used in selecting the organisations included: 
 that the organisation had agreed to take part in further research after Survey 2; 
 at least two organisations from each sector and geographic area sampled; 
 if  possible, at most three people from each organisation; 
 different size organisations (by employee number); 
 possible supply chain or locational relationships between some of  the organisations, this 
to enhance the system dynamics analysis and to establish the effects of  disruption to 
supply chains; 
 organisations with different ownership structures (e.g. sole owner, franchise); and 
 the organisation’s resilience score based on Survey 2 (if  possible one high and one low 
resilience scoring organisation, using the BRT-53, from each sector or geographic 
location). 
Eighteen case study organisations were selected based on the criteria outlined. In total, 26 
interviews were conducted. A maximum of three (qualitative) semi-structured interviews with 
different people were conducted with each organisation selected for this part of the study. 
Bertaux (2002) advises that 15-20 interviews are sufficient for qualitative research in general 
while Morse (2005) and Creswell (2010) write that 30-50 interviews are sufficient for the 
formation of a grounded theory. Where possible, the interviewees were from different 
departments in the organisation to give a fuller picture of events before, during and after the 
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crisis in relation to their organisation. The primary organisation contact, based on Survey 2 
information, was asked to recommend other interviewees who would contribute to the study 
and provide an alternative organisational perspective. In addition to the two organisations 
selected from each sector, there were two other back-up organisations in case the primary 
organisations declined to be interviewed. 
Interviewees were first contacted by telephone and reminded of previous participation and 
contribution to the research. They were then asked if they would be willing to participate in this 
part of the study. The researcher explained the case study process and asked what dates were 
suitable for the interviewee. The interviewees were then sent an e-mail with the interview date 
and other details. The researcher met each interviewee at a location of their choosing; this was 
usually the organisation’s premises for those organisations that had returned to their premises or 
alternative locations if the organisation were working from elsewhere. When possible, the 
interviews were conducted back-to-back for each organisation so that organisational information 
from one interview to the next was still fresh in the interviewer’s mind. All interviews were 
recorded using an audio recorder. This was with the interviewee’s permission who also signed 
interview consent and agreement forms. 
Prior to interviewing the first participant, an interview guide with interview questions was 
developed. This was to ensure that the same topics were covered with all participants (please see 
appendix H for the interview guide). The guide was roughly divided into three main parts: 
 pre-crisis; 
 during the crisis; and 
 post-crisis. 
Two further supporting parts of the interview guide contained specific questions on what the 
interviewees thought of the resilience and recovery of organisations after disaster. In the 
interviews, the first few questions were to establish the organisation’s background (financial 
position, pre-crisis experience) and also served to put the interviewees at ease. The questions 
that followed were not always asked in the order in which they appear in the interview guide, this 
was dependent on answers given by the interviewee. 
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3.5 Data processing and analysis 
The analysis of the data is tailored to the research aims and questions as demonstrated in Table 
3-2. In this thesis, grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is used for theory development. In 
the grounded theory method, the theory emerges from the data collected. To a limited extent, 
grand theory will also be used as it involves the prior formulation of theory as well as deduction 
and testing. The prior formulated theory is based on the literature on disaster recovery, 
organisations and crisis management reviewed earlier. It has been suggested that both theories 
should be used in tandem as they are normally involved in research and it is difficult to separate 
the two (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Additionally, Suddaby (2006) writes that the developers 
of grounded theory did not intend to replace the grand theory method but rather to complement 
it. 
3.5.1 Grand theory 
A lot of research is designed not to generate new theory but to verify existing theory. This 
means that findings are arrived at through logical deduction from past studies and knowledge 
and not from the data itself.  For instance, in the disaster research literature some studies  that fit 
this mould include those by Toder and Allen (2004), Corey and Deitch (2011) and Dahlhamer 
and Tierney (1996). 
This  way of conducting research is often referred to as the grand theory research method which, 
according to Skinner (1990), was developed by Mills (1959). Perz (2007) goes on to describe 
grand theory as having global, abstract concepts while Merton (1967) criticised the 
abstractedness of grand theory as a disadvantage when making the link between theory and 
observed phenomena. Merton argues that this disadvantage stemmed from grand theory not 
providing sufficient direction in how data for particular theories should be collected. In this 
thesis, grand theory will be used only to a limited extent. 
3.5.2 Grounded theory 
The grounded theory research methodology was developed in 1967 by Barney Glaser and 
Anselm Strauss (1967). It is a systematic methodology involving the discovery of theory through 
the analysis of data (Martin & Turner, 1986). According to Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 23), a 
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grounded theory is one that is inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents. 
Additionally, in the literature the term grounded theory is used for both the process and 
outcome i.e. using the grounded theory research approach leads to a theory grounded in data. 
From the extensive works on the grounded theory approach, it can be deduced that the stages 
for the process involve: 
 Identification of  the area to be studied: the study is carried out via the perspective of  
people involved in the area e.g. interviewees in disaster affected organisations 
 Collection of  data: the data for grounded theory can be qualitative or quantitative. 
 Simultaneous collection and open coding of  data: in the grounded theory approach, 
these are integrated activities. Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 96) further proposed axial 
coding which is a set of  procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, 
by making connections between categories. They proposed a coding paradigm comprising conditions, 
context, action/ interactional strategies and consequences (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 96). 
 The writing of  notes or memos in relation to the coding: from this the main dimensions 
and their sub-themes develop. Pidgeon and Harwood (1996) describe memo writing as 
the externalisation of  data analysis and that it enables further theorising. 
 Selective coding of  data: after the main dimensions and sub-themes have been identified, 
coding is carried out for these main dimensions and sub-themes only. Further sampling 
is then directed by the theory being developed and is used to enhance and corroborate 
the main dimensions and sub-themes. 
Several authors point to the advantages of using the grounded theory approach (see e.g. 
(Borgatti, 2004; Charmaz, 2003; Cutcliffe, 2000; Turner, 1981)). Some of the advantages include 
the possibility of using simultaneous inductive and deductive thinking; the approach is open yet 
structured in how it allows researchers to explore themes; and its emergent nature allows for 
analysis of how different parts interact as opposed to only studying specific variables. Lastly, 
Turner (1983) illustrates how grounded theory can be used in organisational research because of 
organisational complex social interactions, while Eisenhardt (1989) points out that the emergent 
properties of the grounded theory approach are ideal for use in case study analysis and cross-
case comparisons. 
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Interestingly, Strauss and Corbin (1990) characterise two levels of theory generated when using 
the grounded theory approach: grand theory and substantive theory. Grand theory evolves from 
exploring a phenomenon in a variety of contexts, for example the study of disaster recovery in 
organisations from different sectors. From the description of grand theory in section 3.5.1, the 
different contexts of recovery can include determining factors of recovery after different 
disasters. Substantive theory on the other hand is derived from the study of phenomena situated 
in a particular situational context. In this research, this is equivalent to the study of disaster 
recovery in an individual organisation. 
3.5.3 System dynamics modelling 
For this thesis, system dynamics principles are used in analysis (see chapter 2 for detailed 
description of system dynamics). Systems thinking and system dynamics are used to analyse the 
system attributes (organisational, inter- and intra-sectoral) that are involved in recovery after a 
major hazard event. This is done using causal loop diagrams (CLDs) and stock and flow 
diagrams from system dynamics. Input information for the system dynamics modelling was 
obtained from both the quantitative and qualitative portions of the research. The system 
dynamics principles work well with the diagramming that is part of the analysis in grounded 
theory used in analysing the semi-structured interview. The inputs to and outputs from the 
system were examined to determine the system’s behaviour. System dynamics modelling is 
iterative and has five key steps (Sterman, 2000) shown in Figure 3-2. 
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Figure 3-2: Steps involved in the iterative steps of system dynamics modelling 
The conclusions in any of these stages in Figure 3-2 can be used to make modifications and 
improvements in any of the other steps. Of the five key steps of system dynamics modelling, this 
thesis makes use mainly of the first three: problem articulation, formulation of dynamic 
hypotheses and formulation of a simulation model. In problem articulation, the purpose of the 
system was stated and led to the definition of the system and its environment. In this stage also, 
the causal loop diagramming was started. The earlier causal loop diagramming was an aid in 
visualising what the system contained. The causal loop diagrams were updated continuously 
throughout the research as new information and insight became available. In step 3, formulation 
of a simulation model, the causal loop diagrams were converted to stock and flow diagrams and 
quantified. 
The numerical output from the quantification of the stock and flow diagrams are included in 
appendix J, however, the results from this are inconclusive. There are two main reasons for this. 
First is that additional data and analysis, beyond the scope of this thesis, are required to carry on 
Steps in 
system 
dynamics 
modelling 
problem articulation 
(what is the problem 
to be addressed) 
formulation of 
dynamic 
hypotheses 
(development of a 
provisional theory 
to account for the 
problem) 
formulation of a 
simulation model 
(translating the 
conceptual model 
into one that can 
be simulated) 
testing (comparing 
simulated 
behaviour to actual 
behaviour) 
policy design and 
evaluation 
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the simulation from the quantified stock and flow diagrams. Second, the time horizon for data 
collection may have contributed to the inconclusive results as the medium-term effects of 
recovery were not yet manifest. As a result of inconclusive results from the quantification and 
simulation of the stock and flow diagrams, step 4 in Figure 3-2 (testing) was not much utilised. 
This thesis did not outline the policy design and evaluation in step 5. However, the aids, 
hindrances and point of intervention in recovery (see chapter 9) resulted from examination of 
the causal loop and stock and flow diagrams. Part of the reason for not outlining comprehensive 
policy is that the time horizon of this research falls within the first two years after a disaster 
event. The design and evaluation of recovery policy would be more beneficial incorporating a 
longer time period, as is suggested in the future work section in chapter 11. 
There is particular notation used in system dynamics modelling. CLDs are used in the initial 
phases of modelling to represent the information gathered and to help articulate the problem. 
An example of a CLD is shown in Figure 3-3. The figure has elements and causal links (the 
arrows). Each causal link has a sign (polarity) showing the effect one element has on another. 
Positive polarity, e.g. between deficit in organisational and sectoral throughput and organisational or sectoral 
recovery measures and programmes means that as the element at the tail of the arrow changes, it 
produces a change in the element at the head of the arrow in the same direction. Negative 
polarity, e.g. between organisational and sectoral throughput and deficit in organisational and sectoral 
throughput, means that as the element at the tail of the arrow changes, it produces a change in the 
element at the head of the arrow in the opposite direction. The feedback loop, B, represents a 
negative feedback loop which means the system depicted is goal seeking. Causal loop diagrams 
are especially useful in articulating a problem and visualising complex interactions between 
numerous system components. Additionally, causal loop diagrams are the foundation upon 
which stock and flow diagrams are built so that the behaviour of the system can be observed 
over time. Figure 3-4 shows a stock and flow diagram. A stock is anything that accumulates or 
depletes over time while a flow is the rate of  change of  a stock. Inflow adds to the stock while 
outflow depletes the stock. The arrows from Stock to inflow and outflow show that there is an 
exchange of  information between the stock and the flows which can contribute to the rate of  
the flows. The clouds on the ends of  the flow arrows depict the environment of  the system. 
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Figure 3-3: Illustration of a system dynamics causal loop diagram of organisational or sectoral recovery 
 
Figure 3-4: Illustration of a simplified system dynamics stock and flow diagram with inflow, outflow and 
information links 
The stock is the rectangle and captures the idea of quantity at any one time. Stocks are elements 
that can be filled or depleted over time. For instance, the health of the economy at any instant is 
a stock. Flows add to or subtract from a stock; the inflows are the arrows flowing into the stock 
(e.g. economic growth), while outflows are arrows pointing away from or draining the stock (e.g. 
economic decline). The valves on the flow arrows act as flow regulators and the clouds are 
sources or sinks (and are outside the system boundary). The stock changes only through the 
inflow and outflow valves. Stock and flow models can also have auxilliary variables which are 
system elements that modify the flows into or out of stocks. 
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One way to conceptualise stocks and flows is to think of a stock as a bathtub with the taps 
acting as valves of flows regulators into the bathtub and the drain as a flow regulator out of the 
bathtub. The water represents the flow. 
3.5.4 Data preparation 
To prepare the contextual interview and case study data sets for analysis, the recorded interviews 
were uploaded to a secure computer. As opposed to analysing the interview transcripts after all 
the interviews had been done and the audio files transcribed, a preliminary analysis of each 
interview was done following its completion and in advance of the next interview. One way of 
doing this involved the writing from memory of extended notes after each interview. 
The audio files were then delivered to a professional transcription agency for transcription. The 
use of a professional transcription agency was one part of interview transcription reliability; that 
what was contained in the audio files was what was in the typed copy. The agency manager 
signed a transcriber confidentiality form on behalf of the agency. The transcriptions were 
verified for accuracy by the interviewer or researcher re-listening to them while reading the 
transcription. One benefit of this was that the interviewer became even more familiar with the 
content while at the same time correcting any errors made by the transcriber. Each interviewee 
was asked if they wanted the interview transcript sent to them for verification. All the 
interviewees declined. 
The contextual interview information provided an overview of the circumstances for each 
particular sector and for the Canterbury region. This information set the scene for some of the 
case study questions as it detailed sectoral pre-disaster trends and some of the interactions in the 
regional economy. For the case studies, within-case and across-case analysis is employed. This is 
in addition to the within-group analysis done for each sector and location using the survey 
results. Following the reading of the transcript several times for familiarisation, the data are 
coded at first manually and then later using NVivo9 qualitative analysis software into main 
dimensions and their sub-themes. In the case study literature, Meadows and Morse (2001, p. 
194) point out that a combination of different analytic approaches e.g. constant comparison, 
immersion or crystallisation, matrices, manual analysis, and computer-assisted analysis can 
enhance and enrich a study. 
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In describing the main dimensions or concepts of the data, the researcher came up with 
appropriate phrases (some drawn from the literature) or occasionally used the interviewees' 
words. The main dimensions (see chapter 6) became the nodes in NVivo9 while the sub-themes 
became the sub-nodes. The analysis of each interview after it was conducted was also partly used 
for the corroboration and expansion of the initial ideas and theories extracted from the earlier 
interviews. 
For the more detailed analysis, a modified version of Strauss and Corbin's (1998) coding 
paradigm was used. The paradigm outlines a logical way of gathering and ordering concepts as 
well as a way of grouping similar data. This paradigm corresponded very well with the different 
parts defined in the interview guide and with the systems thinking approach. This is mainly 
because both system dynamics and grounded theory use the interactions between variables from 
which the theory or the concepts are generated. The paradigm has three components into which 
concepts are arranged. These are presented in Table 3-4 alongside their corresponding 
component from the case study interview guide and from systems thinking. 
Table 3-4: Comparison of the grounded theory paradigm, the case study interview guide used in this thesis and 
systems thinking concepts. 
Grounded Theory Paradigm Case Study Interview Guide Systems Thinking Concepts 
conditions, the conditions that create 
situations relating to a phenomenon 
pre-disaster conditions conceptualisation of system to 
analyse interaction between agents 
actions/interactions, the ways in which 
persons deal with the situations 
encountered 
acute phase of the 
crisis/disaster 
investigation of the change in 
dominance of feedback loops and 
system behaviour during crisis 
consequences, the outcomes of 
actions/interactions 
post-disaster effects further investigation of change of 
dominant feedback loops and 
interactions between system actors 
over time  
The coding of the data was helped by thinking of and using the principal theme of the research 
which was the key elements of recovery for organisations and sectors after disaster. Therefore, all of the 
dimensions identified and coded related back to this main theme. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter discusses the reasons for the selection of the different sectors included in this 
study. There is also an analysis of the methods which are used as the basis for the collection and 
analysis of data. It was shown how the design of the research should be coupled with the 
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methods used to gather data and to analyse it. The methods to be used are drawn from different 
fields: mainly grounded theory and system dynamics and to a limited extent from grand theory. 
These methods complement each other and are useful for investigation and analysis of sectoral 
and organisational disaster recovery. 
The next chapter has a background description of the sectors included in this study. The 
description includes some of the conditions surrounding the individual sectors prior to the 
earthquakes and how such conditions may influence the way the individual sectors were affected 
by the earthquakes. 
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4 Contextual interviews 
This section presents results from the contextual interview part of the research. The aim is to 
provide background information for the climate the affected organisations and sectors operated 
in both prior to and after the earthquakes in Canterbury. Contextual interviews were with 
business and industry leaders, individuals knowledgeable about the economies of Christchurch, 
Canterbury and New Zealand as well as people working with recovery agencies. The interviews 
are also meant to enrich the information gathered via the quantitative portion of this research, to 
explore prevalent themes among the different industry sectors and to identify issues that 
transpired as recovery progressed. In some cases, the interview responses also act as a guide for 
some of the questions crafted for the surveys. Organisations that participated in the contextual 
interviews are shown in Table 4-1. 
Findings from the contextual interviews are presented in three main parts. The first part is an 
overview followed by a brief discussion of each sector in the study. After this is a short 
discussion on the acute phase after the earthquakes and how some of the sectors were affected. 
The chapter closes with a presentation of the main themes, common to the sectors, which arose 
post-disaster. 
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Table 4-1: List of contextual interview organisations and brief descriptions 
Contextual interview organisation Brief description 
New Zealand Building Industry Federation (BIF) represents the supply web of the building industry 
Canterbury Communities’ Earthquake Recovery 
Network (CanCERN) 
network of Residents Association and Community Group 
representatives from the earthquake-affected neighbourhoods 
of Canterbury 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA) 
lead recovery agency after the Canterbury earthquakes 
Canterbury Employers Chamber of Commerce 
(CECC) 
largest business support agency in the South Island of New 
Zealand 
Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) economic development agency for the Christchurch City 
Council 
Canterbury Business Leaders Group (CBLG) forum of business leaders representing substantial investment 
and commercial interests in the Canterbury region 
Canterbury Lifelines Utilities Group (CLUG) non-statutory organisation comprising territorial local 
authorities (TLAs) and commercial utilities operating in the 
region, research organisations and emergency services 
Canterbury Software Cluster non-profit organisation aimed at helping the Canterbury 
software sector succeed in New Zealand and globally 
Central City Business Association (CCBA) works with local authorities and acts as a conduit to the 
businesses, property owners, stakeholders and other 
interested parties 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) second largest district council in New Zealand. Responsible 
for the Christchurch City, Sumner, Lyttelton, Banks Peninsula 
and Akaroa. 
Enterprise North Canterbury (ENC) business association for North Canterbury region 
(Waimakariri and Hurunui Districts) 
Food and Grocery Council of New Zealand (FGC 
NZ) 
industry association representing the manufacturers and 
suppliers of New Zealand’s food, beverage, and grocery 
brands 
Hospitality Association of New Zealand (HANZ) voluntary trade association representing 2,400 hospitality 
businesses 
Lyttelton Harbour Business Association (LHBA) provide area businesses with a commercially oriented 
platform for the support of economic development within the 
Lyttelton Harbour area 
New Zealand Hotel Council (NZHC) incorporated society whose members include the international 
chain, independent, privately-owned and boutique hotels 
throughout the country 
Road Transport Association New Zealand Inc. 
(RTANZ) 
represent the interests of road transport operators 
Waimakariri District Council (WDC) district council for Waimakariri 
 
4.1 Contextual interview overview 
Interviewees were asked to identify the economic or geographic advantages of operating from 
Christchurch pre-4 September 2010. Interviewees noted that, as New Zealand’s second largest 
city, Christchurch has the largest population in the South Island and was a growing market prior 
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to the earthquakes. Other advantages for business were that Christchurch is the hub of and 
gateway to the South Island, the proximity to Lyttelton port and Christchurch airport for import 
and export as well as the proximity to primary producers. Having Christchurch as a hub with its 
sea and air ports cut down on transportation and logistics costs for many of the sectors. Except 
for most of the standalone organisations in the hospitality sector, Christchurch is the primary 
hub in the South Island for the rest of the sectors in the study; where they run their South Island 
operations and distribute or provide goods and services to the rest of the South Island. 
Respondents reported that apart from commercial reasons, Christchurch is attractive to their 
staff for the lifestyle it affords them: the proximity to the sea, the mountains and nature. 
Interviewees narrated that the response phase was characterised by a great deal of uncertainty as 
people tried to comprehend what had occurred. In the midst of all this, there was a lot of 
information that had to be made sense of. However, the general consensus was that 
communication from relevant authorities and agencies during the response phase was not as 
good as it could have been. Sector representatives reported that information was not timely, at 
times not relevant and details remained unclear. For instance, building suppliers state that there 
were too many messages from too many agencies regarding temporary housing which made it 
difficult to decipher what was required of the sector. 
From contextual interviews, none of the industry sectors reported having previously faced a 
disaster of the magnitude caused by the earthquakes. Prior to the earthquakes some sectors such 
as building suppliers, the Christchurch CBD and hospitality were not in the best financial health 
(see sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.4 for details). This affected their organisation’s financial situation, e.g. 
with reduced sales and cash flow, in the time after the earthquakes. Further, interviewees 
characterised recovery for their sectors as a return to pre-earthquake levels of revenue or better. 
Additionally, several contextual interviewees reported that their sector had identified 
opportunities after the earthquakes that were new or that were thought about prior to the 
earthquakes and could be incorporated into a future rebuild strategy. However, sectors reported 
that identifying the right people to speak with about their ideas was not easy. A lot of time and 
energy was wasted being passed on from one agency to the next. As the recovery period 
progressed, interviewees detailed how the plan for the recovery of greater Christchurch was not 
clear. Particularly affected were trucking, hospitality, building suppliers and Christchurch CBD. 
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From the overview of the sectors, inter-sectoral linkages are apparent. These will be explored 
fully in chapter 8 where the system dynamics of recovery are discussed. 
4.2 Industry sectors 
4.2.1 Building suppliers 
Building suppliers were selected for this study on the basis of their being a gauge for activity in 
the construction industry. This is because they have contact with all other parts of this industry. 
The building suppliers sample group in this study is comprised of wholesale and retail 
organisations. These are organisations representing the spectrum of building suppliers: some of 
the suppliers deal in building machinery, others in light manufacturing and yet others in building 
products and construction materials. 
According to Careers New Zealand (2011a), the construction industry was the fifth largest in the 
country, accounting for eight per cent of economic output. Careers New Zealand also added 
that the residential rebuilding part of the sector was struggling. Meanwhile, the New Zealand 
Institute of Economic Research (NZIER) in their August 2010 outlook predicted that the 
commercial part of construction would collapse (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 
2010). This outlook was based on the number of building consents applied for in the time 
leading up to this information release. This shows the state of the both the residential and 
commercial parts of the construction industry prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake was 
poor. 
The industry sector representative interviewed narrated that for each new house built, there is a 
multiple of three jobs created inside and outside the construction sector. Consequently, an 
important aspect that also needed to be looked at in the construction sector, after the 
earthquakes and prior to the larger part of the rebuild commencing, was the shortage of 
tradespeople (e.g. tillers, plasterers and plumbers). Chang-Richards et al. (2012) detail some of 
the challenges of resourcing in the construction industry after disaster.  
Pre-earthquakes, building suppliers were affected by the recession in the construction industry 
and were running at about 60% less than their full capacity (industry sector representative, 
personal correspondence, 2011). This led to a lot of competition for work within the industry 
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prior to the earthquakes. The effects of the earthquakes then increased pressure on already tight 
profit margins. The sector was most affected after the earthquakes by the uncertainty of when 
the rebuild would start and what would be required (what kind of materials and in what 
quantities). Part of the uncertainty can be attributed to the long, unprecedented delays in the 
settlement of insurance claims caused by the unclear regulations surrounding rebuild and repair 
of properties on liquefiable soils. At the time of interview, a few months after the 22 February 
2011 earthquake, the sector was optimistic but admitted that the uncertainty made it difficult to 
plan organisational strategies. This is in contrast to findings after other disasters (see Durkin 
(1984) and Tierney and Webb (2001)) where construction and manufacturing were more likely to 
recover in the short-term after disaster than service or retail organisations. 
4.2.2 Critical infrastructure 
The New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) defines 
critical infrastructure providers, also known as lifeline utilities, as entities that provide essential 
infrastructure services to the community such as water, wastewater, transport, energy and telecommunications. 
These services support the life of our community and are enablers of businesses, and underpin the functioning of the 
public sector social economy (New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 
2012). The utility companies in Christchurch are also voluntary members of a non-statutory 
body, the Canterbury Lifelines Utilities Group (CLUG). The CLUG was formed after the 
completion of the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Project which culminated in the 
publication of the text Risks and Realities (Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group, 1997). The 
project involved critical infrastructure organisations working together to identify network 
vulnerabilities. This information was used in carrying out the strengthening and reinforcement of 
infrastructure in the mid-1990s. Members of CLUG reported that they have benefitted from 
their longstanding networking efforts as utility and non-utility critical infrastructure service 
providers. 
This sector was severely affected by the earthquakes in part due to the nature of their assets (e.g. 
buried infrastructure vulnerable to ground motion) and suffered a loss of capital value as a 
consequence of damaged infrastructure. They detailed that they recognised the value of the 
services they provide to their customers and that theirs is a different level of expectation and 
performance compared to other businesses. Rose and Lim (2002) discuss how business losses 
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can be exacerbated by dependency on lifeline services and the length of disruption to those 
services. For instance, petroleum and manufacturing are heavily dependent on electricity while 
this is not the case for construction. 
According to the critical infrastructure sector representative, the most affected critical 
infrastructure organisations were the ones that deal with wastewater as their buried infrastructure 
suffered the most damage from ground shaking and liquefaction. Conversely, some of the other 
critical infrastructure providers detailed that the costs of repair to damaged infrastructure after 
the earthquakes would have been much higher had the seismic retrofit (e.g. of transformers) of 
the mid-1990s not been done. As a results of the pre-earthquake retrofit, critical infrastructure 
providers calculated that the savings made are approximately 90% of what the post-earthquake 
repairs would have cost (Canterbury Engineering Lifelines Group, 2011). 
Some of the utility infrastructure is tightly coupled and interdependent, for instance electricity, 
wastewater and gas lines in close proximity to each other and also sometimes dependent on each 
other for operation. As a consequence, utility providers worked closely after the earthquakes to 
share best practice and discuss what further improvement measures could be undertaken to 
strengthen their networks. They recognised that the types of assets they own are not renewed 
often. Consequently, repair and remediation after the earthquakes should be used to implement 
newer standards and technologies that can withstand multiple hazard events. 
4.2.3 Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) 
The FMCG sector in this study comprises manufacturers (secondary producers), suppliers and 
retailers (e.g. supermarkets and dairies) of consumables. Some of the manufacturers and 
suppliers are part of larger multinational companies. Additionally, there are two organisations 
that own the majority of the supermarkets in New Zealand (supermarket representative, 
personal correspondence, 2011). Both organisations own supermarket chains that cater to 
different market segments from low end to high end. A dairy is the New Zealand equivalent of a 
corner store or convenience store and is usually privately owned. However, petrol (gas) stations 
usually also have a retail consumables area similar to a dairy. 
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In interviews FMCG manufacturers, suppliers and the supermarket chains all described having 
major distribution centres in Auckland and Christchurch. The Auckland distribution centres 
receive the bulk of shipped goods, service the North Island and also send goods to the South 
Island. The Christchurch distribution centres, some of which receive goods from the North 
Island, service the South Island. Apart from the convenience of having major distribution 
centres in Christchurch, some organisations spoke of very high transport and storage costs if 
they did not have their own distribution centres on the South Island. 
The FMCG sector was in good financial health pre-earthquakes. Sales initially dropped 
considerably just after the earthquakes but this did not last long as most of the organisations in 
this sector produce and provide goods essential to sustain life. This sector was particularly 
affected by the disruption to utilities however. Further, as a consequence of dealing with 
putrescible products, the FMCG sector was faced with a massive clean-up job after the 
earthquakes due to shelving collapse and the need to dispose of stock. Also, the size and access 
to resources of most of the FMCG organisations in the sample meant that they were in a 
position to assist other organisations such as the Red Cross by donating food items. 
4.2.4 Hospitality 
The hospitality organisations in the sample are specifically cafes, bars and restaurants: 
organisations subject to customer discretionary spending. In the five years leading up to the 4 
September 2010 earthquake, the hospitality industry in general had been affected by the global 
financial crisis. Visitor numbers to New Zealand were down and New Zealanders also cut back 
on their discretionary spending (Careers New Zealand, 2011b). However, in a July 2011 release, 
Statistics New Zealand (Statistics New Zealand, 2011d) reported that the highest increase in 
electronic card transactions for the year ending July 2011 was in the hospitality industry. 
However this information from Careers New Zealand and Statistics New Zealand is unclear. 
This is because the information is not presented by region, includes hospitality accommodation 
organisations and could be partly attributed to bookings for the 2011 Rugby World Cup which 
was hosted in New Zealand. For the year to February 2012 however, the largest decrease in 
electronic card transactions was in the hospitality industry (Statistics New Zealand, 2012d). This 
reflects the drop in customer discretionary spending which Statistics New Zealand reported was 
partly attributable to customers not spending as much in the uncertain economic climate. In past 
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disaster studies, Tierney (2007b) found that businesses dependent on customer discretionary 
spending may struggle to recover after disaster as people spend less. 
Interviewed representatives from the hospitality industry reported that pre-earthquakes, the 
sector had been over-licensed, i.e. operational licenses, for an area the size of Christchurch. 
What is unclear is whether cafes were also over-licensed. The hospitality sector also had a high 
staff turnover pre-earthquake as a consequence of the decline in sectoral performance and the 
low wage structure common in the industry (New Zealand Department of Treasury, 2002). Pre-
earthquakes, hospitality organisations located in or near the Christchurch CBD benefitted from 
the proximity to other businesses as well as from the visitor numbers to the CBD’s tourist icons. 
Others hospitality organisations also had a steady custom from the people who worked in the 
CBD. These advantages became disadvantages after the earthquakes as some organisations 
whose premises were not damaged had to close due to the cordoning off of the CBD or of 
nearby buildings. For some hospitality organisations, their equipment was subject to direct 
physical damage and in other instances was not easily moveable which made relocation difficult.  
4.2.5 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) was identified in the Canterbury region’s 
economic strategy as a high-growth sector (Canterbury Economic Development Co. Ltd., 2009) 
and is second only to dairy in export earnings (New Zealand Information and Communication 
Technologies Group, 2010). Additionally, the Canterbury Development Corporation (personal 
correspondence, 2012) regards ICT as a pull sector. Nemet (2009) describes a pull sector as one 
where demand for goods and services is a principal driver for the rate and direction of 
innovation. This description corresponds to the reported rise in demand for ICT services from 
organisations affected by the earthquakes. Despite this, the sector reported facing a shortage of 
skilled personnel before the earthquakes. The sector thought that this trend would be 
exacerbated by the earthquakes as a lot of expatriate ICT personnel were thinking of leaving the 
region. 
The interviewee reported that a significant number of ICT organisations in New Zealand are 
export focused. However, a small proportion of ICT organisations serve the local market for 
activities such as server installation, maintenance, data management and programming. For this 
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proportion of ICT organisations the earthquakes brought with them an increased workload. 
There was a surge in requests for data retrieval and for the migration to newer methods of data 
management such as cloud computing. ICT has become a core part of the operations of many 
organisations and for them to get back up and running as quickly as possible their ICT systems 
had to be functional. 
4.2.6 Trucking 
The National Road Carriers Inc. (NRC) reported that more than 90% of New Zealand’s freight, 
by weight, is transported by road (National Road Carriers Inc, 2012). This is consistent with the 
information from FMCG organisations who stated that a significant portion of their goods are 
transported in this way and illustrates the level of interdependency between these two sectors. 
Apart from those trucking organisations working with FMCG, other trucking organisations 
work closely with the construction industry while others are involved in cross-country 
transportation of goods. 
A characteristic of the trucking industry in New Zealand is that trucking organisations pay road 
user charges based on the weight of the goods they carry and also on the distance their vehicles 
travel (New Zealand Transport Agency, 2012b). This means that it is in their interests to 
transport goods in the shortest distance possible. Trucking organisations reported that after the 
22 February 2011 earthquake, they faced increased costs from more time on the road due to 
reduced road capacity, increased distance caused by detours, as well as from more frequent 
vehicle maintenance because of earthquake damage to road surfaces (this will be discussed in 
more detail in chapters 7 and 8). After the Loma Prieta earthquake, findings point to significant 
economic impacts in surrounding areas such as Santa Cruz as a result of damage to road surfaces 
and supporting infrastructure such as bridges (Kroll et al., 1991). 
The trucking industry representative interviewed expressed that the fortunes in this sector were 
looking up in the 18-to-24 month period leading up to the earthquakes. This was due to growth 
in the timber, dairy and mining industries. Preceding this period of growth, the trucking industry 
had been challenged by 3-to-4 years of recession. Trucking is another industry that had a skills 
shortage before the earthquakes. This was even more noticeable in the response phase after the 
22 February 2011 earthquake as this type of skill was required to operate some of the heavy 
machinery used to deconstruct buildings. The sector talked of the earthquakes bringing with 
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them the opportunity to improve the road network design in the Canterbury region and make it 
more heavy vehicle friendly. For instance, one improvement identified was the re-design of 
some of the pre-earthquake road network in the Christchurch CBD to make it easier to deliver 
goods and services. 
4.3 Geographic locales 
4.3.1 Christchurch Central Business District (CBD) 
The Christchurch Central Business District (CBD), also known as the Central City, is defined as 
the area bound by the four avenues: Bealey Avenue, Fitzgerald Avenue, Deans Avenue and 
Moorehouse Avenue. The CBD had a mix of organisations that gained from its geographical 
centrality as well as from having other organisations around them. Most of the major hotels in 
Christchurch were in or around the CBD; it had some of the tallest buildings in the region and a 
lot of unreinforced masonry structures vulnerable to earthquake shaking. The CBD also had 
some of Christchurch’s major tourist attractions such as the Cathedral, which was badly 
damaged in the 22 February 2011 earthquake and may be deconstructed. After the 22 February 
2011 earthquake, a number of other heritage buildings in the Christchurch CBD were damaged 
and subsequently demolished. These heritage buildings were on the national register maintained 
by the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT)21 (2012). 
Among the 34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, 
New Zealand has the fifth highest car ownership rate (New Zealand Ministry for the 
Environment, 2012). Furthermore, Christchurch’s car ownership rate is slightly higher than the 
New Zealand national average, while the Christchurch CBD had one of the highest ratios of car 
parks to employees among the OECD countries. A lot of these car parks could not be used after 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake which affected the Christchurch City Council’s rates and 
revenue sources. In addition, the Christchurch CBD had the city’s main bus interchange. 
Consequently, the damage to and cordoning off of the CBD brought about re-routing of public 
and other vehicle transport to the remaining roads in greater Christchurch. As discussed earlier, 
                                                     
21 A crown entity set up to preserve and conserve the culture and history of New Zealand 
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trucking associations mentioned the increased amount of time they spent on the road due to 
decreased road capacity. 
At the time of the 22 February 2011 earthquake the CBD had the largest selection of retail, 
hospitality and entertainment establishments in the South Island (Central City Business 
Association, 2011). However, as detailed by the sector representative, the CBD was in decline in 
the time leading up to the earthquakes. It had stiff competition from the expanding suburban 
malls which were increasingly preferred by shoppers. It has been argued that Christchurch City 
had too much retail space per capita (Buchanan, 2011). However, as the hub of the South Island, 
retailers argued that the city served all of the South Island. The trucking and FMCG associations 
emphasised this as one of the pre-disaster advantages of having a presence in Christchurch. 
Some studies have looked at the recovery and performance of central business districts after 
disaster. Chang and Falit-Baiamonte (2002) stress the importance of considering neighbourhood 
effects in how organisations in business districts are affected by disaster. The same 
neighbourhood effects also have a bearing on how the organisations recover. Olshansky (2006), 
in his paper on planning after Hurricane Katrina and the lessons that can be learned, talks of the 
successful rebuild of Kobe’s CBD after the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake. 
4.3.2 Kaiapoi Town Centre 
Kaiapoi is a historic river town which in its boom years had wool and meat processing factories. 
With the closure of these industries in the 1970s and 1980s respectively, Kaiapoi later became a 
dormitory suburb of Christchurch. Blackwell’s Department Store, started in 1871 and the oldest 
family owned department store still operating in New Zealand, is situated in Kaiapoi (Kaiapoi 
Promotion Association Inc, 2012). Kaiapoi also had some heritage buildings listed with the New 
Zealand Historic Places Trust (NZHPT). One of these was the Kaiapoi Museum which was 
damaged in the 4 September 2010 earthquake and later demolished. The community in the town 
was very close knit. 
The modern day Kaiapoi Town Centre (mainly along Williams Street) was the main retail and 
business area for the town and had a substantial number of unreinforced masonry (URM) 
buildings which were badly damaged in the 4 September 2010 earthquake. Kaiapoi had a 
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tremendous amount of liquefaction after the 4 September 2010 earthquake which also 
contributed to the damage.   
4.3.3 Lyttelton Town Centre 
In 2009, the New Zealand Historic Places Trust (2009) made a significant portion of Lyttelton 
Town one of the largest historic areas in New Zealand. This was in addition to the historic sites, 
such as the Lyttelton Timeball, that were already listed with the Trust. The epicentre of the 22 
February 2011 earthquake was located five kilometres away from the town (GeoNet, 2011). Just 
as with the Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi Town Centre, Lyttelton had a lot of URM buildings 
which were subsequently demolished following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The URM 
buildings that were demolished were part of the history and culture of the town and this meant 
that the character of the town was altered. 
The port town of Lyttelton has a lot of locals loyal to the town that have set up there because 
their roots are in Lyttelton. Lyttelton also has strong business and other associations led by a few 
prominent, very active people. Additionally, Lyttelton serves as an important part of the arts and 
crafts scene of the greater Christchurch area. This, coupled with the historic nature of the town, 
is a tourist draw card. Lyttelton is also home to the Port of Lyttelton and is connected to the 
greater Christchurch area by the Lyttelton Road Tunnel which is a conduit for most of the 
import and export traffic to the port. Also of importance is Evans Pass/Sumner Road used by 
the trucking sector to get to the port, especially important for transporting dangerous goods. 
The Evans Pass/Sumner road is still closed at the time of writing (July 2012). More details on 
the impacts of the damage to critical infrastructure in and around Lyttelton are in chapter 7. 
4.4 Emergent themes from contextual interviews 
This section details some of the commonalities between sectors in the response and short-term 
recovery phase. For most of the interviewees, aside from the ongoing earthquakes making 
planning difficult, the change from response to recovery was marked by the day that the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) officially took office. The continuing 
earthquakes made it difficult for people and for organisations to transition from response to 
recovery as the response clock was continually reset. With each major earthquake, buildings had 
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to be rechecked, staff left places of work to check on families and property and people’s 
mindsets went back to response mode. 
During the response, i.e. acute, phase after the earthquakes, some industries in the sample had 
an increased demand for their goods and services immediately following the earthquake. There 
was awareness of these requirements within the sampled industries. The goods and services 
required fell into three broad categories: 
 non-substitutable services; 
 equipment and goods required to support the response and search and rescue efforts 
(Urban Search and Rescue gear, fuel, heavy earth-moving machinery such as diggers, pre-
fab housing units) and also for repair of  damage to infrastructure; and 
 essential goods and services for the public (e.g. water, fuel, portable toilets, tents). 
Those sectors that were needed immediately following the earthquakes had different amounts of 
time, after the main event, in which to provide goods and services.  The trucking industry for 
example had a few hours to prepare as buildings in the CBD were being checked and rescue 
preparations made before they were called in. Sectors providing rescue gear were called on 
almost immediately. One organisation22 had approximately a fortnight to prepare before needing 
to provide their non-substitutable services. 
4.4.1 Pre-existing sectoral conditions and attributes 
Interviewees were asked about other pre-existing systemic conditions that contributed to how 
different sectors were affected (positively or negatively) by the earthquakes. One effect was to 
organisations that were in or around the Christchurch CBD area; apart from the economic 
decline affecting these businesses, they were also subject to neighbour effects. These effects, 
such as benefiting from the close proximity to numerous other organisations in the same area 
and also the general foot traffic from the number of people who worked in or visited the CBD, 
were an advantage pre-disaster and became a disadvantage post-disaster. The advantage was that 
there was a continual flow of foot traffic in the area before the earthquakes and the disadvantage 
was that a large number of people, tourists and employees for instance, did not go to the CBD 
                                                     
22 This service cannot be described for reasons of confidentiality 
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after the earthquakes. A second effect of pre-earthquake conditions was that organisations on 
the edge of the CBD cordon reported that post-September 2010, apart from the fall in numbers 
of people shopping, working and visiting the CBD, another reason for the decrease in customer 
numbers was that people perceived them to be closed because of their proximity to the cordon. 
Furthermore, other contributing pre-earthquake conditions had to do with the industry sector of 
some of the affected organisations. For instance, location specific23 businesses such as those in 
hospitality or retail spoke of the inability to retrieve specialised equipment or merchandise from 
within the Red Zone of the CBD. Both food and accommodation hospitality establishments 
faced difficulties relocating. This contributed to some of these organisations not being able to 
relocate quickly for lack of equipment or merchandise. However, the Christchurch CBD 
industry representative mentioned organisations that had modified the way they interacted with 
their customers by either starting to trade online or even door-to-door. For building suppliers, at 
the time of the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes the sector was still 
struggling to recover from the global financial crisis whereas ICT and trucking were concerned 
about the shortage of skilled labour. 
4.4.2 Factors that aided recovery 
On factors that aided the recovery, interviewees highlighted some organisations that had adapted 
to the post-disaster environment by relocating to other retail areas such as shopping malls. 
Interviewees were asked what would happen to the retail space used by relocated organisations 
when they vacated and moved back to the CBD. Almost all the respondents said this had not yet 
been thought about in detail but would most certainly have an effect later on in time. One 
respondent was of the opinion that as opposed to having the donut effect, with an underdeveloped 
CBD and well developed suburban shopping, perhaps Christchurch would need to sacrifice some 
of its shopping malls in the long run. Furthermore, some central city property owners and some 
of the business leaders suggested that there be a decade long moratorium on new licenses for 
accommodation or for the expansion of shopping malls. They explained that this would provide 
an opportunity to existing earthquake affected businesses to recover. Second, the moratorium 
                                                     
23 The phrase “location specific businesses” is meant in two ways: the first is that clientele came because of where the 
organisation was located and the second is that the organisation had machinery and equipment that they could not (easily) 
move. 
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would work as a check for the sectors already over licensed prior to the 4 September 2010 
earthquake. Interestingly this was in contrast to some of the messages that came from the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) on limited interference and leaving the 
market to sort itself. 
The New Zealand Central Government made available an Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS)24 
for organisations with 50 employees or less. The Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) was paid to 
eligible organisations in the Christchurch area that employed 50 people or less. It was originally 
to be paid for up to six weeks after the 22 February 2011 earthquakes but was extended to eight 
weeks. There was unanimity among interviewees that the ESS for businesses was especially 
helpful as businesses worked through insurance policies and waited for insurance payments for 
lost wages while also trying to plan how to move forward. Another positive step has been the 
collaboration between organisations post-earthquake. Interviewees noted that organisations that 
had different purposes or that represented opposing interests prior to the 4 September 2010 
earthquake worked together afterwards towards a common goal of recovery. 
Chapter 9 has a more comprehensive discussion on the aids and hindrances to recovery after the 
2010 – 2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence. 
4.4.3 Factors that hindered recovery 
On elements that could or did hinder recovery, interviewees felt that the initial Draft Central 
City Plan25, before its adoption by the Christchurch City Council (CCC), was not economically 
viable in the long run. Notably the proposed 7-storey height limit for buildings was seen as a 
disincentive for investors wanting to put their money in the Christchurch CBD as it did not 
offer a good enough return on investment. Also mentioned was that the recovery plan for the 
CBD should overall be good enough to attract new and returning investors by designing and 
planning for a commercially viable CBD. Interviewees said one way to do this could be by 
                                                     
24 Detailed information on the Earthquake Support Subsidy can be found at http://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-
work/newsroom/media-releases/2011/millions-for-christchurch-quake-employment-support.html. 
25 The fundamental ideas in this plan came from the CCC pre-earthquake long-term plan and from submissions by the public. 
Final sign-off and approval for the plan was by CERA. At the time of writing, March 2013, the plan had been reviewed and 
amended. 
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having the CBD as a mixed use residential, business and work area with multiple precincts as 
well as the right mix of businesses and tenants. 
Without exception, all interviewees talked of the uncertainties concerning aftershocks, delayed 
insurance pay-outs and the consequent delay to start of rebuilding work as barriers to recovery. 
The general consensus was that there was not much that could be done about insurance by the 
various industry sectors and that it was a matter of time before this was solved. Some 
interviewees further expressed concern that Christchurch needed to actively market itself as still 
being open for business to counter the possibility of being forgotten.  
4.4.4 Lessons 
Interviewees were asked what lessons have been learnt after the earthquakes. One of the biggest 
lessons was for organisations to have business continuity and disaster recovery plans, as well as 
being ready to adapt and use new ways of working for example in communicating with staff and 
customers. Also, all the interviewees highlighted the interdependencies between the different 
industry sectors with each other and with the wider economy and how a problem in one sector 
could propagate to other sectors. This brings to the fore the need for organisations and industry 
sectors to be cognisant of how other organisations or sectors can affect their operations. 
Importantly, all the interviewees emphasised that the primary importance for recovery is the 
wellbeing of people as they make up the organisation. An organisation’s and a sector’s recovery 
partly depended on the recovery of the people in it. 
4.4.5 Challenges and opportunities 
One of the main messages to emanate from the contextual interviews was that striking the right 
balance between short- and long-term recovery priorities was a challenge. This was made more 
difficult by the continuing earthquakes and by the lack of a clear vision for what the greater 
Christchurch area would recover to. Related to this was the worry many of the sectors had that if 
the recovery strategy and recovery activities took too long, Christchurch would be forgotten as the 
rest of New Zealand and the world moved on. Interviewees mentioned that Christchurch should 
not just be a gateway to the South Island but also a stopping place. However, it was 
acknowledged that a lot of what tourists stopped for, in the CBD at least, was damaged in the 
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earthquakes. Also, the extended closure of the CBD did not serve as good advertising for the 
City, although the pop-up mall26 was a reminder of where the CBD used to be and what it could 
be again. Interestingly, in the second half of 2012, the travel site Lonely Planet 27  named 
Christchurch as one of the most exciting cities in New Zealand. This was attributed to the city’s 
resilience and the emergence of new entertainment areas. 
At the time of interviewing, interviewees felt that a credible vision of recovery as well as a plan 
to fulfill that vision were necessary to give confidence that recovery would happen.   
4.4.6 Industry representation after the earthquakes 
Studies (e.g. (Olshansky & Johnson, 2012; Tyhurst, 1951)) show that the formation of groups in 
reaction to disaster is a common phenomenon. The Canterbury earthquakes were no different. 
Among the myriad groups that formed were associations purporting to support one or other 
industry groups. These new associations were in addition to the already existing pre-earthquake 
industry associations. This trend was both positive and negative. Positive in that people were 
represented, felt empowered and could put their views across. However, in other cases this was 
to the detriment of the affected population or sector (e.g. Christchurch CBD) as groups claiming 
to represent the same organisations did not always have a unified message. Also, the associations 
were all vying for the attention of the same agencies involved in disaster recovery activities. This 
meant that the agencies had to decide who to pick and work with in recovery, which may have 
marginalised some groups. The associations that were the loudest were not necessarily the ones 
chosen. Instead, according to one recovery agency representative, the associations chosen were 
the ones that either had a proven track record or a viable plan for recovery (Recovery agency 
representative, personal communication, 2012). 
Some industry sectors chose to come together and speak with one voice. This was the case in 
the hospitality industry where there are traditionally many associations (mostly with membership 
dependent on type of hospitality establishment). After the earthquakes, several hospitality 
associations came together to form Christchurch Hospitality Inc. (CHI). However, there are 
                                                     
26 The pop-up mall was set up in October 2011 to temporarily house retail establishments as plans for the rebuild of the 
Christchurch CBD were still being drafted. 
27 The full Christchurch Lonely Planet review can be found at http://www.lonelyplanet.com/new-zealand/christchurch-and-
canterbury/christchurch/travel-tips-and-articles/76957 (accessed March 2013) 
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many hospitality establishments that do not belong to any industry association. Similarly, not all 
the organisations in the CBD belonged to the Central City Business Association (CCBA) which 
was very prominent in speaking up for its membership. This might have led the authorities to 
think that all organisations were represented and if the unrepresented organisations wanted to be 
heard, they would have had to find alternative means. Regardless, the industry associations acted 
as representatives for their members with recovery agencies such as the Christchurch City 
Council (CCC) and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA). 
4.4.7 Recovery goals and recovery of the Christchurch central business district 
(CBD) 
When asked who they thought was driving the recovery, interviewees had varied responses. 
Some of the answers given included CERA, CCC, financiers, re-insurers and the continuing 
aftershocks. This list showed that Christchurch still had a way to go in articulating a common 
vision of recovery and how it would be achieved. A common vision is important so that all 
parties concerned have a common understanding of the end goal and can therefore align their 
organisational and sectoral goal(s) with the overall goal for recovery. This aspect is discussed in 
sections 8.4.3 and 9.6.1 on how uncertainty in recovery planning can be detrimental. 
In addition to the recovery of their sector, interviewees were concerned about the recovery of 
greater Christchurch as the two were somewhat entwined. Pre-earthquakes, Canterbury, 
specifically greater Christchurch, was growing and for this growth to continue required external 
sources of funding, investment and in certain instances in-migration. This was even more 
important after the earthquakes. Although not explicitly stated by all interviewees, the view was 
that the CBD was the most visible element of the greater Christchurch rebuild, which if planned 
and advertised well, would serve as the flagship that would make people want to invest funds 
and manpower in Canterbury. 
Interviewees were of the mind that it was not a matter of if but when Christchurch recovered and 
that it would take a concerted effort. Also dominant was the clear need to build back better than 
what existed before the 4 September 2010 earthquake, both for improvement as well as for 
financial and economic viability. Interviewees stated that there was a need to realise that the 
rebuild, if it was done right, presented a chance to revitalise the economy of Christchurch and 
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that the city’s fundamental advantages had not changed following 4 September 2010. This is 
even as the city was different as a result of the earthquakes. For instance, one of the pre-existing 
conditions pointed out was that prior to the earthquakes the retail sector in the CBD in 
particular and the hospitality sector were performing poorly. In addition, the increasingly 
popular suburban malls were directly competing against the CBD for clientele. There was a 
chance after the earthquakes to evaluate the interaction between the CBD and suburban malls 
and craft an overall strategy with that in mind. 
Interviewees emphasised that everyone involved in the rebuild should remember that 
Christchurch was not returning to where or what it was pre-4 September 2010 as the landscape 
had changed almost irrevocably. For instance, the pattern in the last few years before the 
earthquakes had been for businesses to set up or relocate in the west of the city in the Riccarton-
Addington area. With the cordoning off of much of the CBD this trend accelerated. It was 
therefore critical for people to understand that the idea was not necessarily to rebuild the 
Christchurch CBD as was but to design and construct a Downtown Christchurch attractive to all 
users. Instead of having businesses as primary tenants, it was proposed that the Central City 
might be a centre for the arts, for retail and for hospitality. 
In redesigning the Christchurch CBD, interviewees spoke about other opportunities for 
improvement. The trucking sector wish list included the possibility to enhance the road network 
in and around the CBD to make it more user-friendly for delivery trucks, public transport and 
other road users. Further opportunities came from the ICT and building suppliers sectors to trial 
and implement new technologies creating a hi-tech Christchurch. The ICT sector mentioned the 
possibility for use of smart technologies for whoever would occupy the Central City whereas for 
the construction (building suppliers) sector the use of building techniques to minimise damage 
and disruption could be incorporated. There is more discussion on the recovery of the CBD in 
chapter 7. 
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the results from the contextual interviews with business and industry 
leaders. Also presented was contextual information on the sectors included in the study, 
complemented with findings from past research into organisational disaster recovery. The 
information from this section will be used with data from the other results chapters, 5 and 6, in 
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later parts of the thesis for an analysis of the key elements of organisational and sectoral 
recovery. 
From the contextual interviews, respondents detailed the economic and geographic advantages 
of being in Christchurch: its geographic location allowing for easy access to land and sea ports as 
well as the ease of reaching the South Island market. Another advantage is Christchurch’s 
attractiveness to potential and current employees. No industry sector reported having faced a 
disaster of such magnitude in their history in New Zealand. 
Findings from the contextual interview data point to sectors being affected in varying ways after 
the earthquakes. For instance, some sectors such as trucking had increased demand for their 
services while building suppliers were affected conversely. Some of the effects were a result of 
pre-earthquake characteristics such as type of goods and services delivered or organisational 
location. Furthermore, some of the interdependencies between different industry sectors as well 
as with the wider economy highlighted how a problem in one sector could propagate to other 
sectors. 
Other lessons brought up are the importance of staff in recovery and the role of business 
continuity plans after disaster. Some of the major post-earthquake challenges identified included 
making the transition from response to recovery as well as the shortage of skills for sectors such 
as hospitality and trucking. However, respondents narrated that there were also opportunities 
post-disaster such as the chance to incorporate long planned for and needed improvements 
while crafting recovery strategies. 
Interviewees reported that factors that aided recovery included the willingness and ability of 
organisations to adapt as well as assistance from Central Government in the form of the 
earthquake support subsidy (ESS). Interviewees detailed that they thought the financial non-
viability of the Central City recovery plan was a hindrance to recovery. Similarly, the uncertainty 
on the duration of earthquake activity was also seen as a hindrance to recovery. 
Furthermore, interviewees spoke of what they viewed as lack of clear leadership, in leading the 
recovery effort, as not helpful. It should be noted that this was at the start of the short-term 
recovery phase.  
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Specific to the geographic locales, an emergent theme was the existence of unreinforced 
masonry (URM) buildings making them more vulnerable to earthquakes. In addition, the extent 
of damage to individual buildings, in the CBD or town centres, also had an effect on 
neighbouring buildings. 
Interestingly, some of the aspects identified from the contextual interviews with business and 
industry representatives were the same as those identified in the case study interviews with 
organisations in the study. Results from the case study interviews are presented in chapter 6. 
The next chapter has findings from the surveys, deployed to collect mainly quantitative 
information for the study. 
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5 Surveys 
In this study, the surveys were used to capture mainly quantitative data. Their advantage lay in 
the possibility to collect information from multiple respondents using standardised questions 
and in the same timeframe. As outlined in chapter 3, all three surveys deployed contained two 
main components: 1) questions on impacts of the earthquakes to organisations and industry 
sectors as well as what measures they undertook to recover, and 2) questions asking about 
organisational resilience. The survey questionnaires are in appendices K to M. For each of the 
surveys, not all the survey results are presented here. This is both for reasons of space and to 
present results that will best explain the effects of the earthquakes. Extra results tables are 
included in appendices C to E. 
In this chapter, the survey results are presented in the order in which the surveys were deployed. 
For some of the larger tables, some of the values have been highlighted to make it easier for the 
reader. There is also some brief discussion of the survey results throughout the chapter. The 
results from all surveys are then summarised in section 5.4 in a discussion on sectoral challenges 
and temporal trends across sectors. Crucially, the aspects that emerge in this chapter are used in 
analysis to come up with sectoral signifiers of recovery (chapter 7), system behaviour that 
influences recovery (chapter 8), aids, hindrances and points of intervention in recovery (chapter 
9) and organisational disaster resilience (chapter 10).  
The surveys were sent to the same organisations for the duration of the study, however as 
shown in Tables 5-1 and 5-2, the number of survey responses decreased but the response rates 
increased with subsequent surveys. At each survey point, organisations were asked if they wished 
to take part in future research. Some of the respondents declined and for ethical reasons were 
not contacted again. It should also be noted that some of the organisations in this study fall 
within an industry sector group and might also physically be in one of the geographic sectors 
sampled (e.g. hospitality organisations located in the Christchurch CBD). In such cases, data 
were analysed based only on the sector (industry or geographic) they were selected for in this 
study. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 show when each survey was deployed and what the survey response 
rates were. The entire sample group totals in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 are not the same because Table 
5-2 shows the complete survey responses that were used in the analysis. 
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Table 5-1: Survey deployment timeline and response rates 
Survey deployment timeline and response rates 
 Survey Launch 
Date 
Survey Closing 
Date 
Number of 
organisations 
contacted 
Returned 
responses 
Response rate 
(%) 
Survey 128 17 November 
2010 
18 February 
2011 
879 379 43% 
Survey 229 31 May 2011 18 September 
2011 
309 176 57% 
Survey 3 12 March 2012 19 May 2012 98 70 71% 
 
Table 5-2: Sectoral response rates for Surveys 1, 2 and 3 
 N 
Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3 
Building Suppliers 30 11 7 
Critical Infrastructure 24 16 7 
FMCG 42 16 5 
Hospitality 32 7 2 
ICT 55 27 13 
Trucking 38 15 6 
Christchurch CBD 33 17 5 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 40 17 8 
Lyttelton Town Centre 
Did not 
participate 
39 10 
Entire Sample Group 294 165 63 
As can be deduced from the earthquake timeline shown in chapter 3, this study was originally 
intended to track recovery for organisations after one major event: that of 4 September 2010. 
However, after 22 February 2011, the study became one of organisational recovery after multiple 
events. Because of this, results for each survey are presented on their own and discussed. Lastly, 
a limitation of the research is that there are no data from possible permanently closed 
                                                     
28 In Surveys 1 and 2, organisations were asked if they would like to participate in further research. Some organisations 
declined, hence the difference in numbers between returned responses in one survey and deployed surveys in the next. 
Additionally, there was a moratorium on research in the months following the 22 February 2011 earthquake which led to a 
later than planned deployment date for Survey 2. 
29 Lyttelton organisations were included after the 22 February 2011 earthquake and took part in Surveys 2 and 3 only. 
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organisations that were on the original starting sample list. The knowledge of why these 
organisations closed permanently would be helpful to disaster researchers and policymakers. It 
appears though that not many organisations closed permanently after the 22 February 
earthquake. Data analysed by Statistics New Zealand (2012e) showed no significant (2.5%) 
business closure in Christchurch between February 2011 and February 2012. 
5.1 Survey 1 (deployed 17 November 2010 to 18 February 2011) 
Survey 1 was intended to capture the immediate impacts to organisations in the greater 
Christchurch area in the aftermath of the 4 September 2010 earthquake. In the first part of the 
survey, organisations were asked if they had been affected by the 4 September 2010 earthquake. 
The definition of affected was left to the respondents. It appears that most respondents 
probably thought of it in the negative as the answers given to subsequent questions showed that 
the consequences for their organisations were not favourable. Organisations that reported not 
being affected were directed to the second part of the questionnaire which contained statements 
on organisational resilience. Therefore, the organisational impact data for Survey 1 presented in 
this section are for organisations that reported being affected. 
The majority (80%) of organisations were affected by the events of 4 September 2010. Results 
for affected organisations and for those that closed for a period of time after the earthquake are 
shown in Table 5-3. Overall, only 1% of the total sample reported closing permanently. The 
sectors with the highest percentage of organisations reporting (temporary) closure were 
Christchurch CBD (97%), hospitality (93%) and Kaiapoi (87%). For Christchurch CBD, this is 
attributable to the official cordon that was placed around the CBD after the 4 September 2010 
earthquake. As well, most of the hospitality organisations were located in or around the CBD 
and were thus similarly affected. Some organisations reported closing because of damage to 
premises close to or next to theirs. In Kaiapoi, the large number of organisations closing was 
due to the extensive liquefaction and building damage that the town experienced after the 4 
September 2010 earthquake. After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, the sectors reporting the 
highest average number of closure days were Kaiapoi and trucking with an average of 12 days 
each, followed by Christchurch CBD with an average of 8 days. 
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Table 5-3: Affected organisations after the 4 September 2010 earthquake including organisations that reported 
closure* 
Affected organisations after the 4 September 2010 earthquake including organisations that reported 
closure 
 Affected Not Affected*** 
Affected 
organisations that 
temporarily or 
permanently closed 
Affected 
organisations that 
did not close 
Building Suppliers** 70% 27% 45% 55% 
Critical Infrastructure 92% 8% 41% 59% 
FMCG 88% 12% 76% 24% 
Hospitality 94% 6% 93% 7% 
ICT 56% 44% 57% 43% 
Trucking 71% 29% 29% 71% 
Christchurch CBD 91% 9% 97% 3% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 90% 10% 87% 13% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 80% 20% 69% 31% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables some of the figures might add up to just under or just over 100% 
** Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
*** Figures for not affected organisations are included for completion 
After a disaster, it has been documented that organisations can experience a change in revenue 
for various reasons including supply chain problems, lack of customers or even their goods and 
services not being required after disaster (Rose & Lim, 2002). Organisations in this study were 
asked to provide information on changes to revenue, suppliers and customers in the aftermath 
of the 4 September 2010 earthquake. These results are presented in Tables 5-4 and 5-5. 
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Table 5-4: Organisational revenue change and use of new suppliers after the 4 September 2010 earthquake* 
Organisational revenue change and use of new suppliers after the 4 September 2010 earthquake 
  
Change in revenue Need to use new suppliers 
Revenue has 
decreased 
No change Revenue has 
increased 
No Yes 
Building Suppliers 59% 23% 14% 95% 5% 
Critical Infrastructure 18% 50% 23% 82% 18% 
FMCG 16% 62% 16% 68% 32% 
Hospitality 67% 15% 19% 85% 11% 
ICT 20% 70% 10% 93% 7% 
Trucking 38% 46% 17% 96% 4% 
Christchurch CBD 77% 19% 3% 94% 3% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 64% 28% 8% 90% 10% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 45% 39% 13% 87% 12% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables some of the figures may add up to just under or just over 100% 
The general trend for changes in revenue was down. Christchurch CBD (77%), hospitality (67%) 
and Kaiapoi (64%) had more organisations reporting negative revenue changes. Building 
suppliers also showed a marked decrease in revenue with 59% of organisations reporting this. In 
the opposite direction, and not always obvious after disaster, some sectors reported an increase 
in revenue. Critical infrastructure had the most organisations (23%) reporting an increase while 
hospitality, trucking and FMCG had 19%, 17% and 16% respectively. Critical infrastructure 
organisations, such as those dealing with waste, detailed that the increase in revenue was due to 
the increased demand for their services after the 4 September 2010 earthquake. The sector with 
the most organisations showing no change in revenue in the period after the earthquake was ICT 
(70%) followed by FMCG (62%) and critical infrastructure at 50% of organisations. 
Most organisations stated that they did not need to use new suppliers after the 4 September 2010 
earthquake. FMCG had the most organisations (32%) reporting the use of new suppliers while 
only 18% of critical infrastructure organisations reported the same. For FMCG this had to do 
with replacement of larger than usual quantities of product in as short a time as possible after 
clean up and reopening of premises, as well as the decision to stock more of certain products 
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needed by the public. These products included water, tinned foods, chocolate and diapers. For 
critical infrastructure, the need to use new suppliers was for similar reasons to FMCG. They 
needed to replace and repair more equipment than was usual as they made time critical repairs to 
earthquake damaged infrastructure. 
When asked about changes to their customer base, organisations reported mixed results (Table 
5-5). For more than half the sectors, the pattern showed that a large percentage of organisations 
experienced no change in customer base. Sectors that did report a substantial decrease in their 
customer base include Christchurch CBD (47%) as well as building suppliers and Kaiapoi, both 
at 29%. The Christchurch CBD experienced this for two main reasons; first was that the 
organisations were in a cordoned off area in the first few days after the 4 September 2010 
earthquake and second was the public’s perception that organisations in and around the CBD 
were still closed even after they had started trading again. The loss of customers for building 
suppliers was a continuing pre-earthquake trend attributable to the sector suffering a downturn 
prior to the earthquakes and also the cancellation of work booked prior to the earthquake (e.g. 
kitchen renovations booked pre-earthquake may not be needed as a result of earthquake 
damage). Kaiapoi attributed the decrease in customers to their being closed for a longer period 
of time due to damage caused by the 4 September 2010 earthquake. 
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Table 5-5: Change in customer base after the 4 September 2010 earthquake* 
Change in customer base after the 4 September 2010 earthquake 
  Decreased 
substantially 
Decreased 
moderately 
No change Increased 
moderately 
Increased 
substantially 
Building Suppliers 29% 5% 57% 5% 5% 
Critical Infrastructure 0% 9% 64% 9% 14% 
FMCG 0% 20% 66% 9% 3% 
Hospitality 19% 41% 26% 7% 4% 
ICT 0% 10% 77% 7% 3% 
Trucking 4% 17% 58% 21% 0% 
Christchurch CBD 47% 33% 7% 10% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 29% 23% 34% 9% 3% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 16% 20% 47% 9% 4% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables some of the figures might add up to just under or just over 100% 
Kunreuther (2006) writes that insurance is one of the ways that the effects of disaster can be 
mitigated. This is of course contingent on the organisation having insurance in the first place and 
the insurance being adequate to cover losses after significant events. Organisations were 
presented with a list of insurance types and asked to state which ones their organisations 
possessed. The results are in Table 5-6. 
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Table 5-6: Type of insurance* 
Type of insurance 
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Building Suppliers 62% 62% 81% 81% 90% 71% 14% 
Critical Infrastructure 41% 59% 55% 59% 73% 36% 45% 
FMCG 71% 66% 71% 74% 71% 66% 26% 
Hospitality 85% 48% 81% 44% 74% 74% 0% 
ICT 40% 50% 90% 53% 77% 37% 27% 
Trucking 50% 63% 71% 67% 71% 33% 25% 
Christchurch CBD 77% 53% 80% 60% 70% 77% 13% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 51% 46% 74% 43% 77% 40% 14% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 60% 55% 76% 59% 75% 54% 20% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables some of the figures might add up to just under or just over 100% 
Organisation assets and equipment and public liability were the most common types of insurance 
across all the sectors. The breakdown for the other types of insurance shows differences 
between sectors. For instance building suppliers and FMCG have the highest incidences of motor 
vehicle insurance. This is a result of their owning the vehicles that they use, for example to deliver 
product in their day-to-day operations. Additionally, a lot of the critical infrastructure providers 
(45%) reported having other types of insurance. For those that gave a description, in all cases this 
was self-insurance. In a report on liability and insurance for critical infrastructure providers, 
Coopers and Lybrand (1997) found that self-insurance was common in this sector partly because 
the deductibles with traditional insurance are large. 
Related to insurance is the ability of organisations to finance possible increased or unforeseen 
costs after a major event and is one of the ways organisations can recover (Alesch & Holly, 
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2002). Finance is required to maintain cash flow, to purchase new equipment or services and to 
keep paying employees. Complete results for the means organisations elected to use to finance 
their recovery are in Table 5-7. 
The most common type of finance option was organisational cash flow followed by insurance 
claim. Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi had the most organisations with savings as one of the 
means of financing their recovery. The Christchurch CBD (37%), hospitality (30%) and Kaiapoi 
(20%) were more likely to use the Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) given by the Central 
Government to organisations with 50 or less employees. Organisations that used the ESS not 
only had knowledge of the existence of the subsidy, they also made an effort to apply for it. In 
the literature, not all organisations affected by disaster get to know about the assistance available 
and of those that do know not all of them access it (Barksdale, 1998). Organisations that 
received the ESS state that it helped them to not make rash business decisions after the 
earthquake such as laying employees off as a means of saving money. 
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Table 5-7: Organisational recovery finance options after 4 September 2010*  
Organisational recovery finance options after 4 September 2010 
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Building Suppliers 86% 19% 10% 24% 14% 14% 10% 10% 
Critical Infrastructure 77% 9% 0% 5% 0% 18% 0% 14% 
FMCG 46% 20% 0% 0% 0% 37% 3% 11% 
Hospitality 63% 22% 11% 22% 11% 63% 30% 4% 
ICT 73% 7% 3% 7% 3% 10% 17% 10% 
Trucking 58% 4% 0% 4% 0% 25% 13% 17% 
Christchurch CBD 57% 33% 10% 23% 13% 43% 37% 10% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 51% 34% 9% 20% 6% 43% 20% 17% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 62% 20% 5% 13% 6% 33% 16% 12% 
* Figures may add up to more than 100% as some organisations may use multiple alternatives of recovery finance 
Another possible post-disaster effect to organisations is the employee hire and redundancy rate 
(Kondrasuk, 2004). This can be used to check the health of the organisation. Organisations not 
doing well could be laying people off or could have employees leaving as a result of the 
earthquakes. Results are shown in Table 5-8. Most organisations reported that the movement of 
employees was not a result of the earthquake but a normal part of their business cycle. The 
larger part of the sample reported not making any employees redundant. In fact critical 
infrastructure (45%), trucking (33%), FMCG (31%) and hospitality (30%) sectors took on more 
staff. The sectors reported that this was because of the increased workload related to repair, 
remediation and clean-up caused by the earthquake. It should be noted again, that Survey 1 
results are from the first few months after the first earthquake and before the February 
earthquake. 
                                                     
30 This is also known as the Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) 
124 Surveys 
 
Table 5-8: Staff redundancy and hire after 4 September 2010 earthquake* 
Staff redundancy and hire after 4 September 2010 earthquake 
  
  
Staff redundancy Staff hire 
No Yes No Yes 
Building Suppliers 95% 5% 81% 19% 
Critical Infrastructure 100% 0% 55% 45% 
FMCG 100% 0% 69% 31% 
Hospitality 85% 11% 70% 30% 
ICT 93% 7% 73% 27% 
Trucking 92% 8% 67% 33% 
Christchurch CBD 90% 10% 73% 23% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 91% 6% 89% 11% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 92% 6% 72% 27% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables some of the figures might add up to just under or just over 100% 
Organisations were presented with alternatives for how they were affected after the 4 September 
2010 earthquake. They were asked to rank, using a 4-point Likert scale from not at all to very, how 
severely they were affected by each alternative. Each organisation’s degree of effect ODoE was 
calculated, see equation 5-1. 
Equation 5-1: Computation for organisational degree of effect for factors causing disruption to organisations 
operations after the earthquake  
i is the disruptive factor, s is the score assigned a value from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very) for each 
disruptive factor and n is the total number of disruptive factors. For example, each organisation 
assigns a score (from 0 to 3) for each disruptive factor. The organisational individual disruptive 
factor scores are totalled, averaged and then divided by 3 (the maximum possible score for each 
disruptive factor). This is then multiplied by 100 to give a score out of 100. To determine how 
each sector was affected, a sectoral DoE score is calculated by averaging the individual ODoE 
Organisational Degree of Effect (ODoE) = 
 
 
∑ (
  
 
)          
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scores. The higher the score the more severely that sector was affected by the given alternative. 
The results from this computation are in Table 5-9. The three highest degrees of effect for each 
sector are in bold highlighted cells. 
Most of the sectors were not affected by injury to employees. This is because of the timing of 
the 4 September 2010 earthquake which occurred in the early hours on a Saturday morning 
when not many people were at work. More sectors were affected by the disruption to electricity 
than by any other factors. This shows how dependent industry is on the use of electricity to run 
their operations (Rose et al., 1997). Across the entire sample, the highest degrees of effect (DoE) 
were for electricity disruption (38/100), damage to or closure of nearby buildings (37/100) and 
damage to or closure of adjacent organisations or buildings (35/100). An inspection of the 
responses shows that both Christchurch CBD and Kaiapoi were heavily affected by damage to 
or closure of adjacent organisations or buildings and damage to or closure of nearby buildings. 
This exemplifies the neighbourhood effects that organisations in CBDs and town centres face 
even as they benefit from having organisations in close proximity whose foot traffic also adds to 
their business. Additionally, the Christchurch CBD (DoE 69/100) was affected by their inability 
to access their premises. This is again because of the CBD cordon as well as being in close 
proximity to buildings that were declared unsafe and fenced off. Kaiapoi on the other hand was 
affected by water supply disruption (DoE 75/100) as a result of damage to water and waste 
water systems caused by the ground shaking and subsequent liquefaction (Tonkin & Taylor, 
2011). FMCG organisations report being affected by non-structural damage and damage to 
inventory which was caused by the shaking as well as the collapse of shelving. 
For most disasters, a lot of emphasis is placed on physical damage of the organisation’s 
premises. The results in Table 5-9 show that there are other contributors to business disruption 
after an earthquake or other disaster apart from physical damage. For instance, after the 4 
September 2010 earthquake, non-physical damage factors such as electricity supply disruption or 
inability to access premises were reported to be more disruptive than physical damage to the 
organisation’s premises. 
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Table 5-9: Sectoral degree of effect (for organisations that reported being affected) after the 4 September 2010 
earthquake* 
Sectoral degree of effect after the 4 September 2010 earthquake 
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Building 
Suppliers 
25 22 11 8 35 10 3 14 10 13 13 6 0 24 11 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
23 29 24 15 15 24 18 18 18 22 15 11 0 33 11 
FMCG 22 43 27 10 71 30 19 31 10 18 31 9 4 41 13 
Hospitality 14 21 19 5 46 36 17 18 3 53 53 55 0 47 4 
ICT 17 30 18 13 15 25 12 42 11 30 32 38 0 40 14 
Trucking 15 14 14 4 26 13 8 22 11 4 7 4 0 22 8 
Christchurch 
CBD 
31 30 15 9 16 16 8 33 6 62 64 69 0 34 17 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
44 28 25 12 37 75 68 52 52 77 80 62 3 62 20 
Entire Survey 1 
Sample 
24 27 19 10 33 28 19 29 15 35 37 32 1 38 12 
* The three highest degrees of effect for each sector are in bold highlighted cells. All scores are out of a possible total of 100 
Organisations were also asked what factors helped mitigate the effects of the earthquake. These 
are shown in Table 5-10. The score for each sector was arrived at using the same method as for 
factors of disruption. Again, the higher the value, the more that option contributed to mitigating 
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the effects of the earthquake. The three highest mitigation factors, for each sector, are shown in 
bold highlighted cells. 
Table 5-10: Sectoral mitigation factor effect (for organisations that reported using these measures) after 4 
September 2010* 
Mitigation factor effect after 4 September 2010 (scores out of a possible maximum of 100) 
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Building 
Suppliers 
22 47 43 63 30 18 33 15 30 20 10 18 18 77 18 0 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
55 76 59 85 11 23 38 64 32 83 32 79 53 83 20 100 
FMCG 25 61 61 81 30 26 41 48 51 58 27 49 31 73 30 40 
Hospitality 17 62 43 81 49 48 64 28 57 22 7 4 6 86 10 50 
ICT 24 65 30 68 21 25 44 19 13 39 27 33 17 73 12 33 
Trucking 13 49 20 61 28 20 28 32 33 26 10 21 23 70 20 33 
Christchurch 
CBD 
19 49 49 65 31 45 47 23 36 37 27 24 21 71 18 67 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
44 52 48 71 46 51 61 40 48 36 37 24 18 56 29 0 
Entire Survey 1 
Sample 
27 58 44 72 31 32 44 34 37 40 22 32 23 73 20 40 
* The three highest factors of mitigation for each sector are in bold highlighted cells. All scores are out of a possible maximum of 100 
As shown in Table 5-10, well-designed and well-built buildings (73/100) and relationship with 
staff (72/100) were the two mitigation factors that were common across all sectors. This shows 
the importance of staff to an organisation’s recovery and of pre-disaster activities such as 
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reinforcing buildings. In comparison to the other sectors in the study, organisations from the 
critical infrastructure sector found the existence of business continuity or emergency plans and 
the practicing of these plans as being helpful in lessening the effects of the earthquake. For 
FMCG organisations that carry a lot of stock and rely on timely delivery, relationship with 
supplier proved crucial. For ICT and trucking, the non-disruption or quick restoration of 
services (e.g. electricity and roads) was of benefit. After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, the 
restoration times for electricity was exemplary (Eidinger, Tang, & O'Rourke, 2010). However, 
for organisations from the Christchurch CDB and hospitality samples, quick restoration times 
may not have featured prominently because by the time organisations were let into their 
premises, services had been restored. 
5.2 Survey 2 (deployed 31 May 2011 to 18 September 2011) 
The original aim of Survey 2 was to gather information on ongoing recovery efforts from 
affected organisations and industry sectors after the 4 September 2010 earthquake. Although 
Survey 2 was used for this purpose, it was also used to gather information on impacts to 
organisations after the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. This earthquake’s epicentre 
was located near the town of Lyttelton and close to the built up area of the Christchurch CBD. 
It occurred at 12:51pm on a weekday. Organisations from the port town of Lyttelton were 
included in the study at this point as the town centre was badly damaged by the earthquake. 
Consequently, some of the questions in Survey 2 asked for information on both the 4 September 
2010 and 22 February 2011 events. 
The results for how the different sectors were affected after the 22 February 2011 earthquake are 
presented in Table 5-11. It is clear that the nature and location of the 22 February 2011 
earthquake, close to a built up area and at shallow depth, resulted in more severe impacts to 
organisations than the 4 September 2010 earthquake. Almost all organisations taking part in 
Survey 2 reported being affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
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Table 5-11: Per cent of organisations reporting being affected or not affected* 
Per cent of organisations reporting being affected or not affected 
  
4 September 2010 22 February 2011 
Affected Not 
Affected 
Affected Not 
Affected 
Building Suppliers 82% 18% 100% 0% 
Critical Infrastructure 94% 6% 100% 0% 
FMCG** 93% 0% 100% 0% 
Hospitality 100% 0% 86% 14% 
ICT 63% 38% 96% 4% 
Trucking 100% 0% 100% 0% 
Christchurch CBD 93% 7% 100% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre** 100% 0% 86% 7% 
Lyttelton Town Centre** 77% 20% 100% 0% 
Entire Survey 2 Sample 83% 16% 94% 6% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables, numbers might just under or just over 100% 
**Not all organisations answered this question therefore numbers do not add up to 100% 
In the disaster literature, findings point to organisations adapting as one of the elements that 
may help recovery (H. E. Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Faulkner, 2003). For Survey 2, in addition to 
being asked how long they may have closed after the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
earthquakes, organisations were also asked their operational hours (see Table 5-12). The ability 
to adjust to a possible change in clientele or in organisational working hours is one way of 
adapting to a post-disaster environment and in some cases may lead to saving of resources. In 
other cases, such as for some organisations in ICT, this meant that the organisation was able to 
deliver more in-demand goods and services or to catch up on lost production. 
Hospitality had the most organisations closing permanently after both the 4 September 2010 and 
22 February 2011 earthquakes at 14% and 43% respectively. After February, there was also an 
increased number of organisations closing from the Christchurch CBD (47%). Critical 
infrastructure and trucking were the sectors operating for longer hours after both earthquakes. 
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This is because of the increased demand for their services. Some organisations (e.g. from the 
Christchurch CBD) interpreted closing permanently as moving to and re-opening in a location 
other than the area they were in at the time of the earthquake. However, from analysis of the 
data, this interpretation was from very few organisations in the sample. Some organisations 
talked of moving to other towns in New Zealand such as Nelson and Timaru. 
Table 5-12: Closure period following 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes* 
Closure period following 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes 
  
4 September 2010 22 February 2011 
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Building Suppliers 55% 0% 36% 9% 0% 64% 9% 18% 9% 0% 
Critical Infrastructure 50% 0% 19% 13% 19% 50% 0% 13% 13% 25% 
FMCG 64% 0% 21% 7% 0% 50% 14% 21% 0% 7% 
Hospitality 71% 14% 14% 0% 0% 29% 43% 29% 0% 0% 
ICT 46% 0% 33% 8% 4% 63% 0% 29% 4% 4% 
Trucking 33% 0% 25% 17% 25% 17% 0% 42% 8% 33% 
Christchurch CBD 87% 7% 0% 0% 0% 47% 47% 0% 0% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 79% 7% 7% 7% 0% 57% 0% 21% 14% 0% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 57% 3% 29% 11% 0% 66% 9% 11% 3% 9% 
Entire Survey 2 Sample 60% 3% 23% 9% 5% 55% 11% 19% 6% 9% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables, numbers might just under or just over 100% 
Some organisations from Kaiapoi and Lyttelton Town Centres linked the number of hours 
(more or fewer) they operated to their change in revenue following the earthquakes. Other 
organisations pointed to an increase or decrease in customers or in workload as the reason for 
changes in revenue. Organisations were given two consecutive time periods: from 4 September 
2010 to 22 February 2011 and after 22 February 2011 in which to detail any changes to their 
revenue. Revenue change results are in Table 5-13. For both time periods, the overall trend in 
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revenue change was down. This is with the exception of the ICT, FMCG and critical 
infrastructure sectors which experienced mainly no change in revenue. Organisations were not 
asked to state if the changes in revenue were in comparison to the same period in the previous 
financial year. From interviews with different organisations in the study, it appears that 
respondents used their existing business practices and calculated their revenue changes based on 
what they expected to receive for that time of the year. Future surveys asking for this 
information would do well to specify a comparative period as a baseline for organisations to use 
in calculating revenue change.  
Table 5-13: Percentage of organisations in each sector and reported revenue changes* 
Percentage of organisations in each sector and reported revenue changes 
 
Organisation reporting 
revenue decrease  
Organisations reporting no 
change to revenue 
Organisation reporting 
revenue increase 
Between 4 
September 
2010 and 22 
February 
2011 
After 22 
February 
2011 
Between 4 
September 
2010 and 22 
February 
2011 
After 22 
February 
2011 
Between 4 
September 
2010 and 22 
February 
2011 
After 22 
February 
2011 
Building Suppliers 73% 82% 18% 0% 9% 18% 
Critical Infrastructure 13% 38% 50% 25% 19% 19% 
FMCG 21% 29% 50% 29% 29% 43% 
Hospitality 71% 86% 14% 0% 29% 29% 
ICT 17% 13% 67% 54% 17% 33% 
Trucking 42% 42% 25% 25% 33% 33% 
Christchurch CBD 60% 87% 27% 0% 20% 20% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 36% 14% 21% 36% 21% 21% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 40% 60% 40% 20% 11% 11% 
Entire Survey 2 Sample 37% 47% 39% 24% 19% 24% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables, numbers might just under or just over 100% 
Organisations were then asked how they would finance their recovery. Results are in Table 5-14. 
As in Survey 1 (Table 5-7), organisations reported using a combination of financing options in 
Survey 2. Just as after the 4 September 2010 earthquake, the most frequently reported means of 
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recovery was organisational cash flow. More organisations from the Christchurch CBD used the 
Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) made available by Central Government and targeted at 
organisations with less the 50 employees. The ESS was made available after both the 4 
September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. 
Table 5-14: Per cent of organisations in each sector and means of recovery finance* 
Per cent of organisations in each sector and means of recovery finance 
  
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 c
a
sh
 f
lo
w
 
S
a
vi
n
g
s 
M
o
n
e
y
 b
o
rr
o
w
e
d
 f
ro
m
 
fa
m
il
y
 o
r 
fr
ie
n
d
s 
B
a
n
k
 l
o
a
n
 
C
re
d
it
 c
a
rd
s 
In
su
ra
n
c
e
 c
la
im
 
E
a
rt
h
q
u
a
k
e
 W
a
g
e
 
S
u
b
si
d
y
 (
E
S
S
) 
O
th
e
r 
Building Suppliers 91% 27% 18% 27% 9% 27% 36% 0% 
Critical Infrastructure 81% 6% 0% 6% 0% 44% 6% 0% 
FMCG 86% 36% 0% 14% 0% 43% 7% 7% 
Hospitality 29% 29% 43% 29% 14% 86% 29% 14% 
ICT 67% 13% 4% 17% 0% 25% 21% 8% 
Trucking 83% 17% 0% 8% 0% 25% 25% 8% 
Christchurch CBD 67% 33% 13% 27% 13% 67% 60% 0% 
Kaiapoi 79% 36% 0% 7% 0% 21% 29% 0% 
Lyttelton 43% 40% 3% 17% 0% 37% 31% 31% 
Entire Survey 2 Sample 67% 27% 6% 16% 3% 39% 27% 11% 
 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables, numbers might add up to just under or just over 100% 
For staff redundancy and hire, shown in Table 5-15, critical infrastructure and trucking were the 
only sectors to not lay staff off (see Table 5-8 for staff redundancy and hire after Survey 1). In a 
reflection of the surge in demand for their services post-earthquake, trucking (67%) and critical 
infrastructure (56%) were the two sectors that had the most hires. Just over half the building 
supplier organisations and half of FMCG reported taking on new staff. In the FMCG sector, 
aside from an increased demand for goods, an increase in staff was necessitated by the massive 
clean-up resulting from breakage and damage to stock. For the Christchurch CBD and 
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hospitality sectors, certain organisations reported that some of their employees were let go in 
order to look for jobs elsewhere due to the extended closure period and the uncertainty around 
re-opening. 
Table 5-15: Staff redundancy and hire after 22 February 2011* 
 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables, numbers might add up to just under or just over 100% 
Organisations were asked the major reasons for the closure of the organisation (Table 5-16). The 
three most cited reasons for closure, per sector, are in bold highlighted cells. More organisations 
outlined the need to clear up damage to the interior as the major reason for closure. All of the 
organisations in the Christchurch CBD and most (71%) of the hospitality organisations reported 
building located within cordoned-off area31 as one of the reasons for closure. For the critical 
infrastructure sector, there was no one main reason for closure. This might be an artefact of the 
organisations having assets and infrastructure across town and being able to work from many 
                                                     
31 The Christchurch CBD was cordoned off for an extended period after the 22 February 2011 earthquake in some cases for as 
long as a year. More detail about the progressive access can be found at www.cera.govt.nz. 
Staff redundancy and hire after 22 February 2011 
  
Staff redundancy Staff hire 
No Yes No Yes 
Building Suppliers 82% 18% 45% 55% 
Critical Infrastructure 100% 0% 44% 56% 
FMCG 93% 7% 43% 50% 
Hospitality 43% 57% 86% 14% 
ICT 88% 8% 63% 33% 
Trucking 100% 0% 33% 67% 
Christchurch CBD 47% 47% 73% 20% 
Kaiapoi 79% 14% 71% 21% 
Lyttelton 71% 26% 66% 29% 
Entire Survey 2 Sample 81% 19% 61% 39% 
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places as they repaired and remediated. The number of closure reasons given by each 
organisation will be used to calculate the closure impact factor used in chapter 7. 
Table 5-16: Closure* factors after 22 February 2012 earthquake – per cent of organisations by sector** 
Closure factors after 22 February 2012 earthquake – per cent of organisations by sector 
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Building 
Suppliers 
45% 0% 9% 18% 36% 18% 18% 27% 27% 9% 18% 45% 18% 9% 0% 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
6% 13% 13% 13% 19% 19% 6% 6% 19% 19% 0% 19% 19% 6% 13% 
FMCG 21% 21% 36% 21% 50% 36% 14% 43% 14% 14% 0% 21% 14% 7% 14% 
Hospitality 57% 43% 57% 71% 71% 43% 43% 71% 43% 43% 29% 29% 43% 14% 0% 
ICT 38% 4% 8% 17% 50% 4% 13% 17% 13% 8% 8% 21% 29% 17% 4% 
Trucking 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 8% 0% 8% 8% 0% 0% 17% 0% 8% 0% 
Christchurch 
CBD 
47% 53% 27% 100% 33% 33% 33% 60% 47% 80% 20% 67% 60% 7% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
57% 21% 29% 14% 21% 14% 0% 7% 0% 14% 0% 0% 7% 0% 7% 
Lyttelton 
Town Centre 
57% 34% 34% 31% 49% 26% 9% 37% 20% 43% 11% 34% 29% 14% 9% 
Entire Survey 
2 Sample 
65% 36% 39% 47% 64% 36% 22% 47% 33% 46% 16% 49% 44% 18% 33% 
* Closure is temporary or permanent. ** The three most cited reasons for closure, per sector, are in bold highlighted cells. 
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For Survey 2, organisations were asked about organisational disruption specifically caused by 
utilities and non-utilities. In both cases, organisations were presented with a list of possible 
disruptions and asked to state (yes or no) whether they were affected by disruption to this. 
Organisations that were affected were then asked to rank from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very) how 
disrupted they were to ascertain the degree to which they were affected. Results are in Tables 5-
17 to 5-19. 
For each sector, the three most cited disruptive factors are in bold highlighted cells. For non-
utility disruption, the most commonly experienced form of disruption, except for Christchurch 
and Lyttelton, was change in staff emotional wellbeing (see Table 5-17). In the case of 
Christchurch CBD, this is likely because a lot of these organisations were closed for a period of 
time and survey respondents were not witness to the changes in emotional wellbeing of their 
colleagues at the time the survey was deployed. For Lyttelton, the town has a very strong sense 
of community and they reported that this led to people banding together and sharing the burden 
that was the earthquake. All the organisations from the Christchurch CBD were disrupted by 
damage to inventory or stock, damage to or closure of nearby buildings or organisations and also 
our organisation was located within a cordoned-off area. This again brings forward the issue of 
neighbour effects in CBDs and town centres as all the geographic locales as well as hospitality 
were affected by damage to or closure of nearby buildings or organisations. Lyttelton 
organisations were further affected by damage to or closure of nearby buildings or organisations 
and by non-structural damage (fittings damaged e.g. windows or light fixtures). More 
organisations from the FMCG (93%), trucking (83%) and building suppliers (82%) sectors 
reported customer issues as one of the most disruptive factors.  
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Table 5-17: Per cent of organisations, by sector, reporting disruption from non-utilities* 
Per cent of organisations reporting disruption from non-utilities 
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* The three most cited disruptive factors are in bold highlighted cells 
While Table 5-17 contains information on the percentage of  organisations from each sector 
citing which factors affected their operations, Table 5-18 shows to what extent the affected 
organisations from each sector were affected by disruption to non-utilities (the computation is 
the same as that used in section 5.1). Again, the three highest degrees of  effect, for each sector, 
are in bold highlighted cells. For instance, from Table 5-17, overall more organisations reported 
staff  wellbeing as being a disruptive factor. However, in considering the extent to which this 
factor was disruptive, only the trucking sector found changes in staff  emotional wellbeing to be 
very disruptive. The trucking sector also shows the lowest scores altogether for the degree to 
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which they were affected by different factors. Across the entire sample group, the factor whose 
disruption affected organisations the most was the organisation being located in a cordoned off  
area. This is prominent for the geographic sectors as they all had a lot of  unreinforced masonry 
buildings that were damaged and demolished after 22 February 2011 earthquake. The hospitality 
organisations that were affected by being in a cordoned off  area found this to be very disruptive. 
Only 38% of  critical infrastructure organisations reported being affected by their organisation 
being in a cordoned off  area (see Table 5-17). However, these affected critical infrastructure 
organisations found this to be very disruptive (see Table 5-18). These are organisations that had 
major infrastructure in Christchurch CBD and faced some difficulties even accessing their assets 
for repair. 
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Table 5-18: Degree of effect to sector (for organisations that reported being disrupted) after disruption of non-
utilities* 
Degree of effect to sector after disruption of non-utilities (scores out of a possible maximum of 100) 
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Building 
Suppliers 
38 41 29 0 33 37 33 33 60 22 50 71 50 22 33 42 17 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
77 56 60 58 63 47 57 50 76 25 53 64 67 73 50 43 33 
FMCG 64 42 47 6 67 43 50 72 67 8 50 56 33 33 40 52 0 
Hospitality 78 73 73 75 78 75 80 80 83 50 42 53 56 67 73 61 56 
ICT 45 53 44 56 56 50 24 25 50 8 45 57 50 38 48 44 11 
Trucking 33 17 7 0 33 20 8 0 0 0 39 67 17 0 0 37 0 
Christchurch 
CBD 
90 70 67 43 79 46 92 90 100 0 55 87 57 87 71 75 33 
Kaiapoi 59 19 8 40 29 33 44 57 57 0 52 50 56 25 33 48 0 
Lyttelton 71 68 62 42 73 58 67 65 77 0 67 84 64 56 58 57 75 
Entire Survey 
2 Sample 
62 49 44 36 57 45 51 52 63 13 50 65 50 45 45 51 25 
* The three highest degrees of effect, for each sector, are in bold highlighted cells. All scores out of a possible maximum of 100. 
For interruption caused by the disruption of utilities (Table 5-19), more critical infrastructure 
organisations reported being affected by disruption of all the alternatives presented. This is 
because of the closely coupled location of infrastructure where one service needing repair means 
all the other utilities are affected. For instance, the disruption to utilities like roads and gas meant 
that the repair and remediation work to be carried out was slowed down as they were unable to 
get to repair sites or could not access the sites until electricity, gas or water had been turned off. 
This required considerable coordination from the lifeline utilities in the greater Christchurch area 
and was made easier by the fact that they had good pre-existing relationships from the regular 
Engineering Lifelines Group meeting (see section 4.2.2). Disruption to utilities after the 22 
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February 2011 earthquake in some cases also affected search and rescue as rescue teams had to 
ensure that all utilities would not be hazards to operations.  
More organisations reported being affected by disruption to road networks, communications 
and water than by disruption to sewerage and electricity. For the Christchurch CBD sector 
affected organisations reported being very disrupted. This is a result of the extensive damage 
caused by ground motion from the earthquake32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
32 The 22 February earthquake had some of the highest peak ground accelerations ever recorded for an earthquake of MW 6.3 
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Table 5-19: Disruption (by per cent of sector) and degree of effect (for organisations that reported being 
disrupted) - utilities 
Disruption and extent of disruption to utilities 
 Affected by disruption Level of impact caused by disruption 
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Building 
Suppliers 
64% 45% 64% 73% 55% 71 62 67 59 67 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
81% 81% 69% 69% 81% 72 59 69 63 67 
FMCG 64% 36% 50% 64% 79% 67 58 33 47 58 
Hospitality 71% 57% 71% 71% 71% 83 73 83 78 83 
ICT 58% 42% 50% 46% 58% 45 53 62 47 48 
Trucking 33% 25% 42% 42% 67% 42 50 40 50 71 
Christchurch 
CBD 
73% 73% 80% 87% 80% 100 100 100 100 100 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
29% 29% 21% 57% 50% 33 22 33 50 50 
Lyttelton 
Town Centre 
66% 46% 69% 49% 63% 76 82 79 85 89 
Entire Survey 
2 Sample 
63% 50% 59% 61% 69% 65 62 63 64 70 
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5.3 Survey 333 (deployed 12 March 2012 to 19 May 2012) 
Survey 3 was designed to bring together data on the after-effects of the earthquakes 18 months 
after the initial 4 September 2010 earthquake and 12 months after the more destructive 22 
February 2011 earthquake. Survey 3 was also intended to determine how organisations were 
affected by subsequent aftershocks, such as those on 13 June and 23 December 2011. It should 
be kept in mind that results presented for Survey 3 are only for organisations that participated in 
Survey 3 (see tables 5-1 and 5-2 for survey response rates). Additionally, results for the 
hospitality sector are not reported in this section because of the small number of responses 
received from the sector for Survey 3. Some organisations chose not to participate further after 
Survey 1 and Survey 2. 
In Survey 3, organisations were asked to state whether they were open or trading, permanently 
closed or intended to re-open. Table 5-20 has the organisational responses by sector showing 
organisations that were open or trading or those that intended to re-open. Only organisations 
from the CBD and Town Centres reported that they were still closed but intended to re-open. 
Reasons for those intending to re-open included the building of new premises and waiting for 
issues to do with their building to be resolved before it could be re-occupied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
33 It should be noted that the hospitality sector has been omitted from the numerical results presentation for Survey 3 because 
of the low participation of organisations from the sector. 
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Table 5-20: Organisations intending to re-open, open/trading or permanently closed* 
Organisations intending to re-open, open/trading or permanently closed 
 Intend to re-open Open/trading 
Building Suppliers 0% 100% 
Critical Infrastructure 0% 100% 
FMCG 0% 100% 
ICT 0% 100% 
Trucking 0% 100% 
Christchurch CBD 20% 80% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 13% 87% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 40% 60% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample** 11% 89% 
*Owing to rounding, for this and subsequent tables, numbers might add up to just under or just over 100% 
** Hospitality organisations not included 
The Canterbury earthquakes were unusual in that they went on for as long as they did and that 
there were more than four events with a magnitude greater than MW 6. In response to an open 
ended question in Survey 3, organisations reported that the continuing earthquakes made it 
difficult to plan and were also very disruptive as after every earthquake more than MW 5.5 
buildings were evacuated and had to be inspected34. Most organisations did not have dedicated 
geotechnical or structural engineers to check and certify buildings immediately after each 
earthquake. This was a bottleneck in the system. Machinery and other equipment also had to be 
shut down and inspected which affected many production lines. The FMCG manufacturing 
organisations reported that one of their challenges was the stopping and restarting of production 
lines which can take a great deal of time. Another personnel bottleneck was the availability of 
insurance assessors and adjustors. As some of the buildings that had to be inspected were 
schools, this meant that parents had to go and pick up children. This caused even more 
                                                     
34 The reason for the evacuation of buildings after a MW 5.5 earthquake is unclear. It is possible that this came about because of 
the Ministry of Education advising that school should be evacuated and buildings checked after each MW 5.5 earthquake. The 
evacuation of schools meant that parents needed to leave work and collect their children. 
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disruption as they could sometimes not return to the office or if they did had on their minds the 
welfare of their families. 
In the aftershock sequence, overall more organisations (31%) reported being affected by the 13 
June 2011 aftershock than by either the 26 December 2010 (3%) or 23 December 2011 (26%) 
aftershocks. The sector with the most organisations affected by both the 13 June and 23 
December 2011 aftershocks was critical infrastructure. The continuing aftershocks made it 
difficult to renew or get new building insurance or contract works insurance for builders as 
insurance companies weighed up the risks. 
Considering the extended closure of the CBD and the difficulty in getting buildings constructed 
or repaired as a result of the aftershocks, it is interesting to note that over two-thirds of 
organisations participating in Survey 3 did not relocate (see Table 5-21). However, Christchurch 
CBD at 80%, building suppliers (43%) and Lyttelton (40%) were the sectors with the most 
organisations reporting relocating. This emphasises the localised nature that was characteristic of 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake; the more devastating effects of the earthquake manifested in 
the CBD, Lyttelton and in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch. This meant the organisations 
that were able could relocate and work from different parts of the greater Christchurch area. 
This was also made possible by the quick restoration or non-disruption of utilities to many parts 
of Christchurch (Giovinazzi & Wilson, 2012). Additionally, this means that prior to the 
earthquakes, Christchurch had slack building resources in areas outside the CBD that could be 
used as commercial accommodation. 
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Table 5-21: Organisations relocated or not after any of the earthquakes** 
Organisations relocated or not after any of the earthquakes 
 No Yes 
Building Suppliers 57% 43% 
Critical Infrastructure 71% 29% 
FMCG 80% 20% 
ICT 77% 23% 
Trucking 100% 0% 
Christchurch CBD 20% 80% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 88% 13% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 50% 40% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 68% 31% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
According to Alesch et al (2001) and Sheffi (2007) disaster sometimes necessitates a change in an 
organisation’s core business. This might be because their goods and services are no longer 
needed or there is a new market opportunity due to the disaster. In Survey 3, all organisations 
indicated they were still in the same line of business. However 16% of all organisations reported 
adding a new product line to their existing one(s). These figures are for organisations who took 
the opportunity to make alterations to product lines after the earthquakes. However, it is not 
known how many would have taken this step if the earthquakes had not occurred. Half of the 
organisations that added a new product line were from Lyttelton. Further, 21% of organisations 
reported that they had wanted to make changes (prior to the earthquakes) and the time after the 
earthquakes was right and/or they realised the business had to change to survive. 
In relation to this, an organisation, or even its regular supplier, changing operations as a result of 
the earthquakes may lead to the organisation requiring new suppliers. Alternatively an 
organisation’s suppliers may have been unable to meet their supply quota after the earthquakes 
which may have led to a need for new suppliers. An organisation’s supply chain includes other 
organisations that may or may not have been affected by the earthquakes. Table 5-22 contains 
information on how many organisations reported the need to use new suppliers a year after the 
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22 February 2011 earthquake. More critical infrastructure organisations reported using new 
suppliers than any other sector. Interviews with some of the critical infrastructure organisations 
revealed that this was due to their regular suppliers not carrying the amount of supplies required 
for earthquake repairs. 
Table 5-22: Organisations reporting the need to use new suppliers** 
Organisations reporting the need to use new suppliers 
 No Yes 
Building Suppliers 86% 14% 
Critical Infrastructure 43% 57% 
FMCG 80% 20% 
ICT 92% 8% 
Trucking 83% 17% 
Christchurch CBD 60% 40% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 88% 13% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 70% 20% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 76% 23% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
The sequence of earthquakes in Canterbury and the cost of the disaster (Munich Re, 1999) 
caused massive insurance settlement delays. In Survey 3 organisations were asked if they had 
lodged insurance claims, if their insurance cover was adequate and if insurance claims had been 
settled in full following the 22 February 2011 earthquakes. Results are in Table 5-23. More 
organisations from Lyttelton, trucking and Kaiapoi did not lodge insurance claims after the 22 
February 2011 earthquake than from other sectors. Some organisations reported that the reason 
for this was because the insurance excess was more than the cost of the damage incurred. For 
Lyttelton however, the sector had the most organisations (40%) report that they did not have 
insurance cover. Most of the organisations in the Lyttelton sample are small- to medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Also in the Lyttelton sample are some not-for-profit organisations. Both the 
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SMEs and the not-for-profits reported that they could not afford the insurance premiums and 
decided to go without.  
Table 5-23: Insurance type** 
Insurance type 
  
Following the 22 February 2011 earthquake: 
did your organisation 
lodge an insurance 
claim? 
was your insurance cover/policy 
adequate? 
has your insurance 
claim been settled in 
full? 
No Yes No 
No 
Insurance 
cover Yes No Yes 
Building Suppliers 43% 57% 14% 29% 57% 43% 14% 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
14% 86% 0% 14% 86% 43% 14% 
FMCG 40% 60% 20% 0% 60% 40% 40% 
ICT 46% 46% 8% 0% 62% 15% 38% 
Trucking 67% 33% 33% 0% 50% 33% 0% 
Christchurch CBD 40% 60% 20% 20% 20% 60% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
50% 50% 13% 13% 50% 38% 13% 
Lyttelton Town 
Centre 
70% 30% 0% 40% 50% 40% 0% 
Entire Survey 3 
Sample 
47% 52% 11% 15% 56% 35% 18% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
Other documented effects of disaster include changes to cash flow, revenue and profits (West & 
Lenze, 1994). These changes, positive or negative, also have ripple effects such as organisations 
expanding or contracting operations or the hiring or laying off of staff. In order to determine the 
extent to which the earthquakes in Canterbury affected business operations over time, owners 
were asked about changes to cash flow (Table 5-24), revenue (Table 5-25) and staffing (Tables 5-
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26 and 5-27). Organisations were also asked to indicate whether their businesses were worse off, 
better off or about the same compared to before the earthquakes. 
Organisations from the FMCG (80%) and trucking (66%) sectors were more likely to indicate 
excellent or good cash flow while more organisations from critical infrastructure (57%) reported 
having good cash flow. The building suppliers and Christchurch CBD sectors stood out with 
more organisations, 43% and 40% respectively reporting poor cash flow. The sectors have 
slightly different reasons for this, however, all related to not having enough custom. The 
building suppliers (mainly those selling products like floors and roofs) spoke of still not profiting 
because of the slow start to rebuild work. The CBD organisations stated that with the relocation 
of major employers out of the CBD and the drop in foot traffic, there were not enough 
customers. It is worth remembering that some of the organisations that were in the CBD prior 
to the earthquakes may not return there. 
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Table 5-24: Organisational cash flow** 
Organisational cash flow 
  
With your organisation's cash flow in mind, which of the following applies: 
Excellent Good Satisfactory Poor Very Poor Don't 
Know 
Building 
Suppliers 
0% 14% 43% 43% 0% 0% 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
14% 57% 29% 0% 0% 0% 
FMCG 40% 40% 20% 0% 0% 0% 
ICT 15% 15% 46% 8% 0% 8% 
Trucking 33% 33% 33% 0% 0% 0% 
Christchurch 
CBD 
0% 20% 40% 40% 0% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
13% 38% 13% 25% 13% 0% 
Lyttelton Town 
Centre 
20% 20% 30% 20% 0% 0% 
Entire Survey 3 
Sample 
16% 27% 34% 16% 2% 2% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
In comparison to results from Surveys 1 and 2 (see Tables 5-7 and 5-14 respectively), the 
building suppliers sector was still the sector with the most organisations reporting a decrease in 
revenue after Survey 3. Some of the organisations from the building suppliers sector however, 
commented that business has picked up and this will be reflected on the balance sheet in the 
months following. Forty per cent of FMCG organisations reported a drop in revenue. This is 
attributed to pricing changes, i.e. decreases, which led to lower profit margins on many product 
lines after the earthquakes. Organisations reported reducing prices, as a short-term measure, in 
order to attract customers (see section 7.5 for more detail). In contrast, organisations in the ICT 
sector that reported no change or an increase in revenue ascribed this to the continued growth 
of their sector and also to having a customer base outside of the Canterbury region and New 
Zealand. 
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Table 5-25: Organisational revenue change* 
Organisational revenue change 
 Decreased No Change Increased  
Building Suppliers 71% 0% 29% 
Critical Infrastructure 57% 0% 43% 
FMCG 40% 20% 40% 
ICT 15% 38% 46% 
Trucking 17% 50% 33% 
Christchurch CBD 60% 0% 40% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 50% 13% 38% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 20% 30% 40% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 37% 21% 40% 
*Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
Tables 5-26 and 5-27 show the staffing changes in organisations after the earthquakes. 
Organisations reported that they tried to ensure that staff lay-offs were a last resort after the 
earthquakes. One reason provided was that in the period of uncertainty the workplace should 
provide some security. Additionally, organisations also did not want to lose staff through their 
leaving voluntarily. Some organisations offered to relocate staff and their families to other 
offices in New Zealand as this meant they would still be with the organisation. Some 
respondents stated that this was also good for the morale of the teams in the organisation. 
However, some staff still chose to leave voluntarily. Organisations from FMCG (80%), critical 
infrastructure and building suppliers (both at 71%) reported staff leaving voluntarily. The most 
frequent reason for this was the inability to cope with the continuing aftershocks as well as 
family pressure to leave the greater Christchurch region. It is possible that the larger 
organisations with more staff would have proportionately higher numbers of staff leaving; 
however analysis of the data did not indicate this. 
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Table 5-26: Full-time staff voluntarily leaving** 
 Full-time staff voluntarily leaving organisation 
after the earthquakes 
No Yes 
Building Suppliers 29% 71% 
Critical Infrastructure 29% 71% 
FMCG 0% 80% 
ICT 38% 46% 
Trucking 50% 50% 
Christchurch CBD 20% 60% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 50% 25% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 70% 0% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 39% 47% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
Furthermore, some organisations reported on redundancy and hiring changes. Organisations 
from the building suppliers sector more frequently reported hiring personnel. This was 
accounted for by the building suppliers stating that they were hiring in preparation for the 
rebuilding work that would commence and the demand for product that they would have to 
meet. However, building supplier organisations that supply heavy machinery hired people 
because they had experienced a rise in demand for their machinery. 
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Table 5-27: Staff redundancy and hire** 
 Staff redundancy Staff hire 
No Yes No Yes 
Building Suppliers 71% 29% 29% 71% 
Critical Infrastructure 71% 14% 43% 57% 
FMCG 100% 0% 40% 40% 
ICT 100% 0% 46% 54% 
Trucking 100% 0% 50% 50% 
Christchurch CBD 80% 20% 40% 40% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 75% 0% 25% 25% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 80% 0% 70% 10% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 85% 6% 45% 42% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
Organisations were asked to describe the performance of the organisation in comparison to pre-
earthquake levels. Results are contained in Table 5-28. More organisations from the building 
suppliers and Christchurch CBD sectors reported their organisations as being significantly worse 
off, compared to pre-earthquake levels, than any other sectors. For the building suppliers sector, 
this is interesting because the sector was already facing reduced sales prior to the earthquakes. 
Importantly, just under half (45%) of the organisations surveyed said their organisation was 
significantly or slightly worse off in comparisons to pre-earthquake performance. 
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Table 5-28: Self-report performance of organisations pre- and post-earthquake** 
Performance of organisations pre- and post-earthquake 
 With the earthquakes in mind, is your organisation: 
Significantly 
worse off 
Slightly worse Same Slightly better Significantly 
better 
Building Suppliers 57% 14% 0% 14% 14% 
Critical Infrastructure 14% 43% 14% 29% 0% 
FMCG 20% 20% 0% 40% 20% 
ICT 0% 23% 46% 31% 0% 
Trucking 0% 33% 17% 50% 0% 
Christchurch CBD 40% 20% 20% 20% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 25% 38% 13% 13% 13% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 20% 10% 30% 30% 10% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 19% 26% 21% 27% 6% 
**Not all organisations answered this question; totals may not add up to 100% 
5.4 Sectoral challenges 
In all three surveys deployed, organisations were asked what particular challenges their 
organisations faced after the earthquakes. In all three instances, the biggest challenge across all 
sectors was the wellbeing of staff. Organisations reported increased stress levels and drops in 
motivation. This was partly a result of the ongoing earthquakes and also because people had to 
deal with relocation, repairs, restoration or demolition of their properties on top of the insurance 
and other paperwork that needed to be done. Table 5-29 contains complete results of each 
sector’s challenges. 
From Table 5-29, after Survey 1, Kaiapoi and Christchurch CBD both identified as challenges 
reduced customers numbers and reduced customer spending. The hospitality sector also listed 
these as some of their challenges. However, the CBD and Town Centres were also subject to 
neighbour effects. This was a concern for all three geographic locales in all the surveys. From 
Surveys 2 and 3, common to Lyttelton and Kaiapoi were comments from not-for-profits about 
difficulty maintaining their profiles in the community as people’s time was taken up dealing with 
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the consequences of the earthquakes. After Survey 3, it emerged that the trucking and critical 
infrastructure sectors were in competition for some of the same human resources as a result of a 
shortage of that particular skillset. 
The critical infrastructure sector listed damage to their infrastructure, especially the buried 
infrastructure, as a considerable challenge. This continued throughout the different survey 
periods and was compounded by continued damage due to aftershocks and having to ensure 
that infrastructure was assessed after every significant aftershock. Also challenging was planning 
for and implementation of seismic retrofitting measures while not knowing where people would 
relocate to as a result of land use planning decisions such as the residential zoning. Critical 
infrastructure organisations stood out in particular for staff wellbeing because of the extended 
hours their staff worked to effect repairs to damaged infrastructure. 
After both Surveys 1 and 2, those ICT organisations with local customers detailed having 
trouble accessing their customers, especially those who had been located in the Christchurch 
CBD at the time of the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Also, due to the mobile nature of some of 
their work, some of these ICT organisations wrote of worrying about the safety of their staff in 
case of earthquakes as they worked from customers’ alternative premises such as private homes 
which may not have been checked for earthquake resistance. For ICT organisations with 
customers outside the Christchurch region and New Zealand, one of their challenges was 
reassuring clients that they could still deliver. 
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Table 5-29: Sectoral biggest challenges after Surveys 1, 2 and 3 
Sector Challenges Survey 1 Challenges Survey 2 Challenges Survey 3 
All sectors  Staff wellbeing 
Staff wellbeing 
 
 Staff wellbeing 
Building 
Suppliers 
 Uncertain 
demand 
 Not enough 
equipment 
 Cancellation of 
pre-earthquake 
work 
 Cash flow 
 Insurance 
 Uncertain demand 
 Cash flow 
 Insurance/EQC 
 Uncertain demand 
 Reduced sales, cash flow 
Critical 
Infrastructure 
 Damaged 
infrastructure 
 Increased 
demand for 
services 
 Effect of 
continuing 
aftershocks on 
infrastructure 
 Staff long hours 
 Effects of tightly 
coupled 
infrastructure 
 Continued repair 
and restoration of 
large parts of 
infrastructure 
 Estimating level of 
damage to buried 
infrastructure 
 Continual checking 
of large bit of 
infrastructure due 
to aftershocks 
 Staff long working 
hours 
 Balance earthquake 
work with business-
as-usual 
 Uncertainty, planning ahead 
difficult 
 Network retrofit for better 
seismic performance 
 Balance earthquake work 
with business-as-usual 
FMCG 
 Supply and 
demand issues 
 Loss of CBD 
customers 
 Supply and demand 
oscillation 
 Pricing low, reduced profit 
margin 
Hospitality 
 Reduced 
discretionary 
spending 
 Cordons 
 Access to premises 
 Reduced 
discretionary 
spending 
 Insurance 
 
ICT 
 Dealing with 
affected 
customers 
 Accessing 
affected 
customers 
 Dealing with 
 Skills shortage 
 Customer 
engagement for local 
ICT organisations 
 Dealing with 
customers outside 
the region 
 Skills shortage 
 Staff retention 
 Managing workload 
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customers 
outside the 
region 
 Increased demand, 
managing 
workloads 
Trucking 
 Erratic demand 
 Damaged 
infrastructure 
 More work 
 Damaged 
infrastructure 
affecting 
maintenance and 
cost adding to travel 
time 
 Erratic demand, 
uncertainty of work 
 More work 
 Staff retention 
 Damaged infrastructure still 
affecting maintenance and 
cost adding to travel time 
 More work 
 Traffic management issues 
with reduced infrastructure 
 Skills shortage 
Christchurch 
CBD 
 Decrease in 
customer number 
for various 
reasons 
 Customer 
perception 
 Cordons and 
damage to 
infrastructure 
 Decrease in 
customer 
spending 
 Cash flow 
 Insurance 
 Finding premises to 
relocate to 
 Relocating 
 Cash flow 
 Accessing premises 
inside cordon 
 Customer awareness that 
shops are trading 
Kaiapoi Town 
Centre 
 Dealing with 
emotional 
customers 
 Neighbour effects 
 Reduced 
discretionary 
spending 
 Neighbour effects 
 Reduced 
discretionary 
spending 
 Uncertainty 
 Decreased customer numbers 
 Decreased sales 
Lyttelton 
  Insurance 
 Motivation and 
patience 
 Staff and customer 
wellbeing 
 Available premises 
 Building tagging, 
access and repairs 
 Uncertain rebuilding plans 
 
5.4.1 Synopsis of results - temporal trends across sectors 
There are some differences in how organisations and sectors were affected after each survey. 
These differences are more apparent mainly between Surveys 1 and 2 because some of the 
questions were repeated in the two surveys. Some of these differences were also because of the 
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very different characteristics of the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes (see 
chapter 1 for more detail).  
More building supplier organisations closed temporarily after Survey 1 than after Survey 2. 
However, fewer organisations from FMCG, hospitality and trucking reported temporary or 
permanent closure after Survey 1. After Survey 2, there were also less organisations reporting 
closure in Kaiapoi and more organisations closed in the CBD. In keeping with the reported 
increased workload, more trucking and critical infrastructure organisations reported working 
longer hours after Survey 2. In Survey 1, these were also the 2 sectors that worked more hours 
than any other. 
Table 5-30 shows the sectoral revenue changes after Surveys 1 and 2. With each survey, there 
was an increase in the percentage of building supplier organisations reporting revenue losses. 
This is in addition to the building suppliers sector reporting a downward trend in revenue for the 
period before the earthquakes (see section 4.2.1). Some organisations reported that this 
continuing pattern of reduced revenue was a hindrance to recovery as they did not have 
sufficient cash reserves post-earthquakes. In the disaster literature, (Alesch et al., 2009; 
Olshansky & Johnson, 2012; Quarantelli, 1999; Rose & Lim, 2002) it has been documented how 
recovery can be a long, slow process and can be linked to the amount of resources an 
organisation has access to in the recovery period as well as the effective use of those resources. 
Effective utilisation of resources (Gladwell, 2000; Hummel et al., 2007) ensures that they are 
used in the phase of recovery when they are most needed (see chapter 6.8.6). 
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Table 5-30: Comparison of sectoral revenue changes after 4 September 2010 earthquake (data from Survey 1) 
and 22 February 2011 earthquake (data from after Survey 2) 
Comparison of sectoral revenue changes after 4 September 2010 earthquake (data from Survey 1) and 22 
February 2011 earthquake (data from after Survey 2) 
 
Revenue has decreased No change Revenue has increased 
After 4 
September 
2010 
earthquake 
(Survey 1) 
After 22 
February 
2011 
earthquake 
(Survey 2) 
After 4 
September 
2010 
earthquake 
(Survey 1) 
After 22 
February 
2011 
earthquake 
(Survey 2) 
After 4 
September 
2010 
earthquake 
(Survey 1) 
After 22 
February 
2011 
earthquake 
(Survey 2) 
Building Suppliers 59% 82% 23% 0% 14% 18% 
Critical Infrastructure 18% 38% 50% 25% 23% 19% 
FMCG 16% 29% 62% 29% 16% 43% 
Hospitality 67% 86% 15% 0% 19% 29% 
ICT 20% 13% 70% 54% 10% 33% 
Trucking 38% 42% 46% 25% 17% 33% 
Christchurch CBD 77% 87% 19% 0% 3% 20% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 64% 14% 28% 36% 8% 21% 
Lyttelton Did not 
participate 
60% Did not 
participate 
20% Did not 
participate 
11% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 45% 47% 39% 24% 13% 24% 
In contrast, the FMCG sector had a higher percentage of organisations with revenue increases in 
Survey 2 than in Survey 1. There was a slight dip in Survey 3 compared to Survey 2. In personal 
communication with a FMCG business leader, he pointed to the population shift after the 
earthquakes as a challenge for the sector: both in customer numbers and in long-term planning. 
He noted that some FMCG retail locations had far lower numbers than pre-earthquake while 
some had more. The hospitality sector also had a larger percentage of organisations reporting 
revenue increases from Survey 1 to Survey 2. Considering the timing of Survey 2, there are two 
possible reasons for this. The first is that they had increased revenues because of the Rugby 
World Cup (hosted by New Zealand) and the second is that the open hospitality associations 
profited from others being closed. Trucking and Kaiapoi also had more businesses experience 
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revenue increases after Survey 2. For trucking this is consistent with the increased post-
earthquake work load they reported. In Kaiapoi this may be a result of the joint marketing 
campaign the organisations embarked on, profiting from the closure of the Christchurch CBD 
and local customer loyalty. Kaiapoi was also the only sector where there were more businesses 
reporting no change to their revenue after Survey 2. There were less Lyttelton organisations 
reporting revenue decreases after Survey 3. The trends for revenue changes are displayed in the 
form of the recovery rate coefficient (RRC) discussed in chapter 7: significant contributors to 
recovery. 
After Survey 2, more organisations cited insurance as one of their means of recovery finance 
compared to after Survey 1. After Survey 1, some organisations pointed to not filing insurance 
claims because the damage was less than the excess. The increase in reports of insurance as a 
means of recovery finance is likely because more organisations were affected by the 22 February 
2011 than by the 4 September 2010 earthquake (see Table 5-11) and the more severe damage 
after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. However, from analysis of sectoral biggest challenges, 
insurance was cited more frequently as a challenge after Survey 2. The primary reason for this is 
likely the delay in resolving insurance issues. Interestingly, hospitality had an increase in the 
number of organisations using money borrowed from family or friends to finance their recovery. Berger 
(1998) and Avery (1998) found that in small organisations it is often difficult for owners to 
separate their personal assets from organisational assets. In such instances, it is not easy for the 
firm to get a loan from lending agencies. In this thesis, the size of the organisation is just one of 
the attributes investigated. Therefore, a separate more detailed analysis of the effects of recovery 
based on organisation size is contained in appendix I. 
The biggest challenge faced by all sectors was staff wellbeing. Organisations noted that one year 
after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, staff were more likely to suffer fatigue. Some 
organisations commented on the increase in frequency of mistakes made by tired staff. 
Organisations reported that they took measures such as booking holiday getaways, away from 
Christchurch, for staff members to help with the problem of fatigue. In other cases, 
organisations offered staff the option of working from alternate locations instead of having staff 
leave. There is more discussion on staff wellbeing in chapters 6 and 10. 
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Another way in which organisations can be affected after disaster is through staff retention. 
Over the three surveys, the numbers of staff taken on and let go increased for the building 
suppliers sector. This was the general trend for the critical infrastructure, FMCG and trucking 
sectors. These sectors reported requiring more staff for the increased workload after the 
earthquakes. More hospitality and CBD organisations had staff redundancies from survey to 
survey. They also had less hires over this time period. Organisations that had staff redundancies 
reported this being due to their extended closure. The ICT sector had an increase in workforce 
between Surveys 2 and 3. Keeping in mind ICT sector reports of a continuing skills shortage, it 
is unclear where the hires were from. Trucking had more staff hires from Survey 1 to Survey 2 
and experienced a very slight drop between Surveys 2 and 3 in businesses reporting hiring staff. 
Kaiapoi had a slight increase in organisations reporting hires while Lyttelton showed a drop in 
number of organisations reporting redundancies after Survey 3. 
In an illustration of neighbourhood effects, a substantial proportion of CBD and hospitality 
organisations reported one of their biggest causes of disruption to be damage to or closure of nearby 
buildings as well as damage to adjacent buildings. Neighbourhood effects are some of the ecological 
factors that can affect the recovery of organisations after disaster. Some of these effects are 
discussed in chapters 7 and 8. From Survey 1 to Survey 2, there was also a rise in how affected 
organisations were by utility disruption. This again shows the amount of damage caused by the 
22 February 2011 earthquake to infrastructure compared to the 4 September 2011 earthquake. 
5.5 Organisational resilience using the Benchmark Resilience Tool 
(BRT) 
Organisational researchers have long puzzled over what particular organisational traits enable 
some organisations to survive crisis better than others and if it would be possible to ascertain 
business survival before crisis or disaster struck. This has led to the attempt to quantify the 
resilience of organisations. 
The second part of all the surveys deployed for this investigation contained questions from the 
Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) regarding the resilience of the organisation (there is more 
discussion on the BRT in chapters 2 and 10). The BRT contains items (questions) to which 
respondents are asked to indicate a level of agreement (strongly agree to strongly disagree) on a 
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5-point Likert scale. The statements together form the 13 indicators of organisational resilience 
shown in Figure 5-1. The BRT gives a single index score which is the average of the 13 
indicators of organisational resilience. The two factors of organisational resilience named planning 
and adaptive capacity are also arrived at by the averaging of the indicators they are comprised of. 
The planning factor contains five indicators of organisational resilience while the adaptive 
capacity factor contains eight of the 13 resilience indicators. 
 
Figure 5-1: Indicators of organisational resilience contained in the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) 
Using the BRT, the scores for the factors or overall organisational resilience are arrived at via the 
formula: 
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Equation 5-2: Calculation for Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) overall organisational resilience and factors of 
resilience 
It is important to note that the development of the BRT was done with the participation of 
organisations during business-as-usual. Organisations in the greater Christchurch area used the 
BRT during a crisis period. Additionally, the questionnaire was designed for self-completion by 
respondents. This means that there is the possibility of self-reporting bias as various respondents 
may have interpreted questions or phrases differently. Organisations may also be motivated to 
present their performance in a positive light, especially in the level of resilience. This is a 
constraint for any survey that relies on self-reporting and results must be interpreted with this in 
mind. 
The full version of the BRT contains 53 items which when deployed in combination with 
questions investigating earthquake effects to organisations lengthened the questionnaires 
considerably. This called for a shorter version of the BRT which was used in Surveys 1 and 3. 
For more information on the development and validation of the shorter version of the BRT 
please see Whitman et al (2014). For all the items contained in the BRT refer to appendix F. 
The sectoral organisational resilience results computed after use of the BRT are presented in 
Table 5-31 for Survey 1, Table 5-32 for Survey 2 and Table 5-33 for Survey 3. Individual sectoral 
indicator scores for all surveys are shown in appendix F. Also, in chapter 10, the disaster 
resilience of organisations is discussed and some detail on the possible reasons for difference in 
sectoral resilience scores is provided. 
 
Planning [Average of Pi1+ Pi2……Pi5]/3*100 
Adaptive capacity = [Average of ACi1 + ACi2 +…….ACi8]/3*100 
Overall organisational resilience = [Planning factor score + Adaptive capacity 
factor score]/2 
= [[(Pi1+ Pi2……Pi5) ]/5*100 + [(ACi1 + ACi2 +…….ACi8) ]/8*100] 
 
i is the indicator 
P = planning factor 
AC = adaptive capacity factor 
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Table 5-31: Survey 1 sectoral resilience scores using the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT)*  
Survey 1 sectoral resilience scores using the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) 
  
Average Sectoral 
Planning Factor 
Score 
Average Sectoral 
Adaptive Capacity 
Factor Score 
Average Sectoral 
Resilience Score 
Building Suppliers 54% 63% 59% 
Critical Infrastructure 84% 84% 84% 
FMCG 69% 80% 75% 
Hospitality 59% 70% 64% 
ICT 57% 73% 65% 
Trucking 67% 78% 72% 
Christchurch CBD 64% 73% 68% 
Kaiapoi 60% 70% 65% 
Entire Survey 1 Sample 64% 74% 69% 
*Lyttelton Town Centre organisations did not take part in Survey 1. 
After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, the sectors with the highest resilience scores (measured 
using the BRT) were critical infrastructure, FMCG and trucking with scores of 84%, 75% and 
72% respectively. These were also the sectors to have the highest scores for both the planning 
and adaptive capacity factors. The sectors with the lowest resilience scores were building 
suppliers and hospitality with resilience scores of 59% and 64% respectively.  
For Survey 2, the sector with the highest resilience score was again critical infrastructure (54%) 
followed by trucking with 52%. Kaiapoi was the sector with the third highest score at 51%. 
Notably, when sectoral resilience scores are compared between Surveys 1 and 2, the direction 
for all sectors is down. Figure 5-2 (and appendix F) has a graphical representation of the 
difference in sectoral resilience score between Surveys 1 and 2. Additionally, the spread of the 
resilience scores after the 22 February 2011 earthquake was narrower across and between all 
sectors after Survey 2. This is likely because of the level of effect to organisations of the 22 
February 2011 earthquake (more detail in chapter 10). Resilience is a trait that can wear down 
depending on circumstances and that needs to be maintained, rebuilt or renewed constantly. 
Sutcliffe and Vogus (2003) in their work on organisational resilience state the same. 
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Table 5-32: Survey 2 sectoral resilience scores using the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) 
Survey 2 sectoral resilience scores using the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) 
  
Average Sectoral 
Planning Factor 
Score 
Average Sectoral 
Adaptive 
Capacity Factor 
Score 
Average Sectoral 
Resilience Score 
Building Suppliers 46% 47% 47% 
Critical Infrastructure 52% 56% 54% 
FMCG 47% 51% 49% 
Hospitality 42% 43% 43% 
ICT 50% 50% 50% 
Trucking 51% 53% 52% 
Christchurch CBD 49% 52% 50% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 50% 52% 51% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 44% 44% 44% 
Entire Survey 2 Sample 48% 50% 49% 
After Survey 3, the organisational resilience scores were generally higher than after Survey 2. The 
scores after Survey 3 were comparable to those obtained after Survey 1. Also with Survey 3, the 
critical infrastructure sector had the highest resilience scores (79%). This was followed by 
trucking with 71% and Kaiapoi with 70%. The increase in organisational resilience scores from 
Survey 2 to Survey 3 could be attributed to organisations moving from the acute phase of a crisis 
to the very early stages of recovery that are less chaotic. It is also possible that the scores 
increased because surviving organisations took part in later parts of the research. However, on 
being contacted for participation in Survey 3, all of the organisations that declined were still 
operational. 
With the deployment of the BRT occurring after the earthquakes, respondents were being asked 
to reflect retrospectively on the running of their organisation. It is possible that after coming 
through the earthquakes comparatively well, organisations may overestimate how well they 
performed both during and after the response and early recovery phases of the crisis. This 
magnification of the organisation’s capabilities after surviving disaster may also have an effect on 
how well the organisation prepares for future crises (Paton, Johnston, & Houghton, 1998). 
Alternatively, the difference in score between Surveys 2 and 3may be a reflection of the 
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respondents’ states of mind at the time they were surveyed. Harter et al (2006) demonstrated 
that survey results can be affected by disaster. 
Table 5-33: Survey 3 average sectoral resilience score using the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) 
Survey 3 average sectoral resilience score using the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) 
  
Average Sectoral 
Planning Factor 
Score 
Average Sectoral 
Adaptive 
Capacity Factor 
Score 
Average Sectoral 
Resilience Score 
Building Suppliers 58% 67% 62% 
Critical Infrastructure 78% 80% 79% 
FMCG 68% 63% 66% 
ICT 61% 76% 68% 
Trucking 68% 74% 71% 
Christchurch CBD 45% 63% 54% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 70% 70% 70% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 61% 59% 60% 
Entire Survey 3 Sample 64% 69% 66% 
Figure 5-2 shows the difference in organisational resilience scores for each sector after Surveys 
1, 2 and 3. The sectors with the largest difference in organisational resilience scores between 
Surveys 1 and 2 are critical infrastructure (30 percentage points), FMCG (26 percentage points), 
hospitality (31 percentage points) and trucking (20 percentage points). Self-report bias can 
explain one aspect of the trends for the organisational resilience scores obtained using the BRT. 
Some aspects of the organisational resilience scores will be further analysed in chapter 10 of this 
thesis. Another reason for the pattern of the organisational resilience scores is that they are 
associated with the chaotic time period in the immediate aftermath and short-term after disaster. 
It is also possible that organisational resilience levels were run-down between Surveys 1 and 2 
and rebounded between Surveys 2 and 3. As highlighted in the future work section of this thesis, 
organisational resilience scores should also be captured in the medium- to long-term after the 
earthquakes in Canterbury to track recovery at different points in time.  
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Figure 5-2: Average sectoral organisational resilience scores for Survey 1, Survey 2 and Survey 3 
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the results and discussion from the three surveys deployed during the 
course of the research. The surveys were deployed at different times, from two to eighteen 
months after the 4 September 2010, and asked about impacts to organisations from the 
Canterbury series of earthquakes. The results show the differing impacts to sectors after each 
survey period and show that the effects of the earthquakes lasted well beyond a few days after 
each event and can go on for extended periods. The results also showed some of the linkages 
present within and between different industry and geographic sectors and how these may affect 
recovery. 
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After all three surveys, organisations reported that their greatest challenge was the wellbeing of 
their staff. This was partly due to the prolonged earthquake sequence taking its toll on staff 
leading to fatigue and in some cases mistakes at work. The ongoing earthquakes also made it 
difficult to plan for and transition from response to early recovery. Other factors that 
contributed (positively or negatively) to organisational recovery after the earthquakes were: 
 the short or non-existent disruption times for utilities; 
 the localised damage which enabled relocation for organisations that were able; 
 the ability of  organisations to work together; 
 neighbourhood effects (especially for the CBD and town centres); 
 skills shortage for some sectors; 
 increased workload for some sectors and decreased customer numbers for others; 
 location of  customers (inside or outside the earthquake affected region); 
 uncertainty of  supply, demand and a plan for recovery; and 
 adaptation to the dynamic conditions, e.g. by modifying delivery of  goods and services. 
These factors, from the surveys, that affected recovery are comparable to those identified in the 
contextual interviews in chapter 4 and those from the case studies in chapter 6. 
The next chapter contains the results and analysis from case studies with selected organisations 
from each of the industry and geographic sectors in the study. Apart from standing on their 
own, the results from the case studies provide explanation for some of the data seen in this 
chapter with the quantitative portion of the research. The information in this and the next 
chapter will be used in tandem to determine which of three contributors; level of organisational 
or sectoral resilience, pre-earthquake conditions or  direct and indirect earthquake effects; is the 
most significant to organisational recovery for organisations. 
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6 Case studies 
This chapter introduces the case study organisations, presents the results of what issues the case 
study organisations faced after the earthquakes and compares how the different sectors were 
affected. The case study organisations are a subset of the entire sample group and had two 
representatives from each sector. Resource constraints (i.e. time, manpower, finance) meant that 
it was not possible to conduct in-depth case studies with the entire sample set. Criteria for 
selection of the case study organisations are explained in chapter 3.4. The case studies were 
designed to supplement and add to information collected via surveys and contextual interviews. 
This is because some qualitative, in-depth information is not as easy to obtain via survey 
questionnaires as it is through interviews with affected organisations. Using information from 
the case study organisations also allows for a more in depth comparison of how the sectors, 
represented by the case study organisations, were affected after the earthquakes: were they 
affected differently; were they affected similarly; and the reasons for this. It should be noted that 
the semi-structured interview technique was used for both the contextual interviews and case 
study interviews. However, apart from the different interviewees, the questions for the two 
segments were also different. Appendix A shows the informed interview consent form given to 
all interviewees and appendix H is the case study interview guide designed to ensure that the 
same baseline topics were covered with each interviewee. The baseline topics are for 
comparability between and within sectors. 
As the case studies were done after Survey 1, the case studies were also used to corroborate 
some of the findings from the data analysis of Survey 1 and from the contextual interviews. 
Additionally, with the utilisation of case studies the researcher heard first hand from the 
organisations involved their description of events before, during and after the earthquakes and 
specifically how the organisations dealt with the different phases after the earthquakes. 
Understanding the recovery of the individual organisations enables the understanding of the 
recovery of the industry sector they belong to as well as what other agents they might affect or 
be affected by. The case study information, divided into the main-dimensions and sub-themes, is 
further used as one of the sources for the modelling of the system shown in chapter 8. The main 
dimensions and sub-themes are also used in the examination of system behaviour and for the 
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extraction from the system of the aids, hindrances and points of intervention in recovery 
(chapter 9). 
The method used in the case study part of this study is outlined in section 3.4.4. The analysis was 
done using a modified version of Strauss and Corbin's (1998) grounded theory coding paradigm 
which outlines a logical way of gathering and ordering concepts or grouping of similar data. 
Grounded theory uses main dimensions, which can be divided further into sub-themes, to better 
organise data that falls within different groups. 
This chapter starts with a description of the case study organisations and a synopsis of the 
important attributes of the case study set. This is followed by the results from analysis of the 
case study data, presented as the main dimensions and sub-themes, i.e. in what areas the sectors 
were affected. Results and analysis are interspersed with significant quotes from interviewees. 
The chapter ends with a comparison of the similarities or differences in how the sectors were 
affected. 
6.1 Case study organisations 
Presented here are details of each of the case study organisations in this research. In order to 
maintain confidentiality and anonymity, any identifying characteristics have not been given here. 
Each interviewee signed an interview consent form (see appendix A) that informed them of the 
confidential and anonymous fashion the information would be presented in. Each sector in the 
study had two representative case study organisations. Each organisation was asked to provide at 
least two interviewees, if possible from two different departments in the organisation. This was 
to give a broader overview of how the organisation was affected by the earthquakes. Some 
organisations provided only one interviewee while others provided two. 
Additionally, each case study organisation was asked to provide details of the number of 
employees prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Depending on the type of organisation 
(branch, subsidiary, standalone), some of the answers for employee numbers in this section are 
for the branch of the organisation the interviewee was answering on behalf of, while others are 
for the entire organisation. 
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Building suppliers 
BS1: BS1 is a light manufacturing building supplier and has full time equivalent (FTE) staff of 80 
in Christchurch. The organisation is half owned by an overseas company while the other half is 
publicly listed. BS1 has multiple branch organisations in New Zealand, with a head office in 
another city. The organisation has a functional role in head office specifically for organisational 
crisis management. Prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake, BS1 had a documented 
emergency plan. They reported that for a manufacturing organisation, emergency planning 
which includes a strong emphasis on health and safety is crucial. BS1 provided specialist 
counselling services to staff and their families after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, BS1 in Christchurch got assistance from other branches 
that sent supplies such as water and food that were then provided to staff in Christchurch. The 
organisation reported that compared to other organisations or industries, BS1 was affected to a 
minor extent after the earthquakes. However, they also reported delayed re-opening after the 22 
February 2011 quake due to difficulties securing geotechnical and structural engineering 
personnel to carry out the large number of inspections in the greater Christchurch area. They 
further reported that they used contacts in their industry to get the technical inspections done 
quicker. BS1 pointed to quick building inspections as crucial because of the closure of their 
factory and office complex, for geotechnical and structural assessment work, after all 
earthquakes over Mw 5.5. 
BS1 worked with Civil Defence and with some of the critical infrastructure providers in the 
response and early recovery phase after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. They provided 
supplies for search and rescue as well as materials used to repair breaks in water and wastewater 
pipes. Due to high demand, the organisation ran out of the supplies for the pipes and had to 
look overseas for more stock. 
Post-earthquakes, BS1 was affected by the uncertainty in the construction industry. They 
reported that this made it difficult to make long term strategic plans regarding the rebuild. BS1 
carried out a review of their emergency response and identified some areas to be worked on. 
One of the areas for improvement was evacuation: how to ensure that people have left the site 
and to verify their wellbeing in a timely fashion thereafter. 
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BS2: BS2 has an FTE of 44 and is a wholly owned subsidiary of a larger New Zealand 
organisation. They are a wholesale building supplier and reported being affected by the global 
financial crisis. BS2 reported being relatively unaffected by either the 4 September 2010 or 22 
February 2011 earthquake because of their location in the north-west of Christchurch. The 
organisation also reported the possibility of getting assistance from their owner if the need arose. 
BS2 has branches in other parts of New Zealand’s South Island. They detailed that if the 
Christchurch plant were shut down, the combined capacity of the other branches could make up 
for the shortfall in production. BS2 reported being affected by the uncertainty around when the 
major part of the rebuild would start. The organisation narrated that they were able to supply 
after earthquakes but there was little demand for their product. 
BS2 used in-house civil engineers to check their premises for damage and subsequently to check 
all employee houses. They then deployed these engineers to help with geotechnical and 
structural assessments for the greater Christchurch area. BS2 organised counselling for their staff 
on the organisation’s premises. This counselling was extended to family of staff as well. 
Prior to 4 September 2010, the organisation did not place much emphasis on emergency 
planning even though they had regular fire drills. The organisation reported that after the 4 
September 2010 earthquake, they recognised that their emergency planning needed 
improvement and were in the process of reviewing these plans. Also using the earthquakes as an 
opportunity, BS2 were planning to outsource their logistics function. They cited increased 
vehicle maintenance costs and the need to concentrate on their core business as reasons for this. 
However, of concern to the organisation was the possible shortage of skilled labour (especially 
heavy vehicle truck drivers) which would affect the construction industry when the rebuild got 
underway. In readiness for the rebuild the organisation budgeted for staff hire and training and 
redesigned some of their products to align with revisions in the building code. 
Critical infrastructure 
CI1: CI1 is a transport provider and has just over 250 FTE staff. They are owned by a larger 
organisation but have an independent commercial board of directors. Their main office is in the 
Christchurch CBD. The organisation reported no previous crisis experience. Prior to 4 
September 2010, the organisation had a business continuity plan that they reported did not 
specifically include earthquakes but considered hazards such as floods and power outages. 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
173 
 
The organisation reported being more affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Earthquake 
damage to one of their workshops led to the extension of another of their buildings for use as a 
workshop. CI1 detailed that their equipment could operate after 22 February 2011 but that they 
were affected by the condition of the roads. They also pointed to increased maintenance costs 
after earthquakes because of damage to roads. The organisation was further affected by 
congestion on the roads due to reduced road capacity after the earthquakes. Additionally, CI1 
narrated that customers reduced by approximately 40% post-earthquakes because of the 
relocation of organisations and people to different parts of the city. Other effects were as the 
result of damage and closure to Lyttelton Port. As part of managing the crisis after the 
earthquakes, CI1 put on special services to cater for temporary route changes that had taken 
place. 
CI1 recognised that in the longer-term recovery period, the organisation would be affected by 
population shifts and land use planning decisions. These shifts in population would also require 
modification of existing services or the addition of new services. CI1 reported that one of the 
aids in recovery for them was having a mature workforce that could handle crisis. Some 
considerations in response and early recovery included making sure that no staff were made 
redundant. 
CI2: CI2 is a government department with a FTE staff of 26. They reported that in considering 
their mandate, they were not very affected by the earthquakes. They were however affected in 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake because their CBD offices were damaged. CI2 was affected by 
restricted access to their CBD office as this meant that they could not access some 
organisational information and specialised equipment. The organisation had both emergency 
plans and business continuity plans. They reported that in the lifetime of the organisation, there 
was some prior crisis experience but that these crises had been caused by other hazards such as 
floods. 
CI2 worked closely with Civil Defence in response and early recovery. They detailed that some 
of their work with Civil Defence involved the modification of by-laws to suit the disaster 
environment. They also brought experts in from their Auckland office to help manage the 
response. The organisation reported that some of their repair work was affected by the ongoing 
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earthquakes. In addition, the extra work done after the earthquakes increased the department’s 
costs. 
Post-earthquakes, CI2 related how they lost some of their qualified staff to private contractors in 
the same line of work. They reported that they recognised that they could not compete to retain 
staff based on salary as government roles have such details pre-defined. Instead, they wanted to 
work on the environment inside the organisation as a way of retaining people. The organisation 
reported that their future plans would also be affected by decisions on land use. 
The organisation managed to relocate to new premises after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
They also conducted a formal review of their actions in the response phase. Some areas for 
improvement included the management of information and communication as well as 
succession planning and relief for people in the response phase of a crisis. Pre-disaster 
networking also emerged as important: particularly the awareness that it is people in 
organisations who connect and not necessarily the organisation as an entity. 
Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) 
FMCG1: FMCG1 is an independent chain of service stations and associated retail outlets that 
are part of a franchise. They are performance managed by the franchise and do not have to 
follow franchise regulations to the letter. They have a FTE staff of 58 in eight locations in the 
greater Christchurch area. As a consequence of the industry sector they belong to, health and 
safety are taken very seriously. Prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake, FMCG1 conducted 
monthly trial evacuations and had a designated safety officer at each of their locations. The 
organisation reported having very devolved decision making for each site and no prior 
experience of a large crisis. 
FMCG1 reported not having business interruption insurance because they did not think all eight 
locations would be affected at the same time. The organisation was affected in different ways by 
the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. For 4 September 2010, they narrate 
that it was more staff and their families who were affected and operations were restarted quickly. 
After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, both people and the physical infrastructure of the 
organisation were affected. Operations did not restart as quickly as in 4 September 2010, in part 
because of a shortage of geotechnical skills to carry out inspections. 
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FMCG1 provided staff with supermarket vouchers after both the 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011 earthquakes. This was in addition to the offer of counselling services. In 
reviewing their actions in the response and early recovery phase, FMCG1 modified their internal 
methods of communication. They upgraded their physical communication system as well as their 
data management system and also instituted different measures of communication between 
people in the organisation in the event of a crisis. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, 
EFTPOS (electronic point of sale) terminals did not work in some parts of the greater 
Christchurch area. As a result, FMCG1 gave away product to customers for free until EFTPOS 
service was restored or until goods ran out. 
FMCG2: FMCG2 is wholly owned by a multinational corporation. It has multiple branches in 
New Zealand and FTE staff of 53. The New Zealand part of its business is the supply of goods; 
manufacturing of these goods is done in Australia and parts of Asia. The organisation reported 
not knowing of any documented organisational emergency plan. However, they did have plans 
for first aid and for security threats. The interviewee also reported having no knowledge of 
organisational business continuity plans. It appears this may be because of their being a branch 
organisation and the expectation that head office looked after such matters. FMCG2 reported 
having no prior disaster experience. 
After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, FMCG2 was affected by warehouse damage at two 
levels. The first was damage to their own (third party run) warehouse as well as stock, and the 
second was damage to customer warehouses and stock. Damage to customer warehouses meant 
that FMCG2 could not deliver supplies to these warehouses. Damage to customer stock led to 
an increase in demand for new supplies. Collaboration with the customer led to the delivery of 
supplies directly to retail outlets. This required re-packaging of stock in quantities suitable for 
smaller deliveries. Other collaboration with customers was in the form of identification of goods 
needed in the response phase. They agreed to scale down on low volume sellers in order to bring 
in more of needed goods. 
FMCG2 reported that in the response phase, they were aware of which of their competitors 
could not manage to meet demand. However, they did not take advantage of this in part because 
this segment of the sector has only a few players and they would need to work with each other 
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after the earthquakes. FMCG2 helped in the response effort by donating goods to the Red 
Cross. FMCG2 reported that they had not done a formal review of their response to the 
earthquakes but had spoken about it informally. 
Hospitality (bars, cafes and restaurants) 
H1: H1 is a franchise that was based in the CBD and had a FTE staff of 6.5. The organisation 
was located in the CBD because of the large number of employers based there as well as other 
foot traffic. H1 reported not having emergency or crisis plans prior to the 22 February 2011 
earthquake and no prior crisis experience. However, they did have plans for power outages. 
They reported that these plans were not helpful after the earthquakes. H1 did not have 
computer data back-ups of key information. However, they reported that their head office had a 
record of all daily transactions which they could use for tax purposes. 
After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, H1 experienced a 20% drop in revenue because some 
employers evacuated from the CBD area. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the 
organisation lost their premises. H1 made arrangements for some employees to work in other 
franchises locations on the proviso that they would return when the organisation re-opened. The 
interviewee felt that, in general, there was too much bureaucracy in getting hospitality 
organisations relocated and re-opened. They felt that the advice on insurance and legal issues 
from the franchise owner was helpful. However, H1 reported that they did not think advice 
from the industry association was helpful. 
At the time of the interview (14 November 2011) H1 was looking for alternative premises to 
relocate to outside the CBD area. They were however affected by the inability to access their 
premises and equipment which were within the CBD cordon. The lack of information and 
inconsistent information around building access was a source of frustration for H1. Access to 
the premises was also needed so they could document damage for insurance purposes as part of 
the relocation process. By the time the organisation accessed their premises, they had been 
looted and vandalised. The organisation had good insurance cover but was affected by the delay 
in settlement of their claim.  
H2: In the 4 to 5 years leading up to the 4 September 2010 earthquake, H2 had bought out of a 
franchise and gone through a period of rebranding. The rebranding involved the development of 
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a niche market in the hospitality sector. The organisation had a FTE staff of 6. The organisation 
had documented plans and drills for fire but no other emergency plans. They also reported 
having no prior crisis experience. 
After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, H2’s premises were green-tagged (safe to enter) but in 
the fall zone of other buildings in the CBD. H2 reported being affected by lack of access to their 
premises as they had difficulties getting permission to enter the CBD cordon. At the time of 
interview (15 November 2011), all of H2’s employees left H2 and were working in other 
organisations. Prior to this, the organisation accessed the Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) 
provided by Central Government. 
H2 was willing to relocate but could not as their insurance company preferred to know the long-
term plan for the CBD before signing off on relocation. This was also one of the reasons given 
by the insurance company in delaying settlement of their claim in full. However, H2’s 
reoccupation of their old premises was also dependent on decisions by the building owner. 
Additionally, H2 detailed that going back to the CBD was equally dependent on the overall plan 
for the CBD rebuild. This is because the organisation was formerly reliant on custom from the 
now relocated employees of large employers, as well as foot traffic into the area. 
Considering the length of time the organisation was closed, health and safety laws decree that 
the equipment should be disposed of. H2 reported that in case of their agreeing to an insurance 
settlement, it would be based on the present value of equipment. However, if the organisation 
re-opened or relocated, the insurance company would have to pay for new equipment. After the 
22 February 2011 earthquake, H2 worked with some of the other business owners from the 
same vicinity of the CBD. This was for the purposes of information sharing and support. H2’s 
owner also kept in regular contact with the organisation’s former employees. 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
ICT1: ICT1 is a manufacturing ICT organisation with FTE staff of 135. They are a subsidiary of 
a multinational corporation. The organisation reported that prior to the earthquakes, they had 
been affected by the shift of manufacturing to places with lower labour rates, e.g. China. ICT1 
had no previous crisis experience but had very detailed emergency, crisis and business continuity 
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plans formulated to enable response to different hazards. The organisation reported that the 
plans were of value in that people knew what to do in the immediate aftermath of the 
earthquakes. However, the interviewee spoke of gaps in the plan in relation to employees 
accessing their personal belongings such as mobile phones and keys, which could not be taken 
onto the shop floor, and also in procedures to safely re-enter the building. ICT1 has a focus on 
staff health and safety. 
The 22 February 2011 earthquake caused considerable damage to ICT1’s premises and 
equipment. However, the organisation was operating again approximately two to three weeks 
after the earthquake. They reported that they could have opened sooner had they been able to 
have their premises inspected quicker by geotechnical personnel. Despite this delay, ICT1 
managed to supply spare parts to critical infrastructure organisations in the response phase. The 
organisation narrated running out of spare parts that are usually not replaced frequently during 
business-as-usual. ICT1 reported that they were also very aware of when and how their other 
customers (especially those outside Christchurch) would be affected by disruption to the supply 
web. This timeline was affected by ICT1 not knowing what condition their manufacturing 
equipment was in as they could not access their premises. The organisation reported that the 
equipment they use is not available in New Zealand and has a three month lead time when 
ordered. In order to meet demand, ICT1 prioritised customers in their supply chain and worked 
overtime to catch up on lost production. They also reported that they met with their non-
Christchurch customers to reassure them of continued ability to supply. ICT1 had mutual aid 
agreements for location sharing. However, any alternative location was only helpful to a point as 
the manufacturing equipment was on ICT1’s main premises. 
ICT1 reported that the damage to their premises, worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, had 
to be paid for from local profits. This was because the excess on their organisation’s corporate 
insurance policy was larger than the damage to the Christchurch plant. However, ICT1 could 
not make major repairs to their buildings as the area they were in had liquefiable soils. They 
therefore had to wait for more extensive geotechnical inspections before knowing if they could 
repair the building or had to move to new premises altogether. ICT1 detailed that all pre-
earthquake expansion plans had been put on hold as the funding for these was directed to 
earthquake repairs. The organisation applied to the New Zealand Ministry of Science and 
Innovation (MSI) for a recovery grant to help pay for the resumption of expansion plans. 
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ICT1 set up an earthquake fund for staff. They also engaged counsellors to work from the 
organisation’s premises readily available for staff. ICT1 conducted an official review of their 
response after both the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. The organisation 
recognised that they had good evacuation plans but no re-entry procedures. Re-entry procedures 
and Tsunami evacuation plans were added to the reviewed crisis plans. Other measures included 
all employees, not just those on the shop floor, signing in and signing out as a way of keeping 
track of who was on site. Further, staff on the shop floor were allowed to have their keys and 
mobile phones with them, which pre-earthquakes were kept in lockers in a different part of the 
premises. This was to avoid staff going back into a potentially unsafe building to retrieve these 
items or delaying getting out because they needed to look for them. ICT1 also reported that 
other actions from the review centred on better communication in crisis and better succession 
planning. 
ICT2: ICT2 provides professional, specialised ICT services to other sectors such as health. They 
are a wholly owned, privately held New Zealand company with an Australian subsidiary. Their 
main office is in Christchurch with a small branch in Auckland and they have FTE staff of 31.5. 
Prior to 22 February 2011, ICT2 was located in the CBD. In their field, ICT2 have a large 
segment of the New Zealand market and approximately 30% of the Australian market. 
ICT2 reported having a combined emergency and business continuity plan that was incomplete 
and had been in development (slowly) for a long time prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake. 
The organisation reported that this plan fell far short of what was needed especially for an event 
such as the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The organisation had a skills shortage prior to the 
earthquakes and this was magnified after. In fact, ICT2 reported that experienced staff 
voluntarily left the organisation because of the earthquakes. 
After the 22 February 2011 earthquake ICT2’s premises were red tagged. The organisation 
reported having trouble finding suitable accommodation to relocate to until August 2011. While 
looking for accommodation, some staff were sent to work from the Australian office. Other 
staff worked from home which they said affected their family relationships. They reported that 
working from home for such long periods blurred the boundaries between work and home. 
However, added to the shared experience of the earthquakes, working from the non-office 
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environment of a co-worker’s home brought people even closer together and enhanced team 
bonding. Team bonding was also reinforced because team members had the common goal of 
wanting their organisation to recover. 
ICT2 reported that they had problems accessing their premises after both the 4 September 2010 
and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. This was because they were not allowed to enter the 
cordoned area to retrieve business critical material and to restart equipment. After the 4 
September 2010 earthquake, ICT2 faced the issue of not being able to access critical records 
stored on their premises. Between the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 events, ICT2 
augmented their backup practices and also engaged another organisation to look after their 
information technology (IT) system backup. However, after 22 February 2011, the organisation 
looking after ICT2’s IT backup sustained damage to their premises and equipment. This meant 
that for a time after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, ICT2 had problems retrieving some 
organisational records. Additionally, as a result of building damage after the 22 February 2011 
earthquake, ICT2 lost some organisational information in paper form. As a short-term measure 
after 22 February 2011, ICT2 housed some of their technical equipment in seismically retrofitted 
customer premises. 
ICT2 detailed that their customers paying bills before the due date was a help in recovery. 
Another aspect helpful in response and early recovery was that senior management were from 
Christchurch and had also been affected by the earthquake. The interviewee reported that staff 
felt this helped with some of the decision making. The Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) was 
also a major boost. Additionally, ICT2 made the decision that even in the absence of complete 
records, all staff would still be paid based on the last pre-earthquake payroll instructions to the 
bank. ICT2 also ensured that all staff knew that they had access to counsellors. Employees were 
given extra leave days, in addition to the statutory leave days, in order to sort out earthquake 
issues.  
ICT2 reported that their organisational expansion plans were put on hold while they assessed 
their situation after the earthquakes. In a review of the organisation’s emergency plan, ICT2 
identified that the staff communication plan for the response phase needed improvements. As 
well, the organisation recognised that there had to be a trade-off between what preparedness 
planning they could engage in relative to the size of the organisation. 
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Trucking 
T1: T1 is part of an Australian multinational corporation and has FTE staff of 2500 in New 
Zealand and 500 in Christchurch. The organisation’s head office is in Auckland. T1 reported 
that they are in a very competitive market segment. The organisation also reported that it is the 
largest in its subsector in NZ and that they have a diverse business portfolio. T1 reported not 
having any documented crisis plans but did have an undocumented organisational response 
mechanism for crisis because of prior experience with other hazards such as floods and fires. 
The organisation reported that their senior management team was very good at dealing with 
crisis. 
After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, T1 worked closely with Civil Defence who required their 
services. They also coordinated, for the trucking sector, sectoral activity in the aftermath of both 
the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. They noted that this had to be done 
diplomatically to maintain good relations post-earthquake. As a result of an increase in demand 
for their services, T1 brought in resources from other New Zealand branches. This was in 
addition to dealing with their business-as-usual customers, some of whom had been adversely 
affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake. T1 reported that they prioritised customer work 
depending on the importance of the customer.  
The organisation mobilised resources to assist staff, especially after the 22 February 2011 
earthquake. This assistance was in the form of a welfare fund for staff that qualified as well as 
shower and laundry facilities. The organisation also organised a team to visit each staff member’s 
house to assess recovery needs. Part of helping staff involved monitoring staff workload after 
the increased demand for organisational services led to staff working longer hours. 
T1 was affected by damage to roads and reported that they had to carry out more frequent 
maintenance on their fleet. Other effects included increased traffic which led to congestion and 
more time on the road. The organisation reported that the land reclamation in Lyttelton was a 
help in the response phase as this meant they could dispose of demolition waste quicker and not 
stockpile it on demolition sites which would have slowed down the demolition work. However, 
in working with Civil Defence, T1 feel that the transition between the response and recovery 
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phases was not done well. This is because the information for demolition and associated work 
was unclear or non-existent during the transition phase. 
T1 saw the need to expand some of their operations after the 22 February 2011 earthquake in 
order to meet demand and provide better service. This increased demand and scaling up of 
services resulted in higher revenues for the organisation. T1 conducted a semi-formal review of 
the response actions and disseminated this information to all their New Zealand offices. 
T2:  T2 is a public-private-partnership (PPP). They provide an essential service and have FTE 
staff of 45. The organisation had emergency plans prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake. 
They also had a business-as-usual independent telecommunications system which was helpful 
for communication in the response phase. 
After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, T2’s customers were severely affected which then 
affected the organisation. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, due to industry sector or 
location, T2’s organisation’s customers were less severely affected. However demand for T2’s 
services increased dramatically. They were assisted in meeting this increased demand by staff 
from their other New Zealand offices as well as from contractors. Even then, staff still worked 
long hours to meet demand. The organisation set up a welfare scheme for staff which included 
an earthquake fund that staff could apply for. T2 also organised food, water, shower and laundry 
facilities for staff and their families. 
T2 reported that until September/October 2011, they were affected by the erratic nature of 
demolition activity, especially from the CBD. This affected some of the organisation’s forward 
planning. T2 carried out a review of its response and found that prior good relations with other 
organisations were a help in response and early recovery. The organisation also reported that 
they were in the process of setting up a shared resource database with other sister companies. 
This is so that all branches would be aware what resources were available to them in case of 
emergency. 
Christchurch CBD 
CCBD1: CCBD1 is a New Zealand owned company with branches around the country. Its 
headquarters and main distribution centre are in Christchurch. Prior to 4 September 2010, the 
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organisation had no documented crisis plans and no prior crisis experience. The stock in 
CCBD1’s Christchurch stores was uninsured. This decision was reached after the organisation 
decided it was better to insure stock in Wellington branches as that was a higher seismic risk 
than Christchurch. CCBD1 reported being more affected by the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
Of the three branches in Christchurch, the premises for two of them were severely damaged in 
the earthquake. With the closure of two stores in Christchurch, CCBD1 made the decision to 
cancel stock orders for March and reported that this affected their suppliers negatively. As part 
of the response, one of the management team based in Auckland was brought in to assist staff in 
Christchurch. 
CCBD1 reported that they had difficulty accessing both of their CBD premises as they were not 
allowed to enter the cordoned off area. Access to the stores was required to verify the conditions 
of the stores and to retrieve millions of dollars’ worth of stock. The organisation also detailed 
that they got conflicting information for entry procedures to the CBD Red Zone. 
CCBD1’s third Christchurch branch had become operational approximately 1 month prior to 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Staff from the two branches not in operation were transferred 
to the third branch to avoid redundancies. The organisation reported that the Central 
Government Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) was one of the contributors that enabled the 
retention of all staff. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, one of the top recovery priorities 
for CCBD1 was business interruption for their other branches as the main distribution centre 
was in Christchurch. However, in the first few days after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, their 
couriers did not travel outside the Christchurch region which made it difficult to ship stock to 
non-Christchurch branches. The organisation’s other priorities included the provision of 
equipment to earthquake search and rescue teams. 
CCBD1 expressed that they were interested in going back to the CBD but did not know when as 
there was uncertainty surrounding when and how the CBD would be rebuilt. CCBD1 also 
indicated that the lack of information on the selection process for the organisations involved in 
the CBD’s Re:Start Project made it difficult to know what the rebuild plan for the CBD was. 
This was a factor in the extension of the lease agreement on their third, newly opened, 
Christchurch branch. Another factor was that their customers had got used to visiting the new 
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store and there were plenty of support and professional services that had also set up in the area. 
CCBD1 pointed out that they had been in talks with their competitors to find out if these other 
organisations were willing to go back to the CBD. The collaboration with competitors came 
about in part because they have a shared customer base which benefits all parties when they are 
in the same vicinity. 
CCBD1 added that the 4 September 2010 earthquake was a wake-up call for them to review 
their emergency plans and how they delivered goods and services. They initiated a formal review 
of these issues post-September 2010. This review was ongoing at the time of the 22 February 
2011 earthquake. After 22 February 2011, the organisation also started trading online and was 
able to reach a wider customer base. 
When asked, CCBD1 did not provide employee numbers. No reason was given. 
CCBD2: CCBD2 is a New Zealand owned organisation with FTE staff of 18 in the 
Christchurch area. They provide specialised equipment and rely predominantly on customer 
discretionary spending. CCBD2 had no documented emergency plans and no crisis experience 
before 4 September 2010. Prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake, CCBD2 and all their major 
competitors were in close proximity to each other in the CBD. 
After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, CCBD2’s store was in the fall zone of another building; 
this led to the closure of the store for a period of time. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake 
the organisation’s premises were badly damaged and closed. The organisation relocated after 
overcoming the challenge of finding new premises they could lease short-term (to 2014). The 
reason for the short-term lease was because they still had a lease on their damaged Christchurch 
store. The organisation expressed that the uncertainty surrounding the rebuild of the CBD made 
it difficult to negotiate out of their lease. Also, CCBD2 felt that it would have been easier to 
break their lease and to get their insurance settlement if their premises had fallen completely and 
if the stock had been damaged. Because the building was yellow-tagged (restricted use and 
access), the insurance company communicated that they had to wait for the building inspector’s 
report and retrieve stock.  
In their new location, CCBD2 used advertising to inform the public of their new premises and 
reported that their being a destination business was a help in getting their customers back. In the 
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aftermath of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, they travelled to customers’ premises as a way of 
delivering goods and services. CCBD2 was affected by the reduced arts and entertainment 
locations in Christchurch. This is because both the arts and entertainment venues and the 
customers who frequented them were some of CCBD2’s main customers. CCBD2 were also 
affected by reduced customer discretionary spending.  
CCBD2 felt that there was a lack of support from their corporate office but that this allowed 
them to make their own decisions. In addition, the staff in the Christchurch store said they felt 
underappreciated after all the effort to get new premises operational. At the time of the 
interview (31 January 2012), the manager for the Christchurch store said he was planning a 
formal review of the organisation’s actions in response. However, this had not taken place as a 
large percentage of time was taken up getting the new store up and running. This was crucial to 
keep staff employed. 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 
KTC1: The organisation provides specialised, non-substitutable services and is an independent 
organisation. However, KTC1 belongs to a family of similar independent organisations based in 
different parts of New Zealand. In the history of the organisation, interviewees reported that the 
only other large crisis the organisation may have faced was in the 1940s. However, none of the 
current staff had been there for that crisis. KTC1 reported having emergency for plans for fire 
and pandemics but did not have documented business continuity plans. 
KTC1 was affected differently by the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. The 
4 September 2010 earthquake caused physical damage to the building and assets of their Kaiapoi 
branch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake affected them by way of an increased demand for 
their services. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake, in addition to dealing with business-as-
usual KTC1 worked closely with Civil Defence in response and early recovery. After the 22 
February 2011 earthquake KTC1 reported collaborating with other Christchurch organisations 
from their sector. They also had offers of assistance from their sister organisations outside 
Christchurch and reported that it was good to know that the assistance was available, even if 
they did not use it. 
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In reviewing their actions in response, KTC1 expressed that the organisation came to the 
conclusion that they did not need to change much of their existing arrangements. For longer-
term recovery however, KTC1 detailed that they would be affected by population and land use 
decision plans.  
When asked, KTC1 did not provide information on employee numbers. 
KTC2: KTC2 is operated by its owner who occasionally works with a partner. Apart from the 
owner, KTC2 has no other employees. The organisation reported not doing well financially prior 
to the 4 September 2010 earthquake because of the global financial crisis (GFC). This is because 
one of their primary clients, the agricultural sector in Canterbury, was affected by the GFC. The 
owner reported that the organisation had inadequate insurance cover because they could not 
afford the insurance premiums and that the organisation did not have prior crisis plans. KTC2 
was located in Kaiapoi because of more affordable commercial accommodation while still being 
in close proximity to Christchurch. 
After the 4 September 2010 earthquake the organisations offices were damaged but usable. After 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the organisation’s offices were severely damaged and closed. 
The organisation was further affected by the shortage in geotechnical personnel as they had to 
wait for technical inspections before they could access their premises to retrieve specialist 
equipment and organisational records. The organisation had back-ups of its electronic but not 
paper records. KTC2 eventually relocated but cited that this was a major cost. 
KTC2 were indirectly affected by insurance delays as their customers who were waiting for 
insurance claim settlements could not pay them. The organisation reported that they were 
planning to expand their operations prior to the 4 September 2010 earthquake but that these 
plans had been put on hold. KTC2 applied to New Zealand’s Ministry of Social Development 
(MSD) for a monetary grant to help with cash flow. 
For longer-term recovery, KTC1 reported being aware of the need to network more as a way of 
hearing about upcoming work. This was especially important considering the small size of the 
organisation. However, one of the post-earthquake options being considered by the organisation 
was to close and move out of the Canterbury region. 
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Lyttelton Town Centre 
LTC1: LTC1 is owner operated, has no staff apart from the owner and deals in semi-luxury 
goods. The organisation was located in Lyttelton because the owner has strong ties to the town. 
Prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake, LTC1 had no documented emergency or crisis plans. 
However, the organisation reported that they had a fire extinguisher and a first aid kit. 
The organisation was more affected after the 22 February 2011 earthquake by minor damage to 
premises and by being in the fall zone of a building to be demolished. LTC1 had a good 
insurance policy but did not lodge an insurance claim after the 22 February 2011 earthquake as 
the excess was more than the damage sustained. LTC1 detailed that the quick building 
demolition in Lyttelton was helpful for the re-opening of the organisation. However, prior to re-
opening, LTC1 had a stall at the Lyttelton Farmers’ Market mainly to remind customers that the 
organisation would re-open. LTC1 reported that having a stall at the market also enabled the 
organisation to assess the post-earthquake need for their products as they were reliant on 
customer discretionary spending. On re-opening, LTC1 was affected by the dust from the 
ongoing demolition of nearby buildings and had to clean more regularly. The organisation 
reported that this took up valuable time. LTC1 used the Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) as 
part of recovery finance. Organisational expansion plans were put on hold after the earthquakes. 
In the period of closure after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, LTC1 maintained contact with 
their regular suppliers to inform them of progress on re-opening. LTC1 reported paying some of 
their suppliers in advance in order to help with their cash flow and recovery. LTC1 also reached 
the decision to use more Christchurch suppliers after the earthquake as way of helping them to 
recover. LTC1 also offered space on their premises to another organisation from Lyttelton 
Town Centre whose building had been demolished: no rent was asked for. 
LTC2: LTC2 was run by two partners prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The 
organisation was a partnership with not much formal documentation. One partner had insurance 
while the other did not. They offered specialist services heavily reliant on customer discretionary 
spending both in New Zealand and overseas. LTC2 had no crisis plans and no prior crisis 
experience. The organisation was based in Lyttelton because both partners thought the town 
ideal for their type of work. 
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LTC2’s premises suffered substantial damage after the 22 February 2011 earthquake and had to 
be demolished. Prior to the demolition, the organisation faced delays and uncertainty on 
whether they could access their premises and retrieve expensive, specialist equipment not 
available in New Zealand. The delay was due to the shortage of structural engineering personnel 
to conduct an inspection of the building. LTC2 reported that they decided to get around this by 
using connections another tenant in the building had with people trained in search and rescue. 
Search and rescue personnel escorted them on to the premises, however due to time constraints 
they were unable to bring out all their equipment. 
Without work space, the partners in LTC2 each worked from their homes. They reported that 
they missed the creative environment they had when they worked together. The organisation 
also reported being affected by reduced arts and entertainment locations in Christchurch, to 
which they have strong links. As a consequence of reduced sales, LTC2 faced a cash flow 
problem in the months after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. They applied for a monetary 
grant made available to organisations in their line of work. The information about the grants was 
got from being in touch with similar organisations that had come together to form an online 
self-help group. 
6.2 Synopsis of the case studies  
All except one of the organisations interviewed reported doing well financially prior to the 4 
September 2010 earthquake. The organisation facing financial difficulties reported that the 
global financial crisis was the primary cause of its financial underperformance. All the 
organisations had insurance except KTC2 which was under-insured and LTC2 which was half-
insured. Incidentally the organisation that reported not doing well financially was the same one 
that reported the instance of under-insurance. 
There are two main reasons that account for how the case study organisations were affected by 
the earthquakes. The first is that sectoral attributes such as the type of goods and services 
delivered played a part in what some of the effects to organisations were. For instance, trucking 
organisations reported a rise in demand for their services while some hospitality organisations 
reported a decrease in customer discretionary spending. The second main reason for differential 
effects was the organisation’s location at the time of the earthquakes. Some parts of the greater 
Christchurch area were more affected by the 4 September 2010 earthquake (e.g. Kaiapoi) than by 
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the 22 February 2011 earthquake (e.g. Lyttelton, Christchurch CBD and Christchurch’s eastern 
suburbs.) Organisations described the 4 September 2010 earthquake as having partially prepared 
them for the subsequent 22 February 2011 earthquake especially, the response and early 
recovery phases. 
To complement the mainly qualitative information provided by the case study organisations in 
interviews, Table 6-1 is a snapshot of fundamental information from surveys 1, 2 and 3 that 
encapsulates the main dimensions and sub-themes that follow. This information is also used in 
chapter 10 in the discussion on organisational disaster resilience. 
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Table 6-1: Relevant survey data to complement synopsis of  case study organisations*  
  Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3** 
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BS1 74% 
Decreased 
moderately 10 40% -2 47 7 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
BS2 65% No change 5 45% -2 5 0 No Yes 62% -3 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Better 
CI1 84% 
Decreased 
moderately 12 42% 0 55 0 No No 78% -1 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Worse 
CI2 72% No change 29 44% 0 81 3 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
FMCG1 61% Did not answer Did not answer 37% 1 72 6 No Yes 79% 2 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Better 
FMCG2 80% No change 13 29% 0 58 4 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
H1 67% 
Decreased 
substantially Did not answer 33% 2 100 10 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
H2 67% 
Decreased 
substantially 24 27% -2 94 3 Yes No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
ICT1 72% No change 20 47% 0 50 6 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
ICT2 65% No change 26 35% 0 81 10 No Yes 65% 0 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Better 
T1 93% 
Decreased 
moderately 14 33% 2 48 0 No Yes 82% 3 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Better 
T2 79% 
Increased 
substantially 4 43% 2 54 0 No Yes 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
CCBD1 67% 
Decreased 
substantially 21 36% -2 74 5 No No 67% -1 
Intend to 
re-open 
Slightly 
Better 
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  Survey 1 Survey 2 Survey 3** 
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CCBD2 100% 
Decreased 
substantially 36 33% -2 83 11 No No 31% -3 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Worse 
KTC1 76% Did not answer Did not answer 35% 0 45 3 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
KTC2 68% No change 36 50% -2 35 7 No No 61% -3 
Open-
Trading 
Slightly 
Worse 
LTC1 
Did 
not 
take 
part 
Did not take 
part 
Did not take 
part 42% -2 73 1 No No 21% -2 
Intend to 
re-open 
Slightly 
Better 
LTC2 
Did 
not 
take 
part 
Did not take 
part 
Did not take 
part 24% -1 97 3 No No 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
Did not 
take part 
*The organisational degree of effect (ODoE) was presented in section 5.1. The recovery rate coefficient (RRC) and the closure impact factor are explained in detail in sections 7.3 and 7.4.5. 
**The case studies were conducted in between Surveys 2 and 3; see research timeline in section 3.4.2. 
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6.3 Main dimensions and sub-themes emergent after analysis of case 
study data 
The results in this chapter are documented under the headings of main dimensions and their 
sub-themes. In other words, the main dimensions and sub-themes are the issues that the case 
study organisations faced after the earthquakes. The main dimensions and sub-themes were 
arrived at using the grounded theory approach: they were not pre-determined. They emerged 
from analysis of the case study data and using open coding. Open coding allows for the 
grouping of similar ideas without a pre-determined heading assigned. The analysis of the case 
study data was done after each case study. Coding enabled the identification and 
conceptualisation of the large body of case study data and led to these main themes and sub-
dimensions. The coding paradigm corresponds with the different parts defined in the case study 
interview guide and with the systems thinking approach (see chapter 3.5.4). 
The headings for the main dimensions and sub-themes are captured briefly in Table 6-2 and 
then explained in detail, as sub-chapters 6.4 to 6.12, in the sections that follow. The captions of 
the main dimensions and sub-themes were arrived at by using information that best 
encapsulated the information in the main theme or sub-theme and sometimes from words used 
by the interviewees. The main-dimensions and sub themes illustrate the ways in which the 
sectors were affected. Even as the main dimensions and sub-themes are the issues that arose for 
the sector, different sectors were sometimes affected differently for the same sub-theme. 
The main dimension organisational actions in the response phase has no sub-themes. It emerged 
as a result of the description of actions carried out by the case study organisations in the 
response phase after the earthquakes. Some of these actions included verifying staff wellbeing, 
checking buildings and machinery and confirming resumption of service to customers. Another 
main dimension that emerged was wellbeing and its sub-themes of staff, family and community 
wellbeing. All organisations interviewed spoke of how these three strands of wellbeing were 
necessary for organisational recovery. A third main dimension was leadership where some of its 
sub-themes are sectoral leadership, recognising and grasping opportunity, communication and 
leadership of the overall recovery effort. Case study organisations pointed to good, competent 
leadership as one of the important aspects of recovery. These and all the other main dimensions 
and sub-themes are discussed in detail in chapters 6.4 to 6.12. 
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Importantly, the main dimensions are presented separately but are not independent of each 
other. They are connected and relate to the overall theme of the thesis: that of the dynamics of 
organisational and sectoral recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011. From 
chapter 2, the definition of recovery used in this thesis is when an organisation or sector can function 
and sustain itself  (continually) in its new post-disaster environment. 
Table 6-2: Headings of the emergent main dimensions and sub-themes from the case studies of organisational 
and sectoral recovery after the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, arrived at using the grounded theory 
method after analysis of the case study data 
Headings of the emergent main dimensions and sub-themes of organisational and sectoral 
recovery after the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes arrived at using the grounded theory 
method after analysis of the case study data 
Main dimensions Sub-themes 
Organisational actions in the response 
phase 
 
Differing interpretations of pre-disaster 
preparedness, active versus passive 
measures 
 Plans as fantasy documents 
 Prior crisis or disaster experience 
 Post-disaster key “learnings”  
Wellbeing 
 Staff  wellbeing  
 Family wellbeing 
 Community wellbeing 
Location 
 Neighbour effects 
 Damage to organisation's assets 
 Size of  the (regional) economy 
 Localisation of damage 
 Duration of closure 
 Rent or ownerhip of premises 
Access to resources 
 Insurance 
 Financial resources 
 Manpower 
 Physical resources 
 Replacement supplies and raw materials 
 Efficient and effective use of  resources 
Leadership 
 Organisation ownership structure 
 Communication 
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 Recognising and grasping opportunity 
 Sectoral leadership 
 Leadership of  the overall recovery effort 
Industry sector 
 Intra-sectoral collaboration 
 Inter-sectoral collaboration 
 Type of  goods and services provided 
 Make-up for lost production 
Variety and Diversity 
 Sources of  revenue 
 Geographic or locational 
 Delivery of  goods and services 
Information 
 Official sources 
 Economic sources 
 Engineering and technical information 
 
6.4 Organisational actions in the response phase 
In the disaster literature, studies such as Turner’s (1976) detail the different stages before and 
after a crisis. It is also vital to focus on what actions organisations and the people in them have 
taken in the first few moments of a rapid-onset disaster. For instance, Zolin and Kropp (2007) 
write about the actions of surviving businesses after Hurricane Katrina and how analysis of these 
actions can be used to increase business survival. As such actions involve how people actually 
performed; they can be used to inform organisational crisis planning strategies. However, 
Quarantelli (1986) cautions that information from such analyses should only be used after 
careful and objective consideration. This is to ascertain which particular actions are of value to 
the organisation before, during and after a crisis. 
The response phase of the crisis for case study organisations lasted on average four to ten weeks 
after 22 February 2011. For the case study organisations in this work, the reactions and steps 
were similar for many of them in response, hence the emergence of the main dimension 
organisational actions in the response phase. The differences that emerged were based mainly on 
sector, location and to a lesser extent size of the organisation. The common actions 
organisations performed in the response phase are documented in the list that follows. The 
actions described are generic and were not taken in the order they are presented. Some of the 
actions happened concurrently and some of them occurred in sequence: 
 Earthquake occurs; 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
195 
 
 Building(s) evacuated, staff  move to safer area and try to establish wellbeing of  their 
families; 
 One or a few individuals took charge and verified staff  wellbeing by phone, e-mail, word 
of  mouth or social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter). In the few hours after the earthquakes 
phone lines were congested making it hard to reach people. For some of  the larger 
organisations this staff  welfare verification took several days as some staff  had left town; 
 Whoever was in charge (in the larger organisations, usually a group of  three people) did 
a preliminary (mostly visual) damage assessment. This happened in areas where the 
building was still standing, where there was no official cordon around the building, and 
while awaiting expert geotechnical and structural engineering appraisal 35 . Some 
organisations that employed geotechnical or structural engineers as part of  their 
operations reported using in-house engineers for these assessments. Some organisations 
later asked their engineers to assist with appraisals in the Christchurch region; 
 For those organisations that had to wait to get building assessments done, the 
organisation’s leadership team met and decided on measures to be taken. Tasks were 
delegated to different members of  the leadership team as well as to other staff. In many 
cases, task allocation was done by phone and e-mail. Arrangements to work from 
alternative premises (e.g. the homes of  staff  members) were made; 
 The organisation’s position in relation to suppliers and customers was assessed, the 
critical suppliers and customers identified and in what order or fashion they would be 
dealt with; 
 Critical customers and suppliers were contacted and informed of  the preliminary 
assessment for when goods and services delivery could possibly continue; 
 Communication to employees continued, using various methods. The communication 
usually involved further ascertaining the condition of  employees, their families, their 
dwellings and their community. In many instances, organisations offered some kind of  
assistance (food packs, financial grants, laundry facilities) to employees; 
                                                     
35 In most cases, people did not (officially) go back into the building until an expert assessment had been done and the building 
cleared for occupation 
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 A short-term business continuity plan was prepared. This used information on the state 
of  the organisation’s premises, equipment, supporting infrastructure and intelligence 
from critical customers and suppliers; 
 Employees contacted, told the high level details of  the business continuity plan and 
asked about the possibility of  coming back to work. In the main, employees had the 
option of  not coming back so soon after an event: some employees chose to work while 
others chose not to; 
 Continued development of  medium- to long-term organisational post-earthquake(s) 
plan. 
For the response phase of the crisis, organisations reported not planning too far ahead as the 
situation changed continuously. As organisations transitioned into the short-term recovery 
phase, they gradually started to look at what had occurred in relation to medium- and long-
term corporate recovery strategy. 
6.5 Differing interpretations of pre-disaster preparedness: active versus 
passive measures 
Organisations were asked if they had pre-disaster or pre-crisis preparedness plans at the time of 
the earthquakes and if these plans were documented. Of the 18 organisations interviewed, less 
than half had a written emergency plan while one (T1) had a plan that was not documented. The 
fullness of these documented emergency plans varied widely. Comparing with the rest of the 
sample set, only 3% of organisations reported having a documented emergency plan when asked 
in Survey 2 
None of the case study interviewees interpreted the questions on pre-crisis or pre-disaster 
preparedness to mean passive means of mitigation and preparedness like insurance or a fire 
extinguisher, most of which they had. They all related the questions to specific plans dealing 
with low probability high consequence events such as earthquakes. Their responses were likely 
influenced by their recent experience of earthquakes. 
All the organisations spoke of not thinking of Christchurch as being a significant earthquake 
risk. After the 4 September 2010 earthquake, in which most of the case study organisations were 
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not very adversely affected, the occurrence and effects of the 22 February 2011 earthquake were 
even more of a surprise. 
“the person who was [in charge] decided that it wasn’t worth the additional 
expense, and Christchurch wasn’t a risk, so we had quite solid insurance for our 
Wellington store and for our Auckland store, but we didn’t for our Christchurch 
stores” – CCBD1 
Indeed, historically Christchurch was thought to have relatively moderate seismicity and the 
actual faults that caused the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes were 
previously unknown (Beavan et al., 2011). That the earthquakes happened and caused such 
damage and disruption shows that organisations should have plans that encompass the broadest 
range of hazards including ones they have not thought of. 
“we all sort of expected that after [4] September [2010] the worst was over, and we 
were probably going to be safe after that, but no, we were obviously quite wrong” 
– CCBD1 
6.5.1 Plans as fantasy documents36 
Most of the organisations listed having plans for fire, low cash flow and pandemics; what they 
called normal things, but not plans for earthquakes. This makes these organisational plans fantasy 
documents as organisations think they are prepared (see chapter 2.3.3) but their plans bore little 
resemblance to what they would need to do in the event of a disaster. Only one of the 
organisations interviewed (ICT1) had specific plans in the event of an earthquake. It appears that 
the majority of the case study organisations made plans for hazards they thought more likely to 
occur (e.g. fire), hazards that were sector specific (e.g. shelf collapse) or hazards they had 
experienced (e.g. pandemic). Additionally, some organisations reported that they felt the 
overwhelming nature of the events in Canterbury would have rendered such plans almost useless. 
This included both organisations with and without plans. This suggests that organisations may 
have misconstrued the purpose of planning and of having plans. The value of prior planning lies 
                                                     
36 The phrase fantasy documents is from the book Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster by Lee Clarke 
(2001). 
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in knowing what steps to take in the event of a disaster and may also help to minimise the 
effects of a disaster. In a study on organisational recovery after Hurricane Andrew, Kruse (1993) 
showed that organisations with pre-crisis planning recovered quicker after the event. 
Furthermore, case study organisations expressed that in the response and early recovery phases, 
the ability to take quick actions and make on-the-spot decisions with limited information was 
important. Some of the actions seen as helpful after the event included the speedy assembly of 
organisational crisis teams. It can be argued that actions such as these can surely be carried out 
quicker and more efficiently with knowledge from prior planning exercises. However, in 
planning and preparing for crisis, organisations need to recognise that aside from the speed of 
decision making, any actions taken should be suited to the situation they find themselves in. 
Quarantelli (1988) and Dynes (1974) also emphasise this while case study organisation KTC1 
describes it as: 
“…as far as I know, the management do that and then we just follow our orders 
and their expectations…” – KTC1 
From the information provided by interviewees about pre-earthquake plans, business owners 
and managers were more likely to concentrate on employee safety than on business continuity 
which would have included what steps to follow in recovery after disaster. Interestingly, 
interviewees reported that in looking back at what happened in the first few hours after the 
earthquakes, the most valuable type of plan is one that is not too specific and is adaptable. 
Additionally, responses to other questions on actions organisations took after the earthquakes 
exposed contrasting thoughts. It emerged that prior planning would have been of value; for 
instance in procedures used to verify staff wellbeing. They also emphasised that having a plan is 
one thing, rehearsing that plan is equally vital. Interviewees detailed being quicker off the mark 
on 22 February 2011 for the response phase because of some of the motions they had gone 
through after 4 September 2010. Some interviewees pointed to the possible inclusion of regular 
practise drills as part of their organisation’s post-earthquake strategy. 
6.5.2 Prior crisis or disaster experience 
In reviewing their response to a crisis, some of the preparedness measures organisations engage 
in afterwards may still not fully address the challenges of a wide range of disasters. In the disaster 
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literature, researchers have found that prior crisis or disaster experience is not that helpful when 
faced with a major disaster (Dahlhamer & Reshaur, 1996; Tierney, 2009). Additionally, authors 
such as Zhang et al (1973) and Zolin and Kropp (2007) further note that organisational hazard 
mitigation plans often target the response phase after disaster and may not include business 
continuity details. None of the interviewed case study organisations could recall their 
organisation ever having faced a crisis of the magnitude brought about by the 22 February 2011 
earthquake. Nonetheless, it emerged that some organisations from the critical infrastructure and 
trucking sectors, as well as those providing essential or non-substitutable services, were used to 
dealing with crisis of sorts in their day-to-day operations. They said this experience helped to a 
degree in the response phase. However, they added that this limited experience was not adequate 
for the kind of response or business continuity required after a major disaster. It appears that 
exposure to minor crisis may not be adequate preparation for a major crisis. This point, on the 
scale of disasters, has been emphasised by Quarantelli (2006). 
6.5.3 Post-disaster key ‘learnings’37 
One of the outcomes after the acute phase of a crisis has passed is the need to identify key 
lessons that organisations can take away from the experience. These lessons may be used to 
inform corporate strategy for post-disaster recovery or to help manage crises better in the future. 
Other disaster researchers such as Stern and Sundelius (2002) write that learning from a disaster 
should be an objective exercise if organisations are to get the most value from it. In essence, all 
the case study organisations have used the earthquakes as a learning opportunity, but to varying 
degrees. For instance, ICT1 noted that their emergency plans did not have building re-entry 
procedures and did not make provisions for tsunamis. The organisation has since included both 
of these parts into their updated emergency plans. H2 on the other hand believes that there is 
not much that organisations can do about low probability, high consequence events although 
they reported plans to improve the organisation’s health and safety arrangements in future. 
                                                     
37 A word that was used repeatedly by interviewees. 
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6.5.4 Organisational resilience 
Organisational as well as disaster researchers are interested in what makes some organisations 
adapt better in crisis. Organisational resilience has been put forward as a differentiator in how 
organisations handle and survive crises (Seville et al., 2008; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003; Tierney, 
2008). The word resilience was used constantly, mainly in reference to the people of Canterbury, 
after the 4 September 2010 earthquake. Interviewed organisations were asked how they would 
define the resilience of an organisation, what the traits of a resilient organisation were from their 
perspective and if an organisation being resilient added any value. Seville et al (2008) define 
organisational resilience as the ability to survive crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty while Hamel 
and Välikangas (2003) describe resilience as the ability to dynamically reinvent business models and 
strategies as circumstances change. When asked, the case study organisations’ definitions of 
organisational resilience embodied that of both Seville et al and Hamel and Välikangas. The 
organisations thought of a resilient organisation as: 
“…essentially each organisation is there to do something and if it is able to 
continue to be effective in doing that, despite the entire world changing around 
it, then it’s probably reasonably resilient ” - T1 
“…being able to ride this tough time out is probably the biggest measure I have 
of resilience…The other one is for me personally, is psychologically getting 
through it” - KTC2 
 “…two levels to me for organisational resilience….The first level would be the 
resilience within the people, that your people aren’t cracking up, especially ones 
in senior positions, you’ve got to be able to handle the psychological 
impact….the second one, after people resilience is the resilience of your 
processes, your procedures and your organisational structure.” – ICT1 
Even with the different definitions of resilience, there was agreement on the importance of 
resilience to organisations. Interviewees also portrayed resilience in both proactive and reactive 
terms. There was no one particular element of resilience that was mentioned more frequently by 
an individual sector. Some of the attributes interviewees said could lead to a resilient 
organisation: 
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 People employed, skills; 
 Leadership; 
 Networking of  the organisation; 
 Financial position; 
 Adaptation; 
 Location; 
 Diversity; 
 Maintaining relationship with customer base; 
 Good knowledge of  supply web; 
 Disaster plans; 
 Knowing interdependencies between departments in the organisation; 
 Good, solid infrastructure and equipment; 
 Robust organisational processes, procedures and structures; 
 Flexibility; and 
 Organisational (personnel) succession plans. 
In chapter 10, the attributes of organisational resilience described here by case study respondents 
will be contrasted against those in the 13 indicator model developed from the work of McManus 
(2008) and Stephenson (2010). 
6.6 Wellbeing 
Organisations cited staff wellbeing as top of the list when they were asked what factors 
influenced recovery. However, it emerged that there are multiple interrelated aspects to this 
wellbeing.  
6.6.1 Staff wellbeing 
All interviewees reported that staff were the most important aspect of the recovery of their 
organisation. As organisations are made up of people, recovery for the organisation is linked to 
recovery of staff. However, for staff to devote their energies to organisational recovery, their 
primary concerns, e.g. family welfare, need to be taken care of. In the case of disaster, staff need 
202 Case studies 
 
to take care of family needs before turning to those of the organisation. In Canterbury, there was 
recognition that the personal wellbeing of staff was crucial in tackling the response to the 
disaster and in the work to be done during the recovery phase, for instance in the case of staff 
working longer hours to make up for lost production. 
“…you have to have good people, because without execution a plan is worth 
nothing…having a disaster recovery plan is a good place to start, and so long as 
you have recruited well and you’ve got the right people in the right positions” – 
ICT1 
All organisations also reported paying attention to the number of hours staff worked. 
Organisations also worked hard to ensure staff redundancy was a last resort in already turbulent 
times and that work should be one source of certainty. The author spoke to staff in some of the 
case study organisations and heard staff reports of being inspired by the level of care shown by 
management especially without being prompted. Corporate support for staff has been 
documented after other disasters also, for instance after Hurricane Andrew (Sanchez, Korbin, & 
Viscarra, 1995). In Canterbury, organisations mobilised resources to support their staff; 
providing for example basic services such as laundry and shower facilities. Some organisations, 
for instance BS1, also assisted staff by paying for professional advice such as insurance claims 
consultants. Essentially, this is an interpretation of Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, where 
recovery starts with the fulfilment of the individual’s basic needs before moving on to other 
aspects. 
6.6.2 Family wellbeing 
Employee wellbeing is very closely connected to family wellbeing. Employers recognised that 
ensuring their employees were doing well was in itself not enough. They also had to look into 
the wellbeing of the employees’ families and personal situations as this affected the employees’ 
performance at work and their decision to remain in the greater Christchurch area altogether. 
For example, some ICT and critical infrastructure organisations reported that some employees 
voluntarily left their employment due to family considerations. Measures taken to mitigate this 
included giving staff the choice to relocate and still retain their jobs. They reported that, in the 
main, this was a better option than losing staff altogether and helped with team spirit in the 
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organisation38. These efforts made staff feel more valued which often translated into increased 
productivity. 
“… it is important that we were given time to be with our families, we were given 
time to have time out, we were given time to fix our own earthquake things that 
were going on” – KTC1 
6.6.3 Community wellbeing 
To extend the concept of wellbeing further, employees and their families are part of 
communities. To a certain extent, the organisation benefits from contributing to the recovery of 
the community. The organisation relies on the community for provision of resources like 
employees and in some cases for custom. Conversely, the community relies on the organisation 
for provision of goods and services. Some organisations, e.g. ICT1 and FMCG2 reported that in 
certain cases they were aware that they possessed more resources than earthquake ravaged 
communities and felt that they had a duty to help the community. This also conveys that 
community post-disaster recovery may have an influence on the recovery of organisations. For 
instance, Elms et al (2012), Chang and Shinozuka (2004), Paton (2006) and Mayunga (2007)  
demonstrate how organisations and the community are linked in recovery. These different 
studies show that economic recovery and social recovery are very closely related and one cannot 
occur without the other. Therefore, planning for one aspect of recovery should take related 
aspects into consideration. 
6.7 Location 
Location has often been cited in disaster studies as important to organisational recovery (Chang 
& Falit-Baiamonte, 2002). Organisations were asked why they chose the locations they were in 
prior to the earthquakes. Reasons given covered the multiple aspects of location and included 
the benefit from proximity to surrounding organisations; suitability for their type of (specialised) 
business; to be with like businesses; as well as a sense of place and belonging as the owner had 
lived in that area all their lives. These aspects that were an advantage prior to the earthquake in 
                                                     
38 One point that was not discussed was if  and how organisations will maintain, in the long-term, the ‘satellite’ 
offices set up in response to staff  needs after the earthquakes. 
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some cases turned out to be disadvantages after. For instance, organisations that selected the 
area they were in for its benefits pre-earthquake, but whose soils liquefied due to the 
earthquakes. 
“…every quake we get we have movement.  We still have movement in the slabs, 
even when we haven’t got quakes, because the ground underneath is soft” – ICT1 
6.7.1 Neighbour effects 
In some cases, the buildings next to or nearby an organisation’s premises were damaged and red-
tagged as unsafe to enter. This had cascading effects to organisation’s whose premises were not 
damaged but could not be accessed until the damaged building was repaired or demolished. This 
point is closely linked to the duration of closure of an organisation’s premises, their ability to 
access resources such as customer information, as well as delays in getting buildings technically 
assessed and if necessary repaired or demolished. 
“By the [22] February [2011 earthquake], I had nothing, I still haven’t got my 
business. CERA won’t let us in there…we’re in the fall zone of the Grand 
Chancellor [hotel] and [named] Bank” – H2 
6.7.2 Damage to organisation's assets 
The extent of damage to the organisation’s premises and equipment as a result of the 
earthquakes can have an effect on the recovery of organisations. Some assets were damaged by 
the ground shaking, some by falling over and others by objects falling onto them.  
“initially we made the decision to reopen the warehouse as soon as we could 
because we needed to keep our other branches trading, because that was 
potentially impacting on the whole business, compared to the fact that we already 
just lost, or had three Christchurch stores shut down” – CCBD1 
However, the repair or restoration of physical assets alone is not enough to ensure that an 
organisation will recover post-disaster. Other elements such as loss of staff or customers might 
also contribute to an organisation’s demise. Alesch et al (2009) demonstrated as much in their 
work on community disaster recovery. 
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6.7.3 Size of the (regional) economy 
In this case, the economy includes not only the gross domestic product (GDP) but also the 
variety of goods and services produced in the greater Christchurch area and Canterbury region. 
The economy was robust enough in size that even with the closure of the CBD, other sectors 
and areas could still function. 
“…we’re still operating, we’re still making a profit, and we’re in a relatively robust 
economy down here compared to where other parts of [organisation] are in 
Europe and the United States, so we’re actually doing quite well from a numbers 
perspective” – ICT1 
6.7.4 Localisation of damage 
This sub-theme is very closely related to the point above, the size of the region’s economy, and 
is a fundamental characteristic of the Canterbury earthquakes. The (physical) damage caused by 
the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake was localised or concentrated in Christchurch’s 
CBD and eastern suburbs. In other work, Chang (2010) found that the widespread damage after 
the Kobe earthquake was a barrier to recovery. Consequently, after the Canterbury earthquakes, 
some organisations moved to alternative accommodation. This accommodation was in other 
parts of the country, region or areas of Christchurch that had less or no damage. This was also 
because of the non-interruption or quick restoration of critical services essential for the 
functioning of many organisations. The geographic localisation of damage also meant that first, 
resources could get to affected organisations and second, unaffected entities from outside the 
affected area could send resources quickly. 
This sub-theme is related to access to resources detailed in section 6.8. Additionally, some of the 
organisations with their headquarters in Christchurch narrated that localisation of the damage 
meant that important records stored by the head office could be retrieved. CCBD1, whose 
headquarters and main distribution centre are both in the greater Christchurch area, detailed that 
if the damage had been more spread out, this would have affected their organisation severely. 
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6.7.5 Duration of closure 
The length of closure of an organisation’s premises can also influence recovery especially for 
those that cannot relocate or those that can relocate but have no access to equipment, stock or 
business information. This is also linked to the organisation’s position in the supply web as the 
longer the organisation is disrupted, the greater the disruption to their suppliers or customers 
and so on.  
“…we’ve learnt a lot, that we can move around, we can move the business around 
to other places and continue working….we’ve got so many sites that we can just 
get things moving around…we’re fortunate that we’re quite a large business. ” – 
BS1 
Duration of closure included that caused by intermittent downtime brought on by buildings or 
equipment needing to be checked after every significant aftershock. Also, the duration of closure 
for an organisation can have other effects such as customers not returning once the business has 
re-opened. Some of the case study organisations, e.g. LTC1 and CCBD2, reported engaging in 
extra promotional activities to remind customers that they had re-opened. In the disaster 
literature, Nigg and Tierney (1990) found that the length of closure of an organisation may affect 
the return of customers. 
6.7.6 Rent or ownership of premises 
It was evident from information provided by some of the interviewees that the issue of rent or 
ownership of their organisation’s premises played a part in recovery. Dahlhamer and D’Souza 
(2004) write that building owner/occupiers are more likely to engage in preparedness activities 
than renters. From Survey 1, 73% of organisations reported renting their organisation’s 
premises. Some of the (renter) interviewees spoke of wanting to engage in repair, restoration and 
reinforcement work but that this was dependent on the building owners. Organisations report 
that in many cases, they did not have much of a say in the level of repair or restoration decisions 
after the earthquakes. Some owner/occupier organisations interviewed detailed ongoing plans 
for seismic retrofitting in light of the earthquakes. 
Renting a building could be an advantage as the renter can walk away and not have to think 
about issues to do with building repair. However, organisations also spoke of being locked in to 
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their pre-earthquake leases even for buildings that would likely be demolished. This also 
contributed to the delays in insurance payments. In the context of the Canterbury earthquakes, it 
can be argued that rent or ownership of business premises was not very significant for most of 
the organisations. This is because both owners and renters faced similar problems in accessing 
qualified personnel, e.g. structural and geotechnical, to assess building and ground damage. 
Additionally, both owners and renters were affected by delays, for example in getting insurance 
payments (see chapter 8 for more detail). It is important to note that the majority of the sample 
(see chapter 5) were renters. 
6.8 Access to resources 
Resources can be financial, physical (e.g. machinery), manpower (e.g. expert services), basic raw 
materials and information. For the overall sample, this main dimension and its sub-themes is 
related to the localisation of damage discussed in section 6.7.4. From the case study 
organisations interviewed and for this main dimension of access to resources, the small- to 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) faced more difficulties in accessing some resources than the 
larger organisations (see appendix I for detailed analysis of entire sample by organisation size). 
For instance, quick access to finance to purchase goods and services necessary for the recovery 
process. It is clear from the case studies that smaller organisations did not have the capital 
reserves that larger organisations did. For instance, H1 spoke of head office providing a lawyer 
she would otherwise not have been able to afford if she had had to pay for the service. This 
difficulty accessing resources means that SMEs are more likely to struggle to recover following 
the earthquakes.  
Additionally, it became apparent that the resources required after a regional disaster can be in 
excess of what the organisation might require for a day-to-day crisis when costs such as 
relocation, new equipment and extended revenue decreases are factored in. Organisations must 
be prepared for sustained periods of financial underperformance and have a plan to weather 
such periods. 
“The building was closed and had to be inspected and so on, so we were out of 
there for six weeks, two months. Gee that’s costly, I didn’t realise how costly it 
was to move out of an office and set up somewhere else” - KTC2 
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SMEs are more dependent on other ways to carry on operations after cash flow is disrupted 
such as money borrowed from family and friends or on credit. H2 pointed to using family 
savings to make payments for the business. This was in part because her insurance settlement 
was delayed. This shows that for small business owners, their personal wealth is often tied up in 
their business which compromises their financial security. Berger (1998) and Avery (1998) found 
that small business owners often use personal assets to finance their organisations. 
Furthermore, even among the SMEs there is a difference between those that are small and those 
that are medium-sized. The interviewer noticed that the very small organisations with fewer 
employees spoke more frequently about the possibility of closing the business. This was in 
contrast to larger organisations that had more employees who could become redundant in the 
case of organisational closure. The medium-sized organisations often had on their payroll in-
house professional services such as lawyers and accountants that the smaller organisations did 
not have. 
6.8.1 Insurance 
In the disaster literature, Kunreuther (1996, 2008) has written extensively on the use of insurance 
as a form of disaster mitigation. After the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, insurance 
and the delayed settlement of insurance claims emerged as a massive issue. The continuing 
occurrence of earthquakes in Canterbury was a major source of uncertainty for insurance 
companies who delayed payment to policyholders as they assessed the risk. Additionally, the 
insured costs of the earthquakes were unprecedented (Munich Re, 2012). The majority of 
organisations interviewed talked of the delayed payment from their insurance companies as 
having an adverse effect on their recovery as it restricted some of the decisions they could make. 
This was especially so for the small organisations. The system dynamics analysis in chapter 8 
shows what some of the consequences of this delayed or non-payment of insurance were. 
6.8.2 Financial resources 
This is linked to the point on delayed or non-payment of insurance (section 6.8.1). Most small 
organisations do not normally have large amounts of cash flow in day-to-day operations (Dodge, 
Fullerton, & Robbins, 1994). After the earthquakes in Canterbury, low levels of organisational 
cash flow were magnified. The small organisations in the study spoke of still having to pay bills 
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(e.g. mortgages) even as there was no revenue coming in for a certain period after the 
earthquakes. This put a further strain on their organisational and, in some cases, personal 
finances. 
Organisations reported that the quick action by Central Government, after both the 4 
September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes, to assist organisations with 50 employees or 
less has been hailed as one of the best decisions to come out of the Canterbury series of 
earthquakes. The Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) enabled many organisations to consider 
their decisions carefully before taking action in those crucial response and early recovery periods. 
It also enabled them to retain staff. 
Additionally, one of the FMCG organisations pointed to Central Government sending cash to 
Christchurch as an aid. Due to infrastructure damage and a great demand on what infrastructure 
was available, electronic point of sale terminals (EFTPOS) in stores did not work. Central 
Government printed more money that they sent to greater Christchurch which enabled 
customers to use cash to purchase goods and services. 
6.8.3 Manpower 
This includes specialist services such as those to do with accountancy, tax and law which are 
usually functional roles in medium- to larger-sized organisations. Access to resources also 
includes trained personnel who can work in the organisation once it is trading again. For 
example, the hospitality organisations related how they had to let go of their trained staff due to 
their inability to pay them as they waited to re-open. This is one of the consequences of 
inadequate financial resources discussed in the previous section (6.8.2). 
For organisations resuming operations after the earthquakes, training new staff may affect the 
organisation’s efficiency at a crucial time in its recovery. This is because resources such as time 
and money which could be targeted at recovery activities (e.g. advertising) would be channelled 
to new staff training. New staff are not as efficient with organisational processes as longer 
serving staff which leads to lower productivity (Guthrie, 2001). 
Some organisations brought in assistance from other parts of their organisations, for example 
Auckland or Wellington to relieve those on the ground in Christchurch. This turned out to be 
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both a positive and a negative. The positive was that the people in Christchurch could rest and 
also take care of their personal situations. The negative was that some Christchurch personnel 
felt the visitors were stepping on their toes in essence, which caused some friction between the 
locals and the visitors. Also, there was a period of adjustment as relief managers and the teams 
they had to work with took time to get used to each other. Meanwhile, ICT and trucking sector 
organisations spoke of facing a skills shortage prior to the earthquakes which was exacerbated by 
the earthquakes. They also spoke of qualified people voluntarily leaving their employment which 
worsened an already bad situation.  
 “…how much time it takes for constantly sending this information all the time.” 
– H2 
6.8.4 Physical resources 
With limited monetary or physical resources, it is difficult to relocate even if an organisation 
leader or owner wanted to. 
“…with all the specialised software…specialised equipment that we use….We 
couldn’t have worked without the equipment, especially the computers” – KTC2 
For location specific industries such as hospitality their situation differed slightly. In order to 
relocate they had to find the right premises to house their equipment and with all the necessary 
utility services connected. They were also subject to sectoral health and safety regulations that 
have to be met before they can serve customers or employ staff. 
6.8.5 Replacement supplies and raw materials 
An organisation’s access to resources includes the raw materials or replacement supplies they 
need to deliver goods and services. This is influenced by other parts of their supply web 
including but not limited to supplier organisations as well as critical infrastructure such as water, 
electricity and roads. 
“…I tried to buy from local people but they couldn’t supply because they were 
affected…” - LTC1 
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Organisations also needed to access stock and records in damaged buildings. However, for some 
this proved difficult. 
“…one of the key stresses after the quake was the fact that we didn’t have access 
to our stock in the centre of town, and that took some fights, for want of a better 
word, with Civil Defence…we didn’t have earthquake insurance, so it was all 
sitting in the centre of Christchurch uninsured” - CCBD1 
6.8.6 Efficient and effective use of resources 
The urge to use resources quickly in hopes that this will lead to a quicker recovery can result in a 
waste of these resources. The access and availability of resources is intertwined with the effective 
and efficient use of these resources (Gladwell, 2000). Effective in this thesis means that the 
intended and actual outcomes are the same. As recovery can be long and drawn out, resource use 
should be spread out and resources used at the right time in recovery to achieve the most return 
on their investment. 
“until the building owner decides what he’s going to do, there’s really no point in me 
even going to my lawyer to see what I can do as far as my lease is concerned… if I go 
to my lawyer now, it’s costing money that I don’t really need to spend at the moment 
because I’m probably asking questions that I can’t get answers to” – H2 
6.9 Leadership 
In the aftermath of a crisis, leadership that is visible and decisive is vital for the organisation. 
Leaders should also be inspired and inspiring. Chamlee-Wright and Storr (2008) write how 
inspiring leadership helped the recovery of some communities after Hurricane Katrina. It 
emerged in interviews that the leader’s primary roles are to take charge, to make decisions and to 
provide vision to staff and others outside the organisation that the situation will get better. From 
the organisations interviewed, the role of the leader was slightly different depending on the size 
of the organisation and the ownership structure. In the larger case study organisations that had a 
lot more employees and different departments with different people in charge of those 
departments, the leader’s responsibilities included overseeing the entire organisation’s response 
212 Case studies 
 
and recovery plans. The leader’s role was that of coordination between the different departments 
as well. 
In all the case study organisations, the leadership mantle was taken up by those already in 
leadership or management roles prior to the earthquakes. Quarantelli (1986) found that in 
disaster existing chains of command do not usually break down even as people may take on 
extra roles. Interviewees reported that in the response phase of the crisis, the leaders mainly 
made decisions and prioritised activities in the very short-term whereas in the recovery phase 
their role was to balance short- and long-term recovery priorities and look at corporate strategy. 
Apart from decision making and prioritisation, planning and the implementation of plans turned 
out to be extremely important. Also, different ways of thinking were required and in evidence in 
the different phases of the crisis (more on this in chapter 8). KTC1, T1 and T2 resumed 
operations a short time after the event or did not close at all. They relayed how in the days 
following the 22 February 2011 earthquake, their organisations had to deal with the crisis as well 
as with business-as-usual involving existing customers. 
Organisations soon understood that leadership in normal times is not the same as leadership in 
crisis and that different styles of leadership are required for the two situations. In fact, from the 
interviews, one lesson is that even in crisis, the style of leadership needed for the different 
phases is varied. The response and early recovery phases require an almost autocratic style of 
leadership while the medium-term phase requires more of a consultative style. For some 
organisations in this study, it was not just about the leadership but also where they came from. 
Organisations report that they brought in leaders or managers from other parts of their 
organisations partly to relieve those who were from Christchurch but also because the job had 
changed and increased in scope. Of note was the interaction between local people and outsiders; it 
was apparent that even in the same organisation there were several sub-cultures. There 
sometimes was local resentment at being told by outsiders what to do and how to do it. From 
reports, in many cases it was the people who came from outside the region who needed to adjust 
to how we do things around here. This was on top of working in a disaster setting. 
6.9.1 Organisation ownership structure 
Under leadership are also included characteristics that determine the structure of an organisation 
and how decisions are made. These characteristics include the ownership arrangements, lines of 
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communication as well as external influences on the organisation’s recovery. Organisations that 
are franchises or part of larger concerns were able to get help from their franchise or from other 
parts of the larger organisation they were a part of. However, franchisees had less freedom to 
manoeuver and adapt as they were bound by franchise regulations. Branch organisations got 
help from their corporate headquarters while standalone organisations belonging to a larger 
group also got offers of help from sister companies (see section 6.8.3 on manpower). 
“…We brought in staff from Auckland and from Timaru, they were really good, 
and we put them on our trucks, they were very experienced people” – T2 
6.9.2 Communication 
After the earthquakes, communication, modes of communication and quality of communication 
were vital. This was both within and outside the affected organisations. A crucial aspect is that 
after the Christchurch earthquakes, the means of communication functioned. It is possible that 
in bigger disasters, means of communication can be cut off which would make recovery even 
more difficult as the exchange of information is so important. Organisational leadership also 
needed to communicate with the world outside the organisation, i.e. with the actors in the 
organisation’s environment. This included being in touch and working with customers, suppliers, 
local and national authorities as well as the public at large if necessary. Crucially, the messages 
communicated must be the right ones (see also chapter 6.12 for the link between information 
and communication). For instance, communication to customers to assure them of delivery of 
goods and services. 
 “…all on a one to one, we had lots of meetings, lots of gatherings [within the 
organisation and with customers]” - KTC1 
Within the organisation, communication was needed to keep the staff informed of what was 
going on, that there was a response and recovery plan, what the plan was and that things were 
under control (as much as is possible during crisis times). Staff needed re-assurance and when 
they knew that there was someone in charge they were encouraged to do as much as they could 
towards the recovery of the organisation. Some of the organisations pointed out that an 
organisation facing and getting through crisis together was the best team building exercise. 
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In some organisations, new roles were defined for the response and recovery effort. This was in 
essence a new organisational structure which brought with it the need to establish new channels 
of communication in addition to those that already existed. Palen (2007) writes of the emergence 
of temporary organisations and structures after disaster while Tobin (2007) speaks of 
incorporating this feature in hazard planning. 
6.9.3 Recognising and grasping opportunity 
All the organisations interviewed pointed to the disruptive nature of the disaster even as the 
different organisations were unsettled to different levels. As it is not possible to be prepared for 
all crises, adapting to the changed and still changing disaster landscape is crucial. Findings by 
Dervitsiotis (2003) as well as Boisot and Child (1999) point to an organisation’s ability to adapt 
as one way of surviving through turbulent times. Some interviewees spoke of their pre-
earthquake organisational expansion and/or improvement plans having to be put on hold, 
revised or discarded altogether. However, there was also recognition that there were 
opportunities that organisations could grasp in the response and recovery phases. Some of these 
opportunities included exploring what help was available and who to ask for this help. As well, 
organisations expressed that adaptability was one way they reacted to the crisis, as a way of 
getting ahead and staying ahead in an altered environment and market. 
“…the whole dynamics of Christchurch has changed, so you’ve got to think, “Well 
will that work or can I do something else better?” And yeah, so that’s the sort of the 
beginnings of the recovery plans.” – H2 
6.9.4 Sectoral leadership 
Some of the respondents recognised the importance of their industry sector and their 
organisation’s place within the sector. They rose to the challenge and took charge of 
coordinating their sector’s response to the crisis. However, this had to be done in such a way 
that they did not cause offence to the other organisations in the sector. Some of the reasons for 
this were that it was easier to get people to cooperate willingly and also that the sector would still 
need to work together after the response and recovery efforts. 
“….the task of coordinating the entire industry to fix the problems in the [niche 
industry sector] area...had to work with all our competitors really to make sure, 
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because if everybody is fighting each other and so on, it just doesn’t work in that 
environment, it has to be a team approach so we had to coordinate and talk daily 
with all our competitors and figure out who was going to do what” – T1 
In the organisational literature, cooperation between competing organisations is termed 
coopetition. Bengtsson and Kock (2000) have shown how competitors working together can both 
benefit. However, this is partly dependent on whether or not they are competing for the same 
resources. 
6.9.5 Leadership of the overall recovery effort 
Leadership of the overall post-disaster recovery is crucial as they can help facilitate the process 
(Hummel et al., 2007; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Rubin & Barbee, 1985). Case study 
organisations were not directly asked who they thought was in charge of the overall recovery 
effort. However, it was clear from information given during the course of the interviews that 
there was confusion about who was really in charge of the recovery effort as opposed to who was 
appointed to be in charge of leading the recovery of the greater Christchurch area. There also seemed 
to be some confusion as to which organisation was performing which roles; this included the 
government agencies as well as the many business associations that were prominent at the time. 
This confusion sometimes led to organisations wasting time talking to the wrong people about 
issues of recovery or in the extreme not talking to anyone at all. The uncertainty surrounding 
who was in charge changed with time as more information became available. However, in some 
cases, the effectiveness of the plans of recovery agencies did not give interviewees confidence. 
6.10 Industry sector attributes 
Recovery for organisations belonging to the industry sectors in this study was dissimilar. The 
differing industry sector attributes and how they affected recovery are encapsulated as the 
signifiers of recovery in section 7.7. Additionally, in chapter 9; from the aids, hindrances and 
points of intervention in recovery, the critical success factors (CSFs) are a summary of what was 
important for each sector on its path to recovery. From the case study interviews, supported by 
the contextual interviews and revenue survey data, hospitality organisations were not recovering 
at the same rate as those from the ICT sector. This was so even when revenue data for the entire 
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sample set was checked. This has to do with the goods and services produced by the two sectors 
and where their customers were based. For hospitality, the custom was mainly local and they 
were dependent on customer discretionary spending. People held on to their discretionary 
finances after the earthquakes as they waited to see how the economic situation would evolve. 
For ICT, some of their main customers were outside the region and the country. As well, for 
those that serviced the local Christchurch market, their services were required after the 
earthquakes. In a study on business vulnerability to earthquakes and other disasters (Tierney & 
Webb, 2001), it was shown that the manufacturing and construction sectors recovered quicker 
than hospitality and retail. However, in Canterbury this was not the case as more organisations 
from the building suppliers sector struggled in short-term recovery due to low sales volumes. 
After the earthquakes and depending on industry sector, there was post-disaster cooperation 
between organisations in the same or different industry sectors to assist each other’s recovery. 
The industry sectors involved in specialist and non-substitutable goods and services reported 
that collaboration within the industry sector helped in recovery. This theme is linked to the 
sectoral leadership discussed above (section 6.9.4) and the awareness that the recovery of the 
whole sector is vital to maintain certain sectoral and economic dynamics. Other cases of inter-
sectoral collaboration were between trucking and FMCG (see chapter 5). 
“we had a number of competitors around us [in pre-earthquake location], and 
we’ve been speaking with them, because we’d like to be back, we’d like to be 
near each other, because obviously you feed off each other’s advertising” – 
CCBD1 
6.10.1 Type of goods and services provided 
The kind of goods and services supplied by an organisation also contribute to its recovery after 
disaster. This has also been documented in other work on disaster recovery (Alesch et al., 2009). 
For some organisations, especially those dealing with goods and services dependent on 
consumer discretionary spending, the organisation’s recovery might be hampered as consumers 
spend less on items they do not consider vital. For example, high-end retail fashion might face a 
slump after disaster. This was a finding by other disaster researchers also (Tierney & Webb, 
2001). An extension of this is that the organisation’s goods and services are not required in the 
aftermath of a crisis. One retailer from Lyttelton said she realised that the luxury products she 
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sold were not needed in the three or so months after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. On the 
other hand, for firms providing essential and non-substitutable services, their challenge might be 
the ability to meet demand in the aftermath of a disaster event. In Canterbury, this was seen in 
the trucking, critical infrastructure and FMCG sectors. 
6.10.2 Make-up for lost production 
The possibility to make up for lost-production is also sector dependent. One ICT organisation 
reported that they made up for lost production after they re-opened by working longer hours. 
The success of this possibility though is closely linked to some of the other dimensions and sub-
themes discussed such as the wellbeing (mental and physical) of the organisation’s employees in 
the aftermath of a disaster, the amount of damage to the organisation’s premises or equipment, 
the type of product as well as knowing which customers to prioritise. These factors are in turn 
dependent on other factors such as critical infrastructure availability and suppliers’ ability to 
meet the needs of the organisation. 
“…we probably lost I’d say three and a half to four working days … we had to catch 
up with overtime…But then there’s getting that balance between overtime and not 
stressing people out at work so that they went home to their families” – ICT1 
6.11 Variety and diversity 
Researchers such as Sheffi (2007), Dervitsiotis (2003) and Alesch et al (2009) have shown how 
important various forms of diversity are for businesses. Diversity can be in the goods and 
services provided, how those goods and services are delivered, the location of customers, the 
number of suppliers and in the location of the organisation (Hamel & Prahalad, 1996; Lengnick-
Hall & Beck, 2005; Porter, 2000; Senge, 2006). From the case study organisations affected by the 
earthquakes in Canterbury, organisations with more than one product line or with dispersed 
customers or premises were somewhat able to compensate for disruption as they had 
alternatives. For instance, diversity in the way an organisation delivers goods and services to its 
customers can be crucial after disaster. 
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6.11.1 Sources of revenue 
Customer base 
The ICT sector spoke of their clientele being mainly outside Christchurch. One of their biggest 
challenges after the 22 February 2011 earthquake was to re-assure customers outside the region 
and the country that they could still be relied on to deliver. This is in contrast to the hospitality 
sector whose main customer base was in Christchurch. 
Product 
This is connected to the type of goods and services provided by a firm but even more is about 
an organisation not being reliant on one product or on producing different products on the 
same line which could be damaged in a disaster event. For instance, FMCG2 had multiple 
product lines some of which were in higher demand after the earthquakes. 
6.11.2 Geographic or locational 
Studies (Chang & Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Dahlhamer & Tierney, 1998) have shown that the 
location of an organisation can affect recovery. Geographically, and for an event such as an 
earthquake, ground or soil conditions and proximity to the epicentre can affect an organisation. 
Geographic distribution can mean that the organisation has customers in different locations (e.g. 
Christchurch and Auckland). It can also mean that an organisation has alternative premises for 
operation, production or storage. 
“…after [4] September [2010] we were surrounded by buildings that, one in 
particular Manchester Courts, which affected our front entrance. So we had no 
front entrance, so we were closed for probably three and a half to four weeks, just 
under four weeks.” – CCBD2 
6.11.3 Delivery of goods and services 
The way in which an organisation delivers goods and services can aid recovery after disaster. For 
example an organisation can interact with customers from its physical premises as well as 
conduct business online. This also ensures a diversity of customer base as those shopping online 
do not necessarily have to be in the same physical location as the organisation. As well, in the 
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case of a disaster event damaging physical premises, the organisation can still serve their existing 
clientele but in a different way. 
“…and our internet store is based just downstairs in [branch location], and that is 
primarily, probably 50/50 between international and New Zealand, so that’s where 
our international access comes, is through the internet” – CCBD1 
This is of course also dependent on the type of goods and services delivered by the organisation, 
for example, location specific businesses such as some in hospitality might not be able to deliver 
online.  
6.12 Information 
The availability and quality of information were key to the decisions organisations made post-
disaster. Information and communication are intertwined (also see chapter 9); it might be 
possible to communicate but still not inform. For instance the means of communication are one 
feature but the value of the information is also essential. Organisations on the whole were aware 
that things had changed. They report that in certain instances, they wanted to adapt but were 
partly hamstrung by the lack of credible and useful information. One retailer from Kaiapoi 
spoke of wanting to move undamaged merchandise to a different location in the town centre but 
could not access geotechnical information on the quality of the soil the new building sat on. 
The availability and quality of information is closely related to the uncertainty about who was in 
charge discussed in section 6.9.5. As the uncertainty lessened, the quality of the information 
given by recovery agencies was not always of the standard useful to organisations for recovery. 
6.12.1 Official sources of information 
Knowing which organisation is responsible for what and who is at the forefront of the recovery 
effort is essential (see section 6.9.5 on leadership of overall recovery effort). Post-earthquake 
there were a myriad of organisations that said they were speaking for businesses but that had 
never been in touch with the businesses they claimed to represent. Conversely, a lot of the case 
study organisations interviewed say they had not contacted these emergent or already existing 
associations either, as they did not know what they stood for. Also affecting the recovery of 
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some organisations was the lack of information on the timeline for demolition, cordon removal 
and the overall recovery plan for the CBD. 
“….but that sort of first six weeks was definitely the critical part – we had a 
million dollars of stock in the central city…..We knew that the doors were open in 
the stores when the staff left…..we knew that people were accessing the central 
city, without authority…we didn’t know what was going on with it – we had no 
idea, and we couldn’t get any information about it” – CCBD1 
6.12.2 Sources of economic information 
Economic information is to do with insurance payments and other external sources of funding 
as well as with the general financial health of the organisation itself, the industry sector it belongs 
to and the greater economy it is connected to. Concerning insurance, organisations outlined how 
it was not just the delay in payment that was affecting their businesses but also the lack of logical 
explanation for why there was this delay. This was in addition to what turned out to be 
ambiguous wording contained in policy statements as to what their insurance policy actually 
covered. However, the Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) mentioned in section 4.4.2 was 
helpful. 
6.12.3 Engineering and technical sources 
This was one of the most difficult aspects of the Canterbury series of earthquakes in that no one 
had an answer for when the shaking would end or when land assessments would be completed. 
The continuing earthquake and aftershock sequence was one of the reasons given by insurance 
companies for the continued delay of payments to policy holders. The earthquakes also affected 
the pace of building demolition and the clearing of rubble. 
“…when we have aftershocks…I’ve got to arrange with the oil company to send an 
engineer out, and let the engineer, as I said before, the site, what it’s structural 
integrity is.” – FMCG1 
6.13 Sectoral comparisons 
It has been shown that after the earthquakes, the sectors in this research were affected by the 
pre-earthquake characteristics and conditions as well as the direct and indirect effects of the 
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earthquakes. The CBD and the town centres in this study were the financial nuclei of the towns 
they are in. However, for some sectors such as critical infrastructure, ICT and FMCG, the 
factors that affected their rates of recovery in the short-term were more to do with the 
characteristics prior to the earthquakes. Some of these include the nature of goods and services 
delivered, the location of organisational assets, and the ability to work from alternative locations. 
Additionally, the direction of the rate of recovery can be positive or negative. The ICT sector 
showed a more positive rate of recovery than building suppliers, the majority of whom were still 
reporting revenue decreases 18 months after the 4 September 2010 earthquake. In contrast to 
FMCG where the bulk of the organisations are part of larger groups of companies and had over 
50 employees, 80% of the ICT organisations had between 1 and 20 employees and yet had a 
larger percentage of organisations with a positive recovery rate coefficient (RRC) measured using 
changes in organisational revenue after the earthquakes (more detail on RRC is in chapter 7.2). 
This again shows the differences in consequences to sectors after disaster and that factors such 
as customer location (see chapter 7.5 also) and demand for goods and services also play a part in 
recovery after disaster. 
Still using the number of employees as a measure of organisation size39, sectors were affected in 
yet other ways. For example a lot of the ICT organisations had less than 20 employees while 
those in critical infrastructure had more than 50 employees. Both sectors reported that the rise in 
demand for their services after the earthquakes necessitated more staff. Critical infrastructure 
solved this problem by using contractors. On the contrary, the pre-earthquake lack of skilled 
manpower meant that the ICT sector just about had no contractors they could call on to 
distribute the workload to. 
For the Canterbury series of earthquakes, one of the environmental factors that appeared and 
was extremely important was the effects the earthquakes had on employees. Again, the 
earthquakes in Canterbury are unique in that they went on for as long as they did which took its 
toll on the people in the region. Organisations report that in the medium-term they realised that 
people were suffering severe fatigue which was affecting their performance at work and 
                                                     
39 Appendix I has additional analysis on effects to organisations based on size calculated using full-time equivalent staff count. 
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consequently the recovery of the organisation. This fatigue applied to even those who did not 
have physical damage at home. 
Organisations belonging to larger concerns such as franchises or branch organisations reported 
receiving support from their corporate offices as a help in recovery. However, these 
organisations also spoke of the strain of the ongoing earthquakes on their relationships with 
their corporate offices. They detailed how they sometimes underplayed the effects of the 
earthquakes when they had discussions with their head offices. Organisations also said people 
from outside their organisation’s greater Christchurch office really only understood what was 
going on when they came to view the devastation for themselves first-hand. However, this 
goodwill could not go on forever. Some managers in Christchurch felt that if there was a report 
of negative earnings in the extended time periods after the earthquakes, their head office might 
decide to relocate the office to an alternative location outside the greater Christchurch region. 
Two of the managers from case study organisations reported how they had not shared such 
concerns with other staff in their Christchurch office until the situation was clearer. However, 
such actions even when done with the best of intentions show the amount of strain leaders may 
bear in the recovery period. Norwood (1997) documents how this kind of strain in disaster 
situations can lead to fatigue while Dynes (1974) asserts that this overwork and fatigue in 
disaster situations can lead to bad decisions. 
Other sectoral differences were also apparent, for instance in the area of documented crisis or 
emergency plans. Critical infrastructure and FMCG were the sectors most likely to have 
organisations with documented crisis and emergency plans, more so in the critical infrastructure 
sector. This was the same for the practise of crisis or emergency plans. The FMCG sector partly 
attributed this to their sector’s handling of food which requires extra attention. However, the 
hospitality sector also handles food and yet neither the prevalence of documented crisis and 
emergency plans nor the rehearsal of these plans was as high as in the FMCG sector. In 
interviews, hospitality organisations detailed how they had preparedness plans such as fire 
extinguishers or first aid kits and other measures designed to preserve life of staff and clients.  
However, they did not have plans for how their organisation would operate in a crisis or in 
recovery after a crisis. In essence, the organisations with plans for life safety were prepared for 
hazards they thought were likely to affect them and did not take in broader hazard risks. Analysis 
of the sample shows that the hospitality organisations had fewer employees than FMCG 
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organisations: organisational size may be a factor in the level of preparation for crisis. Some of 
the organisations that did not have crisis or emergency plans pointed to the fact that these plans 
would not have been useful after the earthquake. However, prior planning may mean that the 
organisation has a set of steps to follow in disaster that may help them recover quicker. Other 
disaster researchers (e.g. Zolin and Kropp (2007), Zhang et al (1973), Corey and Deitch (1987) 
and Tierney (2004)) found that preparedness was not a significant factor in recovery but that 
larger organisations were the more likely to have emergency plans. 
None of the sectors reported being affected greatly by the inability of suppliers to meet demand. 
However, disruption to business operations took the form of customer issues, the other side of 
the supply web (chapters 5 and 7 contain more detail on this). This was especially highlighted in 
the hospitality sector because of their direct link to customer discretionary spending. Other 
sectors such as FMCG also reported having customer issues; customers could not access their 
premises due to damaged road infrastructure or nearby buildings and in some cases thought they 
were closed. Trucking and FMCG organisations reported having the bulk of their custom from 
their local place of business (e.g. Christchurch or Kaiapoi) and yet just after the earthquakes, the 
goods and services of truckers were more in demand than for FMCG. 
From a sectoral perspective, industry leaders spoke of a critical mass of organisations to make 
the sector viable in the region. This means that if the earthquakes shocked one organisation into 
moving out of  the region, then the benefits to remaining organisations may decline and lead to a 
mass egress of organisations from the region. Considering the interdependence between sectors, 
the implications of one sector leaving the region might be that other sectors also leave the 
region. For instance, as explained in chapter 5, the ICT sector is considered a key high-growth 
sector in Canterbury. It has also been described as a pull sector for the region (Canterbury 
Development Corporation, personal correspondence, 2012). This means that the presence of the 
ICT sector leads to the establishment of other organisations supplying goods and services to 
them. If they were to leave Canterbury, this may mean that these ICT supplier organisations may 
also leave or close. The interdependence between sectors will also be illustrated in chapter 8. 
The organisations in the geographic sectors shared some similarities in the pre-existing elements 
that led to some of the consequences for them. For instance, they all had a large number of 
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unreinforced masonry buildings that proved vulnerable to the ground motions produced by the 
earthquakes and had to be torn down. Organisations occupied these unreinforced masonry 
buildings for various reasons. They reported that the rent was cheaper but importantly, these 
organisations had locational advantage in the number of customers they had in close proximity 
almost every day. This advantage turned into a disadvantage after the earthquakes as they lost 
their premises. More organisations in Christchurch CBD had a higher closure impact factor than 
those in Kaiapoi or Lyttelton Town Centres. For the Christchurch CBD, their plight was even 
more concerning as the cordon that was around the city was there for an unprecedented amount 
of time when compared to other big disasters outside New Zealand such as the earthquake in 
Santa Cruz (Comerio, 2011). The cordon was placed there mainly for the public’s protection due 
to the number of unsafe buildings that had yet to come down. The cordon also acted as a barrier 
to access of premises for those whose premises were located within the cordon. 
The recovery of the Christchurch CBD and the organisations to be based there depends partly 
on what will be contained in the plan for recovery. Some retail organisations that were in the 
CBD spoke of not wanting to go back if their competitors, with whom they shared mutual 
benefits such as a shared customer base, could not go back. Some of the reasons given for 
organisations not being able to go back were that they would be locked into leases they could 
not get out of or that the part of town they had moved to was more ideal than the prospect of 
going back to the CBD. 
6.14 Chapter summary 
In this section, case studies were used to illustrate how vulnerable organisations can be to 
hazards and that recovery is a complex operation that involves collaboration and alignment with 
multiple actors from different sectors. All the industry sectors involved in the case studies 
reported being affected in one way or another, positively or negatively, by the earthquakes. 
Consequently, aggregated regional or national reports of disaster effects mask the true extent of 
damage, physical and otherwise, that disaster can cause. 
The findings from the case studies corroborate some of the findings from the contextual 
interviews and survey data. From all three points of data collection, staff, access to resources, 
some form of business continuity planning as well as information and communication are vital 
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in recovery. Additionally, neighbourhood effects and industry sector attributes such as type of 
goods and services delivered also affect post-disaster recovery 
However, from the myriad components that came together to affect operations, many of the 
facets of the rate of recovery in the short-term are not entirely dependent on measures 
organisations take prior to disaster. As the organisations themselves stated, a certain level of 
organisational preparedness is helpful, however, measures at the level of the organisation may 
prove inadequate for a disaster on a regional scale such as happened in greater Christchurch. The 
characteristics of the event and the ecological conditions that resulted from that were also at 
play. For instance, the majority of organisations had insurance and yet they still faced difficulties 
in insurance companies settling claims. Other ecological factors relate to the recovery decisions 
that were made after the earthquakes such as decisions on cordons and access to buildings. An 
organisation’s actions are governed by its environment to the extent that the organisation is 
dependent on this environment. 
Furthermore, investigating sectoral and spatial effects of earthquakes is necessary for 
determining what actions organisations can take to prepare for as well as reduce the effects of 
disaster. The actions and decisions taken in the different stages of the recovery process also act 
to inform recovery. Knowing what influences organisational and sectoral recovery, and at what 
point in the recovery timeline, can be used to inform policy decisions. This knowledge can also 
contribute towards increasing organisational and sectoral disaster resilience. 
The next chapter brings together results and analysis from the quantitative and qualitative parts 
of this research to determine the most significant contributors to recovery for organisations in 
the greater Christchurch area after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. 
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7 Significant contributors to sectoral and organisational short-
term40 recovery 
This chapter presents results of the investigation on whether the determinants of organisational 
and sectoral short-term recovery documented after other disasters are the same for Canterbury 
after the 2010 – 2011 earthquakes. These contributing factors of short-term recovery from other 
disaster events were reviewed, based on the existing literature on disaster recovery, in chapter 2. 
In this thesis, the determinants of short-term recovery are called components and are arranged 
into three groups of contributors. The contributors are: (1) level of organisational or sectoral 
resilience; (2) pre-disaster characteristics; and (3) direct and indirect post-earthquake effects. The 
contributors and components of organisational and sectoral short-term recovery are correlated 
against a sectorally comparable measure of short-term recovery, post-earthquake revenue, that 
was articulated by the organisations participating in this research. Results from the correlations 
are used to determine the effect size, if any, that each contributor and component has on short-
term recovery. Thereafter, based on the correlation results and the case study and interview data, 
signifiers of short-term recovery are arrived at for organisations and sectors affected by the 
Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 - 2011. 
It is worth remembering that every disaster is unique and in Canterbury there were multiple 
elements that made this so. First is that organisations faced a series of earthquakes since the first 
MW 7.1 on 4 September 2010 as opposed to just one major event. The continuing earthquakes 
and aftershocks acted to reset the recovery clock for organisations thereby making it more 
challenging to advance from the mindset of response to recovery (in general) both of which 
require a different set of skills. Second is that the earthquake of 22 February 2011, although 
smaller in magnitude (MW 6.3) released more energy close to the Christchurch CBD than that of 
4 September 2010. The 22 February 2011 earthquake showed some of the highest vertical peak 
ground accelerations (PGA) associated with an earthquake (Bradley, 2012). As well, the 
cumulative effects of multiple earthquakes caused more damage. Third is that the physical 
effects of the earthquakes were localised at multiple levels within a larger system. The first level 
of localisation was that the event was within New Zealand and the second is that the effects 
                                                     
40 In this chapter, references to recovery are taken to mean recovery in the overall sense to differentiate from 
recovery in the short-term. See section 7.1.1 that follows. 
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were contained to within the South Island of New Zealand. Lastly, the physical effects were 
more pronounced within the Canterbury region: specifically to certain parts of the greater 
Christchurch area such as the CBD and eastern suburbs of Christchurch. This localisation 
enabled assistance and resources for earthquake damaged areas from other parts of the region 
and the country. This was in two primary ways. First, assistance and resources could get to the 
affected organisations and second, unaffected parts could send assistance and resources quickly. 
For instance, organisations with premises in earthquake damaged locations were able to relocate 
to undamaged areas or personnel available from other parts of the region or country could get to 
the greater Christchurch area. In addition, organisations with headquarters or primary 
distribution centres in the greater Christchurch area, described how recovery would have been 
made more difficult if the severe damage caused by the earthquakes had been more widespread 
(see sections 6.6.4 and 6.7 for more). 
Consequently, some of the lessons from this work are singular to the greater Christchurch area. 
At the same time, some of the lessons are general enough that they can be applied to other 
organisations, inside and outside New Zealand, to better prepare them for crises or to help them 
recover afterwards. Again, the analysis presented in this section (and in chapters 8 – 10 that 
follow) is based on combined results from the surveys41, contextual interviews and case studies 
presented in earlier chapters. 
7.1.1 Disaster management cycle – response and short-term recovery 
As was pointed out in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the disaster management cycle is 
characterised by different, overlapping, phases (see section 1.4 and for more detail). The data for 
this thesis were collected in the response and short-term recovery phases after the earthquakes in 
Canterbury. Response is the time period immediately following a disaster event when essential 
services are restored. Short-term recovery is the period up to two years after a disaster event. 
Consequently, it is important to remember that the results in this chapter are a reflection of the 
situation in the post-earthquakes response and short-term recovery periods. It is the opinion of 
this thesis that the short-term recovery period can be described as a transitional, chaotic post-
                                                     
41 Lyttelton did not take part in Survey; two of the components used to calculate the more significant contributor to recovery 
were not used for the Lyttelton sample as those data were collected in Survey 1. 
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disaster phase that organisations need to go through in trying to meet the objective of long-term 
recovery. For instance, from section 2.3.3, Turner describes the first stages after the occurrence 
of  a crisis as having ad hoc adjustments which permit the work of  rescue and salvage to be started. This 
corresponds to the response phase. Furthermore, Alesch et al (2009) have written on how both 
the response and short-term recovery after disaster can be characterised by uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Therefore, it should be noted that the measure of recovery used herein is also affected 
by the time span of the work, i.e. the response and short-term recovery period. Additionally, it 
should be kept in mind that the statistical instruments, correlation and regression, used in this 
chapter to verify cause and effect have been used on data collected during the very dynamic 
situation after the earthquakes. The dynamism and complexity of the Canterbury system post-
earthquakes is captured in chapter 8. The numerous interactions between the system agents 
illustrates that the interactions in the response and short-term recovery phases after disaster are 
characterised by different behaviour leading to different emergent scenarios.  
Importantly, from the systems perspective used in this thesis, the time horizon for analysis of  a 
system cannot be overemphasised (see chapter 2.2.2). System dynamics analysis must reach far 
enough into the past to show how a problem may have started as well as the symptoms and, 
especially in the case of   disaster, it should also go far enough into the future that it can show 
the delayed, indirect, unforeseen effects. This has been discussed extensively by systems thinkers 
such as Forrester (1999), Meadows (1998), Sterman (2000). Therefore, for future research and 
outside the scope of this thesis (see chapter 11 on future work), there is the need to investigate 
organisational recovery trajectories at longer times from the occurrence of the event and using 
multiple indicators (financial and non-financial) of organisational recovery. For instance after the 
Loma Prieta earthquake, studies at two separate times with the same organisations showed 
different results. Dahlhamer and Tierney (1998) found that the industry sector an organisation 
belonged to was not a statistically significant predictor of  short-term business recovery whereas 
Webb et al. (2002) found that industry sector was indeed a strong predictor of  long-term 
recovery. 
Throughout this chapter, to better illustrate the results, there is a distinction made between 
short-term recovery and recovery in general. 
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7.2 Determinants of short-term recovery and their relative magnitudes 
As outlined in chapters 4 and 6, industry and geographic sectors in the greater Christchurch area 
faced numerous challenges brought on by the Canterbury series of earthquakes. However, to 
make the findings from this study more useful and applicable, it is important to discern what 
factors caused organisations the most considerable challenge(s) and to what extent. In other 
words: what are the significant contributors to the short-term recovery of organisations and 
sectors in Canterbury after the 2010-2011 earthquakes? From research question 1 in chapter 
2.10, three possible sets of contributors to organisational and sectoral recovery were identified: 
(1) the level of organisational resilience; (2) the pre-disaster characteristics within and around the 
organisations and sectors; and (3) the direct and indirect effects of the earthquakes to the 
organisations and sectors. These contributors are illustrated in Figure 7-1. A note on the 
contributor pre-disaster characteristics shown in Figure 7-1: the components are those from the 
literature that have been frequently listed as influencing organisational recovery (see chapter 2). 
 
Figure 7-1: Contributors to organisational and sectoral recovery after the 2010 – 2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
Organisational 
rate of recovery 
Level of organisational 
resilience 
Pre-disaster characteristics 
Direct & indirect post-
earthquake effects 
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7.3 Short-term recovery rate coefficient (Short-term RRC) 
It is useful to have a variable that can be used as a measure of the rate of organisational and 
sectoral short-term recovery to which the components can be compared and one that is usable 
across all sectors. As shown in section 2.3 the definition of recovery after disaster is contextual 
and subjective. In other organisational disaster studies, measures of recovery include the time 
taken for an organisation to recover (e.g. (Alesch et al., 2009)) or the self-report post-disaster status 
of the organisation (e.g. (Dietch & Corey, 2011)). Although using slightly different lenses, in 
both these studies, the measures of organisational recovery translated into the post-disaster 
revenue changes organisations experienced. Returning to or increase on pre-disaster levels of 
revenue is used as a marker for recovery. For instance, Sidel and Enrich (1998) show how, from 
the investor perspective, revenue growth for an organisation is more important than expenditure 
savings from cutting costs. 
In interviews for this study, organisations were asked how they would measure recovery for their 
organisations. All the organisations queried reported that they would compare pre- and post-
earthquake revenue (or budgets in the case of some governments departments) to analyse how 
well their organisation was performing after the Canterbury earthquakes. Like Sidel and Enrich 
(1998), Ailawadi et al (1999b) also write that organisations have a focus on financial performance 
indicators because they are easier to interpret.  
As organisations had spoken of a financial measure, they were also asked about other possible 
financial measures of organisational recovery such as return on investment (ROI), profits and 
sales. Revenue has the advantage that it is reported for goods and services that have been 
delivered. Post-earthquake, revenue can also be directly compared to the organisation’s 
expenditure. ROI has the disadvantage that the different organisations have various ways in 
which they value the assets that contribute to this metric. Also, ROI is based on historic data. 
Gunasekaran et al (2001) point to ROI decisions being based on the perspective at the time the 
ROI calculations were done. It can be concluded that for earthquake affected organisations in 
Canterbury, the ROI investments most likely did not allow for earthquake activity. Some of the 
same reasons for not using ROI as a post-earthquake gauge of organisational recovery apply to 
profit also. Bruns (1998) put forward that the historical information profit calculations are based 
on does not indicate future performance. As well, using profit as a measure for all organisations 
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is problematic because different organisations calculate and report their profits dissimilarly 
(Spathis, 2002). Additionally, reported profits are used by investors to make decisions about 
whether or not to invest in an organisation. Therefore, it is in the organisation’s best interest to 
present a favourable profit position (Beaver & Demski, 1974; Hunton, Libby, & Mazza, 2006).  
When asked if sales would be an acceptable metric for measuring organisational rate of recovery 
after the earthquakes, organisations replied that sales figures would show customer orders but 
would not reflect that those orders had been honoured or that they had been paid for. It appears 
that among interviewed organisations, the idea of sales differs. On closer examination, it seems 
that the distinction is to do with the recorded amount of ordered goods and services as opposed 
to the payment for these goods and services. 
Considering the different sectors involved in the study and their responses when asked how they 
would measure recovery, revenue was deemed the most suitable metric. Organisations thus 
characterised recovery as a return to pre-earthquake levels of revenue or better. Figure 7-2 
illustrates how organisations visualised their recovery. The + and – signs in the figure indicate 
the post-earthquake direction of revenue change. Therefore, using revenue change data available 
from Survey 2, a short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) was determined for each 
organisation. Organisations were asked about changes in revenue for two consecutive time 
periods. Period 1 was between 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011. Period 2 was after 22 
February 2011 up to September 2011. Each instance of revenue decrease was assigned a score of 
-1, each increase was +1 and no change in revenue was assigned a zero (0). Points for an 
individual organisation, for each time period, were added to give the organisational short-term 
RRC. The maximum short-term RRC value after Survey 2 is +2, an increase in revenue in each 
of the time periods, while the minimum short-term RRC value is -2 which corresponds to a 
decrease in revenue in each of the time periods. As with other metrics, the short-term RRC has 
limitations as well as advantages. A limit to using the short-term RRC, in this case, is that it asks 
about consecutive time periods in the chaotic short-term period after a disaster. The effects to 
organisations in this time period may not be a reflection of their ability to recover in the 
medium- to long-term. However, an advantage is that organisations can track the effects of 
disaster to the organisation using a measure they understand. Also, it is possible for 
organisations to use this short-term RRC information before a disaster happens. From analysis 
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of revenue change patterns, organisations can plan for and mitigate effects that manifest in the 
period immediately following a disaster event. For instance, organisations can take actions like 
ensuring availability and access of resources for a longer period after a disaster happens when 
revenue might be low. 
 
Figure 7-2: Organisational post-earthquake levels of recovery (using revenue changes) as defined by 
organisations and sectors after the Canterbury earthquakes 
Organisations were not explicitly asked to compare revenue changes with those from the same 
period in the previous financial year or with changes from the time period immediately prior to 
the ones asked about. However, some of the respondents spoken to described that their usual 
revenue comparisons were year-on-year as that is how they normally analysed revenue changes. 
Some organisations further stated that this way of comparing revenue changes took in to 
consideration that revenue was different dependent on time of year. For instance, one hospitality 
organisation (selling beverages) reported that revenue always increased in the summer months 
while a retail organisation also pointed to an increase in revenue when people purchased 
camping equipment in preparation for summer holidays. Table 7-1 shows the percentage of 
organisations from each sector with specific RRC values after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
 
 
Above pre-earthquake levels of 
revenue 
Pre-earthquake levels of 
revenue 
Below pre-earthquake levels of 
revenue 
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Table 7-1: Short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) by per cent of organisations in each sector after 
Survey 2 
 Sectoral short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) after Survey 2: 
-2 -1 0 1 2 
Building Suppliers 82% 0% 0% 9% 9% 
Critical Infrastructure 13% 20% 33% 13% 20% 
FMCG 21% 14% 14% 21% 29% 
Hospitality 57% 0% 14% 0% 29% 
ICT 13% 4% 50% 21% 13% 
Trucking 33% 8% 33% 0% 25% 
Christchurch CBD 80% 7% 0% 0% 13% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 23% 23% 31% 15% 8% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 38% 19% 38% 3% 3% 
Entire Sample 36% 12% 28% 10% 14% 
 
More organisations (36%) had an RRC of -2 than any other value. Also, more organisations 
(82%) from the building suppliers sector had an RRC of -2 than from any other sector. This was 
followed by Christchurch CBD (80%) and hospitality (57%). In contrasting fortunes 29% of 
organisations from the hospitality sector had an RRC of +2. These hospitality organisations are 
the ones that re-opened a few days to a few weeks after the earthquakes. They reported that part 
of the increased custom resulted from other hospitality establishments being closed. 
Table 7-2 shows the sectoral RRC values after Survey 3. Organisations were asked to detail their 
change in revenue for the period after September 2011 to the time they took the survey in 
March to May of 2012. The RRC for the different industry sectors still showed a general pattern 
of decrease in revenue. 
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Table 7-2: Short-term recovery rate coefficient (RRC) by per cent of organisations in each sector after Survey 3 
 Sectoral short-term recovery rate coefficient (RRC) after Survey 3: 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Building Suppliers 83% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 
Critical Infrastructure 14% 14% 29% 0% 14% 14% 14% 
FMCG 25% 0% 0% 0% 25% 25% 25% 
ICT 8% 0% 8% 33% 33% 17% 0% 
Trucking 20% 0% 40% 20% 0% 0% 20% 
Christchurch CBD 60% 0% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 20% 0% 40% 0% 20% 20% 0% 
Lyttelton Town Centre 11% 11% 22% 22% 22% 0% 11% 
Entire Sample 25% 4% 22% 13% 18% 9% 9% 
 
The RRC values used for analysis in this section of the thesis are those from Survey 2. This is for 
a number of reasons. First, Survey 2 included questions, not asked in Surveys 1 and 3, that are 
used as components to the contributors discussed later in this chapter. These components of 
recovery are correlated against revenue change data from the same survey, i.e.  for the same time 
period after the earthquakes. Survey 2 also had participating organisations, from Lyttelton, that 
were not included in Survey 1 and Survey 2 also had more organisations participating than 
Survey 3. Again, it should be noted that the RRC only has data from the response and short-
term recovery phase. 
7.4 Contributors to sectoral and organisational short-term recovery 
The short-term RRC was used as the dependent variable for a uniform measure of post-
earthquake outcomes while level of organisational resilience, pre-earthquake effects as well as 
direct and indirect effects after the earthquakes were the independent variables. These 
independent variables have been called the contributors to the organisation’s rate of recovery 
and are plotted in this chapter for the short-term recovery phase. These contributors of recovery 
are aggregated measures of individual components (variables) that are representative of the 
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contributors. From Surveys 1 and 2, different components representing pre-earthquake 
characteristics and direct and indirect effects were assigned to the different contributors. For 
example, an organisation’s cash flow situation prior to disaster is one of the elements considered 
a component of the contributor pre-earthquake effects. The planning and adaptive capacity 
factors make-up the contributor organisational resilience. Analysis of the indicators of recovery 
shows that organisations leaned in the direction of one of the two factors of organisational 
resilience. This is one of the reasons for the use of the factors of resilience as the components of 
the contributor organisational resilience. As well, for reasons of space and to avoid repetition, 
the individual indicators of recovery are discussed at length in chapter 10.  
Details of the contributors to organisational recovery rates and their components are in Figure 
7-3. The selection of components for each contributor was done based on a review of the 
literature (see chapter 2) and in consideration of the geographical context of the research and the 
sectors involved. For example, organisational closure for both the 4 September 2010 and 22 
February 2011 earthquakes was included as the earthquakes caused different levels of damage 
and in different locations. 
The components of recovery can be thought of as indicators of recovery. Freudenberg (2003) 
writes that indicators are measures, qualitative or quantitative, formulated from factual 
observation and that act to better explain and convey complex circumstances. Nardo et al (2005) 
add that using multiple indicators, or in this case components, brings together information of 
different concepts that cannot be properly represented by an individual indicator or variable. 
Additionally Freudenberg explains that indicators show the relative position of what is being 
measured and when evaluated over time can show the magnitude and direction of change. 
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Figure 7-3: Organisational rate of recovery and contributors to organisational and sectoral recovery42 
Weighting of the components and contributors of recovery43 
For the purposes of this thesis, the weights of the contributors of recovery are taken to be equal. 
This is because weighted aggregation would imply that the weightings of the different 
components in the contributors are known. For the data in this study this is yet to be 
ascertained. Additionally, this method of data aggregation leads to the loss of resolution. For 
example on the pre-earthquake conditions contributor which has a total score of six: if one 
organisation had component scores of (1, 0, 0.5, 0.5, 0.8, and 0.2) while another had component 
scores of (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, and 1); both organisations would have a contributor score of three out of 
six. However, the weight of the contributing components varies and this is lost when the 
individual component scores are aggregated and added. In fact one of the aims of the study is to 
determine the influence of each contributor. Consequently, the weighted method of aggregation 
for the contributors will not be used at this stage. 
                                                     
42 One Full time equivalent (FTE) equals 1 employee working full time. For closure impact factor items, see question 16 in 
appendix G. 
43 Appendix N contains alternative data analysis technqiues that were attempted but have not been used  
Pre-disaster 
conditions 
• Full time equivalent (FTE) 
• Insurance 
• Crisis or emergency plan 
• Practise crisis or emergency plan 
• Cash flow 
• Average annual sales growth 
Organisational 
resilience 
• Planning 
• Adaptive Capacity 
Direct & indirect 
impacts of 
earthquakes 
• Overall level of effect 
• Regular suppliers' capability 
• Change in customer base 
• Closure September 
• Closure February 
• Closure impact factor 
• FTE redundacies 
• FTE hires 
Organisational rate 
of recovery 
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7.4.1 Regression and correlation 
Regression analysis is the name given to the family of techniques used for analysing and 
modelling multiple variables. It is the study of dependence between variables (Asuero, Sayago, & 
Gonzalez, 2006). Regression techniques are used when the focus is on the relationship between 
a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. Regression analysis aids in the 
understanding of the relationship and the strength of the relationship between two variables. 
The strength of the relationship between two variables in a statistical population is called the 
effect size. In analysing the interdependence between variables, their correlation values are used 
(Asuero et al., 2006). For regression, the short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
will be plotted against all the component values and the coefficients of determination (R2) for each 
relationship will be used to show the strength of the relationship. The computations will be 
based on the entire sample in the study as opposed to at the sectoral level. This is because the 
overall sample size is larger than the individual sector sample sizes. R2 is derived from the 
regression equation whose standard form is Y = a + bX where  
 Y is the estimated score for the dependent variable; 
 X is the score for the independent variable; 
 b is the slope of  the regression line; and 
 a is the intercept, or the point on the vertical axis where the regression line crosses the 
vertical y-axis. 
The regression equation states the mathematical relationship between the two variables being 
investigated. The regression line on a graph can be used to predict the value of the dependent 
variable for any value of the independent variable. The differences between these predicted 
values and how far the dependent variables are from the regression line are called residuals. A 
graphical plot of the residuals also shows how well the estimated regression line, R2 value, fits 
the data. 
R2 is the square of the correlation coefficient (r) and is a value between 0 and 1: 0 indicates no 
relationship and 1 indicates a very strong relationship between variables. In the case of two 
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variables, R2 is the proportion of total variation in one variable that is explained by the other 
variable (Cornell & Berger, 1987; Jensen, 1980). 
In addition to the plotting of the short-term recovery rate coefficient against each of the 
components of recovery, the correlation relationships between these variables are also 
investigated to determine their influence on organisational recovery. The most common measure 
of correlation is the Pearson Product Moment Correlation (shortened to Pearson's correlation or 
Pearson’s r) (Lee Rodgers & Nicewander, 1988). Pearson's r reflects the degree of linear 
relationship between two variables and ranges from +1 to -1. A correlation of +1 means that 
there is a perfect positive linear relationship between variables. Pearson’s r does not distinguish 
between dependent and independent variables and, unlike the R2 value, does not indicate the 
slope of the line in the relationship between two variables and. Cohen (2001) offers guidelines 
on interpretation of Pearson’s r values. These are shown in Table 7-3. 
Table 7-3: Guidelines on interpretation of Pearson's r values 
Strength of correlation 
Direction of correlation - 
Positive 
Direction of correlation -
Negative 
Strong 0.5 to 1.0 −1.0 to −0.5 
Medium 0.3 to 0.5 −0.5 to −0.3 
Small 0.1 to 0.3 −0.3 to −0.1 
None 0.0 to 0.09 −0.09 to 0.0 
Sample size 
Cornell and Berger (1987) note that one of the factors affecting the value of R2 is the size of the 
sample. Minitab Inc., developer of the statistical software package Minitab, also has similar 
findings. They caution that 40 is an ideal sample size in case the relationship between X and Y is 
not very strong (Minitab Inc, 2012). If a small sample size is used (e.g. less than 15), then the 
relationship between X and Y may not be detected. Minitab also goes on to state that a more 
exact R2 value is obtained with larger samples of at least 40. Furthermore, Tabachnik and Fiddell 
(2001) recommend that a sample size for regression should be the larger of either the number of 
(independent variables x 8 + 50) or the number of (independent variables + 105). Using this as a 
guideline, simple linear regression in this study would require a sample of 106 cases. The study 
Survey 2 results have at least 150 cases. 
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7.4.2 Overview 
Each of the components of recovery is plotted directly against the short-term RRC and the R2 
value computed. This is depicted in the scatter diagrams in Figures 7-5 to 7-21. Scatter diagrams 
are usually a first step in exploring relationships between variables and are useful because they 
convey information of the variables visually (Weihs, 1993). Some of the scatter diagrams are 
converted into and presented as density plots for better illustration. This is in cases where 
multiple data plots are in the same position. 
As all the components are individually plotted against a common variable (the short-term RRC), 
it is possible to compare the individual R2 values (Exner & Zvara, 1999; Kvalseth, 1985). 
Therefore, using the percentage of variance accounted for, the significant contributors of short-
term recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes are described below. 
7.4.3 Pre-earthquake characteristics as a contributor 
From Figure 7-3, there are six contributors for the pre-earthquake conditions contributor. The 
R2 values from the pre-earthquake components plotted against the short-term RRC are 
presented here in Figures 7-4 to 7-18. Figures 7-4 to 7-6 and 7-18 show R2 values very close to 0 
which denotes a very weak relationship between those pre-earthquake components and the 
organisation’s short-term RRC. Figure 7-9 shows a marginally higher effect size for 
organisational cash flow against organisational short-term RRC. All the R2 values for the pre-
earthquake components are shown in Table 7-4. 
As all but one of the organisations in this study had insurance and there are more than two 
sectoral groupings, the Kruskal-Wallis test (a non-parametric analysis of variance, ANOVA, test) 
was used to statistically compare the different groups. This is instead of plotting organisational 
insurance against the short-term RRC. There was no statistically significant difference between 
the different the sectors (H (8) = 3.229, P = 0.919) for the insurance contributor. 
Analysis of the components making up the pre-earthquake contributor and on the strength R2 
values, cash flow is the more significant contributor (R2 value of 0.051). Table 7-4 contains the 
correlation values of the pre-earthquake components and the recovery rate coefficient. As 
expected, there is a positive correlation (r=.397, p<.01) between organisation’s having crisis or 
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emergency plans and the practising of the plans. Interestingly, there is a negative correlation (r=-
.226, p<.01) between the recovery rate coefficient and organisational cash flow and a negative 
correlation (r=-.264, p<.01) between organisational cash flow and the number of full-time 
equivalent staff. There is also a negative correlation (r=-.265, p<.01) between the size of the 
organisation and the practising of crisis plans. This is in contrast to findings in the disaster 
literature on the size of the organisation influencing the practising of crisis plans. From the 
organisations in this study, the critical infrastructure and FMCG organisations were more likely 
to have crisis or emergency plans. However, even within these sectors, the numbers of full-time 
equivalent staff varied across the organisations. The critical infrastructure sector organisations 
reported FTE staff from 20 to 1500 while FMCG organisations reported FTE staff from 6.5 to 
1022. 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Full-time equivalent staff (FTE) plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term 
RRC) 
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Crisis/emergency or business continuity plan (R² = 0.00721) 
 
 
Figure 7-5: Existence of organisational crisis or emergency plan plotted against short-term recovery rate 
coefficient (short-term RRC) 
Prior to 4 September 2010 - practised emergency response (R² = 0.00148) 
 
 
Figure 7-6: Practise of organisational crisis/emergency plan plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient 
(short-term RRC) 
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Organisational cash flow (R² = 0.05099) 
 
Figure 7-7: Organisational cash flow levels plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term 
RRC) 
 
Average annual sales growth/organisation's income budget (R² = 6.4E-06) 
 
Figure 7-8: Organisational average annual sales growth or organisation's income budget plotted against short-
term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Table 7-4: R2 values for pre-earthquake contributors and short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
Contributor Component R2 value 
Pre-disaster conditions 
Cash flow 0.051 
Crisis or emergency plan 0.0072 
Practise crisis 0.0015 
Insurance 0.0007 
FTE 0.0005 
Average annual sales growth 6.00E-06 
 
 
Table 7-5: Correlation (r) values for pre-earthquake components and short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-
term RRC) 
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Organisational cash flow -.226** 1 .184* .099 -.039 -.264**   
Crisis/emergency or business 
continuity plan 
-.085   1   -.040 -.277**   
Prior to 4 September 2010 - practised 
emergency response 
-.038   .397** 1 -.052 -.265**   
Insurance -.027       1 .028   
Full-time equivalent staff .022         1   
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.003 .192* .138 .031 .054 -.069 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.4.4 The Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) organisational resilience score as a 
contributor to short-term recovery 
After Survey 2, the organisational resilience scores determined after use of the Benchmark 
Resilience Tool (BRT-53) were in a narrower range across all sectors when compared to 
organisational resilience scores from Surveys 1 and 3. This means that after Survey 2 there were 
similar organisational resilience score profiles for organisations with short-term RRC values 
ranging from -2 to +2. The reasons for this might be three-fold. The first is that the BRT, which 
uses self-report responses, was developed during peacetime and not in the aftermath of a 
disaster. From a systems perspective, system elements and behaviour would be different pre- 
and post-disaster. Similarly, Harter et el (2006) demonstrate that disaster events affect responses 
for ongoing surveys. Post-earthquake, it is likely that respondents were more sensitive to some 
of the questions as a result of the earthquakes. The second reason is to do with the design of the 
questions which do not allow for enough variance among respondents. Lastly, the organisational 
resilience scores in the short-term may be an artefact of the chaotic nature of the short-term 
recovery phase. 
Figures 7-9 to 7-11 show the strength of the relationship between the factors of organisational 
resilience and the overall organisational resilience score when plotted against the short-term 
recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC). Analysis of the figures and of the R2 values (Table 7-
6) shows that there is a weak relationship between the organisations’ levels of resilience and the 
rate of recovery (measured using the short-term RRC). Furthermore, Table 7-7 shows that there 
is no statistical correlation between the level of organisational resilience and short-term RRC. 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
245 
 
 
Figure 7-9: Organisational resilience planning factor plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-
term RRC) 
 
Figure 7-10: Organisational resilience adaptive capacity factor plotted against short-term recovery rate 
coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Figure 7-11: Organisational average resilience scores plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-
term RRC) 
Table 7-6: R2 values for resilience contributors and short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
Contributor Component R2 value 
Organisational 
resilience 
Planning factor 0.0019 
Adaptive capacity factor 0.0015 
Overall 0.0012 
Table 7-7: Correlation (r) values for resilience components and short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term 
RRC) 
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7.4.5 Direct and indirect earthquake effects 
In the disaster literature, several authors (see e.g. (Alesch et al., 2009; Dietch & Corey, 2011; 
Holling, 1973; Kroll, 1991; Rose et al., 1997)) have shown how the effects of disaster can cause 
organisational disruption and closure, resulting in revenue losses. As shown in Figure 7-3, the 
third contributor of recovery being investigated is the direct and indirect effects of the 
earthquakes. In Survey 2, organisations were presented with a list of potentially disruptive factors 
and asked to detail which factors had caused the most disruption to their operations and to what 
degree, as well as what factors contributed to their organisation closing (for any period of time). 
The survey response options provided, for factors causing disruption or closure, are in a copy of 
Survey 2 contained in appendix L and are presented on their own in appendix G. 
From Chapter 5 (Tables 5-16 to 5-19), it is shown to what extent each sector was affected by 
disruption to utilities and non-utilities as well as what contributed to organisational closure after 
the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Also shown in Tables 5-16 to 5-19 are the factors, for each 
sector, that were most disruptive. The individual organisation scores for the level of effect and 
for the closure impact factor are correlated against each other, against the recovery rate 
coefficient as well as against the individual resilience scores for each organisation. Table 7-9 
contains the correlations. 
Figures 7-12 to 7-19 show the plots of the direct and indirect effects components against the 
short-term recovery rate coefficient (RRC). The strength of this relationship is indicated by the 
value of R2. The maximum value for R2 is 1 and the closer the computed R2 value is to 1, the 
stronger the relationship between the variable being investigated. In Figure 7-12, the R2 value for 
level of effect (non-utility and utility) against short-term RRC is 0.037. This shows a weak 
relationship between the two variables. However, the level of effect and the short-term RRC 
have a medium strength negative correlation (r=-.259, p<.01) between them (Table 7-8). The 
negative correlation means that as the short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
increases, the level of effect decreases. In other words, organisations that reported more damage 
or disruption were more likely to suffer revenue losses and vice versa. 
The closure impact factor in Figure 7-17 was arrived at by assigning a value of 1 to each reason 
for closure and adding all the 1s for each organisation (see Table 5-15 in chapter 5). The R2 value 
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is 0.0774. The closure impact factor after 22 February 2011 correlates positively with the level of 
effect (r=.412, p<.01). Organisations with more reasons leading to closure reported a higher 
level of effect from disruptive factors such as to utilities. 
Organisations in the study were also asked their operating hours in the period after both the 4 
September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes. The alternatives ranged from closed 
permanently to open but operated longer hours (see Table 5-11). In the disaster literature, findings point 
to the duration of closure of an organisation being linked to their rate of recovery (Alesch et al., 
2009). Some of the reasons ascribed to this include the non-return of customers or reduced cash 
flow after the resumption of organisational operations. The R2 value is 0.0747 for 4 September 
2010 and 0.0742 for 22 February 2011. Of interest is the strong negative correlation between the 
closure impact factor and organisational operating hours after both the 4 September 2010 (r=-
.509, p<.01) and 22 February 2011 (r=-.594, p<.01) earthquakes. Organisations reporting more 
reasons contributing to closure operated shorter hours. 
These findings in relation to organisations in Canterbury are similar to those in other disaster 
studies such as Chang’s (2010) for the 1995 earthquake in Kobe and Webb et al’s (2002) focused 
on the Loma Prieta earthquake and Hurricane Andrew. 
The organisational operating hours for after both the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
events show a strong positive correlation (r=.643, p<.01) with each other. After both 
earthquakes, the sectors reporting working longer than usual hours (see Table 5-11) were critical 
infrastructure and trucking. From case study and interview data, both sectors pointed to an 
increase in demand for their goods and services especially after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
Additionally, for both 4 September 2010 (r=-.251, p<.01) and 22 February 2011 (r=-.227, 
p<.01) earthquakes, Table 7-9 shows that organisational operating hours correlate negatively 
with the level of effect. Organisations that reported less damage and disruption were more likely 
to report a positive revenue change. Also, organisational operating hours exhibit a weak positive 
correlation with the recovery rate coefficient: (r=.273, p<.01) for 4 September 2010 and (r=.272, 
p<.01) for 22 February 2011 earthquakes. 
Of the direct and indirect earthquake effect components, if using the R2 value, change in 
customer base accounts for the larger percentage of variance (Figure 7-14). R2 is 0.1799. A 
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change in customer base could be interpreted in a number of ways. The first is customers leaving 
or not returning to a disaster area (e.g. after Hurricane Katrina) or second, the altered needs of 
customers for the goods and services provided by an organisation (e.g. see (Tierney & Webb, 
2001)). Corey and Dietch (2011) also report organisational recovery being affected by a change 
in customer numbers. Table 7-9 shows a positive correlation (r=.424, p<.01) between the 
change in customer base and recovery rate coefficient (RRC): organisations that experienced 
increased customer numbers showed positive revenue changes. 
Neither FTE redundancies nor hires has a strong R2 value. However, from Table 7-9, there is a 
weak correlation between the recovery rate coefficient (RRC) and the number of FTE hired 
(r=.202, p<.05) and made redundant (r=-.181, p<.05) after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. So 
organisations that had revenue increases were more likely to hire staff than make them 
redundant. This is supported by reports from sectors reporting increased workloads also taking 
on more staff (see section 5.2). 
 
Figure 7-12: Level of effect after 22 February 2011 earthquake plotted against short-term recovery rate 
coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Regular suppliers' capability after 4 September 2010 (R² = 0.00978) 
 
Figure 7-13: Regular suppliers' capability after 4 September 2010 earthquake plotted against short-term 
recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) (Lyttelton not included) 
Change in customer base after 4 September 2010 (R² = 0.17993) 
 
Figure 7-14: Change in customer base after 4 September 2010 earthquake plotted against short-term recovery 
rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Organisational operating hours after 4 September 2010 (R² = 0.07469) 
 
Figure 7-15: Organisational operating hours after 4 September 2010 earthquake plotted against short-term 
recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
Organisational operating hours after 22 February 2011 (R² = 0.07422) 
 
Figure 7-16: Organisational operating hours after 22 February 2011 earthquake plotted against short-term 
recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Closure impact factor after 22 February 2011 (R² = 0.07744) 
 
Figure 7-17: Organisational closure impact factor plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-
term RRC) 
Full-time equivalent (FTE) staff redundancies after 22 February 2011 (as % of FTE) (R² = 
0.03293) 
 
Figure 7-18: Organisational FTE redundancies after 22 February 2011 earthquake plotted against short-term 
recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Full-time equivalent (FTE) staff hires after 22 February 2011 (as % of FTE) (R² = 0.03961) 
 
Figure 7-19: Organisational FTE hires (as per cent of FTE) after 22 February 2011 earthquake plotted against 
short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
Table 7-8: R2 values for direct and indirect earthquake effects and short-term  recovery rate coefficient (short-
term RRC) 
Contributor Component R2 value 
Direct and indirect 
effects of the earthquake 
Change in customer base after 4 September 2010 0.1799 
Closure impact factor after 22 February 2011 0.0774 
Closure after 4 September 2010 0.0747 
Closure after 22 February 2011 0.0742 
FTE hires after 22 February 2011 0.0396 
Overall level of effect (utility and non-utility) 0.037 
FTE redundancies after 22 February 2011 0.0329 
Regular suppliers' capability after 4 September 2010 0.0098 
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Table 7-9: Correlation (r) values for direct and indirect earthquake effects components and short-term recovery 
rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
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Short-term Recovery Rate 
Coefficient 
1                 
Change in customer base 
after 4 September 2010 
.424** 1         -.237*   .070 
Closure impact factor after 
22 February 2011 
-.278** -.130 1 
-
.509** 
-
.594** 
  .412**   -.150 
Closure (Organisational 
operating hours) after 4 
September 2010 
.273** .222*   1     -.251**   .029 
Closure (Organisational 
operating hours) after 22 
February 2011 
.272** .085   .643** 1   
-
.227** 
  .062 
Full-time equivalent (FTE) 
staff hires after 22 February 
2011 
.202* .141 -.029 .069 .034 1 -.097 -.035 -.057 
Overall level of effect (non-
utility and utility) 
-
.259** 
          1     
Full-time equivalent (FTE) 
staff redundancies after 22 
February 2011 
-.181* -.016 .271** -.178* -.084   .142 1 -.002 
Regular suppliers' 
capability after 4 
September 2010 
-.099           -.223*   1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
7.4.6 Combined influence of components of short-term recovery 
The previous section (7.3) showed the R2 values for the different components when plotted 
against the short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC). Table 7-10 shows all the 
component R2 values ordered from largest to smallest. Just over half of the R2 values are under 
0.01. Of the R2 values above 0.01, the largest is the change in customer base with an R2 value 
close to 0.18. In this study, this would make it the most significant component contributing to 
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organisational short-term recovery after the earthquakes in Canterbury, followed by the closure 
impact factor. 
Table 7-10: All R2 values for the components of short-term recovery 
Contributor Component R2 value 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake 
Change in customer base after 4 
September 2010 
0.1799 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake 
Closure impact factor after 22 
February 2011 
0.0774 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake Closure after 4 September 2010 0.0747 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake Closure after 22 February 2011 0.0742 
Pre-disaster conditions Cash flow 0.051 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake FTE hires after 22 February 2011 0.0396 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake Overall level of effect 0.037 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake 
FTE redundancies after 22 February 
2011 
0.0329 
Direct and indirect effects of the earthquake 
Regular suppliers' capability after 4 
September 2010 
0.0098 
Pre-disaster conditions Crisis or emergency plan 0.0072 
Resilience Planning 0.0019 
Resilience Adaptive capacity 0.0015 
Pre-disaster conditions Practise crisis 0.0015 
Resilience Overall 0.0012 
Pre-disaster conditions Insurance 0.0007 
Pre-disaster conditions FTE 0.0005 
Pre-disaster conditions Average annual sales growth 6.00E-06 
The start of this chapter discussed the grouping of the components of recovery into three sets of 
contributors to recovery. Using the SPSS software package, multiple linear regression was 
performed on each group of components to generate the R2 values for each contributor (Tables 
7-11 to 7-13) as well as the normal plots (Figures 7-20 to 7-22). The normal plots used are p-p 
plots, or probability-probability plots, and are used to check the distribution of the residuals. The 
p-p plots for the pre-earthquake and direct and indirect effects contributors show a more linear 
distribution. For the resilience contributor (Table 7-12 and Figure 7-21), the residuals (the 
difference between the observed versus predicted values) are not symmetrically distributed 
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meaning the relationship between the plotted variables is non-linear. One variable does not 
predict the other. 
Tables 7-11 to 7-13 show the R2, adjusted R2 and standard error of estimate values for all three 
contributors to short-term recovery. The adjusted R2 value is a change to the R2 value to 
compensate for the number of variables or the bias in a model when only R2 is used (Heinzl & 
Mittlbock, 2003). This is because R2 always increases when new variables are added whereas 
adjusted R2 only increases if the added variable makes the model better. The standard error of 
estimate is a measure of the error in the prediction. The larger the value of the standard error of 
estimate, the more errors in the prediction. 
Table 7-11: R2 value for composite pre-earthquake contributor against short-term recovery rate coefficient 
(short-term RRC) 
R2 value for composite pre-earthquake contributor against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.205 .042 -.006 1.388 
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Figure 7-20: P-P plot for the pre-earthquake contributor 
 
Table 7-12: R2 value for composite resilience contributor against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term 
RRC) 
R2 value for composite resilience contributor against short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC) 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.059a .003 -.011 1.416 
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Figure 7-21: P-P plot of resilience contributor 
 
Table 7-13: R2 value for direct and indirect earthquake effects contributor plotted against short-term recovery 
rate coefficient (RRC) 
R2 value for direct and indirect earthquake effects contributor plotted against short-term recovery rate coefficient 
(RRC) 
R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
.544a .296 .223 1.308 
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Figure 7-22: P-P plot of direct and indirect earthquake effects contributor 
Comparing the three contributors to short-term recovery after the earthquakes in Canterbury, it 
can be seen that the direct and indirect earthquake effects contributor accounts for the larger 
percentage of  variance, R2 (.296) and adjusted R2 (.223), when plotted against the short-term 
recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC). Additionally, while the overall R2 value for the pre-
earthquake contributor accounts for a large percentage of  variance, when all the component 
variables are taken into account, the adjusted R2 value is low. This shows the extent to which 
change in customer base accounts for the variance. Lastly, the standard error of  estimate for the 
three contributors to recovery is similar in this case.  
7.5 Change in customer base as a significant contributor to 
organisational short-term recovery (from R2 values) 
The change in customer base plotted against the short-term RRC shows the largest R2 value 
compared to the other components of recovery.  This means that the change in customer base is 
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the most significant component contributing to organisational short-term recovery after the 
earthquakes in Canterbury. From the biggest challenges information and interview responses 
provided by organisations (see chapters 5.4 and 6); there are several elements that led to 
organisations facing customer issues after the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
earthquakes. In interviews and from the biggest challenges data, it is clear that these customer 
issues were brought about by a number of elements. From organisational descriptions, customer 
issues translated in to a decrease in customer numbers, a decrease in how much customers spent 
as well as in a reduction in profit margins of certain products. This shows that the elements of 
post-disaster organisational recovery are related and influence each other. 
Customer issues - decrease in customer numbers: organisations attributed reduced customer 
numbers to customers not wanting to access buildings they thought not safe, the perception that 
organisations were not operating because of cordons or nearby building damage as well as a 
reduction in foot traffic for location specific businesses. Two destination specific businesses 
from the Christchurch CBD reported that the distinctive nature of their goods and services were 
a help when customers started to spend money again. Alesch et al (2009) also found that 
reduced customer numbers after disaster affect an organisation’s recovery. Some FMCG 
organisations narrated that a reason for diminished customer numbers was the relocation of 
customers. Similarly, Corey and Deitch (1987) write that the population dislocation in the 
Greater New Orleans area after Hurricane Katrina affected organisational recovery. 
Customer issues - decrease in customer spending: from organisational reports, another 
feature of customer issues is customers spending less money post-earthquake. This is in line with 
Tierney (2007a) who writes that the uncertain economic conditions after disaster can affect 
customer spending especially on goods or services not deemed necessary after disaster. Some 
Canterbury hospitality organisations for example, detailed that the customers who did come in 
did not spend as much money as they did before the earthquakes. From accounts of building 
supplier organisations, the cancellation of pre-earthquake work also acted to decrease customer 
spending. This in turn affected organisational revenue, cash flow and ultimately recovery (more 
details in section 5.1). For some organisations, difficulties in delivering goods and services also 
led to customers spending less. 
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Customer issues - decrease in profit margins of products: some FMCG and Lyttelton 
organisations (more details in section 5.4) reported that they priced certain products lower than 
before the earthquakes in order to entice customers in to their stores as well as to get them to 
purchase more products. However, this meant a reduction in profit margins for these 
organisations; they also noted that such measures were only sustainable for the short-term. 
7.6 Influence of geographic location on organisational short-term 
recovery 
As three of the sectors were selected for this study based on their geographic location (see 
chapter 3), it is worth investigating the influence that geographic location had on organisational 
recovery. In Survey 2 organisations were asked whether or not they had relocated after the 4 
September 2010 or the 22 February 2011 earthquakes. Eighty-nine per cent of organisations 
indicated that they had not relocated after the 4 September 2010 event while 69% did not 
relocate after the 22 February 2011 event. From chapter 5.2, 3% and 11% of all organisations 
reported closing permanently after the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes 
respectively. This means that, at the time of sampling for Survey 2, the majority of organisations 
were still operational and a large percentage of the sample had not changed location. This 
enables the investigation on the extent of geographic location as a contributor to organisational 
short-term recovery, measured using the short-term recovery rate coefficient (short-term RRC). 
In Survey 2, organisations were asked to provide their physical location at the time of the 
earthquake as well as at the time of survey deployment. Investigation of organisational physical 
location and their short-term RRC values showed that the geographic location of the 
organisation was not a predictor of their change in revenue. For the three sample groups 
intentionally sampled for their location, the Christchurch CBD had 80% of organisations with a 
short-term RRC of -2 while Kaiapoi Town Centre had 23% and Lyttelton Town Centre had 
38%. The CBD and town centres, because of pre-earthquake conditions (see chapters 5.4 and 
6.7), suffered the greatest physical damage after the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 
earthquakes. None of the trucking organisations (33%) with short-term RRC values of -2 were 
located in the CBD or in any of the town centres. The building supplier organisations with 
short-term RRC values of -2 (82%) were not located within the four avenues that make up the 
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Christchurch CBD or in the Kaiapoi or Lyttelton Town Centres. Fifty per cent of ICT 
organisations had short-term RRC values of 0 while 43% reported short-term RRC values of +1 
or better. Some of these organisations detailed that their organisation’s premises were within the 
cordoned off Christchurch CBD. 
This demonstrates that for the organisations affected by the Canterbury earthquakes, their 
location was only one variable in how they were affected. Their sector, i.e. the goods and 
services delivered, contributed to some of the impacts the organisations faced. Furthermore, as 
will be shown in chapter 8, there is an interaction of multiple variables in the way an 
organisation or sector is affected by disaster. 
7.7 Signifiers of sectoral and organisational short-term recovery after 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
 
From the determinants of short-term recovery after the 2010 – 2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
and using information from the contributors as well as interview and survey data, it is possible to 
discern organisational and environmental features that may magnify or ameliorate the effects of 
disaster. These features, positive and negative, have been broadly categorised, do not apply to 
every sector and even within sectors do not apply to all organisations. Table 7-14 shows the 
features that organisations may take note of in trying to mitigate effects of disaster or in planning 
for the extent to which they may be affected. The checked boxes signify the factors that were 
important for each sector and contributed to recovery. 
From Table 7-14, it is shown that some of the signifiers applied to all the sectors in this study. 
These are organisational adaptation, relationship with staff, capability of staff, availability of 
different kinds of resources and combined planning between the stakeholders in recovery such 
as organisations, local authorities and the community. The importance of combined planning 
also shows that in recovery, all stakeholders should be identified and involved (see chapter 9.6.1 
and 9.7). Also, relationship and capability of staff aligns with organisations reporting that their 
biggest challenge across all three surveys deployed was staff wellbeing. This means that 
organisations should invest in their staff pre-disaster. 
From Table 7-14, it is evident that for the different sectors, customers issues (discussed 
previously in this chapter) manifest via different signifiers; the post-disaster need for goods and 
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services, reliance on customer discretionary spending, the location of the organisation’s premises 
and the ability of the organisation to deliver goods and services. 
Table 7-14: Signifiers of post-disaster short-term recovery for organisations and sectors after the 2010-2011 
earthquakes in Canterbury 
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Post-disaster need for organisations goods and services √ √ √ √ √ √       
Reliance on customer discretionary spending, location of 
customers 
√   √ √ √         
Organisational assets in non-disaster resistant building             √ √ √ 
Occupation of buildings in close proximity to non-disaster 
resistant buildings             √ √ √ 
Little or no alternatives to critical infrastructure       √           
Diversity (product, location, customers)       √           
Organisational adaptation √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Relationship with staff √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Capability of staff √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Availability of resources (e.g. financial, skilled labour, inputs for 
goods and services) 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Destination or location specific business       √           
Mode of delivery for goods and services       √ √         
Planning for all hazards (involving organisations, local authorities 
and the community) 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
 
However, several crisis management and disaster recovery researchers such as Quarantelli 
(1993), Senge (2006), Simonovic (1982b), Mileti (2005), Alesch et al (2009) and Reason et al. 
(2006) have written on crises or disaster being complex phenomena with many interacting 
agents. From the work of these authors, and from the multiple interacting elements in the 
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Canterbury context, it is therefore possible to deduce that recovery from disaster should be from 
a holistic or integrated, i.e. systemic, perspective of these interconnected agents. 
Consequently, the signifiers of recovery identified here should be used in the context of the 
organisation or the sector and the systems they belong to. The basic statistical techniques used in 
this chapter to highlight elements which affect recovery, while helpful, assume the laws of 
additivity and take the signifiers in isolation. From chapter 2, it was shown that cause and effect 
are not always linear or on a one-to-one ratio: the signifiers apply in different ways to different 
sectors. Also discussed in chapter 2 were the direct and indirect effects of disaster over time. A 
holistic, systems approach to investigating disaster recovery is more likely to show direct and 
indirect interactions. In light of these considerations and in addition to the information in Table 
7-14, chapters 8 and 9 contain analysis on the system behaviours, aids and hindrances to 
recovery. The chapters also cover the points in a system where recovery may be influenced. 
7.7.1 Time, recovery rate and short-term recovery trajectory 
The path recovery takes for different organisations is dependent on a multitude of factors 
including location, industry sector, cash flow, type of goods and services the organisation 
provides, the overall recovery plan as well as other system effects such as the number of 
suppliers and how they each affect the organisation. From the above information, apart from the 
different combination of factors that affect the recovery of different organisations and industry 
sectors, it can be concluded that one of the factors affecting rate of recovery is time. 
Consequently, not only does recovery take a different course depending on organisation and 
sector but also the timeline for recovery is not uniform. This is illustrated in Figure 7-23 
This research focused on the response and short-term recovery timeframe after disaster. It is 
acknowledged that the timespan of recovery extends beyond that. Prior to the earthquakes in 
Canterbury, organisations the world over experienced the global financial crisis. Some sectors, 
e.g. building suppliers, specifically reported that they were affected by the global financial crisis. 
For medium- to long-term recovery, a direction for future work is to determine how much 
influence the global financial crisis may have had on organisational recovery after the 
earthquakes. Also in relation to time in organisational recovery is the need for business owners 
to gauge when they are going to (re)open by also looking at the need for the goods and services 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
265 
 
their organisation delivers, where their customers may have moved to or the availability of input 
for production of goods and services. 
 
Figure 7-23: Organisational re-opening and short-term recovery trajectory after the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury 
earthquakes, for different organisations depending on when they resumed operations
Organisations that re-opened 
almost immediately after 
event. 
Minimal damage to premises, 
equipment and surrounding 
areas, ability to work from 
alternative location, provision of 
essential  
Organisations that re-
opened approximately 3-
6 months later 
Repair, clear interior and 
exterior, re-stock, gradual 
need for goods and services 
Organisations that re-
opened 6-9 months later 
Closed, relocated, changed 
primary business, changed 
how goods and services are 
delivered 
Organisations that re-
opened 1 year later 
Extensive repair, rebuild, 
restoration (of premises or 
critical infrastructure) 
Organisations that re-
opened 18 months later 
More expansive extensive 
repair, rebuild, restoration 
(of premises or critical 
infrastructure), 
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7.7.2 An important note for crisis managers, emergency managers and recovery 
leaders 
From the results in this chapter, it is apparent that the chaos of  the response and short-term 
recovery phases after disaster may show recovery results that are counterintuitive when taken in 
the context of  long-term recovery. Organisational recovery results in the short-term are not 
necessarily an indication of  the final organisational recovery trajectory. For instance, building 
suppliers showing revenue losses when their products should be in high demand after the 
physical damage caused by an earthquake. 
However, the results in this chapter are useful for other organisations that may find themselves 
in a similar situation regardless of  the cause of  the crisis or disaster. It is essential that 
organisations recognise that there are different parts to the overall recovery process; parts which 
call for different skills and types of  resources. Additionally, it may be possible to use short-term 
recovery results and trends as one of  the inputs in an overall recovery strategy. 
Specifically for organisations, and pertaining to disasters of  a regional nature such as that in 
Canterbury, the short-term recovery period may be a time when resources from local authorities 
(if  at all available) have not been made accessible to organisations. Organisations may need to 
make individual plans to keep going while awaiting official aid. It may be that challenges and 
trade-offs may have to be made in the response and short-term recovery phase so as not to 
compromise longer-term recovery efforts. The accessibility and availability of  a large amount of  
resources for an extended period after disaster are discussed further in chapters 9 and 10 of  this 
thesis. Hills (2002) writes that the specific time and [physical] location of  a disaster may disguise 
the fact that it may take a considerable amount of  time to recover and that not all affected by the 
disaster will actually recover. For the organisations affected by the earthquakes in Canterbury, 
this means that not all of  them will survive and not all will recover. 
7.8 Chapter summary 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that for the different industry sectors and for the 
organisations within those sectors, the different contributors to recovery affect the rate of 
recovery to differing degrees. From the extent to which the Canterbury region was affected by 
the sequence of earthquakes, it has emerged that organisational level characteristics only play a 
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certain part in the trajectory of organisational and sectoral recovery. For instance, organisation 
size measured by the number of full-time equivalent staff, the existence and practise of 
emergency plans and the organisation’s average annual sales growth over five years were found 
to not significantly affect short-term recovery. 
For all sectors, factors that did affect short-term recovery (positively and/or negatively 
depending on sector) include: 
 wellbeing of staff; 
 relationship with and capability of staff; 
 customer issues; 
 availability of different kinds of resources to enable production and delivery of goods 
and services; 
 organisational adaptation; and 
 combined planning between the stakeholders in recovery such as organisations, local 
authorities and the community. 
Furthermore, organisations more affected by environmental factors such as service interruption 
to utilities as well as disruption caused by factors such as damage to equipment or machinery 
showed more post-earthquake revenue losses than organisations that were less disrupted. As 
well, organisations affected to a greater degree also operated fewer hours after the earthquakes. 
(see Chapter 9 for specific critical success factors (CSFs) for each sector’s recovery) 
For Canterbury, this chapter also showed that the components to short-term recovery (as 
defined in this thesis) do not account for all the elements that determine the recovery trajectory 
of an organisation or sector. Factors external to the organisation or sectors are involved, for 
instance the global financial crisis and to a lesser extent, the geographic location of the 
organisation. Environmental elements such as how the sectors interact with each other and with 
the wider economy, decisions on recovery (e.g. access to organisational premises) made by the 
Recovery Authority and insurance payments should also be factored in. 
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Furthermore, environmental factors that were not included in the list of contributors and 
components to recovery in some cases played a greater role in the recovery of organisations. 
Insurance, which most organisations had but which was subject to payment delays is one such 
component. For some organisations, this compromised their financial position. For 
organisations in and around the CBD, Recovery Authority ambiguity on access to the cordoned 
off area did not help recovery as they could not access organisational records and assets. 
Showing how these components can interact, the inability for some organisations to access the 
cordoned off area and retrieve documents further delayed insurance claims settlement. The 
global economic climate was a component that affected building suppliers. However, it is 
unclear to what extent this contributed to their revenue losses post-earthquake. For the 
Christchurch CBD and the town centres, geographic location is a contributor to their recovery. 
In the Canterbury earthquakes context, these locales were subject to proximity to the earthquake 
epicentre and also the existence of building stock prone to damage from earthquake shaking. 
It should also be noted that due to the subjective nature of any disaster, the more significant 
contributors to organisational recovery will likely differ by sector and by disaster. This is 
evidenced by the different sectors having dissimilar signifiers of recovery. Additionally, the 
measure of recovery used in this chapter is post-disaster revenue changes in the short-term 
recovery phase. However, dependent on the purpose of the organisation, i.e. of the system, it 
would be prudent to use more than one measure of recovery in combination. These measures 
should be relevant to the organisations using them and can be defined by the organisations 
themselves. 
In chapter 8, system dynamics techniques will be used for the analysis of how different elements, 
such as the contributors and signifiers of recovery within a system, interact to affect 
organisational recovery. 
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8 System dynamics of sectoral and organisational recovery 
This chapter has the results of the use of system dynamics techniques in the analysis of 
organisational and sectoral recovery after the 2010 – 2011 earthquakes in Canterbury. As shown 
from the preceding chapter, recovery of an organisation in the aftermath of a disaster event 
should be considered within the context of a dynamic architecture that incorporates 
interdependencies and downstream effects. The industry and geographic sectors in Canterbury, 
in fact in any economy, are interrelated and affect each other’s recovery. The reason for using 
the principles of system dynamics is to better understand system behaviour that influences the 
recovery of organisations and industry sectors as well as possible points of intervention in their 
recovery. Organisational or sectoral recovery is defined here as when an organisation or sector can 
function and sustain itself  (continually) in its new post-disaster environment. From a systems perspective, 
three vital aspects should be kept in mind with this (or any) definition of  organisational or 
sectoral recovery: (1) recovery is a process and takes time; and (2) the organisation, as a system 
and its environment, is dynamic and not static. Ultimately, the organisation’s primary aim is of  
production and selling of  goods and services. Accordingly, a third aspect (touched on in chapter 
6.9 and discussed further in this chapter) is that the organisation or sector in continually 
functioning and sustaining itself  after disaster, undertakes different activities in order to achieve 
this primary aim. For instance, in the response phase, the organisation while not producing and 
selling goods and services at pre-disaster capacity, engages in activities to return to this pre-
disaster state; i.e. to recover.  
In this chapter, with the use of system dynamics techniques, conceptual models of the system 
being investigated are developed to aid in the analysis and identification of the behaviour or 
system characteristics that influence organisational and sectoral recovery. A system is an 
assemblage or combination of  things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole (R. A. Johnson et al., 1964, 
p. 367). A system is defined for and has a purpose and is encircled by its environment (D. H. 
Meadows & Wright, 2008). In this research the system is comprised of  the organisations and 
sectors in the study, and the environment consists of  any elements they interact with in recovery. 
The system dynamics approach can be used in any dynamic system with mutual interaction 
between elements, information feedback and circular causality (see chapter 2.2 for more detail). 
Each system dynamics model is built around a particular phenomenon: in this case the recovery 
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of sectors after the Canterbury earthquakes. The phenomenon being investigated defines the 
elements that are included in the model. This is helpful in representing the system and its 
environment. Importantly, system dynamics models are not predictive; they are used to explore 
the behaviour in complex systems with numerous interactions. 
Every disaster contains some element of surprise and is unique. Therefore, the system dynamics 
models presented here are representative of the recovery of organisations and sectors as seen 
through the eyes of the organisations in this study. This means that factors not shown in the 
models are assumed to be constant or that their changes are negligible and do not affect the 
system’s behaviour to a great degree. For the purposes of analysis in this thesis, it assumed that 
the factors not shown are held constant. This allows for the analysis to focus on the 
relationships between the elements of interest. In this case, those factors which have an 
influence on and influence the recovery of organisations and sectors. In effect, this is a use of 
the ceteris paribus clause used in science, engineering, economics and other disciplines. For 
instance, Schlicht and Thompson (1985) in their work on isolation and aggregation in economic 
modelling, write that all factors not explicitly considered as variables are assumed to be fixed within an 
argument. 
Furthermore, also crucial to the analysis in this thesis and closely related to ceteris paribus, is that 
it is not the larger, complete, system under investigation. It is only a part of the wider system that 
is analysed; a part defined for the purposes of studying organisational and sectoral recovery. As 
such, it can be concluded that the analysis done here is only for a partial system. Another way to 
look at this is from Sterman’s (2002) work in which he states that any system is the worldview, 
or mental model, of the individual who defined it. Having said this; despite the systems in this 
thesis being developed with information for the Canterbury earthquake organisational and 
sectoral recovery, there are some general lessons that could apply to many other organisations 
outside the region. The effects to organisations and sectors have not been ranked. This is 
because it is difficult to rank effects due to the multiple interactions within a system and also 
because the rankings would differ by sector. However, chapter 9 contains critical success factors 
(CSFs) for the recovery of organisations and sectors. 
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Dynamic systems share common characteristics such as positive and negative feedback loops, 
delayed feedback, oscillation and amplification. Positive feedback loops are reinforcing whereas 
negative feedback loops are self-correcting (or goal seeking). Feedback loops enable the 
transmission of information of the state of the system and influence the occurrence being 
observed. The various feedback loops in a system are dominant at different times and contribute 
to balancing the system. The presence of the feedback loops counterbalancing each other also 
leads to the emergent property of resilience. Apart from resilience, hierarchy and self-
organisation are the other features of a system that enable the system to function well. 
In a system, positive (reinforcing) feedback loops carry on until offset by a negative feedback 
loop or by the unavailability of one of the required resources to keep the positive loop going. 
This results in either S-shaped growth where the system reaches equilibrium, i.e. the system goal, or 
overshoot and collapse where the system exceeds its capacity to sustain growth and then reverses the 
direction of growth and attains equilibrium. In some cases, overshoot and collapse can lead to 
the destruction of a system. System dynamicists, e.g. Forrester (1969), Meadows (2008) and 
Sterman (2000), have written extensively on such system behaviour. 
As stated earlier, the system and its environment affect each other. In this thesis, for the time 
horizon under scrutiny, the delays referred to are environmental time delays. These environmental 
time delays had an effect on the system (organisations or sectors as systems) and are shown in 
the system dynamics diagrams as orange (showing as light grey when printed in black and white) 
causal loop arrows. 
Lastly, it is usually the case that there are multiple feedbacks loops interacting simultaneously in a 
system. This makes observation of interactions and effects more complicated. Therefore, in the 
systems analysis process, it is useful to start with a system in equilibrium to which a perturbation 
is introduced. This makes it easier to observe which elements are affected and in what way. In 
the case of the organisations and sectors in Canterbury, such a disturbance is the earthquakes. As 
well, the dynamic modelling allows for adjusting of various system parameters and noting their 
effects.  
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Systems diagrams 
In this work, causal loop diagrams (CLDs), and to a limited extent stock and flow diagrams, are 
used to understand the behaviour of the system (see chapter 3 for more detail). In the causal 
loop diagrams, negative feedback loops are shown as a B (balancing) and positive feedback loops 
are shown as an R (reinforcing). CLDs have arrows from one element to another; the direction 
of each arrow shows the direction of effect. The polarity of each arrow denotes the relationship 
between the connected elements. Positive polarity shows that the elements change in the same 
direction while negative polarity indicates change of the elements in opposite directions. 
CLDs are used for qualitative analysis and are used as a foundation for the stock and flow 
diagrams in this chapter. Stock and flow diagrams can be quantified and used for simulation. In 
this work, stocks and flows were included in the analysis for organisational recovery only. The 
quantification is done using information from interviewees as well as from other sources such as 
Statistics New Zealand. However, inspection of the resulting graphs suggests that the time 
horizon for this research covers the effects in the response and short-term recovery phases after 
the earthquakes: phases marked by great uncertainty. The full effects need to be observed at 
longer times, e.g. 4 to 10 years, after the earthquakes. Also, more information is required, from 
other sources, to be added to the quantified stock and flow diagrams if a more detailed analysis, 
leading to policy formulation, is to be done. This extra information is beyond the scope of this 
research to fully explore. The quantification and additional analysis of the stock and flow 
diagram for organisational recovery are included in appendix J.  
Figure 8-1 is a simplified system dynamics causal loop diagram showing the negative feedback 
loop for organisational or sectoral recovery. It shows that actual organisational or sectoral output can 
be disrupted by external events, in this instance seismic activity. This results in a difference 
between the intended organisational or sectoral throughput and the actual organisational or sectoral 
throughput. A decrease in actual organisational or sectoral output leads to an increase in the deficit in 
organisational or sectoral output, hence the arrow having negative polarity. The information from the 
goal of the system, intended organisational or sectoral output, coupled with the state of the system, 
actual organisational or sectoral output, leads to knowledge of the gap, deficit in organisational or sectoral 
output. This then leads to the development of organisational or sectoral recovery programmes aimed at 
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closing the gap between the organisation’s or sector’s intended and actual throughputs. The 
direction of the negative feedback loop B denotes the direction of net effect. The feedback loop 
is negative because it acts to reduce changes to the system to achieve a specific goal. Hence, in 
Figure 8-1, the power and efficacy of organisational or sectoral recovery measures and programmes 
governs the organisation’s or sector’s rate of recovery. Intended organisational or sectoral output is 
considered an auxiliary variable. 
The CLDs in this study are built primarily using information from survey and interview data 
from key participants in the system. Other input data are from government agencies and 
documents from various specialised areas (e.g. geology, engineering and economics). The 
combination of information from these sources, to generate the CLDs, led to the emergence of 
significant information that would have been difficult to visualise and comprehend had the 
system elements been observed individually. When elements in a system are considered 
individually, there is a possibility of concluding that some elements are more important than 
others and also not detecting the interactions between numerous elements. Sterman (1994, p. 
305), showing the value in using system dynamics, writes that in dealing with complexity people 
generally adopt an event-based, open-loop view of causality, ignore feedback processes, fail to appreciate time delays 
between action and response and in the reporting of information, do not understand stocks and flows, and are 
insensitive to nonlinearities that may alter the strengths of different feedback loops as a system evolves. 
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Figure 8-1: Simplified causal loop diagram (CLD) for sectoral and organisational recovery after the Canterbury 
earthquakes 
Chapter arrangement 
This section of the thesis is arranged as follows. The findings are presented first at the sectoral 
level and then at the organisational level. For both the sectoral and organisational levels, the 
models are divided into two main parts with respect to the earthquakes and to show the 
changing behaviour of the system over time. The first part covers the response phase and the 
second part is the short-term recovery phase. The response phase is mainly characterised by 
organisational and sectoral activity to prevent further damage after the earthquakes. There is also 
a lot of uncertainty in the response phase. The short-term recovery phase is when organisations 
and sectors work to return their situation to normal or to the desired recovery goal they have 
identified. It is shown in the analysis that the activities in these two time periods after disaster are 
considerably different and require different sets of skills and resources. At the sectoral level, only 
causal loop diagrams are utilised. In addition, at the organisational level is a stock and flow 
diagram depicting organisational recovery. The organisational level stock and flow diagrams are 
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presented in two parts. Part one represents organisational response and part two is 
organisational short-term recovery. 
Both types of systems diagrams are accompanied by a description of the interactions between 
the agents in the system. Following on from this description of systemic exchanges is an 
explanation of the system characteristics that influence recovery. For clarity of presentation, the 
sectoral causal loop diagrams for each time period after the earthquakes are presented in three 
parts. The first part is an overview of the inter-sectoral effects involving all the sectors in this 
study. This is to illustrate the overall sectoral interactions. The second and third parts each depict 
only some of the sectors as well as environmental factors that influence their recovery. This is so 
that the interactions between the sectors and the environment are magnified for more detailed 
analysis. For instance, Sterman (2000) advises against showing all the important loops in a single 
complicated diagram as the information to be conveyed may be lost. Lastly, some of the 
diagrams have orange coloured causal arrows. This indicates a time delay in the environment 
that had a pronounced effect on organisations and sectors. 
8.1 Sectoral response phase 
Response is the period from the first moments after the shaking stopped to a few weeks after 
the earthquakes. For the 4 September 2010 earthquake, organisations reported that this phase 
lasted up to four to five weeks after the earthquake. This is except for organisations in Kaiapoi 
for whom this period was slightly longer. Organisations further reported that after the 22 
February 2011 earthquake, the response phase lasted on average up to 10 weeks after the 
earthquake. As most organisations in this study were more affected by the 22 February 2011 
earthquake (see chapters 5 and 6), most of the effects described in this section are from the 
period after this earthquake. The analysis again shows the dissimilar effects to sectors. 
8.1.1 Overview of inter-sectoral effects in the response phase 
The sectors interacted with each other in different ways. The causal loop diagram in Figure 8-2 
demonstrates the propagation of earthquake effects between the sectors in the response phase. 
No environmental factors are shown in Figure 8-2. The clear boxes, e.g. health of building suppliers 
sector, represent the sectors in this study. The use of the word health is to illustrate the wellness of 
the sector at any point in time. The use of the word health, qualified by descriptive adjectives 
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like well or ill, also enables understanding of the state of a stock at a given point in time. The grey 
boxes on the causal arrows are the way(s) in which one sector affected another, with effects in 
the direction of the causal arrows. Using one of the links in Figure 8-2, health of the critical 
infrastructure sector and health of Lyttelton Town Centre as an example, the grey box closure of or 
disruption to Tunnel, Port, roads means that the change was in the sector at the tail of the arrow and 
the effects were to the sector at the head of the arrow. If the change in the health of the 
initiating sector is for ill, i.e. negative, and leads to ill health in the receiving sector also, the 
polarity of the arrow is positive. So, the change to the critical infrastructure sector was the 
damage and disruption of the Lyttelton Tunnel, Lyttelton Port and roads. Briefly, effects to 
Lyttelton Town Centre were that it was difficult to get in to or out of the town centre. As well, 
not shown in Figure 8-2 but in other causal loop diagrams are some of the multiplicative effects 
of difficulty in accessing Lyttelton Town Centre, for example to the retailers needing supplies. 
The causal loop diagrams are a representation of the system and are used to illustrate the more 
detailed explanation contained in the text. In the same way, the effects in the grey boxes are also 
explained in detail in the text. 
The boundary of a system is defined dependent on the scope of analysis and on the information 
obtained. It should be noted that the CLDs are constructed using information provided by 
organisations in this study, through interviews and surveys. For instance, in the wider system, 
there are other organisations, sectors and elements that interact with those in this study but that 
have not been included in the CLDs. The details in the CLDs are those which organisations and 
sectors explicitly reported as affecting them and which they affected. Consequently, effects from 
other organisations and sectors and even some from the earthquakes, e.g. ground deformation, 
that were not mentioned by organisations and sectors are considered part of the system’s 
environment. 
In general, there was diminished capacity in all sectors in the period after the earthquakes. The 
different levels of effect were to infrastructure, organisational assets and employees. The 
individual sectors were affected to differing degrees by each of these three aspects. For example, 
infrastructure damage was more pronounced for hospitality, Christchurch CBD, the town 
centres and critical infrastructure. Whereas, FMCG and also critical infrastructure were very 
affected by damage to organisational assets, e.g. stock for FMCG and service delivery 
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architecture for critical infrastructure. All sectors reported that staff wellbeing was of primary 
concern. 
The importance of critical services such as electricity, water, gas and roads, provided by critical 
infrastructure whose health was diminished, to other industry sectors became apparent as all 
sectors were disrupted by interruption to critical services. There was a gradual resumption of 
productivity for the sectors depending to what extent they had been affected and the nature of 
goods and services they produced. In essence, some sectors (e.g. critical infrastructure and some 
trucking organisations) had to step up while others (e.g. hospitality) had to step down or scale 
back operations. 
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In Figure 8-2 the critical infrastructure sector has interactions with all the other sectors in this 
study. This was a result of the interruption to critical services such as electricity, water, roads and 
to a lesser extent gas. The consequences of this varied by sector. For instance, one of the 
consequences to Lyttelton Town Centre was the closure of the Lyttelton Road Tunnel that 
connects it to the rest of greater Christchurch. The closure of the Tunnel affected the movement 
of people and goods into and out of the area. As well, the town was affected by the closure of 
Lyttelton Port, the main port for import and export in Canterbury. The building suppliers sector 
was also affected by closure of the Port and damage to other road infrastructure. Additionally, 
both the building suppliers and trucking sectors were affected by increased traffic on the roads 
due to reduced road capacity. The health of building suppliers sector also influenced the health of 
trucking sector. The uncertainty faced by building suppliers meant that they affected trucking 
organisations that worked with them. 
The health of the Christchurch CBD has a bearing on the health of the hospitality sector as well as on the 
health of the FMCG sector. The hospitality sector organisations whose premises were in the CBD 
Red Zone had difficulty accessing their premises. In addition, damage to the CBD affected the 
tourism sector which also affected the hospitality sector. The deterioration of the CBD also 
meant that there was a relocation of a large group of people who were customers of the FMCG 
organisations that served the CBD. Some of the FMCG customers included hospitality 
organisations that were closed. Other more detailed consequences are contained in chapters 5 to 
7. 
In Figure 8-2 are the reinforcing feedback loops R1 and R2 for sectors in this study that showed 
especially high levels of interdependence: trucking-FMCG and critical infrastructure-
Christchurch CBD. Reinforcing feedback loops, if left unchecked, continue in the direction of 
amplification unless slowed down or counterbalanced. Loop R1 involves health of trucking sector 
and health of fast moving consumer goods sector. Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) organisations 
had an increased need for trucking services due to excess stock waste that required disposal. The 
excess waste was caused by spoilage of putrescible products resulting from interruption to 
electricity and water supplies. Other stock waste was caused by breakage brought on by 
collapsed shelving and falling merchandise. This stock breakage and spoilage required a massive 
clean-up operation which took some time and resulted in closure of some FMCG organisations, 
e.g. supermarkets. As a result of the increased demand for trucking services from FMCG, one 
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would expect that the polarity of the trucking-FMCG causal arrow in Figure 8-2 should be 
negative. That is, that the increased demand for trucking services which could result in better 
health for the sector even as the health of the FMCG sector diminished. 
However, this is not the case as closure of supermarkets resulted in trucking organisations not 
being able to deliver goods. Truckers reported that this affected them more as the supermarkets 
were closed for an extended period even after waste was taken away. This is because 
supermarket closure led to an accumulation of undelivered stock in trucking warehouses, which 
were at the same time facing the problem of reduced space because of earthquake damage (and 
potentially affected more of the trucking sector’s customers, not just supermarkets). This also 
caused a backlog of unfulfilled orders for truckers that brought goods into the region. Loop R1 
can be counteracted by clearer and timelier communication between the sectors involved, 
leading to the re-establishment of the supply-demand equilibrium. For instance, information 
from FMCG to trucking on how long closure would be. This information could then be passed 
on to manufacturers. As shown in chapter 5, reactions based on incorrect, incomplete or delayed 
information can be costly for organisations as they may vary orders or production schedules 
based on this information. This may cause excess or insufficient stock. The storage or 
production of excess stock also adds to costs. 
Loop R2 is that of health of critical infrastructure sector and health of Christchurch CBD. It illustrates the 
consequences when infrastructure providers have major assets in built-up areas with a lot of 
unreinforced masonry buildings that were badly damaged by the earthquakes and subsequently 
condemned for demolition. A lot of the buildings in the Christchurch CBD were badly damaged, 
especially after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, which led to the cordoning off of the CBD. 
This resulted in limited access for critical infrastructure providers to parts of their networks in 
the cordoned off area and also to organisational records for those critical infrastructure 
providers with offices in the CBD. This inability to access the physical parts of the infrastructure 
affected the rate at which some repairs could be done. In the same loop (R2), organisations in 
the CBD area but not within the cordon were affected by interruption to critical services as they 
were serviced by parts of critical infrastructure networks within the cordon. These organisations 
on the periphery of the cordon were also subjected to slightly extended service interruption 
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times as they waited for critical infrastructure providers to gain access to the cordoned off area, 
make repairs and restore service. 
For Figure 8-2, the sectoral response phase, both feedback loops are reinforcing. Reinforcing 
feedback loops carry on until there is a negative loop to counterbalance them or in the case of 
systems involving physical entities, until one of the required resources runs out. Following the 
response phase, it is seen that in the short-term recovery phase, these loops are no longer 
present. This is because, in both cases, after the initial information delay, equilibrium was 
restored as for R1 FMCG organisations could take delivery, trucking could deliver and for R2 
critical infrastructure could access the CBD and make repairs even as it took longer for the 
repair and restoration of the CBD itself. 
8.1.2 Trucking, critical infrastructure, FMCG and Christchurch CBD 
Figures 8-3 and 8-4 show the more detailed interactions between health of trucking sector, health of 
critical infrastructure sector, health of fast moving consumer goods sector and health of Christchurch CBD. 
Figure 8-3 shows the overall interactions and Figure 8-4 better emphasises the loops. Orange 
coloured causal arrows are used to show time delays from the environment, which affected 
organisational recovery. Both figures contain the environmental elements that affect the 
recovery of the sectors shown and that are relevant to the interactions in the models. Some of 
these environmental elements include organisations such as local authorities: Christchurch City 
Council (CCC), Environment Canterbury (ECan) and other local councils (represented by 
hexagons). Elements such as finance also affect organisations. However, they have not been 
included here for two main reasons. First, in the response phase when organisations and sectors 
were trying to prevent further damage, finance was not the most important aspect. For example, 
in some cases, difficulty accessing personnel to assess buildings was more of a problem. Second 
is that the size of the regional economy was a buffer for some of the effects of the earthquake 
(see chapters 6.7.3 and 6.7.4). Also, in Figures 8-3 and 8-4 is text in black font that is not 
enclosed in boxes or hexagons. These elements are non-organisational or non-sectoral parts of 
the environment. i.e. they are auxiliary variables. They affect and are affected by the sectors in 
this study and, in the diagrams, have been left unenclosed for clarity. 
Starting with Figure 8-3 the health of the critical infrastructure sector is affected by the availability of 
spare parts and by skilled labour. Both of these factors influence the rate at which repairs can be 
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carried out. Health of the critical infrastructure sector has an effect on the revenue levels of the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC). This then affects the health of Christchurch CBD as CCC is a 
major source of funding for the rebuild of the CBD. This is because CCC own buildings in the 
city centre, such as the Town Hall, that were damaged and require extensive repair or rebuilding.  
The health of Christchurch CBD affects health of the trucking sector. Some of the reasons for this 
include those trucking organisations that had customers in the CBD as well as trucking 
organisations that had an increased workload of debris removal after the earthquakes. Both the 
trucking and FMCG sectors are affected by excess waste (discussed in the previous section) and 
excess stock in warehouses which was caused in part by a shortage of warehousing space. The inadequacy 
in warehousing was brought about by earthquake damaged warehousing. Another link in Figure 8-3 is 
between Environment Canterbury (ECan - the regional council in the greater Christchurch 
region) and health of the critical infrastructure sector. ECan contracts public transport services from 
some of the critical infrastructure organisations. In addition, ECan decides when and which 
transport services and routes to run. After the earthquakes, services were greatly reduced, partly 
due to damaged infrastructure and also a reduced customer base, which affected the critical 
infrastructure sector. 
In the response phase, land use planning decisions were important for FMCG, critical infrastructure 
and Christchurch CBD. The delay in availability of this information was caused in part by the 
delay in geotechnical assessment of land in the greater Christchurch region. As discussed in 
chapters 5 to 7, a delay in geotechnical inspections contributed to some of the delays in 
insurance claim settlements. Land use planning information, related to population resettlement 
patterns, was needed by FMCG and critical infrastructure providers for longer term planning of 
retail outlets and network structure respectively. Land use planning decisions were also needed 
for incorporation in repair, reconstruction and new build decisions. Knowledge of the proneness 
of land to liquefaction for instance, was valuable to organisations and insurance companies for 
decisions on proceeding with building repairs and new build and even had an effect on the 
revision of insurance policies. 
 
284 System dynamics of sectoral and organisational recovery 
 
 
Figure 8-3: Causal loop diagram of the 
response phase for trucking, critical 
infrastructure, Christchurch CBD and 
fast moving consumer goods 
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Figure 8-4 is a version of Figure 8-3 with the feedback loops emphasised. There are five 
interacting feedback loops shown in Figure 8-4. As discussed previously, interactions of multiple 
feedback loops increases difficulty in observing system effects. This is because it is not easy to 
tell what the individual effects are. However, it is still possible to observe the emergent 
behaviour of the system. The five feedback loops in Figure 8-4 are: 
 loop R1 – health of  critical infrastructure sector, Christchurch City Council, health of  Christchurch 
CBD, health of  fast moving consumer goods sector, health of  trucking sector; 
 loop R2 - health of  critical infrastructure sector, health of  fast moving consumer goods sector, health of  
trucking sector; 
 loop R3 – health of  trucking sector, health of  fast moving consumer goods sector; 
 loop R4 – health of  trucking sector, health of  critical infrastructure sector; and 
 loop R5 – Christchurch City Council, health of  Christchurch CBD. 
In day-to-day affairs, some loops and resulting interactions may not be noticed or are taken for 
granted. This is to mean that they are vital but may be taken for granted. For instance, loop R5, 
Christchurch City Council, and health of Christchurch CBD. The Christchurch City Council is 
dependent on the Christchurch CBD for some of its revenue, in the form of rates and taxes. A 
damaged CBD means that some of these rates and taxes are reduced and in some cases cannot 
be collected. Unsurprisingly, critical infrastructure has the most connections of all the sectors in 
the figure showing the reliance of business on critical services. It can also be seen from Figure 8-
4 that the sectors affect each other directly and indirectly. 
Loop R1 includes critical infrastructure, Christchurch City Council (CCC), Christchurch CBD, 
FMCG and trucking. This loop shows how organisations are influenced by and can influence 
their environment. The loop contains links not only between the sectors under study but also 
other important sectors they relate to. The reduced revenue from critical infrastructure providers 
to CCC affects the type of construction projects that can be planned for and built in the 
Christchurch CBD. This could possibly also affect the recovery of the CBD in the medium-
term. Also in loop R1 is the link between the CBD and FMCG. As a result of the earthquakes 
the number of people in the CBD reduced drastically. This caused a drop in customer numbers 
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for organisations outside the cordon and for those that serviced organisations that used to be in 
the Red Zone. FMCG organisations that serviced the CBD, both through hospitality 
organisations and through the loss of direct sales to the relocated organisations, reported being 
affected. This had knock-on effects for trucking organisations that worked with these FMCG 
organisations. Loop R2 has trucking, critical infrastructure and FMCG. The disruption of critical 
services resulted in excess waste for the FMCG sector. This meant that FMCG organisations 
had more than the usual demand for trucking services. The trucking sector was affected by the 
critical infrastructure sector by not being able to meet demand for transport of needed inputs. 
Loop R3 is that of the FMCG and trucking sectors and was discussed in section 8.1.1.  
However, in Figure 8-4, some of the environmental interactions for this feedback loop are 
shown. The shortage of warehousing space affected manufacturers and suppliers who contracted trucking 
organisations to deliver goods to the FMCG sector. When the supermarkets were ready to re-
stock, this had to be done gradually as not all their orders could be fulfilled immediately. For a 
short while there was a lack of some goods on supermarket shelves as the supply-demand 
balance was brought back to normal. The supermarkets however recognised that in this time 
period they needed to stock more of goods such as bottled water, chocolate and cigarettes as 
these were in higher demand after the earthquakes. This required constant readjusting of orders 
by all the members in this loop, which forms part of a supply web. 
Loop R4 has the reinforcing feedback loop between the trucking and critical infrastructure 
sectors (the causal arrow from health of trucking sector to health of critical infrastructure sector is also part 
of loop R2). The trucking organisations also faced increased demand for delivery of ordered 
inputs from the critical infrastructure sector. The other causal arrow of loop R4 shows how the 
health of the trucking sector was affected by damage to roads, the Lyttelton Port, the Lyttelton 
Tunnel and bridges as well as by traffic management after the earthquakes. This led to truckers 
incurring increased costs in vehicle maintenance and longer delivery times. Loop R5 interacts 
with loop R1 and was discussed briefly in the analysis of loop R1. The Christchurch City Council 
funding shortfall affected the health of the Christchurch CBD. However, the rates and taxes from the 
CBD are some of the revenue sources for CCC. The manifestation of the loops in Figure 8-4 
shows that aside from the preparation individual organisations engage in, they should also 
consider that external, environmental, factors would affect their post-disaster recovery and so 
must be included in planning. For instance, seismically reinforcing critical infrastructure while 
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still situating it in areas where buildings are vulnerable to earthquakes is only one part of the 
solution as the infrastructure itself may suffer moderate damage but be inaccessible for repair. 
Networks should also be designed with the environment they interact with in mind: first to 
minimise damage and second to enable quick restoration. 
All the loops in Figure 8-4 are reinforcing. Again, it should be noted that this is the response 
phase after the earthquakes. In the case of organisational and sectoral recovery after the 
Canterbury earthquakes, except for loop R1, the positive feedback is counterbalanced in the 
short-term recovery phase. For loop R2, critical infrastructure services were gradually restored 
for use by FMCG and trucking; the excess waste was removed; and FMCG organisations re-
opened and could take delivery of goods. Loop R3 is part of loop R2 and was also discussed in 
the overview section. Loop R4 shares links with loop R2. 
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Figure 8-4: Causal loop diagram with feedback loops for the response phase for trucking, critical infrastructure, 
Christchurch CBD and fast moving consumer goods 
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causal arrows. As pointed out earlier, the environment of the system is influenced by and 
influences the system; the environmental time delays shown are for elements that were 
important to organisations in that resources, e.g. information or manpower, were delayed. 
Environmental time delays are shortened to time delays. Also, some of the interactions shown 
have been discussed in sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2 and are included here for completion of the 
model. 
The health of Christchurch CBD affected the health of ICT sector. This is because ICT organisations 
had clients whose premises were located in the CBD Red Zone. Additionally, some of the ICT 
organisations were themselves located in the CBD prior to the 22 February 2011 earthquake. 
They sustained damage to equipment and disruption to operations. However, some ICT 
organisations were shielded from the prolonged effects of the earthquakes because of their 
customer/revenue base outside Canterbury or New Zealand. 
In comparing the geographic locales, the Christchurch CBD has more interactions than either 
Kaiapoi Town Centre or Lyttelton Town Centre. Also, the health of Christchurch CBD affects the 
health of Kaiapoi Town Centre and health of Lyttelton Town Centre. The organisations in Kaiapoi Town 
Centre, like the ones from Lyttelton Town Centre, reported that the possible moratoria on 
commercial building and expansion could affect their long-term planning and viability. The 
moratoria were part of proposals from some organisations in and around the Christchurch CBD 
as a way of hastening recovery. The health of Kaiapoi Town Centre was also influenced by land use 
planning decisions after the extensive liquefaction caused by the 4 September 2010 earthquake.  
In Figure 8-5, commercial and residential rebuild are shown separately because of different 
arrangements. The residential rebuild was managed by a specially appointed project management 
construction organisation. The commercial rebuild on the other hand did not have such 
arrangements. However, the pool of skilled labour and other resources required for both these 
parts of the rebuild had a great deal of overlap. Furthermore, some building supplier, CBD and 
town centre organisations in this study reported being affected more by commercial rebuild than by 
residential rebuild. For some organisations, this is because the delay in commercial rebuild and the 
difficulty finding suitable commercial accommodation affected their operations. The availability 
of skilled labour also led to time delays in land use planning decisions as there was a shortage of the 
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necessary geotechnical manpower to carry out inspections in a timely manner. There was also a 
shortage of skilled people to conduct building inspections and building demolitions as well as for the 
commercial and residential rebuild. The inspection time delays led in part to time delays in insurance 
claims being filed and settled. Time delayed insurance claims affected cash flow for some 
organisations. The health of building suppliers sector, while affecting the commercial rebuild, was itself 
affected by the health of Christchurch CBD and residential rebuild. Building suppliers were also 
affected by the global financial crisis which affected their customers in the agricultural sector. Health of 
building suppliers also affected health of trucking sector. 
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Loop R1 in Figure 8-5 is that of health of Christchurch CBD, health of building suppliers sector and 
commercial rebuild. The significant number of damaged buildings in the CBD meant that there was 
a substantial amount of building supplies required for rebuild and repair. However, the specifics 
of the repair and rebuild were not known and this affected stock forecasting for building 
suppliers. This then affected some parts of the commercial rebuild as building suppliers did not 
always have the right supplies at the right time. A time delay in commercial rebuild then led to time 
delays in repairing the parts of the CBD that could be repaired and influenced the health of 
Christchurch CBD. 
Loop R2 of Figure 8-5 shows how the health of Lyttelton Town Centre interacts with health of arts and 
crafts sector and with health of tourism sector. The closure of the Christchurch CBD led to a drop in 
tourist numbers to the greater Christchurch region. This contributed to lower tourist numbers in 
Lyttelton also. Fewer tourists, in turn, affected not only hospitality but also the arts and crafts 
sector which Lyttelton claims to be the heart of. One solution to break this loop was the use of 
alternative ways of reaching arts and crafts customers, for example by using the Lyttelton 
Farmers’ Market. Additionally, the promotion of more of the tourist attractions outside the 
Christchurch CBD could be used to draw in tourists. 
Loop R3 was discussed in section 8.1.2. 
8.2 Sectoral short-term recovery phase 
From Figure 8-6, it can be seen that some of the effects from the response phase continued into 
the short-term recovery phase. Indeed, the effects of other interactions also manifested in this 
later phase. In the causal loop diagrams for the short-term recovery phase, the interactions 
shown are those that are the most significant for the focal sectors. This means that in some 
cases, some sectors are not affecting any other focal sector or are not affected by another focal 
sector. 
8.2.1 Overview of inter-sectoral effects 
Figure 8-6 is related to Figure 8-2 and represents the short-term recovery phase. In the short-
term recovery phase different parts of infrastructure were gradually re-opened. Organisations 
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made tentative plans for how operations would proceed while they continually adjusted 
themselves to the post-disaster environment. The feedback loops from Figure 8-2 are no longer 
present in Figure 8-6. 
As in the response phase, illustrated in Figure 8-2, in the short-term recovery phase the 
hospitality organisations within the Red Zone were still affected by the inability to access their 
premises while those outside the Red Zone were affected by decreased foot traffic. The health of 
building suppliers sector was influenced by damage to critical infrastructure as they sought to bring 
in building supplies. Health of building suppliers sector was also still influenced by health of Christchurch 
CBD as the major part the rebuild had not started. At the same time, the building suppliers were 
trying to keep up with demand for specific materials needed by the critical infrastructure sector. 
The state of the roads affected trucking organisations that were also affected by the delay in start 
of rebuilding and by the volume of waste generated from the Christchurch CBD. 
The health of ICT sector was affected by an increase in demand for spare parts and for professional 
services required by the critical infrastructure sector. In the short-term recovery phase, both 
health of Kaiapoi Town Centre and health of Lyttelton Town Centre were affected by closure of some 
roads as well as repair of others. Organisations from the two town centres reported that the 
closure or repair of roads made it difficult to get around and for their customers to reach them. 
Road closure in Lyttelton affected health of trucking sector. 
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Figure 8-6: Overview of intersectoral effects in the short-term recovery phase after the Canterbury earthquakes 
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sector although it is affected. 
8.2.2 Trucking, critical infrastructure, Christchurch CBD and FMCG 
Figure 8-7 is the short-term recovery phase associated with the response shown in Figures 8-3 
and 8-4. These interactions involve health of trucking sector, health of critical infrastructure sector, health of 
Health of
Information and
Communication
Technology Sector
Health of
Building
Suppliers
Sector
Health of
Hospitality
SectorHealth of
Trucking
Sector
Health of
Critical
Infrastructure
Sector
Health of
Kaiapoi
Town
Centre
Health of
Christchurch
CBD
Health of
Lyttelton Town
Centre
+
+
+
+
+
+
Continued
demand for
goods and
services
required for
repair and
remediation
+
Road closure
+
State of roads
and ongoing
repair
+
Major parts
of
infrastructure
located in
CBD
+
Volume of
demolition and
disaster waste
Traffic capacity,
infrastructure
wear and tear,
continued
demand for
goods and
services required
for repair and
remediation
Taffic
management,
state of the
roads and
increased
maintenance
costs as a
result
Major part of
rebuild not started
Uncertainty of
commencing
rebuild - no
construction
material to
transport
+
Access to
premises,
decreased foot
traffic
Evans
Pass/Sumner Road
Closure
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
295 
 
Christchurch CBD and health of fast moving consumer goods sector. Also shown are the continued 
interactions involving the regional (ECan) and local councils (CCC and others). In the short-
term recovery phase, there is also the addition of the Central City Development Unit (CCDU). 
In 2012, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) formed CCDU and appointed 
them to lead the recovery and rebuild of the Christchurch CBD. 
In the short-term recovery phase, repair to damaged infrastructure and reconstruction of some 
of the needed infrastructure was underway. However, land use planning decisions continued to affect 
health of critical infrastructure sector, health of fast moving consumer goods sector, health of Christchurch CBD as 
well as ECan and other local councils. The continued environmental time delay on release of 
land use planning information was more pronounced in this phase. The delayed geotechnical 
assessments and information on which land use planning was based were an important part of 
the land-zoning issue that would inform what the future population profile of Christchurch 
would look like. This was mainly because of the effect to the long-term strategic plans of a lot of 
sectors such as the town centres, FMCG and critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure 
organisations were faced with repair to massive parts of their infrastructure and also had to 
factor in repairs to infrastructure in areas that could be uninhabited in as little as nine months to 
two years. Not knowing which areas would be subsequently settled meant that network 
expansion planning was made more difficult. 
ECan were also affected by land use planning decisions. This possibly had a bearing on the 
renewal of services contracted from the critical infrastructure sector. At the same time damage 
to infrastructure such as roads continued to affect the trucking sector who reported that they 
faced increased costs from more frequent maintenance and from more time spent on the road 
due to reduced road capacity and increased traffic. 
Health of critical infrastructure was still affected by both availability of spare parts and skilled labour. 
Critical infrastructure organisations still reported not having enough skilled labour to carry out 
repair and remediation work44. They also stated that it was not always easy to acquire inputs 
needed for repairs. For the Health of trucking sector, the restricted use of critical infrastructure 
                                                     
44 As at July 2012, there were reports in the media of an increase in advertised jobs for the greater Christchurch region. Also, 
Immigration New Zealand had created a special visa category for skills required in the earthquake recovery. 
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continued into the medium-term recovery period. This meant a continued adjustment to 
trucking schedules as well as incremental costs. 
Loop R1 is that of health of Christchurch CBD and Christchurch City Council (CCC). In the short-term 
recovery phase, it became clearer how much monetary loss CCC would bear from loss of rates 
and taxes from the non-functioning CBD. This is in addition to reduced critical infrastructure 
revenue. This influenced funding from CCC towards the rebuild of the CBD which contributes 
to health of the Christchurch CBD. Loop R1 can be broken by the (gradual) re-opening and use 
of the Christchurch CBD.    
 
Figure 8-7: Causal loop diagram (CLD) of the short-term recovery phase for trucking, critical infrastructure, 
Christchurch CBD and fast moving consumer goods 
8.2.3 Christchurch CBD, Kaiapoi Town Centre, Lyttelton Town Centre, hospitality, 
building suppliers and ICT 
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and affordability of insurance. Insurance still affected cash flow for organisations. Furthermore, 
the effects of skilled labour to building inspection, residential rebuild, land use planning decisions and 
commercial rebuild were still being felt. 
Land use planning decisions influenced residential rebuild. Post-earthquake, the land in greater 
Christchurch was assessed and categorised depending on soil vulnerability to earthquakes. This 
meant that residential rebuild and repair work was dependent on this information being available. 
This continued to affect health of building suppliers sector. Figure 8-8 also contains the interaction 
between building code revision and the commercial rebuild and repair. Some parts of the building code 
were revised post-earthquake. The code stipulated that buildings be built or retrofitted to greater 
seismic strength. This effect on commercial rebuild affected health of Christchurch CBD. Another link 
is between building code revision and health of building suppliers sector. Changing building codes might 
require the stocking of new building materials and the re-training of qualified tradespeople and 
others who work in the construction sector. 
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Figure 8-8: Causal loop diagram (CLD) for short-term recovery phase for Christchurch CBD, Kaiapoi Town 
Centre, Lyttelton Town Centre, hospitality, building suppliers and information and communication technology 
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affected. 
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of  the CBD. Information on what would be rebuilt or repaired, when this would happen, what 
materials would be required and in what quantity. This would help building suppliers to forecast 
and positively affect the health of  the sector. 
Noticeably, Figure 8-8 still has positive (reinforcing) feedback loops R1 and R2. Both R1 and R2 
have health of  Christchurch CBD as a variable. In the short-term recovery phase, some of  the 
issues surrounding repair and rebuild of  the Christchurch CBD were still unresolved. This is 
further illustration of  the time extended nature that recovery can take.   
8.3 Modelling organisational recovery 
Figure 8-9 shows the generalised stock and flow depicting the main interactions that affected 
response for individual organisations in Canterbury. Figure 8-9 also shows the main stocks and 
flows that were identified for organisational recovery in the response phase. Importantly, the 
value of this and other stock and flow models is in uncovering the patterns of behaviour of the 
system. This information can be used to identify important elements that affect recovery and in 
some cases points of intervention to effect recovery. As mentioned previously, for the purposes 
of this thesis, stocks will sometimes be referred to as levels. Levels contain information about 
the state or health of the system at any given time. In Figure 8-9, which has greater resolution at 
the organisational level, both reinforcing and balancing feedback loops are present. 
Analysis of Figure 8-9 shows that the main levels in the recovery of organisations are related to 
their three main sources of vulnerability discussed in chapter 7: health of the organisation 
(organisational attributes), available built environment (infrastructure they use to deliver goods and 
services) and health of the economy (environmental factors). The health of the organisation is related to 
the volume of customer or product orders converted into the flow throughput. Contributing to 
throughput is customer or product orders and is the number of orders the organisation gets and can 
fulfill. 
The other flow into health of the organisation is the outshipment of products. Outshipment is dependent 
on product sales and contributes to environmental factors such as health of the economy through the 
inflow growth of the economy. The level health of the economy, through its outflow decline, is also  
influenced by uncertainty. Contributing to the uncertainty that may influence economic decline as 
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people spend less, is the recovery leadership calibre. The recovery leadership calibre has a bearing on the 
greater Christchurch recovery plan which all sectoral and organisational recovery plans should ideally 
align with. 
Available Built Environment influences the disparity in available and needed accommodation, has the 
inflow construction, reconstruction and repair and the outflow building stock deconstruction. The inflow 
construction, reconstruction and repair is influenced by the disparity in available and needed 
accommodation which is affected by the needed rental or commercial accommodation. 
In the stock and flow in Figure 8-9, are both reinforcing (R) and balancing (B) feedback loops. 
Loop R1 shows the interactions between the health of the organisation, availability of organisational 
reserves and organisational throughput. However, throughput is partly reliant on availability of 
organisational reserves and on available labour. Throughput and outshipment of goods and services are 
inflows for the level health of the organisation. According to interviewed organisations, the pre- and 
post-earthquake measures of health of the organisation are usually in terms of sales, revenue and 
cash flow. Loop R1 shows that the better the health of the organisation the better the availability of 
organisational resources to contribute to throughput. Also the availability of organisational reserves is linked 
to the crisis management ability of the organisation and the two form loop R2. Part of the crisis 
management and subsequent recovery of an organisation is getting back to their pre-earthquake 
levels of throughput (production) or better which requires the prudent use of organisational 
reserves. 
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Loop B1 also involves resources, the available (capacity of) infrastructure after the earthquakes. 
Customers and use of infrastructure or consumption of services complete this loop. The available (capacity of) 
infrastructure is further affected by seismic activity. Seismic activity also influences the customers of loop 
B1. Loops B2 and B3 are both linked to the level available built environment. Available built 
environment influences available (capacity of) infrastructure. Loop B2 of Figure 8-9 shows the 
relationship between available built environment and its inflow construction, reconstruction and repair. The 
level of available built environment affects the disparity in available and needed accommodation which 
influences the inflow construction, reconstruction and repair. However, the rate of construction, 
reconstruction and repair is affected by the revised building code. Loop B3 shows the relationship of the 
available built environment and its outflow building stock deconstruction. In the response phase, this 
outflow is affected by resource availability.  
Figure 8-10 shows the systemic interactions in the short-term recovery phase for organisational 
recovery. Seismic activity persisted into the short-term recovery phase and still affected 
customers, available (capacity of) infrastructure and insurance. It also affected crisis management ability 
through crisis. The delay in insurance carries on into this period and influences availability of 
organisational reserves as more are used up. Insurance also affects uncertainty which contributes to the 
health of the economy outflow decline. Continued seismic activity also affected revised building code which 
affected construction, reconstruction and repair. 
Unsurprisingly, loops R1, R2 and B1 from the response phase still exist in this later phase. For 
loop R1, organisations that reported the strain on the availability of organisational reserves as they 
continued to deal with crisis. Availabilty of organisational reserves were used up through increased 
costs associated with repair, relocation or payment of overtime wages. Some organisations 
reported diverting resources meant for expansion to manage the crisis caused by the 
earthquakes. 
In the short-term recovery phase, crisis management ability was still as important as in the response 
phase. Organisations reported that the type of  leadership required in the short-term recovery 
phase is consultative as opposed to slightly autocratic in the earlier phase. Also, investment in staff 
made crisis management ability even more pronounced. Staff  fatigue resulted from the ongoing 
earthquakes. This shows that management of  staff  and their personal situations is important.
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Loop B1 persisted partly as a result of the ongoing seismic activity which sometimes made the 
repair or restoration of infrastructure difficult. This affects available (capacity of) infrastructure. One 
way of counterbalancing loop B1 is by acting to maintain the condition of assets in the face of 
ongoing seismic activity. In addition, the other influcnce on available (capacity of) infrastructure, the 
use of infrastructure or consumption of services, also needs to be worked on in parallel. However, critical 
infrastructure medium- to longer-term planning is still affected by customers as the decisions on 
land use had not been finalised 18 months after the earthquakes. 
8.4 System behaviour influencing recovery 
As described earlier, the structure of the system is very closely related to its behaviour. From 
descriptions of the system in sections 8.1 to 8.3, it is possible to abstract the system behaviour 
that influences the recovery of sectors and organisations. In the response phase after the 
earthquakes, there was a great deal of perturbation as organisations tried to understand how they 
had been affected and what the situation was.  It was in this phase also that the initial assessment 
of buildings and infrastructure was done and repair work started. In the short-term recovery 
phase, many things were still uncertain; there were continuing delays and mismatches in needs 
and requirements. This was in addition to the ongoing earthquakes whose effects also had to be 
dealt with. 
The system behaviours identified as affecting recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes and 
detailed below are: 
 interactions between system elements; 
 environmental time delays; 
 mismatches; 
 uncertainty; 
 hierarchy and self-organisation; and 
 resilience.  
These specific system attributes are intertwined even if they are presented separately. They will 
also be discussed in chapter 9 in the context of aids, hindrances and points of intervention in 
recovery. 
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8.4.1 Interactions between system elements 
Interactions between elements of a system and its environment are what lead to the emergence 
of complex behaviour. These interactions result in the bi-directional exchange of information 
and lead to different effects for different system actors. The interactions and their effects act to 
affect recovery. 
8.4.2 Environmental time delays 
Time is a crucial aspect of recovery and time delays can act to impede recovery. Time delays 
contribute to actors in the system reaching decisions based on incorrect information. In the 
figures in this chapter, the environmental time delays shown were the ones that significantly 
affected system actors and had cascading effects. System delays, on the other hand, occur in 
feedback loops and are the effect of a time lag in effects to one element from another. In the 
time horizon for this research, system delays were not yet apparent. The time delays after the 
Canterbury earthquakes were from various sources: building inspections, repairs, insurance 
payments, land inspections and overall recovery plans. In Table 8-1 is a list of the time delays in 
the system’s environment after the Canterbury earthquakes. It should be noted that a 
contributor to the environmental time delays was the occurrence of the numerous (significant) 
aftershocks. With each aftershock the response clock was reset and transition to recovery 
required more effort. However, the continuing earthquakes presented a particular challenge: that 
of carrying on with the recovery efforts even as the aftershocks went on. 
Table 8-1: Summary of major system delays affecting recovery after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
Summary of major time delays, in the environment, affecting recovery after the 2010-2011 Canterbury 
earthquakes 
Time delays in insurance payments 
Time delays in organisations accessing their premises 
Time delays in geotechnical or structural engineering assessments 
Time delays in building demolition or deconstruction 
Time delays in land use planning decisions 
Time delays in availability of a plan for recovery and rebuild of the Christchurch CBD 
From interviews with agents in the system, the speedier the recovery the better, as long as there 
is no compromise on quality. There were numerous time delays present in the system. There 
were delays in assessment of land and buildings which led to delays in the settlement of 
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insurance claims as the assessment information was required for insurance claims. Time delays in 
building assessments led to time delays in organisations accessing their premises and retrieving 
important organisational records or equipment. 
However, some of the time delayed settlement of insurance claims happened even after 
assessment and reporting of building and land damage had been done. In some cases, this led to 
time delays in building demolition work. The longer it takes for a building to be demolished and 
the debris removed from a site, the longer it takes to start construction on that site or repair of 
nearby buildings. This affects other organisations in the system that might not be able to access 
their premises for instance. For some organisations, time delays in insurance settlements affected 
the organisation’s cash flow or other resource reserves. Also, time delays in land use planning 
contributed to the difficulty some organisations had in making long-term strategic plans. 
The time delay in insurance payments led to consequences including time delays in building 
demolition, inability to relocate for some organisations and the inability to effect repairs to 
damaged premises. Another related time delay was in insurance loss adjustors sending 
information back to affected organisations after assessment. This affected the organisations’ 
knowledge of what the insurance company would pay out for after policy review. 
Additionally, there were time delays in getting geotechnical and structural engineering experts to 
inspect land and buildings respectively. Part of the time delay was caused by there not being 
enough experts to carry out assessments in a timely manner as well as the delay in receipt of 
technical reports after the assessment was completed. This particular time delay was the 
equivalent of organisations competing for the same (scarce) resources to aid their recovery. As 
shown earlier, resource availability is vital for the recovery of an organisation after disaster. The 
engineering assessment of buildings and land is carried out for several reasons; having land and 
buildings inspected means that organisations know the extent of damage and what measures 
need to be taken such as repair or relocation. In Christchurch if the land or building was deemed 
irreparable, this was part of proof required by the insurance company. Another source of delay 
in reconstruction and repair was the non-availability of construction works insurance after the 22 
February 2011 earthquake. This was mainly because of the ongoing aftershock sequence and 
insurance companies re-analysing and re-assessing risks. The system dynamics analysis in chapter 
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8 demonstrates that recovery is long and complex; time delays in the process also have the effect 
of draining the much needed hope and energy of those involved in recovery. 
8.4.3 Mismatches 
In investigating actions after the earthquakes, it can be seen that there was a disparity between 
when needs were articulated and when they were fulfilled. Mismatches contribute to the system 
being out of balance. A list of mismatches after the Canterbury earthquakes is contained in Table 
8-2. 
Table 8-2: Summary of system behaviour mismatches, for needs and requirements, after the Canterbury 
earthquakes 
Summary of system behaviour mismatches after the Canterbury earthquakes 
Mismatch in numbers of qualified personnel to conduct timely post-earthquake assessments and building 
demolition and number of buildings requiring assessment and/or demolition 
Mismatch in available resources (e.g. machinery) to carry out building demolition and deconstruction and the 
number of buildings requiring demolition or deconstruction 
Mismatch in available stock and needed stock post-earthquake 
Mismatch in available finance and needed finance for post-earthquake recovery 
Mismatch in available road capacity and the increased traffic on the roads after the earthquake 
Mismatch in the need for timely, relevant information and the availability of this information 
For instance, there was a need for qualified personnel to conduct assessments. However the 
scale of the job far outweighed the number of people on the ground. There was also a mismatch 
in when insurance money was required and when it was paid out, if at all. The rate of demolition 
was affected not only by decisions on who would pay for the demolition (insurers or building 
owners) but also on demolition machinery and manpower being available at the time it was 
required. 
Another mismatch was in the response and early recovery phase and involved the FMCG and 
critical infrastructure sectors. The FMCG stock buffer did not match the demand for some 
goods needed immediately after the earthquakes. This is partly a result of a sectoral pre-
earthquake use of just-in-time (JIT) storage and delivery of stock. JIT also led to the availability 
308 System dynamics of sectoral and organisational recovery 
 
of spare parts not matching the number of repairs to be carried out by the critical infrastructure 
sector. 
Damage to and closure of the Lyttelton Port, the Lyttelton Road Tunnel and the Evans 
Pass/Sumner Road were a problem mainly for trucking and building supply organisations. At 
the time they had a great need for infrastructure, there was a restricted use of this infrastructure. 
Additionally, there was an increase in the number of trucking organisations after the 
earthquakes. This raised another discrepancy: that of the region’s carrying capacity and the long-
term viability of the sector. The idea of carrying capacity can also be applied to the number of 
skilled tradespeople required in the Canterbury area for the rebuild. If the rebuild were to take 
place at the same time in different parts of the greater Christchurch region, availability of labour 
would be just one of the problems. Another concern would be where to house the labourers 
who would come in from out of town (as was part of the plan by recovery authorities) and what 
the social implications of so many (mostly) men would be. All these are mismatches. 
Other disparities were visible in the system. The recovery of Lyttelton Town Centre affected the 
recovery of the arts and crafts sector. Arts and crafts were affected by lower tourist numbers. 
However if tourists were to be encouraged to come to the greater Christchurch region, 
accommodation hospitality organisations would need to increase the number of guests they 
could host (the hospitality sector reported the loss of 70 – 80% of beds after the 22 February 
2011 earthquake). 
There were also mismatches in the need for and availability of information and communication. 
This is related to section 8.4.5. The uncertainty about what the CBD would look like or when it 
would be functional again caused affected organisations to make plans that involved not 
returning to the CBD in the medium-term. As well, information in the form of revised building 
codes should be in step with construction and training. Such a mismatch may lead to delays in 
starting construction work and could also lead to work not carried out competently due to newer 
requirements. 
8.4.4 Uncertainty 
There was a lot of uncertainty surrounding many aspects of recovery after the Canterbury 
earthquakes. In a disaster situation, it is expected that there will be uncertainty and that some of 
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this uncertainty is caused by the lack of information. However, it is imperative that ways of 
minimising post-disaster uncertainty should be determined. Uncertainty contributes to lack of 
system clarity and cohesion. 
As with the delays, there were multiple causes of uncertainty. There was uncertainty about the 
overall recovery plan as well as how it would be financed and implemented. This was significant 
as it could affect organisational strategic decision making, most especially for organisations that 
were in the CBD. This plan was also important for any would be investors in the greater 
Christchurch economy. 
Consequently, there was also uncertainty because of lack of information. Some actions to 
counter this uncertainty include articulation of the recovery plan, especially regarding finance 
and implementation. In the absence of concrete and detailed plans, information on where the 
planning process had got to and possibly how long it would take to craft the plan would have 
been beneficial to organisations and sectors. 
Another factor that contributed to uncertainty was lack of detail in the original CBD recovery 
plan. Some anchor projects were planned for (e.g. the new Town Hall) but their precise locations 
in the CBD had not been decided. This had the effect that landowners did not know if their land 
would be part of an anchor project. Additionally, any other buildings to be erected in the CBD 
had to be placed in context of these anchor projects. 
8.4.5 Hierarchy and self-organisation 
The system exhibited self-organisation in reaction to the disruption brought about by the 
earthquakes. Self-organisation was possible because the system is made up of smaller units, in 
this case the organisation and then the industry sector. This is an example of the hierarchy of 
systems; the intermediate level connecting the greater economy to the organisation is the sector. 
For instance some ICT organisations acted to stabilise demand and supply difficulties by 
negotiating with customers modified delivery schedules as they worked to restart production and 
catch-up on lost productivity. The organisations said this worked due to having a good supplier-
customer relationship established prior to the earthquakes. In other cases, competing 
organisations collaborated by sharing workspace and equipment. 
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From the actions taken by organisations and sectors to effect recovery after the earthquakes, it is 
clear that the system’s tendency to self-organisation is a result of its capacity to learn, diversify 
and evolve. The complexity of the Canterbury system also made self-organisation possible. From 
the interview data, it seems that self-organisation was also brought about (made possible) 
because of the instability caused by the earthquakes. In the absence of the order organisations 
and sectors were accustomed to, there was a need to be creative and innovative in order to 
survive and recover. Carpenter et al (2001) emphasise that a resilient system need not be stable 
in the traditional sense of  not changing and Perrings (1998) writes that system actors may 
actually desire system states that are not sustainable. 
8.4.6 Resilience 
In this thesis, the definition of recovery, which can be extended to the overall system, is when an 
organisation or sector can function and sustain itself  (continually) in its new post-disaster environment while 
resilience is defined as the ability to survive crisis and thrive in a world of uncertainty (Seville et al., 2008). 
Resilience is an emergent property of the system, enables system survival and contributes to the 
achievement of system goals even when the system is faced with challenges. Also, it can be 
concluded that resilience and recovery are context dependent, as was shown with the differing 
definitions of  recovery and resilience in chapter 2. Additionally, every system is defined for a 
purpose and is bounded by its environment (D. H. Meadows & Wright, 2008). The environment 
being the context within which the system operates. Furthermore, the resilience and recovery of  
a system should be managed to achieve the system’s purpose. As such, in the context of  the 
Canterbury earthquakes, the articulation of  what recovery would look like was important (see 
sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.3) in shaping organisational and sectoral plans for recovery. 
The changing dominance and existence of the feedbacks loops is a major contributor to the 
resilience of the system. From analysis of the model of the greater Christchurch system after the 
earthquakes, it can be seen that different feedback loops in the system were dominant at 
different times. For instance, some feedback loops that were in the response phase did not 
manifest in the short-term recovery phase. 
Prior to the Canterbury earthquakes, the resilience of the system or parts of it may not have 
been immediately evident or even measurable. However, the perturbation resulting from the 
earthquakes, where the system’s bounds were tested but not broken demonstrates that the 
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system is resilient. Table 8-2 contains interrelated aspects that contributed to organisational and 
sectoral resilience after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes. Some of these aspects include 
adaptation, diversity and self-organisation. Apart from the aspect changing dominance of  
feedback loops in Table 8-3, the rest of  the aspects that contributed to overall system resilience 
are comparable to the characteristics of  organisational resilience described by organisations in 
section 6.5.4. For instance, the ability of  organisations to adapt to post-earthquake 
circumstances by working from alternative premises contributed to their resilience. The 
possibility for organisations to relocate in this way was partly attributable to the localisation of  
physical damage caused by the earthquakes as well as the quick restoration or non-interruption 
of  utilities. This is also to do with system hierarchy. In thinking of  Canterbury as one part of  a 
larger system, Canterbury could still access resources from other parts of  the system that are 
outside the region. 
For some organisations and sectors, diversity of  location, customer base and goods and services 
contributed to their resilience. However, for organisations with geographically spread customers, 
this was dependent on the organisations’ ability to produce goods and services and to get these 
goods and services to their customers. For example, some organisations from the ICT sector 
that deliver their services online said they were still able to deliver goods and services to 
customers. An aspect of resilience that aided this was the organisations being able to 
communicate with their customers and inform them of the organisation’s post-earthquake 
status. Information and communication being some of the ways in which uncertainty can be 
managed. Managing uncertainty, communicating with customers and restarting operations after 
the earthquakes all require leadership and self-organisation.  
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Table 8-3: Aspects contributing positively to system resilience after the 2010 - 2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
Aspects contributing to system resilience after the 2010 - 2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
System aspects Details 
Localisation of earthquake damage Differing degrees of damage to different parts of the 
greater Christchurch area 
Changing dominance of feedback loops Different loops dominant at different stages giving rise to 
changing system behaviour over time  
Adaptation Of people, relocation, adjusting mode of delivery of 
goods and services 
Diversity Of people, location, customers, goods and services 
Bi-directional information flow between system agents System agents give and receive information 
Leadership and self-organisation  Leadership within sectors, and self-organisation in the 
form of partnerships 
Hierarchy  For instance individual organisations making up sectors 
Managing uncertainty (to certain extents) For organisations, ensuring staff not made redundant 
Recognition of complexity of recovery task and 
involvement of multiple stakeholders  
Recovery agencies, organisations, community, local 
authorities 
Recognition of limiting factors in recovery Some limiting factors are finance, personnel, machinery 
Conversely, there were aspects that when not managed properly led to a decline in resilience for 
organisations and sectors. One of these is the lack of relevant information and communication 
from recovery authorities as to when certain buildings could be accessed. Another aspect 
contributing negatively to organisational and sectoral resilience was the shortage of necessary 
skills that contributed to organisations being able to resume operations. Some of these include 
engineering skills for land and building assessment. As discussed in other parts of the thesis, 
such shortages had cascading effects. 
The specific elements of organisational and sectoral disaster resilience are explored in detail in 
chapter 10. Again, the aspects listed in Table 8-3 emerged from the system that was examined.  
The systems view enables the identification of the different feedback loops in evidence, their 
role in recovery as well as in hazard mitigation and planning. 
8.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter illustrated, through the use of systems thinking, the interactions between system 
elements in the response and short-term recovery phases after the Canterbury earthquakes. In 
these two periods after the earthquakes, different feedback loops were dominant leading to 
differing system behaviour and effects. This emphasises that the structure of a system, the 
linkages between system actors, determines its behaviour. This chapter has shown that the 
system is influenced by and influences the environment and that system agents are affected 
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directly and indirectly by other agents. The examination of the linkages in the system led to the 
identification and explanation of specific system attributes that influenced organisational and 
sectoral recovery after the earthquakes in Canterbury. These are: 
 interactions between system elements; 
 (system) environmental time delays; 
 mismatches; 
 uncertainty; 
 hierarchy and self-organisation; and 
 resilience. 
After listing the system attributes that contribute to recovery, chapter 9 follows on from this 
with information on specific elements that helped or hindered recovery after the earthquakes in 
Canterbury. As well, points of leverage that can be used to manage the system for recovery are 
pointed out. 
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9 Aids, hindrances and points of intervention in recovery  
 In this section, the information from chapters 4 to 8 is brought together and employed to 
determine the factors that aid or hinder recovery. In addition, possible points of intervention 
that can be used to influence system events are identified. All the aids, hindrances and points of 
intervention are shown in Figure 9-1 and described in the sections that follow (using the same 
headings). It should be noted that in a system, intervention can lead to positive or negative effects 
and unintended consequences. The aids and hindrances to recovery as well as the points of 
intervention are presented here individually for clarity, however, they are linked. Also, some of 
the aids, hindrances and points of intervention that have been discussed in previous chapters will 
not be discussed in detail; they are listed here for completeness. 
As can be seen in Figure 9-1, some of the aids to recovery are actions that can be undertaken by 
organisations prior to or after a disaster event. As well, the points of intervention in recovery 
have been grouped into actions organisations can take; infrastructure relied on for organisational 
operations and environmental factors. 
It should be noted that the aids, hindrances and points of intervention are not listed in rank 
order of importance. First, for different organisations and sectors, the rankings of these elements 
differ. What is important for individual organisations and sectors is the recognition of which of 
these elements affect them, to what extent, and how they can mitigate this. Second, ranking the 
importance of elements in a complex system is not easy because of the interactions between 
them that lead to this complexity. 
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Figure 9-1: Aids, hindrances and point of intervention in recovery after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
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9.1 Aids to recovery 
9.1.1 Buffering  
Buffering here refers to actions or events that shielded organisations and sectors from some of 
the effects of the earthquakes, e.g. in giving them more time before they ran out of supplies. 
Some organisations and sectors had buffers that assisted in the short-term after the earthquakes. 
These buffers took different forms. For all of the sectors, the size of the economy of 
Christchurch also acted as a buffer as there was more than one main contributing sector to keep 
the Canterbury economy going. Additionally, the localised nature of the Canterbury earthquakes 
(discussed in section 9.1.2) made it possible to access available external resources. 
The good average annual sales growth for trucking, FMCG and ICT (see chapter 5) helped, i.e. 
was a buffer, with cash flow which was necessary after the earthquake to pay for immediate 
repairs. FMCG also had small reserves of some stock (helpful in the short-term) both in 
warehouses and in the back of the store. These were helpful in meeting short-term demands 
when stores re-opened. Some FMCG organisations communicated that they used a just-in-time 
(JIT) system for stock delivery and stored little excess goods on their premises. Reasons for this 
include the cost of renting more floor space for excess goods and the convenience of having a 
distribution centre in Christchurch.  
When asked, some critical infrastructure organisations reported having a store of spare parts in 
some of their warehouses. However, these spare parts were usually for sections of the network 
that in their experience broke down frequently. They did not have many, if any, spare parts for 
sections of the network that did not frequently breakdown but that sustained damage in the 
earthquakes and required replacement. 
After the Canterbury earthquakes, organisations and sectors could plan for an increase in 
buffering capacity of major resources. An increased buffering capacity affords organisations time 
to re-start operations, where possible, while supply links are restored. The localisation of the 
damage in Canterbury meant that organisations could access resources to a certain extent. While 
having little excess stock on hand might be economical during business-as-usual, in the event of 
a regional disaster, holding more excess stock might prove to be an advantage for the recovery 
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
317 
 
of the organisation and the region. The downside of this is the increased storage costs 
mentioned and also possible stock damage should a disaster eventuate. 
9.1.2 The scale and reach of the earthquake damage 
The distribution of the effects of the earthquakes is related to the buffers mentioned in section 
9.1.1. The adverse physical damage caused by the earthquakes, to structures, the ground and 
infrastructure, was confined to certain parts of the greater Christchurch area. This was a help to 
the recovery efforts. For instance, localisation of damage to the Christchurch CBD resulted in 
the loss of at least 65% of commercial building stock in the CBD. According to a Christchurch 
City Council (CCC) official interviewed, this represented approximately 7-10% of the city’s 
overall commercial building stock (Christchurch City Council official, personal communication, 
2012). This seemingly low percentage might be because of what was, pre-earthquake, unused 
commercial accommodation in Christchurch. 
Damage to the Christchurch CBD resulted in the cordoning off of parts of the CBD for more 
than 18 months. This localised damage meant that some organisations could relocate to other 
parts of greater Christchurch that did not suffer the same level of damage. This is if the 
organisations had the means and the possibility to do so. This however raises the question of 
how much slack commercial accommodation there was in Christchurch before the earthquakes 
and what it was used for. 
9.1.3 Creation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) was created by Central Government to 
lead and coordinate recovery efforts for the greater Christchurch area after the 2010-2011 
earthquakes. See section 9.6.1. for more detail on CERA as an aid to recovery. 
9.1.4 Other Government actions 
Apart from the creation of a Recovery Authority, other Government actions such as the 
Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) and sending cash to Christchurch (electronic sales terminals 
were inoperable) were a help. See section 6.8.2 for details. 
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The ESS acted as a source of funds for organisations, in the short-term after the earthquakes. It 
afforded organisations much needed time to analyse how they had been affected by the 
earthquakes and what actions to take. Making cash available also enabled much needed trade to 
carry on and acted to keep the flow of money going in the economy. 
9.1.5 Organisation’s knowledge of supply web  
The recovery of the supply web is an integral part of an organisation’s or sector’s recovery. The 
supply web enables the delivery of inputs and the shipment of finished product. From the 
supply web perspective, there are three main sources of disruption: from the supply side 
(suppliers), from the demand side (customers, discretionary, non-discretionary) and from within 
the organisation itself. The accounts of supply web disruption from organisations demonstrate 
that building redundancy into their supply web was one way that they could have overcome 
some of the effects of the earthquakes. For instance, one light manufacturer spoke of having 
more than one production line or main warehouse. However, such measures represented 
additional oftentimes unjustifiable expenses for organisations. It emerged that a flexible and agile 
supply web may have been a better option for instance through product substitution or through 
the acquisition of supplies from different vendors as main suppliers worked to come back on 
line. 
An organisation’s awareness of their position in the supply web, and its characteristics, affects 
not only their recovery but also affects organisations that rely on them in different ways. 
Inversely, the knowledge of the organisation’s critical suppliers and what might affect them 
cannot be overemphasised. This awareness incorporates knowledge of which organisations on 
both sides of the web would be most inconvenienced if the focal organisation were disrupted as 
well as which of the focal organisation’s supply web partners could most affect them in the case 
of a disruption. This knowledge can be used to prioritise customers so as to retain them 
especially in long-term recovery. 
Some ICT and FMCG organisations spoke of getting in touch with their customers to verify 
what the effect of their being unable to deliver would be to these customers. They also worked 
out altered delivery schedules in collaboration. The organisations reported that this cooperation 
with their customers worked in part because of the trust they had built in the course of their 
relationships. 
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From interviews, no organisations reported having discussed supply web issues with their supply 
partners prior to the earthquakes. 
9.1.6 Organisational networking 
The organisation’s network means the arrangement of connections, interactions or relationships 
that the organisation has with other actors in its system or environment. The interviewed 
organisations with more networks (formal and informal) seemed to be doing slightly better in 
their recovery efforts than the organisations with fewer networks. These networks were used for 
the exchange or pooling of resources and in the response and early recovery periods were vital 
for obtaining information. Organisations reported that the usefulness of the information was not 
the most important thing in those first few weeks especially after the 22 February 2011 
earthquake. That they could get some information was helpful in itself. 
Organisations referred to networking as a way of keeping up with information and trends inside 
and outside their industry that could aid their recovery. Networking was also used to find what 
upcoming work was available in their or connected industry sectors. Informal networks ensured 
that they were known to organisations that might require their services which could lead to more 
formalised arrangements or as a way to procure or get jobs by word of mouth. 
9.2 Hindrances to recovery 
There were multiple hindrances to recovery after the earthquakes in Canterbury. As with the aids 
to recovery, the hindrances are listed separately but are closely connected.  
9.2.1 Delays 
Time delays are a crucial aspect of recovery and can act to impede recovery. More details on the 
effects of time delays are presented in section 8.4.2. 
9.2.2 Uncertainty 
After a disaster situation, there will likely be some level of uncertainty. Uncertainty contributes 
to lack of system clarity and cohesion. Section 8.4.4 has more detail on the effects of uncertainty 
post-disaster. 
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9.2.3 Lack of information (and communication) 
Information and communication are complementary. Communication can be thought of as the 
means of delivering or disseminating information. Consequently, good means of communication 
does not mean that the information is right or adequate for the intended purpose. 
Information is a precious commodity in disaster recovery and the deficiency of it often leads to 
uncertainty, misinterpretation or incorrect assumptions as people look to fill the void. The lack 
or slow release of information post-earthquakes added to the uncertainty of the plans for 
recovery especially for the Christchurch CBD. This affected those organisations that wanted to 
return to or invest in the CBD for example. However, even as the lack of information was a 
serious issue, there needed to be a balance between speedy decision making and long-term 
planning. The period of recovery from disaster is a chance to engage in long-term disaster 
preparation and mitigation activities. 
The dearth of information was also in the residential land zone planning. It was unknown for 
long periods of time which areas would be declared irreparable45. This of course had a bearing 
on the post-earthquake planning of organisations in the critical infrastructure, FMCG, Kaiapoi 
Town Centre and Lyttelton Town Centre organisations. Just because an organisation’s assets are 
undamaged does not mean that their recovery will not be affected by other factors such as 
customers moving away from the area. 
After disaster, both the means of communication and the content of the information 
communicated are vital. Organisations require information in order to make meaningful strategic 
plans for instance. Information should be available, relevant and timely. For example, in greater 
Christchurch, information on land zoning was delayed and unclear. This meant organisations did 
not have the right information on population profiles to use in business and recovery decisions. 
Also, the delivery of information, i.e. the means of communication, should suit the situation. In 
some cases it may be better to inform using physical mail while in other cases, social media may 
suffice. 
                                                     
45 The details of the residential land zone offer can be found in chapter 5. 
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In a positive aspect of information and communication, the trucking and FMCG sectors worked 
together on supply and demand instability issues. This illustrates the criticality of communication 
and collaboration after disaster as well as in peacetime. One of the system effects in this case is 
the bullwhip effect (Sterman, 2000) caused by the different elements involved in this loop having 
incorrect or inadequate information about stock requirements in the supply web. This can cause 
the variability of orders to increase further upstream in the supply web. 
9.2.4 Official cordon around Christchurch CBD Red Zone 
The cordon around the Christchurch CDB Red Zone was put in place for several reasons such 
as the protection of the public from falling masonry after extensive damage to buildings caused 
by the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The cordon, while growing progressively smaller, was 
maintained while the demolition of buildings was done. In addition, the cordon was used as a 
physical control point by the authorities for anyone wanting to access the CBD Red Zone. Any 
individual wishing to enter the cordoned off area had to seek official permission and sign 
consent papers. 
However this procedure did not stop people getting into the cordoned area illegally. This 
worried many business owners who were concerned as many of them faced difficulties in their 
trying to access the area legally to check on what damage their property had sustained, for 
insurance purposes as well as for the retrieval of equipment, information or stock. They 
expressed concern at the looting that took place as they had expected that the authorities would 
have provided adequate security to stop the wrong people gaining access to the Red Zone. This 
prompted some building and business owners to illegally enter the cordoned off area, admittedly 
at risk to their own lives, as they felt that their premises and belongings were unsafe. This was a 
case of separate decisions made by individuals aimed at achieving their own interests partly due 
to a lack of credible information and assurance from those officially tasked with leading the 
recovery of the greater Christchurch area (see chapter 6.9 on leadership and trust). The existence 
of the cordon was also a source of uncertainty. 
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9.2.5 Flow of financial resources  
Money is one of the crucial attributes in recovery. It enables the carrying out of many other 
activities. One way to keep money (and capital) flowing is through the settlement of insurance 
claims. Insurance has been discussed in relation to delays and mismatches. Apart from the delay 
in insurance payments, organisations reported that the non-settlement and the non-availability of 
insurance policies affected them in a number of ways. Some organisations were affected because 
banks were not lending money to organisations with no insurance policies; this was especially so 
in cases of relocation when organisations could not get new insurance policies for new premises. 
Additionally, other organisations could not get contractors to repair premises because some 
contractors could not get contract works insurance. 
The role the insurance industry played in the Canterbury earthquakes merits special mention as 
New Zealand has a high earthquake insurance penetration rate (J. Johnson, 2013). The delay in 
paying out insurance claims was a problem for a lot of organisations in Christchurch, especially 
the small- to medium-sized organisations. However, some contextual and case study 
interviewees stated that another aspect of insurance was the uncertainty of future insurability; 
both the availability and affordability of it. 
One of the reasons Christchurch got into the insurance situation it was in was because of the 
management of expectations. As discussed earlier, the seismic risk for Christchurch was known, 
even if the faults that caused the Canterbury earthquakes were not. However, risk managers did 
not want to be seen to be pessimistic and may have downplayed the worst case scenario (CEO, 
personal correspondence, 2012). The focus was instead on Wellington and the Alpine Fault. 
Herein lie lessons for organisations in other parts of New Zealand that there are multiple 
hazards that should be considered. Additionally, perhaps there is a need to spread the risk in 
other ways and not just through traditional insurance. For Christchurch, and by extension New 
Zealand, this requires a rethink of how disaster risk is perceived. However, it should be noted 
again that the 22 February 2011 earthquake exceeded by a considerable margin the maximum 
credible earthquake assessment. 
The Canterbury earthquakes also highlighted some major loopholes and further mismatches in 
existing business interruption insurance wording and policy. Some organisations did not get paid 
their business interruption insurance because their insurance company deemed that they could 
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open the door and trade. However, by law all buildings had to be checked and certified by qualified 
personnel before they could be used again. As previously mentioned, there was a shortage of 
people with the required skills to carry out these assessments which meant that there were 
organisations that were caught in limbo. The insurance issue was further complicated by the 
tiered insurance system for disaster. The Earthquake Commission’s (EQC) declarations of 
certain earthquakes as events for households and contents were not matched to the definition of 
events that commercial insurers used.  
9.2.6 Organisational supply web vulnerabilities 
The supply web includes any resources the organisation needs to produce goods or deliver 
services. This can be employees, raw materials, customers, suppliers, utilities or technology and 
highlights anew the many ways in which organisations can be disturbed. A supply web can also 
have first and second order ripple effects beyond the affected organisation (Sheffi, 2007). First 
order effects are to the customers and suppliers of the organisation, while second order effects 
are to customers and suppliers of customers as well as customers and suppliers of suppliers (and 
any other entities that can be affected). From the interviews, two aspects are apparent for the 
supply web relationship between two (or more) organisations; 
 on how many levels and to what degree and extent the organisations are connected; and 
 the criticality to one organisation of  the goods and services offered or bought by the 
other organisation. 
From interviews with the FMCG sector, a third aspect is the number of organisations reliant on 
one supplier, for instance the number of retailers dealing with one supplier. This is a feature of 
the New Zealand market considering its size and location. If one major producer or supplier was 
disrupted, many retailers would also be inconvenienced as that supplier is a single point of 
failure. 
Supply web vulnerabilities mean that there is also a pre-disaster requirement for organisations to 
understand the minimum conditions to maintain core business functions. Minimum 
requirements being the least possible requirements for the organisation to function. Also, prior 
understanding of the availability of external resources, i.e. from outside the organisation, is 
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important. This is of course situation, industry sector and business type dependent. The 
robustness and resilience of an organisation’s supply web are only some facets of this. Also of 
value is recognition of the critical links in the supply web as well as understanding how these 
links being disrupted would affect the members of the web.  
9.2.7 Limiting factors (resources) 
In every system there are limiting factors. In the presence of all other resources, limiting factors 
act to slow down the functioning of a system or its subsystems. For recovery, this is not always a 
good thing. In greater Christchurch, depending on which part of the system is under scrutiny, 
there were several such factors. They include finance, skilled labour, infrastructure availability 
and recovery plans, among others. For instance, the lack of a somewhat detailed recovery plan 
resulted in difficulty for organisations and sectors, e.g. building suppliers, in forecasting demand. 
This then affected the supply side also. 
9.3 Points of intervention in recovery: From research to practise 
From the analysis above, there are points of intervention in the system where action can be 
taken in order to alter the trajectory and influence the system. Meadows (2008) calls these leverage 
points. The identification of these points in the system is one of the ways in which this research 
can make a practical contribution for the benefit of policymakers, organisations and sectors. This 
is in addition to clarifying why the system behaves the way it does. It should be noted that the 
system can be influenced in a positive or negative direction depending on the motives of the 
intervener. 
The aids and hindrances to recovery as well as the discussion in chapter 7 shows that from an 
organisational and sectoral perspective, there are three main aspects that interact and lead to 
different degrees of vulnerability. These three aspects are: the organisational characteristics, 
infrastructure and frameworks used by organisations to deliver goods and services, and 
ecological factors which are outside the control of the organisation. In conjunction with analysis 
from chapters 5, 6 and 8, these are the aspects that will be used in discussing points of 
intervention. In this chapter, the points of intervention in recovery have been grouped into: 
actions by organisations and sectors, infrastructure used by organisations and environmental 
factors. 
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9.4 Actions by organisations and sectors 
The decisions made by an organisation in the immediate aftermath of disaster can influence not 
only their long-term recovery but that of other organisations. Corey and Deitch (2011) came to 
similar conclusions when they investigated organisational recovery after Hurricane Katrina. 
9.4.1 Investment in staff 
The realisation that staff are crucial to the organisation and its recovery after disaster should 
translate into organisations investing more in their staff, for example through training, 
counselling, the enablement of employees to balance family and work demands. This investment 
needs to be done both before and after a disaster event.  
For instance, information from organisations shows that the ongoing earthquakes in Canterbury 
took their toll on staff and their families. Organisations reported that on return from the 
Christmas and New Year break 2011 - 2012, employees seemed more tired than before they 
went on break. This is likely because of additional earthquakes and also from other earthquake 
effects such as filing insurance claims and dealing with tradespeople. These activities dragged on 
from one month to another in a seemingly endless cycle and took their toll on people’s reserves. 
The multiple earthquakes worked to reset the clock (physically and emotionally) for many people 
and for some, affected their performance at work. Some organisations reported that actions such 
as making sure staff took some time off were helpful. 
9.4.2 Organisational or sectoral leadership in crisis and leadership wellbeing 
Another element necessary for successful recovery is leadership. This is touched on in chapter 6. 
Staw et al. (1981) observe that in situations where the organisation faces an external threat (e.g. an 
earthquake) people in an organisation will look to others in the organisation in positions of 
leadership for direction. From the definition of organisational crisis given in chapter 2, it can be 
concluded that leadership is needed for all crises. 
The case study organisations all narrated the importance of having a thoughtful, decisive, goal 
oriented and clear communicator as one to lead a crisis. This is the person or persons that 
initially assess the altered post-disaster environment before the organisation can open its doors 
326 Aids, hindrances and points of intervention in recovery 
 
again. This means there needs to be an awareness of what has transpired and what is yet to 
unfold. Another aspect of leadership is to plan for and implement the targeted and effective46 
use of resources in the response and recovery phase so that available resources are put to the 
best use during response and recovery. Specific to the greater Christchurch region, in the 
presence of other resources (financial, physical and geotechnical engineering knowledge), 
persistent earthquakes should only affect the decision making for so long. 
However, the interviewer observed that the wellbeing of the small business owner and of the 
people in organisations leading the recovery is something that needs to be explored further. 
People leading the recovery effort were themselves affected by the earthquakes. This may or may 
not have had a bearing on how they led. Specific to the small business owner is that they are the 
business and the business is them. Small business owners should look into possible succession 
plans for crisis times as they have to manage their personal as well as professional lives with little 
or no outside help. 
9.4.3 Investigation, analysis and application of lessons 
Recovery starts before or immediately after an event in the measures taken by organisations to 
prepare for and mitigate against the outcomes of disaster. At the time of interviewing (March to 
April 2012), most of the organisations had not reviewed decisions and actions that were taken in 
the response and early recovery phase after each earthquake. As is discussed in section 5.5, 
organisations may overestimate how well they performed both during and after the response and 
very early short-term recovery phases post 4 September 2010. This may have affected analysis of 
their response, in how well they coped, as well as subsequent preparation for future disaster 
response. Paton et al (1998) write that this magnification of the organisation’s capabilities after 
surviving one disaster may have an effect on how well the organisation prepares for future 
events by underestimating risk and by constraining thinking. Mileti and O’Brien (1993) refer to 
this as normalisation bias. 
It would be helpful for organisations to have an organisation wide discussion of response and 
recovery actions and decisions, not for the purposes of finger pointing or individual blame but 
to identify best practise that can inform corporate strategy as well as possibly reducing or 
                                                     
46 Effective here means that the planned and eventual outcomes are the same. 
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counteracting future crises or disasters. Some of the ways in which organisations can do this is 
by enquiring if the organisation’s existing (institutional) capabilities are adequate for the handling 
of future challenges or if there is a need to modify and add to these capabilities. For instance, for 
the building suppliers sector, will the sector have the resources to deal with the requirements of 
rebuild when it takes off on a large scale? 
For all sectors, some of the lessons learnt can be applied as soon as is possible in the recovery 
process. For example, there should be an emphasis on building back with improved methods 
and technologies. It appears that experiencing losses in the earthquake had a positive effect on 
the preparedness levels of some organisations in this study. The two items on the preparedness 
checklist that showed the greatest improvement following the earthquakes were bracing of 
shelves and equipment, as well as having the organisation’s premises structurally assessed. 
9.4.4 Preparedness for all hazards 
Crisis preparedness is linked to the analysis and use of lessons from prior crises. In crisis 
preparedness, most of the organisations spoken to did not have documented crisis, emergency 
or business continuity plans over and above fire evacuation maps and fire extinguishers. 
Additionally, some organisations reported also not having back-ups of important organisational 
information. And yet the large majority were able to adapt to the turbulent circumstances, 
recognising in the process what they had to do to carry on in the short- and long-term. This is 
good but adaptability is only one of the elements in the successful recovery of a firm. 
Preparedness and planning should be ongoing; these activities do not end with the production of 
a written report. Organisations observed that in hindsight, pre-existing crisis plans and the 
rehearsal of these plans (table top and enacted) are good starting points for how to manage in 
crisis. Enacting plans not only ensures that the people who use these plans know of their 
existence but also that they know what is contained in the plans. Organisations further noted 
that as every crisis is different, crisis, emergency, business continuity or recovery plans should 
contain enough detail to act as a guide but not too much detail that there is little room to adjust. 
There are also other aspects to disaster preparedness. One crucial part to incorporate into the 
design of disaster planning is the behaviour of people in the organisation in reaction to a 
disaster. For instance, after the earthquakes, one organisation noted that they had good 
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evacuation plans but no mention of re-entry plans which is one part required for business 
continuity in their case. 
Other preparedness measures include the organisational development of robust back-up 
practices for all important documentation. This is to mean more than one extra copy of any vital 
information as well as storage in different formats and locations. Back-up can also be for 
machinery or premises by having mutual aid agreements with other organisations. Preparedness 
can also involve organisations investing in new building technologies for damage avoidance to 
mitigate against damage and disruption. 
Preparedness includes the organisations incorporating disaster resilience into their strategy. For 
most organisations the expenditure on crisis preparedness needs to be balanced with the value of 
those plans both before and after disaster. As there was concurrence on the value of resilience 
and its attendant benefits to organisations, there is a business case to be made for resilience. 
Organisations should look into investing in those actions that would make them resilient such as 
succession planning, having good leaders, well trained staff as well as emergency and recovery 
plans. Chapter 10 touches on this by analysing how organisations can embed disaster resilience 
and make a business case for the same. 
A relatively high proportion of organisations engaged in some measures geared towards life-
safety, such as having a first aid kit and fire extinguisher available on their premises. 
Organisations however reported that they were not prepared for large events such as the 
Canterbury earthquakes. This is a demonstration of organisations being prepared for events they 
thought would happen to them and not a broader range and scale of hazards. Rather, 
organisations should engage in planning from an all-hazards perspective as it is not possible to 
plan for every single possibility. Generic plans have the advantage of being applicable to many 
different hazards and scenarios. For the organisation, such plans also save them resources as 
they spend considerably less time and money developing all-hazard plans than specific hazard 
plans. 
In risk management exists the principle of consistent crudeness (Elms, 1985) which organisations can 
use as a heuristic for disaster preparation. Using this principle, the amount of effort or energy 
put into any one part of disaster readiness should be commensurate with that in other parts of 
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the readiness strategy or plans. This is because disproportionate attention to any one part could 
equal a poor utilisation of resources if there are weaknesses in other parts. 
9.4.5 Involvement of organisations and sectors as part of the core recovery strategy 
Results from this study have brought to light that organisations and sectors can engage in 
recovery in various ways: as employers, as stakeholders in the community and as an aid to each 
other’s recovery. In this way, they can be used as leverage points in recovery. From the actions 
that organisations took to aid employees, and also collectively because of the number of 
employees they have, organisations are an integral part of any disaster response strategy. First, 
organisations have access to a large number of people at the same time. They also usually have 
resources available to employees that can help the community at large. Apart from their being 
monetary contributors to the recovery effort they can be used in response, recovery and 
mitigation phases to reach communities and help the authorities collect critical information e.g. 
by collecting information on the state of employees houses and sending this into a central 
recovery database. This could work in conjunction with the Red Cross and other organisations 
and act to inform decisions about where help is most needed and what actions need to be taken. 
This approach is not without its drawbacks. First the location of the disaster would play a major 
role. In the case of Christchurch, the nature of the disaster and the availability of technology 
meant that a lot of employers embarked on ascertaining the wellbeing of employees and families. 
This method might not be applicable in a less developed country or in a larger disaster or 
catastrophe. Also, there would have to be guarantees of privacy for the information provided. 
After the earthquakes, employees were more willing to give out certain types of personal 
information though, such as private or unlisted telephone numbers and other data that could be 
used for recovery purposes. For employers in Christchurch, this was information they were 
already collecting anyway from their employees to help them decide what kind of assistance they 
could provide to employees. For example, one organisation booked holiday homes in Hanmer 
Springs, an area close to Christchurch. All the employees and families who were still in 
Christchurch were strongly encouraged to use it on a rotational basis. Despite this, the recovery 
authorities would still have to be aware of those who are unemployed and have no access to 
communication facilities.  
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Organisations also found value in sharing best practice on how to manage employee stress or on 
parts of recovery strategies employed (inter- and intra-sectorally) by other organisations within 
and outside their sector. This is an example of pooling the knowledge of a few into the work of 
many others and saving resources such as time and money. After all, the different organisations 
and sectors are to various extents dependent on each other for recovery. However, for the long-
term recovery strategy of the greater Christchurch area, organisations reported that they were 
not consulted on what they thought or were not asked to sit at the table especially considering the 
interests (financial, human, etc.) they had in the recovery of the area. This is the under- or non-
utilisation of resources. 
9.5 Infrastructure used by organisations 
From the effects of the earthquakes, two things are important for organisations to look for; the 
causes of disruption and the effects of disruption. This should also be applied to structures 
organisations rely on for delivery of goods and services. 
9.5.1 Physical infrastructure 
This is infrastructure organisations are dependent on to produce and deliver their goods and 
services. This includes but is not limited to roads, bridges, plant, machinery, communications 
apparatus (computers, telephones, and radios), water and electricity. The organisation’s inability 
to access or use this infrastructure can cause disruption to operations. In the greater 
Christchurch context the extensive building damage was limited to specific areas and the 
restoration of critical services such as electricity and roads was relatively quick. The quick 
restoration of essential services is a leverage point in recovery. Additionally, the arrangement of 
the rubbish transfer stations, in Christchurch, enabled the removal of debris from building and 
demolition sites allowing organisations that could, to re-enter premises and in some cases 
resume operations. The presence of debris can cause disruption by limiting access to 
infrastructure. 
9.5.2 Supply web 
The supply web forms part of the organisation’s network. After disaster, a functioning supply 
web is another leverage in recovery. This may enable an organisation to restart operations 
quicker. This is discussed further in section 9.1.5. 
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9.6 Environmental factors 
In any disaster, but especially on a regional or wider scale, organisations are affected by agents in 
their environment. As elements in larger systems, organisations operate in an environment 
where the actions they take and the results of those actions are sometimes dependent on the 
actions and decisions of others such as customers, suppliers, competitors or the authorities. 
Therefore, there are points in the organisation’s or sector’s environment that can be used to 
effect recovery. 
9.6.1 Role of recovery leaders and agencies 
The significance of the people and the agencies leading overall recovery efforts cannot be 
overestimated as a leverage point in recovery. A competent, inspired and inspiring leadership to 
set the recovery goals and come up with an overall recovery strategy gives vision and hope to all 
interested parties. This also ensures that all agents involved with the recovery, to whatever 
extent, can align their plans with the greater recovery strategy. However, apart from the effort 
put into aligning stakeholders towards the same goal, the goal has to be the right one, as defined 
by the stakeholders (see section 8.4.5).  
Interviewees spoke of the silos between the main organisations or authorities working towards 
or leading the recovery. These were the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) as well as other government agencies. The silos contributed to 
the authorities not sharing valuable information with each other about the recovery strategy. 
Often, one agency did not know what the other was planning which led to different groups 
being given conflicting information. It also caused confusion about who really was in charge of 
recovery for greater Christchurch. 
In all, organisations identified the stakeholders in recovery after the earthquakes as CERA, local 
authorities, communities and organisations (the business community). Even after the link 
between business and community was identified (see section 6.6), organisations reported that 
they still did not work with the other recovery stakeholders in a way that was more beneficial. 
This shows that in managing after disaster, it is not necessarily a command-and-control 
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approach47 that is required. What should be emphasised is the coordination between different 
stakeholders. 
From the contextual interviews and case studies, some respondents expressed dissatisfaction at 
the structure of CERA. The setting up of a Recovery Authority to lead the work was welcomed 
but the direct report of its Chief Executive to a government minister was not. Interviewees felt 
that reporting to an independent board would have given the Recovery Authority more 
autonomy and that it would have engaged better with the community and with organisations. 
Some of the reasons for this were that the way Central Government functions, and by extension 
CERA, was not the best way to guide such a massive and sensitive project. It was felt that 
reporting to a government minister disempowered the organisation and by extension the people 
of Christchurch in what was for them a very personal recovery. It remains to be seen whether 
the setup of CERA was the best alternative for recovery after the Canterbury earthquakes. 
9.6.2 Regional and national economies 
After disaster, one goal of a Recovery Authority should be to encourage the creation of 
conditions conducive to successful recovery. In this way, a regional or national economy can be 
used to leverage recovery. For instance, the creation of a special category visa for personnel with 
skills required for the Canterbury earthquake rebuild was one such point of intervention. 
9.6.3 Information 
Organisations require information in order to make meaningful strategic plans for instance.  
After disaster, the content of information communicated is essential. See section 9.2.3 for more 
detail. 
9.6.4 Communication 
Information and communication are complementary. The dissemination of information relies on 
the means of communication. The importance of this after disaster is discussed in section 9.2.3. 
                                                     
47 A command and control approach may be required in the immediate response. 
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9.6.5 Policy 
Policy is another tool that can be used to influence how the system behaves. However, the 
direction of influence is not always as intended. For example, it was recognised that 
transportation of disaster debris to pre-earthquake transfer stations led to delays in carrying out 
demolition on demolition sites. Organisations involved in debris removal were then allowed to 
sort waste on the demolition site or from temporary transfer stations in order to hasten 
demolition and access to sites. In some cases, this led to some organisations removing financially 
valuable parts of the debris, leaving the not so valuable parts to be cleared up by someone else, 
in this instance the taxpayer. This behaviour affected the organisations that sorted all their waste 
as they had a smaller profit margin than the rogue waste removal organisations. The actions to 
stop these rogue businesses were seen as ineffective. For laws to work, they must be seen to be 
fair. 
A case where policy did not work so well is with CBD Red Zone cordon. The cordon was set up 
to keep people out of the damaged CBD area and safe. Organisations whose premises were in 
this zone required access in order to retrieve stock and documents as well as for insurance 
purposes. However, there was a consistency problem in that some people were let into the Red 
Zone while others were not. There was a lack of communication between CDEM and CERA 
and organisations needing to access the Red Zone. In addition, there was no proper explanation 
or information for why this was so or when organisations could access their premises. 
Organisations reported that this led to corruption in who got into the zone and who was 
excluded. This was in addition to the looting that had taken place in some parts of the cordoned 
off area. 
Policy can also be used as input into the building code for seismic limits for new buildings or for 
the reinforcement of older building stock. Other possible policy measures proposed after the 
Canterbury earthquakes were moratoria on new hospitality or retail licenses for a period of five 
to 10 years as a way of assisting the struggling hospitality and retail sectors. This is very similar to 
offering subsidies to organisations and has some of the same disadvantages. It can be argued 
that if some of these organisations were not doing well prior to the earthquakes then they should 
not be assisted in this way after the earthquakes. Instead, conditions such as increasing tourist or 
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customer numbers should be created that encourage these organisations to flourish. The 
moratoria in and of themselves may stop start-ups but will not bring much needed customers to 
existing establishments. Alternatively, the timescale for the moratoria needs to be considered 
carefully if it is to be part of the overall recovery strategy. 
9.6.6 Subsidies and incentives 
The Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) provided by the Central Government was welcomed by 
just about everyone affected by and involved in the recovery of greater Christchurch. Other 
incentives mentioned in interviews included lower land rates for building owners wanting to re-
invest in the Christchurch CBD. 
However, some interviewees felt that in place of subsidies or incentives should be the creation 
of conditions that attract the return or setup of organisations and people to an area like 
Christchurch’s CBD. These could be to do with the architecture of the buildings or the activities 
that people could engage in. 
9.7 Critical success factors for organisational and sectoral recovery after 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes 
In summary, the management of the recovery process after disaster can be compared to that of 
managing a project in the business sphere. Therefore, the project management principle of critical 
success factors (CSFs) (Rockhart & Bullen, 1981) is pertinent to disaster response and recovery. 
CSFs are factors essential for a project to achieve its aims. In disaster response and recovery, 
CSFs are those actions that must work out well or elements that must be present if the recovery 
efforts are to succeed. 
There are numerous CSFs in recovery from disaster. In chapters 4 to 7 of this thesis, the 
differential effects of disaster for different sectors are shown. Consequently, it stands to reason 
that the CSFs for the sectors in this study may differ by sector while others may be similar. For 
instance, just after the earthquakes, the critical infrastructure sector was in need of spare parts 
for repair while the building suppliers sector was in need of information required for forecasting. 
However, for both sectors the CSF of leadership is important. Table 9-1 shows the CSFs that 
have been identified for the recovery of the sectors in this study. The CSFs with the √ sign are 
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what contributed positively to recovery of the sector. The CSFs with the X were important but 
were, from the organisational and sectoral perspective, either missing or not done well. 
Table 9-1 Sectoral critical success factors that contributed positively to recovery:  
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Building Suppliers           √ √ √ X 
Critical Infrastructure  √  √ X X   √  √ √ √ X 
FMCG  √  √ X      √ √ √ X 
Hospitality   √  X      √ √ √ X 
ICT √  √  X X √ √ √  √ √ √ X 
Trucking     X X   √  √ √ √ X 
Christchurch CBD √  √  X X  √   √ √ √ X 
Kaiapoi Town Centre    √ X      √ √ √ X 
Lyttelton Town Centre   √ √ X     √ √ √ √ X 
The CSF all sectors deemed important but deficient was that of external information and 
communication with recovery agencies. This is related to the identification and engagement of 
all stakeholders in the recovery process, arrangements on the cordon around the CBD and the 
general uncertainty not reduced when there was no information forthcoming from recovery 
agencies. Road network disruption is another CSF particularly pointed to by all sectors. This is 
attributable to the need for critical infrastructure organisations, for example, needing to get to 
repair sites, customers not being able to reach organisations, organisations not being able to 
reach customers, increased amount of time on congested roads and increased vehicle 
maintenance costs from wear and tear caused by driving on damaged road infrastructure. For 
critical infrastructure, ICT and trucking, a shortage of resources in the form of skilled personnel 
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to carry out work affected the sectors. Trucking and Christchurch CBD were affected by 
availability of specialist machinery for building demolition and deconstruction. 
In this study, CSFs are applicable to both organisations and sectors. To gain the most out of 
CSFs, organisations and sectors need to identify, at the earliest opportunity, those activities 
crucial to the success of their recovery and then carry them out. It should be noted that some 
CSFs might not be immediately apparent in the aftermath of disaster and that these CSFs change 
the further in time from the disaster event. For instance, from the project management literature, 
Pinto and Prescott (1988) write that the different stages of the project life cycle have different 
CSFs. For organisational and sectoral recovery after the Canterbury earthquake sequence, this is 
demonstrated in the different feedback loops dominant at different points in the system’s time 
horizon. 
9.8 Chapter summary 
In this chapter, the use of system dynamics has enabled the identification of the aids and 
hindrances to recovery as well as points of intervention in the system. This was done by 
observing the effects of the interactions between system actors. Knowing the possible sources 
that have an influence on recovery and at what point in the recovery timeline will better inform 
policy decisions, lead to the improvement of loss estimation after disaster and increase overall 
organisational and sectoral resilience. Recovery research should therefore give more priority to 
what organisations and sectors require for a successful, long-term recovery and reconstruction. 
Essentially, it is not easy to place the aids, hindrances and point of intervention in recovery in 
rank order. This is because, as has been pointed out previously, each sector was affected 
differentially and also every disaster is different. Additionally, from the systems perspective, 
different feedback loops are dominant at different times and act to influence the system in 
different ways. Elms (1985) in his principle of consistent crudeness cautions against 
concentrating on one element to the detriment of other elements which are part of the system. 
After a disaster event, the list of aids, hindrances and points of intervention can be used as a 
starting checklist for how the organisations and sectors have been affected, what is required for 
their recovery and the importance of each of these requirements at the different points in time 
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after the disaster event. These can be used in conjunction with the signifiers of recovery and the 
critical success factors for preparation before a disaster and for recovery after. 
Based on the contextual interview and case study data (chapters 4 and 6), survey data (chapter 5) 
the signifiers of recovery (chapter 7) and the systems analysis (chapters 8 and 9), it is possible to 
classify tier 1 and tier 2 influences that affected the recovery of Canterbury organisations. Tier 1 
indicates that these influences had greater import than tier 2. It is also important to remember 
that the Canterbury earthquake sequence was a regional disaster. Therefore, the more influential 
elements in this disaster may not be the same in a disaster in a different place or of a different 
scale. These tiers can also be used as information by organisations and recovery agencies outside 
the Canterbury region to help them prepare for and manage disaster. 
 
Tier 1 influences: 
 Staff capability and wellbeing; 
 Availability of resources (skilled workers, machinery, finance, stock, utilities); 
 Demand for organisation’s or sector’s good and services; 
 Uncertainty, information and communication; 
 Leadership; 
 Location of customer base; 
 Mode of delivery for organisation’s goods and services; and 
 Localisation of earthquake damage; 
 
Tier 2 influences: 
 Organisational level characteristics e.g. preparedness and documented crisis plans ; and 
 Organisational location. 
 
In chapter 10, organisational and sectoral disaster resilience will be explored. Specifically, what 
aspects contributed to organisational and sectoral disaster resilience after the 2010 – 2011 
earthquakes in Canterbury. 
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10 Sectoral and organisational disaster resilience 
In chapters 6 and 8, it was demonstrated that there are three broad categories whose 
elements combine to varying degrees making organisations susceptible to disaster. These are 
the organisation’s internal characteristics (e.g. type of goods and services delivered, 
preparedness and planning), the physical systems involved in the delivery of the 
organisation’s goods and services (e.g. roads and equipment) and the organisation’s 
environment (e.g. community hazard mitigation). In addition, the extent to which an event 
causes disruption is dependent on the scale of the event: whether it is an emergency, crisis, 
disaster or catastrophe. In the disaster literature, Quarantelli (2006) writes about the 
magnitude of an event leading to its classification in one of the categories. 
Consequently, for the regional disaster that organisations in Canterbury found themselves 
dealing with, this work puts forward the thesis that there are at least two interconnected 
levels of resilience. The first is the business-as-usual (or pre-disaster) resilience of the individual 
organisation and to a degree that of its sector. This is related to the organisation’s 
characteristics such as finance, location and type of goods and services. The second level of 
resilience is to do with the environmental factors emergent after the Canterbury earthquakes 
and necessitates the development by organisations of their disaster resilience. The connection 
between the two levels of resilience is depicted in Figure 2-6 in chapter 2. 
The reason for the distinction between these interconnected levels of resilience is to do with 
the scale of an event. Business-as-usual resilience is when the organisation is affected but 
little or none of its environment is similarly affected. Disaster resilience is when not just the 
organisation is affected but also its environment such as suppliers, customers and the 
community. The interaction of these two levels of resilience typifies the hierarchy of systems 
within systems. Authors such as Paton and Johnston (2006), Tierney (2008), Manyena (2006), 
Chang (2004), Alesch and Holly (2002), Whitman et al (2011) as well as Kachali et al 
(2012)detail how the concept of disaster resilience has gained prominence and is vital for 
recovery after disaster. 
In addition to business-as-usual organisational resilience, organisational disaster resilience 
was also required for organisations affected by the Canterbury series of earthquakes. For 
instance, some organisations from the critical infrastructure sector pointed to their being well 
prepared to handle crises that are part of their business-as-usual but that this preparation  
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(and resources) was not always adequate for the work needing to be done after the 
earthquakes (see chapter 6 for details). In the FMCG sector, organisations narrated being 
affected because the populations they served were affected. For some FMCG organisations 
this was in the form of the community moving away leading to reduced custom while for 
other FMCG organisations this took the form of increased customer numbers. And yet, this 
was only one element that affected FMCG organisations in their recovery after the 
earthquakes. From chapter 8, it is shown that there were many more interactions, such as 
product supply disruption, that had a bearing on FMCG recovery. Consequently, after the 
Canterbury earthquakes, it was evidenced that disaster resilience incorporates many more 
facets than business-as-usual organisational resilience in the breadth of agents both affected 
and involved. 
A further representation of the need for organisational disaster resilience is staff wellbeing 
and its link to external organisational elements such as the wellness of staff family, friends 
and community. The wellbeing of the community is also connected to hazard mitigation 
decisions made by the community and which affect the recovery of organisations post-
disaster. For instance, the decision made by elected officials to under-insure public buildings 
partly contributed to how organisations from the Christchurch CBD and town centres in the 
study were affected. Also, the unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings in the CBD and town 
centres were especially vulnerable to earthquake shaking which led to extensive damage and 
extended periods of closure for these areas. 
Another agent involved was New Zealand’s Central Government which created a ministerial 
position as well as an agency (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority - CERA) especially 
dedicated to the recovery of the region after the damage caused by the 22 February 2011 
event. Therefore, in a regional disaster, organisational disaster resilience plays a larger role 
than business-as-usual organisational resilience. Importantly, for both levels of resilience, 
baseline indicators are required for measurement and monitoring especially across time. 
As illustrated in chapter 5, one part of each survey deployed for this study contained items 
from the Benchmark Resilience Tool48 (BRT-53 or BRT-13) as a measure of organisational 
resilience. Using computations from these items after Surveys 1 and 2, the BRT 
                                                     
48 BRT-13 is the short-form version of the BRT-53. See (Z.R. Whitman et al., 2013) for development of BRT-13. In this thesis, 
BRT is the umbrella name for both BRT-13 and BRT-53. 
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organisational resilience indicators which were more prominent for each sector are presented 
in this section. Also, participants in contextual interviews and case studies were asked to 
describe resilience (see chapter 6.5.4). The more prominent indicators of disaster resilience 
deduced from the interviews and case studies are also presented here. The two sets of 
resilience indicators, from the BRT-53 and BRT-13 as well as from interviews and case 
studies, are contrasted. This section also contains discussion on the relationship between 
recovery after disaster and the organisation’s or sector’s level of disaster resilience. 
10.1 Sectoral disaster resilience indicators - using the Benchmark 
Resilience Tool (BRT-53 and BRT-13) 
The Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) (Lee, Vargo, & Seville, 2013; McManus, 2008; 
Stephenson, 2010) was developed to be used by organisations to measure their resilience. For 
example, many of the items in the BRT address how respondent organisations run their day-
to-day business, preparedness measures they may have engaged in and how they would 
respond in a crisis. The organisations in this study used the BRT while in the midst of a crisis 
at a regional scale and the BRT does not specifically ask about organisational actions in a 
regional disaster. However, even in a regional disaster, some of the responses to the BRT 
yield possible understanding into what is required for organisations and sectors to be disaster 
resilient. Appendix F contains the complete tables for BRT sectoral resilience scores and for 
the items contained in the BRT. 
As this research sampled the same group of respondent organisations multiple times, it can 
be likened to a longitudinal study. The same questions from the BRT were asked of 
respondents at three different points in the course of the research. Additionally, the effects 
of the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes are considered in analysis. For 
instance, it is likely that the BRT organisational resilience scores after the 22 February 2011 
earthquake are a result of organisations being more affected by environmental factors than 
by those inside the organisation (see chapters 5 for BRT scores and chapter 8 for 
environmental factors). 
Diggle (2002) writes that a fundamental advantage of longitudinal studies is in how they 
effectively measure changes over time in the same variables. Also, because of the 
involvement of multiple respondents in the study, the findings can be generalised. Diggle 
also points out that in some studies, the period, or calendar date is also essential in analysis. 
Harter et al (2006), in their study on the administration of surveys amidst disaster, 
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demonstrate how a disaster event can affect respondents as well as survey results. Anderson 
(1969) shows how organisations undergo periods of adjustment post-disaster that affect how 
they function. In the case of organisations in Canterbury, the effects of the earthquakes most 
likely had a bearing on how they responded to survey questions. 
It has been demonstrated how the sectors in this study were affected variably after the 
Canterbury earthquakes. It follows that the sectors in this study had different sets of 
individual BRT indicators that were more meaningful for them. Table 10-1 shows the 
differences in sectoral resilience indicator scores between Survey 1 (deployed after 4 
September 2010) and Survey 249 (deployed after 22 February 2011). For each sector the three 
largest differences (decreases) in sectoral resilience indicator scores are shown in bold font. 
The organisational resilience scores from Survey 1 are comparable to those from Survey 3. 
As well, the sample set in Survey 3 is smaller than in both Surveys 1 and 2. For these reasons, 
it was deemed sufficient to use BRT organisational resilience scores for Surveys 1 and 2. 
The current design of the BRT uses the concept of the higher the overall organisational resilience 
score, the more resilient the organisation. This is the same for the organisational resilience individual 
indicator scores. Therefore, the difference in the BRT organisational resilience score 
achieved by the organisation can be compared to the highest possible score as a means of 
evaluating performance. The results can thereafter be used to improve resilience. Similarly, in 
existing organisational practices, the balanced scorecard (BSC) developed and popularised by 
Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996b) is used to set organisational priorities such as staff or 
customer satisfaction and the targets for those priorities. At the end of the measurement 
period, the target and the actual values are compared as a means of checking how well the 
organisation performed. The differences in scores are used to set improvement measures. In 
the same way, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2012) runs the annual Business 
Longitudinal Study (BLS) for employer organisations. The annual BLS measures the impact 
of different business characteristics (e.g. industry sector, exports and employment details) 
and uses this change in metrics to track the performance (e.g. profit, revenue and sales) of 
businesses. From a systems point of view (see chapter 8), the negative feedback loop 
depicting disaster recovery shows how organisations can use the differences between their 
actual and intended targets to draw up organisational improvement measures. 
                                                     
49 Lyttelton organisations did not take part in Survey 1; the prominent indicators for those organisations were calculated 
using Survey 2 and Survey 3 data. 
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In the same way, in this study the difference in sectoral indicator scores between the two 
surveys shows which of the indicators of resilience the respondents were more affected by or 
were more sensitive to in the case of a regional disaster. Kaplan and Norton (1996a) as well 
as Davenport and Stoddard (1994) advise that it is more useful for organisations to 
concentrate on diligently pursuing a few aspects and doing those well as opposed to working 
on a broad suite of organisational improvement measures and not doing them well. This is 
the fundamental reason for this study highlighting the three sectoral resilience indicators that 
showed the largest differences between surveys 1 and 2. Furthermore, three indicators linked 
to the organisation’s strategic goals are a more manageable objective that individuals in the 
organisation can focus on at one time as opposed to 13 indicators. 
Table 10-1: Percentage differences in Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) sectoral resilience indicator 
percentage scores between Surveys 1 and 2* 
Percentage differences* in Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) sectoral resilience indicator percentage scores 
between Surveys 1 and 2 (all values are in percentage % ) 
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 
Building Suppliers 8 2 -3 14 20 25 29 6 18 18 16 9 6 
Critical Infrastructure 28 37 36 32 28 27 35 29 24 32 27 23 24 
FMCG 19 16 16 25 25 28 32 28 28 34 41 25 19 
Hospitality 28 21 10 23 5 37 25 25 33 26 30 22 16 
ICT 15 10 3 0 5 24 28 19 33 26 22 23 9 
Trucking 21 13 13 14 20 32 30 20 23 25 29 27 17 
Christchurch CBD 13 14 22 15 12 24 31 15 22 24 27 16 11 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 13 19 8 3 6 16 18 13 25 22 22 22 4 
Lyttelton Town Centre 15 13 25 15 16 12 9 27 13 23 10 28 -5 
Entire Sample Group50 19 17 14 14 14 28 27 21 28 27 27 23 13 
*All positive numbers, i.e. positive percentages, indicate a decrease between Surveys 1 and 2 while negative values indicate an increase from Survey 1 
to Survey 2 
                                                     
50 As these results are using Survey 1 and Survey 2 results, the Lyttelton sample is not included as they did not take part in 
Survey 1. 
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Therefore, the prominent indicators highlighted in Table 10-1 may serve as an aid in 
development of disaster resilience measures for the organisations and sectors in this study. 
Also, as the indicators of resilience are interconnected, work on some of them may lead to 
some improvement in others. Also, from chapter 8 and manifested in the difference in 
organisational resilience scores between Surveys 1 and 2 is the concept that resilience 
advancement is context dependent and is a continuous process. 
The analysis that follows in this chapter is based on information from the qualitative data 
provided by organisations; the organisations were not specifically queried on their 
interpretation of the items and indicators contained in the BRT-53. This information was 
obtained from organisations while pursuing other lines of questioning to do with disaster 
recovery. This is another reason for discussing only three indicators per sector. The detailed 
explanation for all the indicators requires a thorough investigation in which they are the 
focus. Consequently, each organisation and sector may have distinct explanations for how 
the indicators relate to them. This is an area that could be pursued further in future research 
coupled with follow on surveys of earthquake affected organisations at four, eight and 10 
year intervals from the 4 September 2010 earthquake. 
10.1.1 Sectoral indicator score differences - overview 
When broken down by sector, the BRT indicators: planning strategies, recovery priorities, 
and information and knowledge did not feature at all for organisational resilience indicators 
that stood out in disaster. Analysis of the items (questions) that form the BRT indicators (see 
appendix F for a list of the BRT-53 indicators) shows that some of them may not necessarily 
apply in the context of a disaster. 
Organisations reported that after the earthquakes, they tried to understand the situation, how 
they had been affected and that uncertainty was the norm and not the exception. One of the 
items making up the planning strategies indicator asks about planning strategies carefully before 
taking action. Carefully, in this instance, to mean cautiously or after thorough assessment. 
However, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, a lot of instinct and adaptation is called 
for and is partly dependent on availability of information and resources. Post-disaster, 
information and resources are not always readily available and some decisions have to be 
made on the spot with whatever information is at hand. In disaster, it is not always possible 
to completely assess a situation before reaching a decision.  
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The information and knowledge indicator is also not one of the three prominent indicators 
for any of the sectors. Survey and interview respondents stated that one of the most 
important elements in recovering from disaster is information that is credible, timely and 
relevant to the situation. One of the items from the information and knowledge indicator 
asks about readily obtaining expert assistance when there is a problem. The supply of expert 
assistance, e.g. geotechnical and structural engineers, was not in step with the increase in 
demand especially after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Additionally, with the huge 
uncertainty caused by the earthquakes as well as other interacting factors, in the response and 
early recovery phases it was not easy for organisations to tell what the problem actually was 
let alone get expert assistance. 
Furthermore, one of the recovery priorities indicator items is we understand the minimum level of 
resources our organisation needs to operate. All organisations interviewed expressed that they knew 
what minimum resources their organisation needed to operate during business-as-usual. 
However, their operational needs after the earthquakes differed from business-as-usual and it 
was not always immediately apparent what the requirements were as they adapted to a 
changing situation. As demonstrated in chapters 6 and 8, base requirements to keep the 
organisation operational are different in a regional disaster and at different times after the 
disaster event. As well, keeping the organisation operational in the response phase in efforts 
to minimise further damage differs from the short-term phase when resumption of 
productivity may be the focus. 
As stated earlier, any future study of the BRT, for disaster, needs to incorporate detailed 
scrutiny of both the questions and the indicators. There are two main reasons for this. The 
first reason is that there are indicators, e.g. planning strategies, which after the earthquakes 
were not among the most prominent for any sector. Further investigation may reveal which 
indicators are applicable in a disaster context. Additionally, analysis of all items in the BRT-
53 showed that even for indicators that were outstanding for some sectors, not all the 
questions applied in disaster. More extensive and detailed research of the indicators and 
items in the BRT is required and recommended as a future research strand. 
10.1.2 Building suppliers 
Apart from staff involvement and leadership, proactive posture was one of the indicators 
with a more significant difference for building suppliers. In fact, this was the only sector 
where this indicator was prominent. One of the sector’s biggest challenges after the 
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earthquakes was the inability to forecast demand as the rebuilding boom that was expected 
to occur did not. One of the other effects of the earthquakes was that work that had been 
scheduled pre-earthquake, for example home renovations, was put on hold or cancelled 
because of earthquake damage and insurance wrangles. Some of the building suppliers 
expressed that they had taken a wait and see approach for when their sales and revenue 
would pick up. 
10.1.3 Critical infrastructure 
Two of three noteworthy indicators for critical infrastructure were to do with planning: 
participating in exercises and external resources. As discussed earlier, this was the only sector 
where all organisations had pre-earthquake crisis or emergency plans. Organisations in this 
sector also believed that not only should these plans be documented but that they should 
also be tested. Critical infrastructure organisations reported regular practise drills as part of 
their business-as-usual and that this helped in the response phase. Despite planning and 
rehearsing their plans locally, critical infrastructure organisations reported that the scale and 
urgency of the task required the use of staff from offices outside Christchurch as well as 
contractors from other organisations. 
Critical infrastructure organisations also had to work with many other organisations in the 
response phase. Some of these organisations were parts suppliers who at times did not have 
required stock on hand. This affected critical infrastructure’s perception of external 
resources. The third prominent indicator was staff involvement. Of all the sectors, staff from 
the critical infrastructure sector worked the longest hours restoring and repairing time critical 
services after the earthquakes. The sector reported that one of their biggest challenges was 
managing staff work times and workloads in addition to ensuring people had enough rest 
between jobs and that they got the chance to look into personal matters.  
10.1.4 FMCG 
The three outstanding indicators for FMCG were staff involvement, internal resources and 
decision making. FMCG organisations reported that they required more staff after the 
earthquakes for the large clean-up work that resulted from damaged shelving and stock loss. 
Organisations also reported that they did not have adequate stocks on hand for some goods 
such as bottled water which were in higher demand after the earthquakes. The decision 
making indicator can be attributed to resolving what product mix was right after the 
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earthquakes as some products were more in demand than others. In reaching some of these 
stocking decisions they worked with supplier partners to adjust stock levels and supply 
schedules. Some of the producer FMCG organisations said they had to consult their head 
offices about whether adequate stock was available in New Zealand before they could make 
decisions on what they were able to supply. 
10.1.5 Hospitality 
All the stand out indicators for the hospitality sector were to do with adaptation: leadership, 
minimisation of silos and decision making. At the time of writing (July 2012), some of these 
organisations were still closed as a result of the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The closed 
organisations were located in the CBD Red Zone prior to the earthquake. In interviews, 
owners and managers spoke of how they shepherded staff off organisational premises, 
mainly after the 22 February 2011 earthquake, and the close relationship they had with their 
staff before and after the earthquakes. From this account of leadership in the hospitality 
sector, it is unclear why there was a significant difference in leadership indicator scores 
between Surveys 1 and 2. 
The other prominent indicators were decision making and minimisation of silos. Some 
hospitality organisations reported that they felt decisions to do with re-opening were 
dependent on many other factors they had no control over such as the cordon around the 
Red Zone, insurance payments and building renovations. Also, respondents reported that the 
size of the organisations and crossover of tasks in this industry acted to minimise silos. 
However, that this indicator had one of the larger score differences between Surveys 1 and 2 
hints at a different scenario. It is also possible that the items did not apply to the respondent 
organisations. 
10.1.6 ICT 
Leadership was a prominent indicator for the ICT sector. Interviewed ICT organisations 
emphasised that leadership came not just from the people in leadership roles before the 
earthquakes but also from among other staff. Another prominent indicator was minimisation 
of silos. From interviews, one attribute of the ICT sector is the ability individuals have of 
working on their own for long periods of time on unique projects or in specialised areas. It 
was noted that this could lead to silos in organisations. After the earthquakes, there was a 
need for staff to work in groups on some new post-earthquake tasks or in close proximity 
for extended periods. Organisations reported that this was not always easy. On the other 
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hand, individuals being able to work on their own for long periods, to achieve organisational 
aims, is aided by devolved decision making and autonomy. Devolved decision making was 
the third indicator for ICT which had a significant difference between Surveys 1 and 2.  
10.1.7 Trucking 
Staff involvement was one of the indicators for the trucking sector that showed a larger 
difference between Surveys 1 and 2. Some of the trucking sector, mainly debris removal and 
construction, recognised the opportunity presented to them after the earthquakes. They also 
realised that the task was enormous and would require skilled manpower which was in short 
supply even before the earthquakes. However, some organisations spoke of their drivers 
leaving for other organisations that paid slightly better after the earthquakes. This was as the 
competition for demolition and debris removal contract work increased. 
Leadership and internal resources were the other prominent indicators for trucking 
organisations. Apart from not having enough manpower, some truckers reported not having 
enough machinery and equipment (internal resources) for the work needed to be done after 
the earthquakes. Some of the machinery and equipment required was specific to work that 
was being done because of the earthquakes. 
10.1.8 Christchurch CBD 
Prominent indicators for Christchurch CBD were internal resources, leadership and decision 
making. Christchurch CBD organisations said it was difficult to make major decisions 
affecting their organisations immediately after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. This was 
because it was difficult to access organisational premises, records and stock that were in the 
CBD Red Zone. Lack of access to records meant that they could not access their customer 
databases or collect evidence for insurance. Apart from not accessing stock and hence not 
being able to trade, another of the CBD’s biggest challenges was cash flow, which constitutes 
internal resources. In cases where organisations could not access premises for long periods 
of time, this meant that even if they could relocate, they may not have been able to afford 
new stock. 
10.1.9 Kaiapoi Town Centre 
In Kaiapoi the indicators showing a wider gap between Surveys 1 and 2 were to do with 
minimising silos, being innovative and creative as well as on internal resources and devolved 
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decision making. After the 22 February 2011 earthquake some of the respondents from 
Kaiapoi expressed that the community felt they had been abandoned as attention shifted to 
Christchurch. They equated this shift in attention to a shift in resources, by the authorities, as 
the problems in Christchurch were more visible. Respondents spoke of the need to work 
towards new and innovative ways of using the resources they had to get the town back on its 
feet again. 
Respondents also spoke of the strong community spirit that existed before the earthquakes 
needing to be even stronger as they made plans to rebuild their town. However the drop in 
the minimisation of silos indicator score shows that they may not have been working so well 
together anymore. Lastly, they felt disempowered by some of the decisions made by the 
Recovery Authority (CERA) about issues such as land zoning, that they were no longer in 
control and were not consulted on their future. This may also have contributed to 
minimisation of silos coming to the fore. 
10.1.10 Lyttelton Town Centre 
The Lyttelton Town Centre organisations were the only group for whom situation 
monitoring and awareness was one of the indicators with a larger percentage difference 
between sampling times. The other two indicators were external resources and innovation 
and creativity. Organisations in Lyttelton also reported that they felt side lined by all the 
attention Christchurch had drawn. Further to this was the feeling that some recovery 
solutions proposed for Christchurch (e.g. moratoria on commercial expansion outside the 
CBD) would not be in the interests of Lyttelton and would divert resources to the 
Christchurch CBD. The respondents from Lyttelton reported that it was important for them 
to keep track of activities going on outside the town that might affect recovery. 
Community based associations in Lyttelton were very active in leading recovery initiatives 
after the 22 February 2011 earthquake. The town acted faster in certain ways than 
Christchurch CBD, for instance in demolishing buildings. However, amidst all this activity, 
some organisations in the town felt that it was only a few people speaking louder than others 
and that not all opinions were being heard. This led to the feeling that it was not always 
majority ideas about the best innovative and creative ideas to implement in recovery. 
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10.2 Sectoral disaster resilience indicators - using information from 
impact data, contextual interviews and case studies 
An alternative and additional way (to using the BRT) of arriving at the more important 
organisational disaster resilience indicators is to use the qualitative data provided by the 
disaster affected organisations. This includes information from contextual interviews, case 
studies and qualitative responses from the survey questionnaires (see section 6.5.4). One 
advantage of this is that these responses are a way in which the BRT can be continually 
improved by the addition of new information pertinent to disaster resilience. This is because 
respondents did not merely show a level of agreement with statements on business-as-usual 
organisational resilience. Instead, after experiencing disaster, they stated what relates to 
disaster resilience as they see it. Additionally, the BRT was developed during non-crisis times; 
questions used during business-as-usual may not be suitable after disaster. 
From the contextual interviews and case studies, the most prominent indicators of 
organisational disaster resilience turned out to be ones to do with specific areas of 
organisational performance after the earthquakes. As described above, organisations depicted 
recovery as first returning to their pre-earthquake performance levels, exceeding those levels 
and the time taken to achieve this. Consequently, organisations reported that for them, the 
fundamental indicators of disaster resilience are those listed in Figure 10-1. They include 
evaluating post-earthquake revenue, staff and customer retention levels; the time taken to 
return to pre-earthquake levels of these components; as well as leadership and organisational 
adaptability. 
Two case study respondents, one from the ICT sector and the other from the building 
suppliers sector emphasised that for them an additional mark of the organisation’s disaster 
resilience was to what extent the organisation’s safety procedures worked and were followed 
just after the earthquakes struck and with each major aftershock. Of all the case study 
organisations, these two placed a lot of emphasis on occupational health and safety. The ICT 
organisation is specialised in light manufacturing while the building supplier works with steel. 
The indicators given in Figure 10-1 are in accord with findings from the organisational and 
disaster literature. For instance, Knight and Pretty (1996), in evaluating pre- and post-disaster 
organisational performance, demonstrate that effective crisis management can minimise 
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organisational losses. In other work Rose (2004) argues that resilience can also be measured 
in how long it takes to resolve a crisis.  
 
Figure 10-1: Self-report organisational description of measures of disaster resilience after the 2010-2011 
earthquakes in Canterbury 
For the organisations in Christchurch, when asked what their suitable measure of recovery 
was, organisations pointed to changes in revenue compared to pre-earthquake levels. As well, 
organisations indicated that the length of time, after the earthquakes, that it took for the 
organisation to return to pre-earthquake levels of revenue is also an indicator of the 
organisation’s disaster resilience. Noticeably, these metrics are a mixture of traditional 
accounting and intangible measures and can be seen as subjective. Importantly, they translate 
into something organisations understand and can use for improvement. Neely et al (2002; 
2005) contend that if performance metrics are to be acceptable and useful to organisations, 
they must be understandable to the organisation and measure aspects that are of value to the 
organisation. 
Self-report organisational description of indicators of disaster 
resilience 
Comparing (pre- and post-earthquake) year-on-year performance levels, what was the difference 
after the disruption of the earthquakes including to revenue, staff and customer retention? 
If there was a difference in year-on-year performance, the time it took to return to the path they 
had planned and were on prior to the earthquakes 
Did the organisation sustain the minimum of losses? In light of the disaster, how successful the 
organisation was at mitigating further losses, of whatever kind 
How well the organisation reacted not just in making the right plans and decisions but also in 
actually implementing those plans and decisions (adaptation). How well the organisation’s 
leadership performed was related to this. 
In the case of recovering to a minimum state, how far from their target was the organisation? 
From the managerial perspective, how well the organisation looked after staff welfare 
From the non managerial perspective, how well the organisation treated staff without being 
prompted   
Accumulation, dissemination and use of information  
A wide variety of resources needed in the different stages of recovery  
Key elements of sectoral recovery and resilience after the Canterbury earthquakes: A system dynamics 
approach 
Hlekiwe Kachali 
351 
 
10.3 Contrast of similar indicators of disaster resilience from 
quantitative data (using the Benchmark Resilience Tool - BRT) 
and from qualitative data (using interview responses) 
Following its use after the Canterbury earthquakes, it is highlighted that the Benchmark 
Resilience Tool (BRT-53) in its present form does not adequately capture some of  the 
aspects of  organisational resilience that are present in or after disaster (more discussion on 
this later in this chapter). For instance, in interviews organisations provided their indicators 
of  organisational disaster resilience. However, in the BRT-53, these indicators are not 
explicitly asked in the way described by organisations. Therefore, it is important to ascertain 
the differences between indicators of  organisational disaster resilience provided by 
organisations and indicators currently contained in the BRT-53. Some of  the distinctions 
from this analysis will be used in proposing modifications to the existing Benchmark 
Resilience Tool (BRT-53) for better capture of  organisational disaster resilience attributes. 
The indicators proposed by organisations have been categorised into four main areas for the 
purposes of  comparison. Also, for ease of  comparison, the BRT-53 indicator naming 
convention (see appendix F) is used here and additional explanation of  what the 
organisations meant is provided: 
 Staff  (welfare/wellbeing and involvement); 
 Leadership (ability to delegate and devolved decision making); 
 Resources (more the availability and acquisition of  resources from within and 
from without when they are needed and in the quantities required); and 
 Information and knowledge (however, not coupled as in the BRT). 
Staff involvement: staff are an important component in organisational recovery after 
disaster. Fallara (2003) states that disaster recovery is a task that requires the assistance and 
co-operation of all staff in an organisation. In all interviews after the Canterbury earthquakes, 
respondents linked the employee’s welfare to that of their family and community (more 
explanation on this is in chapter 6). Several interviewees spoke of employees’ work 
performance being affected by the state of their family, friends and community. These are 
aspects not captured in the BRT. 
Leaders’ ability to delegate and devolved decision making: this arose from respondents 
realising that in disaster, decisions might have to be made in a hurry. Several respondents 
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spoke of indecision being a hindrance in response and recovery. Depending on what needed 
to be done, this meant that anyone in the organisation could find themselves having to make 
important decisions without conferring with management or other organisational hierarchy. 
This sometimes involved making decisions in areas traditionally not the employee’s purview. 
Respondents felt that this kind of devolved decision making required the element of trust. 
Leaders needed to trust their staff to make decisions to the best of their ability under the 
circumstances and also staff needed to trust that there would be no adverse consequences 
afterwards. Turner (1976) and Smith (1990), in work on how organisational crises develop 
(see chapter 2), show that how a crisis is handled could lead to the escalation of that crisis.  
Also related to decision making is the leaders’ ability to delegate. This is an aspect not 
sufficiently accounted for in the BRT. Leaders’ ability to delegate ensures that more is 
accomplished as the workload is carried by more than just a few people. After the 
Canterbury earthquakes, it also reinforced trust within the organisation and made people feel 
that they were part of the solution. Kay and Goldspink (2012) in their investigation on CEO 
views of organisational resilience found that trust was one of the central tenets in 
organisational resilience. 
Organisations affected by the Canterbury earthquakes further related that apart from 
showing trust, delegation also meant that leaders acknowledged their limitations; that they 
did not know everything that was going on and had to rely on other people for some things 
to get done. Delegation also ensures there is less chance of individuals overworking which 
may make them increasingly inefficient in the long run. Another important aspect of 
leadership was knowing the right balance between autocracy and consultation in decision 
making in the response phase after the earthquakes. 
It was often mentioned that some of those who emerged to lead after the earthquakes did 
not have leadership functional roles prior to the earthquakes. For both emergent leaders and 
those in traditional leadership roles, respondents spoke of the necessity of caring leaders as 
well as of inspired and inspiring leadership. Furthermore, it appears that those in leadership 
positions looked after the welfare of other members of staff but it was not clear who looked 
into their welfare. This is another facet that needs to be captured in the BRT. 
Resources: in this research, this refers to two main sets of resources: those that the 
organisation would not necessarily require in business-as-usual, e.g. geotechnical engineering 
skills, and (sufficient) resources to maintain the organisation through vastly turbulent times. 
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These characteristics need to be considered in organisational disaster resilience and are not 
definitively incorporated in the BRT. 
From responses in interviews, organisations need to be able to sustain extended periods of 
underperformance (if measured using revenue and sales) in the aftermath of disaster as the 
system moves to some kind of equilibrium. However, the organisation should still be able to 
rebound after this and start to be profitable again. An example from this study would be the 
building suppliers sector, many of whom reported revenue losses in the three consecutive 
periods they were asked about. This kind of prolonged revenue loss requires large resources 
to get through. Alesch et al (2009) showed how organisations can be affected in the long-
term by disaster and that adequate resources are required to get through this period. 
However, Comfort et al (2004) caution that vast amount of resources are not the only factor 
in surviving disaster. They cite the need for coordination and communication also. These are 
aspects that have been discussed in this thesis, especially on the efficient and effective use of 
resources (see section 9.4.4). 
Information and knowledge: according to respondents, in disaster situations having 
knowledge of how or what to do is not the same as having information. In addition, many 
people likened knowledge to the tacit kind. They thought of information as what had been 
distilled from all the noise that was present after the earthquakes and was useful to them. This 
is the reason for information and knowledge not needing to be coupled, as in the BRT, and 
should be accorded individual attention. Additionally, organisations reported that after the 
earthquakes, new roles and new tasks were defined; this required that the pre-earthquake 
channels of communication be modified. Especially tied to information were the notions of 
human and social capital. To get information, respondents said they had to know the right 
people to speak to. In many cases, networks formed prior to disaster were very useful. 
Respondents said it was not enough to form bonds between organisations; it was between 
the people in the different organisations that decisions were made. This is not explicit in the 
BRT. 
10.4 Evolution of the Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT-53) 
The Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT), like all tools that measure changing concepts, is a 
living tool that requires ongoing development. This is to keep up with evolving trends in 
organisations and in the environment around them and to make the information obtained 
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from the tool more useful to them. Using the BRT in disaster enabled the identification of 
some indicators necessary for organisational disaster resilience. 
Apart from the differences in indicator description given in section 10.3, there are other 
aspects, picked up during the course of the research, that should be considered in the 
continual improvement of the BRT. Some of these aspects include the length of the BRT-53 
and the phrasing of the items. Some respondents spoke of some of the questions in the BRT 
as not being suitable to their organisation or to the disaster situation. For example, it was 
difficult for smaller organisations to answer questions about organisational departments. In 
small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), not all functions are separate processes. Other 
ways of improving the BRT as a survey instrument include reversing some of the items. Past 
studies on survey design show that reversing some of the items in a survey allows for more 
variance in responses (Alwin & Krosnick, 1991). 
This section contains outcomes that are analysed and presented as part of this research’s 
contribution to the betterment of the BRT. It should be emphasised that this study focuses 
on how the BRT can be improved mainly for the purposes of disaster resilience. 
Improvements to do with a version of the BRT for different sectors and for different size 
organisations as well as to do with reversing the items in the BRT are recommended as 
future work. This is because all the improvements discussed require thorough research and 
testing which is beyond the scope of this thesis. In summary, what should be included or 
thought of in the context of regional disasters for the BRT: 
 The extent of  staff  wellbeing. The employee, their family, their community; 
 Staff  wellbeing, both of  the leaders and the led; 
 Community wellbeing, which partly speaks to the BRT indicator external resources but 
also emphasises human and social capital; 
 Networking, to more explicitly include items on individuals within organisations 
being the link to cooperation and collaboration inside and outside the organisation 
and sector; 
 Location of  organisations as pertains to hazards. This is with the awareness that 
organisations can be affected by other disasters that occur far from where they are; 
 In asking about preparedness and planning, that this is general enough to cover the 
broadest range of  hazards but must not be agent (hazard) specific; 
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 More consideration of  the organisation’s sector and the goods and services delivered, 
how they are delivered, where customers are located; 
 Pre-disaster situation of  the sector or organisation (including community hazard 
planning and preparedness); 
 The extent of  disaster. The organisation’s level of  resilience alone is not enough as 
this interacts with the higher level of  disaster resilience which involves many other 
actors; 
 Size of  the organisation. Some of  the items in the tool are more suited to larger 
organisations. This raises the possibility of  having different versions of  the BRT in 
order to suit different size organisations. This can be extended to versions of  the 
BRT-53 suited to different sectors. However, this might raise issues of  cross 
comparing being difficult within and outside sectors; 
 Minimum level of  resources for different stages in the response and recovery 
process; 
 The measures of  excellence or performance require modification. For those 
organisations that are not-for-profits or government departments, a measure of  
recovery that is suitable for their organisation. A proposal of  this thesis is that in 
addition to assigning a measure as is currently done in the BRT, organisations should 
be queried on how they measure doing well and that measure should subsequently be 
used to track their progress on either side of  the time period in which they were 
queried. This helps to translate the message that one part of  being resilient is for the 
organisation to do well whatever it is they do and that traditional measures of  
excellence might not after all suffice. It can be argued that an organisation’s version 
or definition of  resilience involves what they would like to achieve; there is no one-
size-fits-all of  organisational resilience. This also means that there is a relationship 
between the organisation’s level of  resilience and their management techniques. 
Further, combining organisational self-report performance indicators with those in 
the BRT asking about traditional indicators such as sales growth ensures that there is 
some compatibility in results from different organisations; and 
 Another version of  the BRT for disaster situations or an organisational disaster resilience 
module to be added to the BRT, taking care that the questionnaire is not time 
expensive for respondents (see section 10.4.2 on length of  the BRT questionnaire 
and some disadvantages when the full suite of  items is deployed). 
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10.4.1 Proposed supplementary organisational disaster resilience module for the 
Benchmark Resilience Tool (BRT) 
Bringing together several elements in this and in preceding chapters of this thesis: the 
quantitative information gleaned from the results of the BRT; the self-report disaster 
resilience indicators (section 10.2 and Figure 10-1) from the qualitative interviews with 
organisations; the signifiers of recovery (chapter 7); influential system behaviour (chapter 8); 
the critical success factors for sectoral recovery (chapter 9) and the possibility to continually 
improve the BRT; this section contains some possible items for inclusion in the BRT-53. 
These items are to help organisations identify possible areas of improvement for their 
disaster resilience. Some of the items are modified forms of existing items in the BRT-53. As 
with all survey research and design, the proposed items need to be tested before deployment 
as part of the BRT-53 or as a separate survey. 
Organisations highlighted the importance of staff in the recovery of the organisation. These 
first three questions address the notion that a disaster would not be just one more reason for 
staff to leave the organisation: 
 What is your level of  satisfaction at work?; 
 Please state possible reason(s) you may have for leaving this organisation; 
 Is there an issue at home, in your neighbourhood or in your community that 
affects your ability to do your job?; 
 
Specific to small organisations: 
 What percentage of  your personal wealth is invested in the organisation?; 
 Do you use personal resources for business purposes or vice versa?; 
  
All other items: 
 The training provided by the organisation is relevant to the work I do; 
 Individuals in this organisation interact with others belonging to organisations we 
need to cooperate and collaborate with; 
 Our organisation engages with the community; 
 Our organisation works with the community in hazard preparation and planning; 
 Our organisation has identified what resources it can provide or contribute to 
staff  in the case of  a regional disaster; 
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 Our organisation is aware of  local hazards that would lead to disruption of  
operations; 
 Our organisation has prepared for these local hazards; 
 Our organisation has also prepared and planned for a broad range of  hazards; 
 Our organisation’s hazard plans are adaptable to different situations; 
 Our organisation regularly simulates disaster scenarios; 
 Our organisation has identified factors that may cause disruption to the supply 
and demand sides of  the supply web; 
 Our organisation has identified the requirement, to consumers affected by a 
regional disaster, of  our goods and services; 
 Our organisation would be able to obtain financial and other resources in the 
case of  prolonged effects of  a regional disaster affecting other organisations in 
the same area; 
 Our organisation knows that different resources and skills are required for 
different phases before and after a disaster; 
 Our organisation understands the minimum level of  resources required for the 
different phases before and after a disaster; 
 What key performance indicators (KPIs) does your organisation use to monitor 
performance?; and 
 Using those key performance indicators (KPIs) how has your organisation 
performed in each of  the last 5 years? 
10.4.2 Benchmark Resilience Tool-53 (BRT-53) and Benchmark Resilience Tool-
13 (BRT-13) 
Other advancements to the BRT contributed by this research include the development and 
validation of a short-form of the BRT. The 13 indicators in the BRT combine to give an 
organisation’s resilience score: the causal direction is from the indicators of organisational 
resilience to the latent construct of resilience. It is a latent construct because it cannot be 
measured directly but is instead measured using an aggregation of multiple items. The causal 
direction from the indicators to the latent construct suggests that the BRT-53 is a formative 
model (Jarvis, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003). Furthermore, original development of the 
BRT-53 involved grouping the items into indicators using measures of internal consistency 
and not on their unidimensional ability to measure resilience (see (Stephenson, 2010)). 
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Hinkin (1998) states that the reliability of a measure should be assessed after 
unidimensionality has been established. Unidimensionality as defined by Hattie (1985) is the 
existence of a single trait or construct underlying a set of measures. Unidimensionality for a 
scale ensures that all the items in the scale are measuring the same construct (in this case 
organisational resilience). Internal consistency is a measure of the strength of the correlation 
between different items. High measures of internal reliability are not sufficiently justified in 
the literature (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988) as a grouping mechanism when unidimensionality 
is not achieved. Furthermore, Boyle (1991) writes that a high measure of internal item 
consistency may also suggest a high level of item redundancy. In essence, this means that the 
same information is asked for in different items which need not be the case. 
Consequently, using internal consistency to group the items may not be the most robust for a 
formative model such as the BRT. Reasons for this include that if the items are not 
unidimensional, it is unclear how the items affect each other. This is because the effects may 
be due to a different construct and not the one being measured. Additionally, grouping the 
items because they showed a high internal consistency may lead to low item variance, i.e. 
highly similar results across items which may be measuring different constructs. This is 
evidenced by the similarity in scores across sectors in each individual survey (see chapter 5). 
Lastly, these items contained in the BRT were not defined as unique factors, but were among 
many other items that showed high reliabilities as well. Using measures of internal 
consistency to group items means that some items which did not correlate highly were 
discarded and could be a required part in the formation of the latent construct of resilience. 
In a formative model such as the BRT, high correlations are not necessarily required between 
items. For example, while an organisation may have arrangements with other organisations 
for emergency supplies in the event of a crisis, it does not necessarily have to have 
arrangements with the community for assistance in recovering post-disaster. Both of these 
factors would contribute to that organisation’s access to external resources; however, they do 
not necessarily have to be correlated. 
The high internal consistency of the items in the BRT contributed to the development of a 
shorter version of the tool. The complete version of the BRT (called the BRT-53) contains 
53 questions. When combined with questions investigating other phenomena, such as 
impacts of the earthquakes, requires a lot of time from respondents. This was the case when 
Survey 2 of this study was developed and deployed. As a result of the high internal 
consistency of the items and respondent survey fatigue or non-participation, a shorter 
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version of the BRT was developed, tested and validated. The shorter version of the tool is 
called the BRT-13 and has a single item representing each indicator (see (Z.R. Whitman et 
al., 2013)). It was found that the use of BRT-13 could accurately reproduce results when used 
in place of the full complement of questions contained in the BRT-53. A shorter 
questionnaire makes organisations more amenable to deploying it in their organisations and 
can only aid in further development of the concept of organisational resilience. This is one of 
the improvements to the BRT that this research has contributed. 
10.4.3 REAG and Resilient Organisations: BRT model comparison 
In other work, the developers of the BRT-53 (Resilient Organisations Research Programme - 
ResOrgs) collaborated with the Resilience Expert Advisory Group (REAG) of Australia. The 
REAG and ResOrgs originally had separate but similar sets of indicators. However, the 
REAG had a 3-factor model; leadership and culture, change ready and networks. Resilient 
Organisations on the other hand, had the 2-factor model made up of the planning and 
adaptive capacity.  
REAG and Resilient Organisations worked together to align their indicators of resilience 
using a common language. The alignment resulted in the adoption of the REAG’s 3-factor 
model and some modification to the items. This means that the Resilient Organisations 
indicators were re-arranged to fit the REAG model. The alignment resulted in the retention 
of the Resilient Organisation’s 13 indicator model, grouped under the REAG’s 3 factors.  
For the purposes of the BRT, while this collaboration resulted in some improvements to 
indicator names and item wording, as well as the addition of some new items to close 
identified gaps, the underlying structure of the BRT remained the same. Table 10-2 shows a 
comparison of the factor and organisational resilience scores using the 3-factor REAG and 
2-factor Resilient Organisations models for results after Survey 1. The comparisons of the 
two models for Surveys 2 and 3 are contained in appendix F. 
From the results in Table 10-2, there is no difference in the organisational resilience scores 
using either of the models. There is also very little difference in the scores for the individual 
factors and indicators. Part of the reason for this was discussed in sections 5.5 and 10.4.2 and 
has to do with the use of measures of internal consistency to group the items in the BRT. 
This way of grouping items in a formative scale may lead to low item variance and 
homogeneity of scores for different organisations. 
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Presently, the grouping of the indicators into different factors is useful for explanatory 
purposes as it is couched in language organisations can relate to. However, the primary focus 
for the continual development of the BRT should be the formation, validation, test and re-
test of the items and indicators of resilience. 
Table 10-2: Comparison of organisational resilience scores using REAG and Resilient Organisations 
models after Survey 1 
Comparison of organisational resilience scores using REAG and Resilient Organisations models after 
Survey 1 
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Building Suppliers 64% 57% 58% 59% 54% 63% 59% 
Critical Infrastructure 84% 84% 83% 84% 84% 84% 84% 
FMCG 82% 70% 71% 75% 69% 80% 75% 
Hospitality 70% 62% 65% 64% 59% 70% 64% 
ICT 74% 59% 66% 65% 57% 73% 65% 
Trucking 81% 69% 71% 72% 67% 78% 72% 
Christchurch CBD 74% 65% 68% 68% 64% 73% 68% 
Kaiapoi Town Centre 71% 61% 66% 65% 60% 70% 65% 
 
10.5 Organisational disaster resilience and organisational recovery 
All the organisations interviewed as part of this study mentioned the importance of an 
organisation being disaster resilient in relation to recovery. Survive, bounce back, flexible and 
adaptable were some of the words used to describe a resilient organisation. In chapter 2, 
recovery for organisations and sectors was defined as when an organisation or sector can function 
and sustain itself  (continually) in its new post-disaster environment. It has since been established that 
the organisations and sectors in this study equated recovery to returning to pre-earthquake 
levels of  performance or better (see chapters 4-7). However, is there a link between how 
organisations perform and their level of disaster resilience? 
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Organisations explained that one of their fundamental measures of recovery was change in 
revenue. From Survey 1 and Survey 2 deployed after the 4 September 2010 and 22 February 
2011 earthquakes respectively, there was no significant statistical correlation found between 
the organisations’ level of resilience (using BRT-53 scores) and their revenue (see chapter 7 
for more detail).  
Keeping in mind the time horizon (response and short-term recovery phases) for data 
collection, analysis of all the survey data shows that the organisation’s BRT-53 resilience 
score was not a predictor of the direction of revenue change for organisations after the 
Canterbury earthquakes. For instance, using the case study information for a more detailed 
analysis, an organisation from Kaiapoi had a resilience score of 50% (out of a hundred) and 
showed a decrease in revenue in all three periods asked about in the study. On the other 
hand, a trucking organisation with a 33% resilience score exhibited revenue increases in all 
three periods. This again highlights that in the response and short-term recovery phase of a 
disaster, the indicators of resilience are different from those in peacetime. Correlations, at the 
sectoral level, between the recovery rate coefficient (RRC) and organisational resilience score, 
measured using the BRT-53, yielded no significant correlations except for the FMCG (r=-
.580, p<.05) and trucking sectors (r=-.692, p<.05). 
Consequently, it is worth investigating the link between an organisation’s disaster resilience 
and its performance using some of the indicators described by the respondents (Figure 10-1). 
For this, it is important to recall that the fundamental definition of organisational resilience is 
that not only did the organisation get through the disaster or crisis, but that they eventually 
came out of it well. Authors such as Alpaslan and Mitroff (2004), Hamel and Valikangas 
(2003) as well as Seville et al (2008) agree with this view. The organisations in this study have 
shown a level of resilience by going through an acute phase in their existence and still 
carrying on. For instance, most of the case study organisations had RRC values of -2 after 
Survey 2. Nonetheless, none of them at the time of writing had ceased trading. However 
there are different levels to how the organisations performed after the earthquakes. Some of 
the organisations bounced back to where they were prior to the earthquakes, such as a lot of 
the ICT sector. Others managed to bounce forward even and are from different sectors: 
trucking, ICT and building suppliers. 
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10.5.1 Linking disaster resilience and recovery 
The organisations in the study experienced a great deal of turbulence after the earthquakes 
but persevered and showed resilience51. Using the indicators of disaster resilience as given by 
organisations (section 6.5.4 and Figure 10-1), it can therefore be demonstrated that there is a 
link between an organisation’s disaster resilience and its recovery after disaster. In addition, 
organisational disaster resilience has multiple aspects to it. What is also evident is that the 
measures for organisational disaster resilience should align with the short- to long-term 
strategy adopted by the organisation post-disaster. This is partly connected to the need for 
different resources and skills in the various stages after a disaster event. Organisational 
disaster resilience measures should also be in line with the extent of the disaster and some of 
the organisational pre-disaster conditions such as sector or economic conditions. This would 
make the measures more usable to organisations. 
For instance, in asking about staff wellbeing after disaster, their situations away from work 
should also be asked about. It should be left to the employee to decide whether to give this 
information to their employer. Examples of the scale of a disaster are the localisation of 
damage after the 22 February 2011 earthquake and the quick restoration or non-disruption of 
service that enabled organisations that could to relocate to other areas of the greater 
Christchurch region. In addition, some of the sectoral pre-existing conditions played a part. 
For instance, some of the ICT industry was growing prior to the earthquake and some of the 
organisations report that their cash flow was good which acted as a buffer for much needed 
resources after the earthquakes. However, this buffer was not so large that it could sustain 
the organisations involved for extended periods of time. The organisations did not define 
what extended meant but it can be concluded that loss of revenue, unless by prior planning, is 
never good for the organisation. 
Some organisations had alternate premises they found to work from after the earthquakes. 
Not all of them were planned for this purpose pre-earthquake, for instance, employees’ 
homes. This showed quick thinking, ability for adaptation and was helped by the localisation 
of earthquake damage and availability of critical services. Other organisations consolidated 
branches, those branches affected by the earthquakes and those not so or not at all affected 
were merged. This shows an effective and efficient use of resources which become even 
more valuable after disaster and could allow the organisation a competitive edge. 
                                                     
51 The hospitality organisation that was closed at the time of writing (July 2012) reported that they intended to re-open. 
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10.5.2 Leading versus lagging indicators of organisational disaster resilience 
The indicators in Figure 10-1 were reported by organisations after their earthquake 
experiences: they are lagging indicators. Lagging indicators come after an event has occurred 
and are useful in confirming the occurrence of trends. The organisational self-report 
indicators of disaster resilience used in section 10.5.1 on the link between disaster resilience 
and recovery are lagging. Leading indicators on the other hand can be used to signal or 
predict future events. Therefore, there is a need for the identification of the leading 
indicators of disaster resilience if they are to be of use to organisations in future disaster 
situations. Using the lagging indicators of organisational resilience reported by the 
organisations, it is possible to determine leading indicators of organisational resilience for use 
in future. These are contained in Figure 10-2. In the figure, indicators in bold are new 
compared to those contained in the BRT-53 while those not in bold are similar to some in 
the BRT-53. 
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*Indicators in bold are new compared to those contained in the BRT-53 while those not in bold are similar to some in the BRT-53 
Figure 10-2: Proposed leading indicators of organisational disaster resilience identified from the 
organisational self-report lagging disaster resilience indicators 
10.6 Sectoral disaster resilience 
The definition of industry sector for this thesis is of a group of  organisations that operate in 
the same segment of  the economy or share a similar business type. Furthermore, according 
to Porter (2000), organisations from the same sector and in the same location form a cluster. 
Porter goes on to demonstrate that the health of the individual organisations is linked to that 
of the cluster. The organisations interviewed for this thesis reported that their performance 
and existence in Canterbury was tied to that of their sector. As industry sectors are the 
building blocks of the economy, this makes sectoral disaster resilience even more important. 
Proposed leading indicators of organisational disaster resilience* 
Extent of financial reserves and value of organisational assets 
The organisation's ability to obtain financing and other resources in the case of a 
regional disaster 
Reliability of supply web 
Recognition of skills and resources needed for different stages of the disaster recovery 
cycle 
Trends for staff satisfaction, customer satisfaction and leadership performance 
Relevant staff training and staff capability 
Level of organisational engagement with community in hazard mitigation and 
planning 
Community preparedness for hazard mitigation, response and recovery 
Trends for usability, applicability and efficacy of organisational processes and performance 
Accumulation, dissemination and use of relevant information 
Trends in organisational innovation from conception to end product 
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Additionally, the different ways in which sectors were affected after the earthquakes in 
Canterbury demonstrates that industry sector is definitely one of the determinants of 
recovery after disaster. Level of effect is also dependent on the kind of disaster (e.g. 
earthquake, flood) and on other factors such as the economy. Consequently, some of the 
measures for organisational disaster resilience can be applied at the sector level. Alternately, it 
is possible to analyse the disaster resilience of a sector from the disaster resilience of the 
organisations within it. 
For instance, the level of disruption to the sector after the earthquakes, how long before the 
sector got going after the earthquakes and the level of sectoral losses compared to pre-
earthquake. After the Canterbury earthquakes, FMCG organisations were greatly disrupted 
but most managed to re-open within a few hours to a few days after the earthquakes. This 
enabled the minimisation of initial losses while still ensuring that customers were served. 
Similarly, the critical infrastructure organisations also mobilised themselves quickly to carry 
out repair and restoration. 
Discussing disaster resilience at the sectoral level enables the organisations in the sector to 
have a common language on the subject. This could enable knowledge sharing and sectoral 
minimum disaster resilience standards. For example, organisations got together after the 
earthquakes to share best practise. This meant that resources were saved as not all 
organisations tried every alternative for themselves. It is not known how long into the 
recovery phase this cooperation will last. Regardless, in the event of another crisis of the 
same or different magnitude, these links already exist and organisations know who to call on. 
Another aspect crucial in sectoral disaster resilience is that of collaboration within and 
between sectors. All the geographic sectors in the sample had groups of organisations that 
collaborated with each other to ensure that as many of them as possible got back on their 
feet. They reported that this was important because a certain level of competition was 
healthy and encouraged competitors to do better. They also added that choice was good for 
the customer. One Kaiapoi organisation reported that working with another organisation 
from Kaiapoi Town Centre enabled them to buy goods in bulk which they could not have 
been able to do on their own. In the trucking sector, such was the scale of the demand for 
their services that they worked together in some cases even pooling equipment. They also 
worked to share the workload. Two of the respondents say they recognised that the job was 
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extensive and that there was enough work for everyone. Intra- and inter-sectoral 
collaboration is a way of ensuring the recovery and survival of the sector post-disaster.  
10.7 Chapter summary 
Some of the collective wealth of the Canterbury region was depleted when buildings and 
other infrastructure were damaged in the 2010-2011 earthquakes. It will take massive 
resources, financial, physical, mental and human to replace this loss. Seemingly, some kind of 
economic benefit can develop from a disaster when individual businesses and sectors make 
new and sometimes better decisions while in the recovery phase. Some of these decisions 
include seismically retrofitting organisational premises, diversifying delivery of goods and 
services, adding to or improving existing product lines and identifying how they can better 
prepare for before and after a disaster. Consequently, this chapter demonstrates that the 
organisation’s business-as-usual resilience is only one part of the larger resilience picture. 
Organisations also need to be disaster resilient. 
This chapter proposes some ways of measuring organisational disaster resilience in addition 
to measuring business-as-usual resilience. While lagging indicators of disaster resilience, e.g. 
leadership performance and minimisation of staff, customer and financial losses, are useful 
for post-disaster analysis, in order to mitigate future crises and disasters, organisations 
require leading indicators of disaster resilience. Some of these leading indicators include: 
 the organisation’s access to a wide and considerable range of  resources for prolonged 
periods of  adversity; 
 a reliable supply web; 
 pre-disaster engagement with other stakeholders such as the community and recovery 
authorities; 
 accumulation and utilisation of  relevant information; 
 utility and demand of  organisation’s goods and services in disaster, 
 staff  capability (at all levels); and 
 comprehension of  the requirements in the different phases after disaster. 
The extent of the Canterbury series of earthquakes was regional. It has been shown that 
resilience is context dependent and needs to be worked on constantly, especially in dynamic 
circumstances. This also means that organisations and sectors need to adopt an all hazards 
approach in assessing risk as no two disasters are alike. 
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The next, and final, chapter has the summary and conclusions of this research and some 
suggestions for future work. 
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11 Summary and conclusions 
The Canterbury series of earthquakes re-affirms the notion that each disaster is unique and has 
its own set of recovery challenges. The 4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011 earthquakes in 
Canterbury are the manifestation of no two disasters being alike. This shows that the scale of a 
disaster should be a consideration in disaster planning, analysis and recovery. Additionally, as 
unique a phenomenon as the Canterbury earthquakes are, there are lessons that can be extracted 
and used by other organisations, sectors and policy planners that can help them plan for and deal 
with disaster. As stated earlier, the frame of reference for this thesis is from the bodies of work 
on organisations, crisis management and disaster recovery. This framework, underpinned by the 
use of system dynamics analysis and grounded theory, addresses gaps in the literature on: 
 some of  the determinants of  recovery, prosperity or failure for organisations and 
industry sectors after a major hazard event; 
 some of  the aspects that are important in organisations in the immediate response and 
early recovery phase of  disaster; 
 the key characteristics of  disaster resilience for organisations and industry sectors as well 
as the interlinked nature of  organisational and sectoral recovery; and 
 the development of  a systems dynamics recovery framework for organisations and 
industry sectors. 
The timeframe for this research was concentrated in the two phases following a disaster event: 
the response phase and the short-term recovery phase. 
11.1 Research findings 
In this thesis, it has been shown that different sectors are affected to varying degrees by the 
earthquakes. Even within the same sector, organisations are affected dissimilarly. Furthermore, 
as shown in chapter 7, there are three broad areas that contribute to organisational and sectoral 
vulnerabilities. These are: organisational level attributes, infrastructure used to deliver goods and 
services and external environmental factors. The environment being the context in which the 
organisation or the sector operates. Distinct combinations of these factors lead to differential 
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effects for organisations and sectors which in turn results in sectorally unique individual 
signifiers of recovery that have been identified in this work. 
This means that in a disaster of a regional nature, the organisation’s characteristics are only one 
part of how an organisation can be affected: organisational level attributes include the size of the 
organisation and its financial position. Environmental attributes, encompassing conditions and 
actions before, immediately after and in the short-term after disaster, all play a crucial role in 
understanding organisational and sectoral recovery. Some environmental attributes are the pre-
disaster economic health of the affected region, the post-disaster demand for the organisation’s 
goods and services and also interactions with other sectors or organisations. 
Organisational location is another feature that can affect recovery; spatial analysis has shown the 
effects when organisations in built up areas such as Central Business Districts (CBDs) are 
affected by disaster and how this affects neighbouring organisations. Additionally, the 
infrastructure organisations rely on to distribute goods and services is susceptible to disaster, 
which in turn influences recovery. The infrastructure includes roads, information and 
communication technology as well as machinery. 
Similarly, organisations and sectors follow different recovery trajectories dependent on the 
combination of the three broad areas of vulnerability identified. Elements that influence the 
recovery of sectors and organisations include leadership, staff, level of damage to assets, 
resource availability and post-disaster requirements for the organisation’s goods and services. 
Other contributing elements are organisational size, diversity of product or market, type of 
goods and services delivered and favourable ecological conditions such as repaired 
infrastructure. Adaptability, availability of the right information as well as human and social 
capital have also been shown to be crucial in recovery. In Canterbury a Central Government 
employment subsidy was a major element in the recovery of organisations. 
Conversely, there are factors that hinder recovery. Findings from this research point to the 
persistence and amplification of pre-disaster sectoral trends, e.g. skills shortage, which can affect 
recovery. After a regional disaster such as occurred in Canterbury, quick recovery of 
organisational and sectoral operations requires a large amount of resources, some of which the 
organisation does not have on hand. Specifically, finance for recovery may be difficult to obtain. 
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Other hindrances to recovery include delays in insurance payments, a shortage of skilled labour 
and equipment, as well as uncertain operating conditions. Uncertain conditions can be brought 
about by lack of information in general, or lack of relevant information in particular. Post-
disaster, if there is a lack of information from credible sources such as experts and recovery 
agencies, information from other sources will fill the vacuum and this can be detrimental to 
recovery efforts. A logical use of information and communication is an aid in recovery. A further 
drawback in recovery is the mismatching of recovery needs and requirements, e.g. finance and 
manpower, and when these can be made available and delivered. 
Preparedness and planning at the organisational level alone proved to not be enough in shielding 
organisations from the effects of disaster. After the earthquakes in Canterbury, organisational 
pre-disaster preparedness did not turn out to be the most important factor in recovery. 
However, for some sectors, the existence of prior plans was helpful to a limited extent, especially 
practised plans. It emerged that prior practising of emergency plans is helpful in so far as 
defining actions that may be required in the response phase after a disaster. However, even for 
organisations with documented and practised emergency plans, decisions made by agents in the 
organisational system’s environment also added to disaster effects. For instance, community or 
local authority decisions on seismic retrofitting of unreinforced masonry buildings in the CBD 
and town centres. 
After the Canterbury earthquakes, there was also evidence of temporal effects occurring in the 
different phases after a disaster event. Effects in the response phase are not the same as in the 
short-term recovery phase. The different phases require different ways of thinking, different 
skillsets and different resources. An understanding of this is of assistance in the allocation of 
organisational or sectoral resources for recovery. Specifically from the systems point of view, 
there are a lot of reinforcing feedback loops between sectors in the response phase which is 
characterised by immense uncertainty. In the short-term recovery phase, some of the reinforcing 
feedback loops are broken as organisations and sectors adjust and make recovery decisions 
based on the information at hand. 
Another finding in this work is that there are multiple stakeholders in recovery (see chapters 6 
and 9). For Canterbury, stakeholders whose actions affect each other include the Recovery 
Authority, the social community, the business community and local authorities. The post-
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disaster recovery of organisations and sectors depends on the individual choices they make and 
also on decisions made by the communities they are part of. Crucially, the Recovery Authority 
can influence but cannot determine whether organisations and sectors recover. In such a system, 
the perception that organisations, sectors and the community have of clear recovery leadership is 
essential. As such, the Recovery Authority can help to create conditions conducive to aiding 
organisational and sectoral recovery. One way of achieving this is through the issuing of a clear 
statement of the transition from response to short-term recovery to help define the recovery 
actions taken by organisations and sectors. Furthermore, there are points of intervention at 
which recovery can be effected. The use of policy to achieve recovery aims has been identified as 
one way to leverage specific points in the system to aid in recovery. Other points of leverage, 
such as clear communication between stakeholders, should also be used to improve and 
optimise the functioning of the system. 
Finally, this thesis also adds to the body of knowledge on disaster resilience. Organisational 
disaster resilience is a growing field and our incremental understanding of it and its crucial 
aspects is important. It has been shown that business-as-usual organisational resilience and 
organisational disaster resilience are interconnected parts of the overall resilience frame. 
Organisational disaster resilience involves many more agents and is associated with the scale or 
extent of a disaster. 
This thesis has furthered the discussion on possible metrics that organisations and sectors can 
use in the development of indicators of disaster resilience. The measures of disaster resilience 
provided by respondents from disaster affected organisations in this study are one part of this 
subject area. Some of these measures are staff wellbeing which is linked to family and 
community wellbeing, leadership ability to delegate to achieve organisational recovery aims, 
organisational adeptness at working with external agents, availability and access to a wide range 
of resources as well as the use of information and communication in ways that are beneficial to 
organisational recovery. 
11.2 Research recommendations 
Demonstrably, aggregated reporting of the effects of disaster, at national or regional levels, may 
conceal the effects to individual sectors and make it difficult to formulate effective recovery 
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programmes. As such, the effects of disaster should be reported for individual sectors and 
recovery plans should consider the differential effects. Additionally, from the breadth of agents 
listed as influencing recovery, it is advantageous for organisations and sectors to adopt systemic 
thinking to assess how they would be affected by a broad range of hazards. Understanding and 
working with the structure of a system can be used to influence the behaviour of the system. 
In recovery for organisations and sectors, adequate support for staff is necessary as they are a 
vital part of recovery efforts. This is for both before and after a disaster event. Support for staff 
can also be through work with the community that organisations exist in. Furthermore, after the 
experience of the multiple earthquakes in Canterbury, organisations should review the insurance 
of their assets, understand the provisions of their insurance policy and ensure appropriate cover.  
Organisations, sectors and recovery authorities should aim to reduce or eliminate uncertainty in 
order to aid recovery. There should be an effort made to identify needs and requirements and 
the timely provision and delivery of these. Similarly, finance is important for recovery. It is 
crucial to create conditions that keep money flowing in the economy. Additionally, prior 
recognition of what resources will be needed in response and recovery after disaster should be 
identified before the eventuation of a disaster. 
Recovery from disaster cannot and should not be separated from disaster preparedness and 
mitigation. In addition to the existence of documented emergency and business continuity plans, 
enactment of these plans is essential. As part of recovery, organisations should aim to objectively 
analyse their actions in response and recovery and incorporate these into future preparedness 
and planning activities. It is important that these activities are incorporated into plans that are 
general enough to be applied in multiple hazards situations. The incorporation of systems 
thinking is necessary in all hazard planning, preparation and mitigation activities. 
It is of value for organisations and sectors to recognise that the time periods after disaster, i.e. 
response and short-term recovery, are different and require different ways of thinking, skillsets 
and resources. Existing organisational analysis methods can be employed to help with the 
identification of an organisation’s more important elements in recovery. This is one way to make 
use of the wealth of knowledge in the wider organisational literature for post-disaster recovery. 
Again, these traditional organisational analysis tools should be used in combination with systems 
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thinking. Systems thinking and analysis should also be used to recognise potential feedback 
loops to counteract the reinforcing feedback loops present in the response phase characterised 
by uncertainty. 
Another recommendation in this work is that the stakeholders in the recovery effort should be 
identified and engaged early in the process. From the experience in Canterbury, the setup and 
reporting structure of the Recovery Authority also needs to be considered as this may affect 
engagement with other stakeholders. It is important that the Recovery Authority works with 
other stakeholders in cooperation to maximise recovery efforts. Successful recovery requires that 
stakeholders work towards similar goals. Therefore, articulating clearly the overall recovery 
goal(s) for all stakeholders to align with can be of benefit. For the actual recovery process, the 
order of planning and execution of the recovery strategy is equally vital. This should incorporate 
the balance between measures in the response phase with those in the short-term recovery 
phase. It is important to note that many of the decisions made and actions carried out in 
recovery can be highly contested at the time. This, however, should not stop the crafting of a 
recovery plan with involvement of stakeholders. 
In addition, post-disaster recovery policy should be formulated and targeted at specific problems 
while also considering the long-term and wider implications. Policy should also be enacted with 
the overall goal in mind. As well, in the New Zealand context, the Recovery Manager’s role as 
defined by the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) should be 
effectively utilised during the response phase. This would allow for an assessment of short-, 
medium and long-term impacts of decisions made during this initial phase after a disaster. This 
may help when making the transition from response to recovery as well as in balancing response 
and recovery plans. 
While preparedness and business continuity plans may contribute to organisational and sectoral 
survival in the short-term after disaster, there is as yet no rehearsed plan for long-term recovery 
before an event has occurred. Consequently, disaster resilience is key. The monitoring and 
measuring of organisational and sectoral disaster resilience cannot be overemphasised. However, 
any such metrics should be understandable and usable by organisations and sectors and aid in 
decision making.  
374 Summary and conclusions 
 
11.3 Future work 
The findings in this thesis are only the start of the documentation into how different industry 
sectors are affected by disaster. Future research is needed to identify what other actions 
organisations can engage in to prevent or mitigate the effects of disaster. The concept of viewing 
organisations and sectors as self-organising systems within the context of larger systems provides 
a foundation for further elaboration, discussion and development. The next steps: 
11.3.1 Continual improvement of the Benchmark Resilience Tool BRT-53 
The BRT-53, like any other tool, requires continuous improvement. Some of the possible 
enhancements include reversing some of the questions in BRT-53 to achieve better variance 
among respondents; develop different versions of the BRT-53 for organisations with different 
characteristics such as sector, size as well as for-profits and not-for-profits; and also develop a 
BRT-53 version or a module within the BRT-53 specifically for organisational disaster resilience. 
Another research strand involving the BRT-53 is the detailed explanation for all the sectoral 
indicator scores after disaster as each organisation and sector may have distinct explanations for 
how the indicators relate to them. 
11.3.2 Survivor bias 
One aspect of this research is that the organisations followed are those that could be contacted 
during the course of the study. Consequently, there is a possibility of survivor bias. An area to be 
explored further is to track organisations that reported permanent closure or those that intended 
to re-open at the time of writing (October 2012). Therefore, future research should incorporate 
investigation of organisational and sectoral recovery trajectories at longer times from the 
occurrence of the disaster event and using multiple indicators (financial and non-financial) of 
organisational recovery. 
Apart from tracking organisations that closed, the progress of the recovery process (four, eight 
and 10 years from the 4 September 2010 earthquakes) for all the organisations involved in the 
study is also important. This can also enable investigation, in the long-term, of how factors such 
as the global financial crisis may have had an effect on sectoral medium- to longer-term 
recovery. 
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11.3.3 Comparison of recovery processes for different disasters 
Comparing the recovery process in Christchurch to that after other disasters enables the learning 
of what worked in different contexts and how this affected organisational and sectoral recovery. 
The findings can be used to deduce if there are any similarities across disasters and if these 
similarities can be used to contribute to the development of pre-disaster indicators. 
11.3.4 Investigate the interaction of employee, community and organisational 
disaster resilience 
 
In this thesis, a crucial finding is that the recovery of organisations and sectors is dependent on 
the recovery of staff. However, staff recovery is closely linked to the wellbeing of their families 
and communities. The investigation of the interaction between employee, community and 
organisational disaster recovery and resilience is one area that merits further attention. 
11.3.5 Quantification of the system dynamics models 
Lastly, an area requiring further enquiry is the completion and detailed analysis of the quantified 
system dynamics diagrams. Quantification of system dynamics models can also help to 
determine the effects to the system when certain parameters are modified. The quantified 
models can then be used to determine future recovery trajectories which can be compared with 
real world scenarios. The results from the quantification and analysis can also be used as input in 
policy formulation and disaster recovery planning. 
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